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THE
BIOLOGY OF WAR

THE BIOLOGY OF WAR

BY

DR. G. F. NICOLAI

PROFESSOR OF PHYSIOLOGY AT BERLIN UNIVERSITY

TRANSLATED FROM
THE ORIGINAL GERMAN
BY
CONSTANCE A. GRANDE
AND
JULIAN GRANDE



NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1918

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Published, October, 1918

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

"The Biology of War" was written in German, by a German, for Germans, written since the outbreak of war, in the German fortress of Graudenz in which the author was imprisoned. If the German Government could have had its way, the book would never have seen the light, at any rate not so long as the war lasted; but by a happy chance the manuscript was conveyed to Switzerland, where it was brought out by the leading German-Swiss publishing firm, Orell Füssli of Zurich.

When the book appeared, it was promptly barred from Germany, the reasons for which will soon be obvious to anyone who reads it; and the author was condemned to five months' imprisonment in a common jail. At present he is interned in Germany, and carefully watched. Indeed, were it not for his position, he would probably still be in prison like Liebknecht, or would have shared the fate of Edith Cavell or Captain Fryatt.

Dr. G. F. Nicolai was born in Berlin in 1872. Before the outbreak of war he was known throughout Germany as the leading heart specialist, in which capacity he had attended the German Empress, whom he is said to have saved from a troublesome malady. He also held the chair of physiology at Berlin University. He married a daughter of Admiralitätssrat Buslay, and has one child, a daughter.

Even before the war Dr. Nicolai was opposed to Prussian militarism, and when war broke out and Germany violated Belgian neutrality, he openly protested. For this he was degraded from his professorship and his property confiscated; and finally he was sent to Graudenz fortress, occupying during part of the time the room famous as the "Fritz

Reuter room." (Fritz Reuter, born 1810, died 1874, was condemned to death in 1833 because he belonged to a German students' society—a sentence commuted into one of thirty years' imprisonment. In 1840, however, on the accession of Frederick William IV of Prussia, he was liberated. His tales and poems, mostly in Low German, some of which have been translated into English, are still much read and appreciated.)

Professor Nicolai's property having been confiscated, his wife and child were left penniless. Her father, who belongs to a Prussian Junker family, offered her a home with every comfort if she would renounce her husband. She replied that she would prefer to become a charwoman or a street-cleaner and earn her bread and that of her child in this way rather than renounce her husband.

Professor Nicolai's friends, anxious to save him from having his health ruined by long confinement, brought up his case in the German Reichstag, but to no purpose. Those who have seen him recently declare that his imprisonment and suffering have greatly aged him, and that he now looks quite a broken man. By nature, however, he is a very vigorous man, whose health was nowise impaired by severe study or by his wide travels before the war, although he sometimes visited unhealthy climates. For instance, he has visited such diverse countries as Malacca, the United States of America, Russia, Lapland, and China.

"The Biology of War" is hardly a book that the average European would be capable of reading even in his own language. In the United States, however, it is likely, we think, to find proportionately far more readers because of the high general level of education and the scientific turn of mind of so many Americans. This prevision is borne out by the experience of Dr. Nicolai's Swiss publisher, who states that "The Biology of War" has been much more read than he expected even in Switzerland, but not so much by specialists or biologists as by persons of good general education.

Although the English translation has been simplified as much as possible without doing violence to the author's ideas, nevertheless the fact remains that this book is not for the intellectually indolent. Certain passages it has not been possible to make very simple because the ideas themselves are profound, while the reasoning is throughout very close. The whole book is written from the standpoint of a biologist, while the medical man not infrequently appears in it as well: the breadth of the author's knowledge and the variety of his quotations, classical, literary, and historical, cannot fail to astonish every reader.

The book has no affinity whatsoever with an ordinary pacifist publication, nor is Dr. Nicolai one of those who are the friends of every country but their own. One of his main contentions is that the dusk of the War Gods has come. An animal, he says, just before it becomes extinct, usually grows monstrously unwieldy and clumsy. War has done likewise: it has grown beyond all bounds. Again, he contends that there is no biological justification for war now, and in particular none whatever for the favorite German argument that without war nations become degenerate and effeminate. Finally, he asserts that war is never to be regarded as a necessary and inevitable part of nature, something which, like an earthquake, is wholly beyond human control, and something to which we *must* submit. On the contrary, war is in the category of something not inevitable and to which we need not submit. War ought to be regarded as we regard smallpox or the plague, as something which we can and ought to eradicate by taking proper preventive measures.

The book, of course, always refers specially to Germany, and the effects of war are largely illustrated by showing their action in Germany. The writer demonstrates, for instance, the influence of Bernhard, Treitschke, Moltke and others on the German mind. But no one must imagine that Dr. Nicolai condemns all war of every description: revolu-

tionary and defensive wars he would put in a category by themselves as justifiable. That wars may be prevented he urges that a society of nations should be constructed; and the brotherhood of man and the strengthening of all human bonds, whether between the members of the family of nations or between members of a human family, must become realities, not ideals. It may be that he does not regard the question from precisely the same angle as President Wilson, but his main lines of thought are the same.

The book, as we have hinted, is reasoned out like Euclid, wherefore it is useless, interesting as it may be, to dip into it and read a chapter here and another there. No real idea of the author's meaning can be gained thus, and it would be an injustice to what we think most readers will agree is, beyond doubt, the most remarkable book which this war has yet produced, a volume likely to live in history even when the scientific ideas which it contains have been superseded by the wider knowledge of generations to come.

CONSTANCE A. GRANDE

JULIAN GRANDE

*Berne, Switzerland,
June, 1918.*

Postscript—Since writing the above the world outside Germany has been gratified to learn that Professor Nicolai has escaped from Germany in a German *aéroplane* and has reached Denmark. The *aéroplane* was the "Albatross 3415" and of a somewhat old-fashioned type. Dr. Nicolai's companion on board was Dr. Silberhorn, a German subaltern. A second *aéroplane*, the "F. 16," accompanied the "Albatross 3415." On board were a lance-corporal and a pilot, both Germans. As neither Professor Nicolai nor his companions were armed, they have not been interned. At present it is better to refrain from giving details of this escape.

INTRODUCTION

1.—THE ORIGIN OF THIS BOOK

§ 1.—*Its Condemnatory Tone as Regards Germany*

The outward and visible cause why this book was written was the manifesto to the civilized world published in the early days of October, 1914, by ninety-three representatives of German science and art. The unfortunate effects of this could easily have been foreseen by any dispassionate person. Although probably every one would now admit that the dispassionate few of those days had right on their side, yet many will disapprove of the selection of a German manifesto as a peg on which to hang a book, urging that there are surely enough reprehensible manifestos published outside Germany. This German manifesto, however, was the cause of this work, which, I hasten to insist, is written primarily for Germans. Consequently, wherever isolated events are discussed, it is in the main only German conditions which are under consideration.

Apart from the fact that it is impossible to gain a correct idea of foreign opinion from the fragmentary extracts quoted from the foreign press, the only way to attain the necessary independence of mind is not to inquire whether other nations besides Germany have been to blame, and to endeavor to make sure no one can cast a stone at us. More than ever is it to-day incumbent on every person and every nation to shoulder his or its share of responsibility for the war. Even supposing that any foreign learned society had issued a more regrettable manifesto than this hot-blooded appeal, which is excusable, considering the anxious time when it was drafted; yet those

who have genuine German civilization at heart are the very persons who need not concern themselves much about foreign manifestos, since Germany and Germany alone is responsible for her own words and deeds.

These preliminary observations are necessary because otherwise the fact that it is mainly Germany which is instanced as exemplifying the bad effects of war might have made it appear as if this book were an unconditional acknowledgment of the justice of the view that it is the German people who have been guilty of by far the worst barbarities.

Again, every nation in the world can and even ought to hope that it and its institutions will one day serve as a model for a whole world full of reforming zeal; for such a hope is the strongest incentive to progress. But if Germany entertains any such expectation, she must redouble her efforts to revive the old German idealism and to keep it pure and undefiled.

"Volk, o deutsches Volk, die müssen am größten dich schelten.
Die dich in Herzens Grund immer am meisten geliebt."¹

Now, just because this manifesto was apparently likely to give the lie to our glorious past, it cannot fail to cause every true patriot and friend of humanity (the one ought not to exclude the other) to protest.²

¹ "Epigramme aus Baden-Baden," by Th. Fischer, 1876. Stuttgart. "Hass und Liebe," p. 33.

² For truth's sake it must be observed that, at any rate, some of the signatories now regret their action. Even in December, 1914, they wrote, telling me as much, so that it would seem as if the intoxication which could so greatly obscure their conceptions of truth and impartiality must have been comparatively short-lived. I may also state that in June, 1915, when this manifesto was reprinted in the "Aktion," without a word of comment, one of the signatories wrote to that journal, stating that he must protest against such a document being reprinted, for "of course" he no longer held such views, "and it was an insult to continue to impute them to him." In itself such a rapid change of mind is cause for satisfaction, but it is amusing that this signatory should consider it an insult not to be instantly taken for a chameleon.

§ 2.—*The Manifesto to the Civilized World*

The full text of this notorious document is as follows:

As representatives of German science and art we protest before the whole civilized world against the calumnies and lies with which our enemies are striving to besmirch Germany's undefiled cause in the severe struggle for existence which has been forced upon her. The course of events has mercilessly disproved the reports of fictitious German defeats. All the more vigorous are the efforts now being made to distort truth and disseminate suspicion. It is against these that we are raising our voices, and those voices shall make the truth known.

I.—IT IS NOT TRUE THAT GERMANY WAS GUILTY OF THIS WAR

Neither the nation nor the Government nor the emperor wanted it. The Germans did everything possible to avert it, documentary evidence of which is before all the world. In the twenty-six years of his reign William II has frequently shown himself the defender of the world's peace, as has frequently been acknowledged even by our enemies. Indeed, this same emperor, whom they are now presuming to call an Attila, was ridiculed for twenty years and more because of his unswerving devotion to peace. Not until our people was attacked from three sides by superior forces, which had long been lying in wait at the frontier, did it rise as one man.

2.—IT IS NOT TRUE THAT WE CRIMINALLY VIOLATED BELGIAN
NEUTRALITY

It can be proved that France and England had resolved to violate it, and it can be proved that Belgium had agreed to this. It would have been suicidal not to have anticipated them.¹

¹ On August 14, 1914, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, then German Chancellor, said in the Reichstag: "Gentlemen, we stand now perforce on guard. Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, possibly trodden Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is contrary to international law. . . . In this way we have been forced to override the justifiable protests of the Belgian and Luxemburg governments. We shall repair the injustice which we are committing as soon as our military object is attained."

3.—IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE LIFE AND PROPERTY OF A SINGLE
BELGIAN SUBJECT WERE INTERFERED WITH BY OUR SOLDIERS
EXCEPT UNDER THE DIREST NECESSITY

Again and again, despite all warnings, did the population lie in ambush and fire on them, mutilating wounded men, and murdering doctors even while actually engaged in their noble ministrations. There could be no baser misrepresentation than to say nothing about the crime of these assassins and then to call the Germans criminals because of their having administered a just punishment to them.

4.—IT IS NOT TRUE THAT OUR TROOPS BEHAVED BRUTALLY IN REGARD
TO LOUVAIN

They were forced to exercise reprisals with a heavy heart on the furious population, which treacherously attacked them in their quarters, by firing upon a portion of the town. The greater portion of Louvain is still standing, and the famous town hall is quite uninjured. It was saved from the flames owing to the self-sacrifice of our soldiers. Every German would regret works of art having been destroyed in this war or their being destroyed in the future. But just as we decline to admit that any one loves art more than we do, even so do we refuse no less decidedly to pay the price of a German defeat for the preservation of a work of art.

5.—IT IS NOT TRUE THAT WE DISREGARD THE PRECEPTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN OUR METHODS OF WARFARE, IN WHICH
THERE IS NO UNBRIDLED CRUELTY

But in the East the ground is soaked with the blood of women and children slain by Russian hordes, and in the West the breasts of our soldiers are lacerated with Dumdum bullets. No one has less right to pretend to be defending European civilization than those who are the allies of Russians and Serbians, and are not ashamed to incite Mongolians and negroes to fight against white men.

6.—IT IS NOT TRUE THAT FIGHTING OUR SO-CALLED MILITARISM IS
NOT FIGHTING AGAINST OUR CIVILIZATION, AS OUR ENEMIES
HYPOCRITICALLY ALLEGE

Without German militarism German civilization would be wiped off the face of the earth. The former arose out of and for the

protection of the latter in a country which for centuries had suffered from invasion as no other has done. The German Army and the German people are one, and the consciousness of this makes seventy millions of Germans brothers to-day, without regard to education, rank, or party.

We cannot deprive our enemies of the poisoned weapons of falsehood. All we can do is to cry aloud to the whole world that they are bearing false witness against us. To you who know us, who, together with us, have hitherto been the guardians of man's highest possessions—to you we cry aloud, "Believe us; believe that to the last we will fight as a civilized nation, to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant is no less sacred than hearth and home."

This we vouchsafe to you on the faith of our name and our honor.

The manifesto was signed by the following seventeen artists actually practising their profession: Peter Behrends, Franz von Defregger, Wilhelm Dörpfeld, Eduard von Gebhardt, Adolf von Hildebrand, Ludwig Hoffmann, Leopold Graf Kalkreuth, Arthur Kampf, Fritz Aug. von Kaulbach, Max Klinger, Max Liebermann, Ludwig Manzel, Bruno Paul, Fritz Schaper, Franz von Stuck, Hans Thoma, Wilh. Trübner.

By these fifteen natural scientists: Adolf von Beyer, Karl Engler, Emil Fischer, Wilhelm Foerster, Fritz Haber, Ernst Haeckel, Gustav Hellmann, Felix Klein, Philipp Lenard, Walter Nernst, Wilhelm Ostwald, Max Planck, Wilhelm Röntgen, Wilhelm Wien, Richard Willstätter.

By these twelve theologians: Adolf Deissmann, Albert Ehrhard, Gerhard Esser, Adolf von Harnack, Wilhelm Herrmann, Alois Knöpfler, Anton Koch, Josef Mausbach, Sebastian Merkle, Adolf von Schlatter, August Schmidlin, and Reinhold Seeberg.

By these nine poets: Richard Dehmel, Herbert Eulenberg, Ludwig Fulda, Max Halbe, Gerhard and Karl Hauptmann, Hermann Sudermann, Karl Vollmöller, and Richard Voss.

By these seven jurists; Lujo Brentano, Johannes Conrad,

Theodor Kipp, Paul Laband, Franz von Liszt, Georg von Mayr, and Gustav von Schmoller.

By these seven medical men: Emil von Behring, Paul Ehrlich, Albert Neisser, Albert Plehn, Max Rubner, Wilhelm Waldeyer, and August von Wassermann.

By these seven historians: Heinrich Finke, J. J. de Groot, Karl Lamprecht, Maximilian Lenz, Eduard Meyer, Karl Robert, and Martin Spahn.

By these five art critics: Wilhelm von Bode, Alois Brandt, Justus Brinkmann, Friedrich von Duhn, and Theodor Wiegand.

By these four philosophers: Rudolf Eucken, Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Windelband, and Wilh. Wundt.

By these four philologists: Andreas Heusler, Heinrich Morf, Karl Vossler, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.

By these three musicians: Engelbert Humperdinck, Siegfried Wagner, and Felix von Weingartner.

By these two politicians: Friedrich Naumann and Georg Reicke.

By this theatrical manager: Max Reinhardt.

§ 3.—*German Truth, Past and Present*

This document, therefore, was signed altogether by ninety-three German men, some of them very well known. Among them were fifteen natural scientists. Even if this is not a very large number in comparison with the seventy-eight other signatories (thirty-five representatives of art and letters, sixteen moral philosophers, twenty scientists of various kinds, and seven medical men), yet it includes almost all Germans of real celebrity in this branch of science. Now, the wording of the manifesto alone ought to have horrified any natural scientist even if he approved of its tenor. I shall not discuss the fairness of rejecting the mendacities of foreign newspapers without mentioning the lying war news of the German press. The fact remains, however, that every one then knew, for instance, how little the German Com-

mission of Inquiry into Belgian atrocities was really able to ascertain. It might of course be argued that it was no business of the signatories to have referred to this even although the mere hint that the vile charges brought against enemy soldiers were not believed made certain manifestos of foreign intellectuals appear friendly. -

Six times, however, does this manifesto contain the words, "It is not true." Now, five of the six points raised unquestionably cannot be thus flatly denied. Whether a person has or has not been guilty of a particular action (Paragraph 1), whether he has committed a crime or acted under compulsion (Paragraph 2), whether he is exercising reprisals brutally or with a heavy heart (Paragraph 4), whether imperialism and civilization are irreconcilable or go hand in hand (Paragraph 6), and finally whether a person has acted with or without regard to the ill-defined, vague precepts of international law (Paragraph 5), cannot be positively asserted by any one, and in each individual case opinion depends upon individual sense of justice.

Even in Paragraphs 3 and 5, where definite details were cited as to what had been done in Belgium and East Prussia, the categorical statement, "It is not true," seems for other, but not less sound reasons, misplaced, since at best such evidence can have been only hearsay "from a thoroughly trustworthy source." Above all, no one can with a good conscience support the negative assertion that "the life and property of not a single Belgian subject were interfered with except under necessity."

Every one is naturally entitled to consider anything as truth of the correctness of which he is morally convinced unless he is posing as a "representative of science"; for it is the chief distinction of a man of science not to call anything true unless he be convinced by impartial observation that it is so. The recognition that there is such a thing as this impartially established truth is a debt which the present generation owes in part to German thoroughness, and the patriot-

ism of departing from it cannot be accepted without question.

The three main witnesses invoked, Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant, would scarcely have signed such a manifesto, for all three preserved their impartiality even in time of war. Goethe, indeed, especially during the Wars of German Independence, was often enough blamed for his impartiality, and subsequently for his sharp condemnation of "German gush about the Fatherland."¹ Once, in his irritation, he went the length of saying, "The world may still have to wait a couple of hundred years before it can be said of the Germans that it was a long while since they were barbarians."²

As for Kant, it was during the first Coalition War that he published his plan for perpetual peace, in which, with praiseworthy independence, he breaks a lance in favor of French institutions, just then being opposed by his own country. Moreover, the founder of critical philosophy would never have described as truth what could be only a matter of opinion.

Finally, Beethoven's last great work, the Ninth Symphony, is a hymn of praise to universal brotherhood, while he dedicated the Third Symphony, the one which he himself considered his finest, to Germany's arch enemy, Bonaparte.³

I agree with the signatories of the manifesto in believing that German ideas will prevail if the legacy bequeathed to the Germans by these three shining lights is to them "as sacred as their worldly goods." To me, however, it seems no mere chance that these three greatest Germans should have differed from the present generation in their ideas about disputes between nation and nation; for despite technical sci-

¹ Goethe's letter to Zelter, August 24, 1823.

² Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe," Thursday, May 3, 1827. Brockhaus, 7th Ed., Vol. III, p. 114.

³ This is not inconsistent with the fact that afterward, when Napoleon became emperor, Beethoven revoked the "Dedication to the Consul." He considered the Emperor Napoleon as an enemy of human brotherhood.

ence, soldiery, and trade, the peculiar virtue of the German is still a certain faculty of just appreciation. For us Germans the upward path may be by way of Essen, Potsdam, and Hamburg, but it must not leave Weimar out of account.

This manifesto, which was apparently the negation of every great and fine quality which had hitherto been attributed to and expected from men of science, was signed by Germany's greatest sons; and this was the sort of truth for which Germany's most honored seekers after truth interceded. Some, certainly, were able to excuse themselves, if it be an excuse, by urging that they had never read the manifesto, but had allowed their signatures to be appended to it on the strength of a telegram from Herr Erzberger, the well-known Center party deputy. Erzberger as an apostle of German science and learning! In any case, it would be well to inquire somewhat more closely into the unquestionably very singular manner in which this manifesto came to be launched.

§ 4.—*A Manifesto to Europeans*

The fact remains, however, that this manifesto was published and distributed broadcast; and considering how the war seemed to have metamorphosed men of science, it seemed desirable, not to say necessary, to appeal to a wider public especially to maintain a uniform conception of civilization, just then divided. For although only the few are capable of promoting civilization, yet it is by the standard of popular feeling that the maintenance of its continuity is insured. In mid-October, 1914, therefore, together with Professor Albert Einstein and Privy Councilor Wilhelm Förster, I drafted the following manifesto:

Technical science and intercommunication are clearly tending to force us to recognize the fact that international relations exist, and consequently that a world-embracing civilization exists. Yet never has any previous war caused so complete an interruption of that

coöperation which should exist between civilized nations. It may, of course, be that the reason why we are so profoundly impressed by this is only that we were already united by so many ties the severing of which is painful.

That such a state of things should exist must not astonish us. Nevertheless, those who care in the slightest degree for this universal world civilization are under a twofold obligation to strive for the maintenance of these principles. Those who might have been expected to care for such things, in particular men of science and art, have hitherto almost invariably confined their utterances to a hint that the present suspension of direct relations coincided with the cessation of any desire for their continuance.

Such feelings are not to be excused by any national passions. They are unworthy of what every one has hitherto understood by civilization, and it would be a misfortune indeed were they generally to prevail among persons of culture; and not only a misfortune for civilization, but, we are firmly convinced, a misfortune for the very purpose for which, after all, in the last resort all the present hell was let loose—the national existence of the different countries.

Technical achievement has made the world smaller, and to-day the countries of that large peninsula Europe seem brought as near to one another as the cities of each individual small Mediterranean peninsula used to be; and Europe—it might almost be said the world—is already one and indivisible, owing to its multitudinous associations.

Hence it must be the duty of educated and philanthropic Europeans to make, at any rate, an effort lest Europe, owing to her not being sufficiently strongly welded together, should suffer the same tragic fate as ancient Greece. Is Europe gradually to be exhausted by fratricidal war and perish?

The war raging at present will scarcely end in a victory for any one, but probably only in defeat. Consequently, it would seem that educated men in all countries not only should, but absolutely must, exert all their influence to prevent the conditions of peace being the source of future wars, and this no matter what the present uncertain issue of the conflict may be. Above all must they direct their efforts to seeing that advantage is taken of the fact that this war has thrown all European conditions, as it were, into a melting-pot, to mold Eu-

rope into one organic whole, for which both technical and intellectual conditions are ripe.

This is not the place to discuss how this new European order is to be brought about. We desire only to assert in principle that we are firmly convinced of the time having come for all Europe to be united together, in order to protect her soil, her inhabitants, and her civilization.¹

Believing as we do that the desire for such a state of things is latent in many minds, we are anxious that it should everywhere find expression and thus become a force; and with this end in view it seems to us before all else necessary that there should be a union of all in any way attached to European civilization;² that is to say, who are what Goethe once almost prophetically called "good Europeans." We must never abandon hope that their collective pronouncement may be heard by some one even amidst the clash of arms, most especially if the "good Europeans" of to-morrow include all those who are esteemed and considered as authorities by their fellow-men.

To begin with, however, it is needful that Europeans should unite, and if, as we hope, there are enough Europeans in Europe,—in other words, enough persons to whom Europe is no mere geographical term, but something which they have profoundly at heart,—then we mean to attempt to found such a union of Europeans. We ourselves wish only to give the first impulse to such a union; wherefore we ask you, should you be in agreement with us, and, like us, bent upon making the determination of Europe as widely known as possible, to send us your signature.

This appeal was sent out privately, and although we received many sympathetic letters about it, yet most of the writers declined to sign it. One did not consider the reference to Greece quite historically accurate, another thought that the time had gone by for such a manifesto, another that it was

¹ Whether this protection is to be insured with weapons from the armory of force or of mind, need not be discussed here. At all events, Europe must learn to feel herself united into one. (Cf. Chapter III "War and Natural Selection," Chap. III, ¶ 34.)

² By European civilization I mean every endeavor, in the broad sense of the word, throughout the world the origin of which can ultimately be traced back to Europe.

premature, and yet another that it was undesirable that scientists should mix themselves up in the hurly-burly of the world. Obviously it would not have been feasible to reconcile the views of any considerable number of men of independent mind even if in principle they might all be striving after the same objects. Therefore, as a brief manifesto of this kind could have value only if backed by well-known names, we allowed the plan to drop.

§ 5.—*The Personal Sense of Individual Responsibility* ·

In the circumstances it seemed to me that I was bound to raise my individual voice and express what I honestly believed to be the rights and the stern necessities of the situation, giving the best reasons I could for the faith that was in me. Therefore I announced for the summer term of 1915 a lecture on "War as a Biological Factor in Human Evolution," and began to collect material for it. My being called up as a doctor, and my subsequent imprisonment in the fortress of Graudenz, made it impossible to carry out this plan; and the only course open to me was to work up into a book the notes intended for a lecture. I am still of opinion that it is just during this war that a peace book should be written. It is during this fratricidal European struggle that we must insist upon being considered as a single unit. This is necessary not because of a handful of scholars who happened to wander a little from the straight path,—they will soon recover themselves,—but because of the countless other persons who now do not know what to do with their lives, who must begin again from the beginning both literally and metaphorically. In the case of all of them many ideals have been destroyed—ideals which may have been confused, but were deep-rooted. For these people I resolved to write a book, assuring them that here on earth war is only a passing phase, to which too much importance must not be attached. To achieve my purpose and inspire fair-minded and right-thinking men with my own triumphant assurance, I have also endeavored to set forth a vital

conception of the problem of war, in order that every one may feel he has some solid ground under his feet and may again know which way to turn.

Thus did this peace book come into being in the midst of the military life of the Fortress of Graudenz. The small fortress was both a hindrance and an incentive to its writing. It was an obstacle because of the lack of books and the absence of friends who could have advised me on matters of which I have no expert knowledge. Nevertheless, some friends did do much to help me, both by pointing out many defects and making emendations, for which I desire once more to tender them thanks. Again, unfortunately, there were some quotations of which I had taken only hasty notes, meaning to base an oral lecture upon them, and which I was now prevented from comparing with the full text. Yet this was just what I ought to have been able to do, for what I wanted to prove was that there has never been a single man of real eminence who has seen anything great or beautiful in war. This I meant to do by citing numbers of passages from poets and writers in general, which I had taken much pains to collect; but the mass of material was so overwhelming that I could give only a small portion of it in the last part of my book. I admit that, however great the quantity of material, it would not have been possible to prove any such negative contention absolutely conclusively, for some one would always have been able to say that the enthusiasts for war had been left out of account. But let any one of those intellectuals, carried away by the intoxication of the moment, attempt to prove the contrary.¹

I have referred to the obstacles with which I had to contend. Let me now mention the incentive to my work. One constant incentive was the Fritz Reuter room ² in the fortress.

¹ Cf. Chapter XIV.

² Fritz Reuter, German humorist, 1810-74. He was a member of the German Students' Society, and in 1833 was arrested and condemned to death, the sentence being afterward commuted to one of thirty years' imprisonment. He was liberated in 1840, on the accession of Frederick William IV of Prussia.—Translator.

This room, where this German patriot spent years in captivity because he believed in Germany, has been converted into a temple by his former jailers, which is a living instance of the fact that reaction cannot endure forever. We may be quite sure that the very same persons who to-day still continue to decry as high treason Goethe's conception of the citizen of Europe will in a few years' time be subscribing to it, even as the successor of the commandant of Courbière Fortress, once Reuter's jailer, is now keeping his cell in order as a museum.

Just as certain of our forefathers in advance of their time enthusiastically advocated a united Germany, even so do we mean to fight for a united Europe. That is the hope inspiring this book; and if I should succeed in convincing even a few persons that the term "citizen of Europe" is justified on grounds alike of ethics and natural science, thereby rendering another war a shade less likely, then I should feel that this was a reward for my work for which I scarcely ventured to hope.

Come what may, however, this book had to be written.

Graudenz, in the summer of 1915.

G. F. NICOLAI.

2.—THE POINT OF VIEW OF THIS BOOK

§ 6.—*War as a Natural Phenomenon or Human Act*

The so-called "objective methods of reasoning" seem to us the highest achievement of modern science. The fact must not be overlooked, however, that the methods alone ought to be objective or impartial. The isolated facts must be impartially collected, but the inferences therefrom will always contain an element of hypothesis, and consequently a certain personal element as well. Poincaré,¹ Lorentz, and Einstein, themselves leading mathematicians,—that is to say, representatives

¹ Jules Henri Poincaré, 1854–1912, French mathematician, in 1886 appointed professor at the University of Paris.—Translator.

of the most objective science,—recently pointed this out, but the points of view they adopt could not be more divergent. Now, if this is true of mathematics, how much more is it true of physics, of natural science, and of all those branches of knowledge in which efforts have been made to apply natural science merely as a method?

It is just here that a false objectivity is harmful, as the enemies of natural science know only too well. Thus, one of them recently remarked that no one really knew for certain who his father was; that he cannot even positively rely upon his mother's statements, for he has to depend upon what she, the doctor, or the midwife say, which may or may not be true. As we do not know even our own parents, it is argued, how can we positively prove whether our remote ancestors were descended from monkeys or not?

It is easy to see that by thus overstraining the conception of what constitutes proof, an obstacle is put in the way of all increase of knowledge. Such overscrupulousness can never do any good, and at best it helps only those who always see two sides of a question, and who would fain rescue not only truth for truth's sake, but many an article of faith besides.

In any case, our positive knowledge is more increased by a courageous one-sidedness than by that elegant half-heartedness which is everlastingly trying to adjust facts, and which is in no circumstances capable of doing more than correct defects, never of creating anything new. Every one, indeed, feels instinctively that it amounts to an utter lack of either intellect or style. Our age, however, always anxious to be impartial and fair "all round," quite seriously imagines that faith and science, beauty and fashion, art and money-making, war and humanity, liberal and socialistic ideas, internationalism and nationalism, and much else besides, are still reconcilable with one another. Such impartiality is in itself never justified. In the case of natural phenomena, however, it can, at any rate, be partly understood, because there is no cogent reason why we should apply one epithet to them and one only. Thus it is

allowable to describe the eruption of a volcano as both beautiful and destructive; we may note the grace of a tiger's spring without for a moment forgetting that it may cost the life of a human being. The volcano is undoubtedly part of nature, which has no choice but to obey certain fixed laws, and the tiger may be considered in the same light. They are natural phenomena, the effects of which we can change (for instance, by not inhabiting volcanic districts and by exterminating the tiger), but which themselves will never change. This is perhaps why man as an onlooker is entitled to consider them from whatever point of view he chooses. In the case of human action it is quite different, for so long as we refuse to give up the right of insisting upon our own individuality and pursuing our own purposes, so long must we judge man's acts absolutely as those of an individual man. War, however, is a human action, and must be judged accordingly. Any middle course would tend to confusion, and in short be almost contrary to morality.¹

We may love or hate war. Like good old Herbart,² we may say that "we delight not in strife," or, like Ihering, in his love of battle, that "we delight in strife"; but what we may not do is to disapprove of it or excuse it in principle because of all its accompanying circumstances. War, like everything else, should have light thrown upon it from every side before being criticized, but to none but mediocrities would it occur to criticize war from every point of view or even from only two.

These preliminary remarks are essential in order to show in what sense this book may claim to be impartial or objective. I have endeavored to collect the material as impartially as possible, and while working it up afterward I had always one main conception present to my mind—the conception of humanity. This conception can also be objectively

¹ Cf. what Kant has said about the analysis of the Sublime ("Critique of Pure Reason," I, ¶ 23). Cf. also § 153 of this present work.

² German philosopher, 1776–1841.—Translator.

expressed as the fact that there is only one human race, which can be proved to form one organism. This, however, is anticipating matters, for the main purpose of this book is to prove that there is a sound logical basis for the conception of humanity.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	V
<p>THE ORIGIN OF THIS BOOK—Its condemnatory tone as regards Germany—the manifesto to the civilized world—German truth, past and present—a manifesto to Europeans—the personal sense of individual responsibility.</p> <p>THE POINT OF VIEW OF THIS BOOK—War as a natural phenomenon or human act.</p>	
CHAPTER I. WAR INSTINCTS	3
<p>THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTINCTS—War instincts versus pacifism—the value of instinct—advantages and disadvantages of instinct—man as master of his instincts.</p> <p>TRIBAL INSTINCTS—Man's original tendency to live in hordes.</p> <p>THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND BEAST—The peaceableness of animals—the impossibility of war without property.</p> <p>THE NATURAL PRICE OF WAR—War and slavery—the uses of enslavement.</p>	
CHAPTER II. WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE	25
<p>THE BASES OF WAR—Darwinism—the fundamental law of growth and the limits of size—the impassable barrier.</p> <p>THE STRUGGLE FOR ENERGY—Why this struggle is waged—struggle in the animal world—human struggle on animal lines.</p> <p>THE STRUGGLE OF MANKIND—Increase of vitality—the utilization of extraneous energy—creative struggle and war of extermination.</p> <p>FREEDOM AND NATURAL COMPULSION—Conformity to law and unfettered harmony—the evolution of the brain—the autonomy of the brain—war as a free human act.</p>	
CHAPTER III. SELECTION BY MEANS OF WAR	66
<p>SELECTION AND EDUCATION—Positive and negative selection—the trend of selection—wise and foolish—the effect of war on the development of intelligence—the futility of wars to-day—what a war of extermination means.</p> <p>THE ALLEGED TONIC EFFECTS OF WAR—The hardening and enervating effects of war and peace—war weariness—the injury done to the brain by war—the influence of war on the birth-rate—the reenforcement of the sense of power.</p> <p>THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF WAR—Its alleged cruelty—man as subject and object of warfare—killing and dying—bloodthirstiness—the brutalizing effects of war</p> <p>THE UNIVERSAL CHANGE OF ATTITUDE—The enemy's motives—defective sense of responsibility—insults and libels—training to hate—training to lie—France-Treur warfare—war and art.</p>	

	PAGE
CHAPTER IV. THE CHOSEN PEOPLE	139
THE ADVANTAGE NATIONS ARE ALLEGED TO DERIVE FROM WAR—The injury to the world in general—the advantages of war to an individual nation—the unprofitableness of war to-day.	
NATIONAL EXPANSION OR COLONIZATION—Necessity for and advantages of colonies—colonial possessions and colonial domination.	
WEAPONS OF LIFE AND WEAPONS OF DEATH—The victor's empty laurels—the decay of world wide empires—the economic effects of war—national influence—the sword for the weak.	
CHAPTER V. HOW WAR IS BEING METAMORPHOSED . .	169
THE DUSK OF THE WAR GODS—The growth of armies—the death agony of the war giant—defensive warfare and lying.	
THE HUMANIZING OF WAR—The principle of humaneness—the theory and practice of noble war—the value of humanitarian effort.	
THE COMPARATIVE RETROGRADENESS OF WAR—Reasons for this—what are the facts?—the mischief of overestimating the art of war.	
WAR AND THE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY—The decline of comradeship—results of the separation between officers and men	
CHAPTER VI. HOW THE ARMY HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED	214
NATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ARMIES—The invincibility of a national army—a question wrongly worded—the three reasons for the introduction of professional armies.	
DEFENSIVE MILITIA OR AGGRESSIVE ARMY—The origin and meaning of militia—the rise of a hireling army in Germany—the rise of an army of mercenaries in Prussia—the 1807 reorganization committee—the reaction of the military party.	
THE PRUSSIAN MILITIA—The people's militia—the royal militia—the transformation during the wars of liberation.	
MILITARISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY—The new militia—army and revolution—universal military service in Europe.	
CHAPTER VII. WHEREIN PATRIOTISM IS ROOTED . . .	250
PATRIOTISM CONSIDERED AS AN INSTINCT—Inevitable decadence—the commanding position of patriotism—our love for our native land—overcoming our love of our native soil—the organic family instinct—the change in racial instincts.	
THE SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS OF MANKIND—The explanation of public-spiritness.	
CHAPTER VIII. DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PATRIOTISM . .	264
LOCAL PATRIOTISM—Natural Patriotism—true and false patriotism	
DYNASTIC OWNERSHIP—The affection of subjects—Prusso-German and Austro-German—the free association of states.	
RACE PATRIOTISM—The problem of race—the value of race purity—historical and linguistic races—physical racial characteristics—the mixture of races in Germany—Germans and Teutons—the European race.	
CIVILIZATION AND PATRIOTISM—The multiplicity of combinations—states within a state—language as a formative element of states—the ideal of European patriotism.	

CONTENTS

xxix

	PAGE
CHAPTER IX. UNJUSTIFIABLE CHAUVINISM	302

- SELFISHNESS AND LOVE—Love of one's country not real love.
- MASS SUGGESTION—Mass feeling among animals—mass-feeling among men.
- THE CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHAUVINISM—There is no demarcation between patriotism and chauvinism—war as a necessary condition—self-praise and fear.
- THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN CIVILIZATION AND CHAUVINISM—Civilization as an organism—the internationalism of civilization—the effect of chauvinism upon civilization in general—the special effect of war.

CHAPTER X. THE LEGITIMATE INDIVIDUALISM OF NATIONS	334
--	-----

- THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY—The right to individuality—the restriction of personality—the primacy of the reason—nations as individual units.
- THE INDIVIDUAL QUALITIES OF NATIONS—The excellences of individual nations—the excellences of their defects.
- THE PECULIAR QUALITY OF THE GERMAN SPIRIT—German civilization—originality—the period of German greatness—German adaptability—overstraining of adaptability.
- GERMAN HUMANITY AND GERMAN MILITARISM—What is militarism—German love of liberty—three reasons why German liberty has taken a wrong turn—"the absolute"—bethink yourself!

CHAPTER XI. ALTRUISM	379
--------------------------------	-----

- OVERCOMING PESSIMISM—Germany's mission—the new empire—natural right—right and cosmopolitanism.
- RIGHT AND WAR—The law of nations—the right of reprisals—the right of the stronger—evolution and revolution—war and the judgment of God.
- SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON ALTRUISM—Natural law and purpose—inborn rights—the right to war—the law of the organism.
- THE HISTORY OF ALTRUISM—The twofold basis of altruism—the development of the "English" doctrine of utilitarianism—the evolution of Kantian morality—the abuse of Kant's doctrine—a change of parts and a comedy in consequence—the inadequacy of both bases of morality.

PART II

HOW WAR MAY BE ABOLISHED

CHAPTER XII. THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM	431
--	-----

- THE HELLENIC PERIOD—The first presentiments of there being a soul in this world—the Post-Socratics.
- THE CHRISTIAN ERA—The scholastic victory over primitive Christendom—Renaissance and reaction.
- THE MODERN PERIOD—Its forerunners—modern empiricism.

	PAGE
CHAPTER XIII. THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM	447
THE PHYSICAL REASON FOR MANKIND FORMING AN ORGANISM—Hypotheses and facts—the continuity of germ plasm—earthly love makes heavenly love possible.	
THE APPROACHING MUTATION OF WAR—The meaning of mutation—the mother of war instincts.	
THE UNITY OF MANKIND AS REGARDS BOTH TIME AND SPACE—Man's connections from the point of view of time—man's connections in regard to space.	
THE AGE "WHEN MANY SHALL GO TO AND FRO"—Humanity and intercommunication—speech as a means of intercommunication—the results of intercommunication—the connection between intercommunication and the greatness of countries—premature attempts to attain a universal monarchy.	
CHAPTER XIV. THE TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN JUDGMENT	478
THE PERIODICITY OF OPINIONS—Contradictory views—the idea of evolution as the solution of the difficulty—love of war, ancient and modern.	
THE VOICE OF NATIONS—The antique—more recent times—the transition to modern times—soldiers and diplomatists.	
WAR POETRY—Dramatic war poetry—lyric poetry—the three German poets of war—the poet and liberty.	
MODERN DELIGHT IN WAR—The renaissance of delight in war—Moltke and his school—instances from the writings of war advocates.	
CHAPTER XV. WAR AND RELIGION	528
RELIGION AND LOVE OF PEACE—The older religions—the old Testament a Jewish National Book—the brotherhood of man.	
THE DILUTION OF CHRISTIANITY—The practical compromise between Christian doctrine and war—the theoretical compromise of the middle ages—the theoretical compromise of modern times.	
THE WATERING DOWN OF KANT AND BUDDHA—The misuse of Kant—the compromise of Buddhism.	
THE NEW RELIGION—The meaning of every religion—the religion of humanity—uniformity of moral law.	

THE BIOLOGY OF WAR

THE BIOLOGY OF WAR

CHAPTER I

WAR INSTINCTS

1.—THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTINCTS

§ 7.—*War Instincts Versus Pacifism*

For thousands of years past war has been hateful. No thoughtful person has ever yet had anything good to say for it; at any rate, not if he thought fit to take the responsibility for his ideas to the extent of committing them to writing. And now almost every one adores and glorifies war; at all events, they did so in Germany at the beginning of this present war. There is clearly something wrong about this. It is unlikely that the German should suddenly have revolutionized his instincts, thus creating a new variety of human being; and hence it would simply seem as if either educated men of all times or men of to-day had been mistaken. In reality both were mistaken. Chaste ears cannot endure the mention of what chaste hearts cannot dispense with; but reason never will and never can justify war, and all attempts of modern men to justify it have failed miserably. The ancients knew that war could not be justified, and therefore they cursed it; but they did not realize how strong is the war instinct of man, which is more deeply ingrained in him than any kind of reason. The moderns have had practical experience of this—an experience which filled them sometimes with horror and sometimes with admiration; but they again are mistaken in

believing that because instinct is so strong in all of us, therefore it is commendable.

In even the sincerest opponents of war there is a certain hankering after war. A primeval impulse, a something reminiscent of the most secret wellsprings of human strength, attaches us to it. Even the best of the Germans, for instance, is at heart and always has been mildly proud of having made his first appearance in history as the conqueror and destroyer of the Roman Empire, which in itself does not mean much, since all nations first entered their country as conquerors, and even the Jews, assuredly not a warlike people, first had to conquer Canaan.

Now, the fact remains that we still have these reminiscences, and although we may be otherwise human, yet there is in all of us a "tiny fragment of earth," which we in Germany quite rightly describe as "*furor teutonicus*." In short, whoever becomes involved in a war is always dazzled by the magnificent aspect of so gigantic an event. Delight in war, like an occult instinct, is in a nation's very blood, and when the time comes, it awakes and manifests itself. In time of peace such intoxication must be artificially created, which in the case of the Bavarian can be done by means of beer, and he becomes rowdy. An English sailor uses his fists after drinking enough whisky, the Russian in the joys of vodka beats himself or, at any rate, his wife, and the southern Frenchman or Italian, when wine has gone to his head, seizes his knife.

It is when nations are overcome by the intoxication of war that rowdiness, blows, and the use of fists and knives become general. Then the French are no longer "decadent praters," the Britons as "passive as cows," the Russians "sickly dreamers," the Italians "gambling Lovelaces," or the Germans "idealists forever droning about humanity." One and all become men of action, aflame and afire for war; and it is precisely the fact that the war fever has infected them all which proves that it is an instinct innate in the human race, ever ready to break out.

Because delight in war seemed an instinct wholly unconnected with the powers of reflection, it was considered sacred; "for," we were told, "instincts are man's most valuable possession, and if a nation once loses its right instincts and follows wrong ones, it is lost." Now, the second part of this sentence contradicts the first, for if there are right and wrong instincts, then we must not obey every instinct indiscriminately, and in each individual case we must consult our reason as to what we ought to do; in other words, as to whether in this instance the impulse is good or bad. But if, after all, reason is to have the last word, it might be thought that the whole question of instinct had no practical bearing upon the lives of us human beings. This, however, is by no means the case. Man's instincts are of even more importance in determining his conduct than we have been accustomed to think. Reason, it is true, can decide and direct us; it can develop one instinct and suppress another: but strength to take action proceeds from a whole series of unconscious impulses. And even if we have a thousand times admitted warlike instincts to be wrong, we shall never get the better of them unless we replace them by other and pacific instincts.

In Part III of this book I shall show that the instinct of love is more powerful than that of hate, but my present purpose is to set forth what, after all, an instinct really is, and to trace the origin of martial instincts.

§ 8.—*The Value of Instinct*

Liebmann¹ once pregnantly observed that the conception of instinct is like a railway junction: everything we know about psychology runs into it. Without analyzing instincts, indeed, it is impossible either to understand the human soul or rightly to estimate man's passion for war.

The instincts which we first noticed were just the most marvelous, the most complex, and consequently the most difficult to understand. Hence imperfect knowledge has gradu-

¹ Otto Liebmann, German philosopher, born 1840.—Translator.

ally enveloped instinct with a veil of mystery. The proper way to arrive at a right comprehension of instincts, however, is to begin with the simplest. And here may I be permitted to make a slight digression? We call an act instinctive which an animal performs unconsciously and with mechanical regularity. Such acts, for instance, are the sucking movements of a newborn infant and the closing of the eyelids when the eye is threatened with injury. Now, as a matter of fact, in the immense majority of instinctive acts there is really an astonishing element of expediency far beyond the degree of understanding which can possibly be possessed by the animals performing them. Hence it might be thought that an instinct must of necessity serve some useful purpose. Men noted how a bird, which had never seen a nest built, yet carried out this difficult work without any one to teach it, lining the nest warmly at the proper season for its nestlings, of whose future existence it could nevertheless hardly have any foreboding. They noticed how migratory birds unerringly wended their way southward at the proper season, and how the bee built itself six-cornered cells long before modern statics had shown that of all possible constructions these were the ones best suited to the bees' purpose. The instinct of animals thus surpasses all human intelligence; it is truer, less liable to err, and apparently can see what is to come, for which reason Jean Paul called it the "sense of the future."

This conception, which, as will be shown, is a wrong one, gave rise to the opinion, which since Rousseau's time has become popular, that all that is necessary is to recognize instincts and follow them; then everything would go right of itself. Even instincts, however, can go wrong, as a little reflection will show. Thus, in the lowest animals all acts take place absolutely automatically. Just as the light which strikes a stone expands it, and does so forcibly and always in the same way, similarly when it strikes certain low forms of life such as bacteria, it forces them toward the light (positive heliotropism, as it is called) or away from the light (negative

heliotropism). Similarly in such low forms of life all sorts of influences produce definite, forcible reactions, which in themselves merely obey certain laws, and are neither expedient nor inexpedient. If, however, they are injurious to the particular animal in question, it becomes extinct. Hence it happens quite naturally that the only species of animals which have survived were so constructed that they were led to do what was good for them and preserved from what was bad for them. The complex instincts of the higher animals arose in precisely similar fashion, and no one need wonder at their expediency. Now, certain of these reactions are obviously of such importance for the preservation of life that they must occur in all animals without exception. For example, it is wholly impossible that any animal whose instinct it was to eat poisonous substances could exist; and it is equally obvious that the only protoplasms and, in course of evolution, the only animals that have come into existence are those which absorb substances in themselves nourishing, and involuntarily avoid substances that for them are poisonous. Hence we must not be surprised that all animals should know how to avoid plants poisonous for them.

§ 9.—*Advantages and Disadvantages of Instincts*

Despite all this, however, if one of these “animals with true instincts” is transferred from its accustomed surroundings to a region in which plants unfamiliar to it occur, it frequently happens that it eats unwholesome plants and consequently perishes. Thus in a different environment a “true instinct” may become false. Such occurrences are far from ~~rare~~ in nature. For instance, the instinct of the moth to fly into the candle or lamp, or that of the female thrush to feed the young cuckoo until it pushes her own nestlings out of the nest, are harmful, though they were not always so. The moth first began struggling to get to the brightness at a time when there were no lamps, and its flight toward the sun and upward did it no harm, but, on the contrary, good. To feed the

young is an instinct without which it is inconceivable that there could ever have been any birds; and the fact that from time to time the cuckoo lays her eggs in the thrush's nest cannot and ought not to alter the latter's instinct.

Hence in nature, besides many valuable instincts, there are also many harmful ones; and the mere fact that an act was performed instinctively is in itself no proof that in the particular circumstances it was useful. It may probably be safely concluded, however, that at the time when the instinct arose it was useful; and if man has warlike instincts, this is a proof that it *was* necessary to wage war, but no argument whatever as to its still being necessary. For, as is proved by the case of the moth flying toward the light, instincts are uncommonly conservative, and persist long after the conditions which produced them have ceased to exist; and there are countless instances of such "rudimentary instincts."

Take the case of the dog. He was once an arrant thief, though he has ceased to be so more quickly than his master; so that it would seem as if the teachings of the whip went home more than those of morality. Be that as it may, however, it was in the predatory period of his existence that the dog acquired the habit of burying his excrements, a habit which in the case of wolves is often praised as testifying to great intelligence. At a time when the thief on his nocturnal rambles desired to make it as difficult as possible to scent him, there was a very good reason for this habit. As the dog, however, did not then realize that this was so, he has preserved this unconscious habit even to this day, despite the fact of his present occupation being much more peaceful; and it is ridiculous to see our street dogs scratching for a time with their hind legs on the asphalt pavement of some modern town after relieving nature. Here is an instance of a senseless, purposeless instinct. Now, it must not be thought that human beings had no rudimentary instincts. When a monkey of old set upon his enemy, he did what very many animals do: he first showed him his means of defense in order to strike terror

into him. Raising his upper lip, he exposed to view his powerful incisors, and clenched his fist threateningly. Similarly, whenever we civilized Europeans, who have wholly ceased to bite and almost ceased to make any use of our fists, get into a passion, we raise the upper lip and clench the fist precisely as did our ancestor, the old forest-dwelling monkey.

Thus, no instinct is useful in itself, its existence being justified only so long as the conditions which gave rise to it remain unchanged. Just as an animal which in the course of centuries wanders farther north gradually acquires a thicker coat, even so must it adopt other habits and other instincts.

§ 10.—*Man as Master of His Instincts*

What has just been said of animals applies more to us human beings, endowed as we are with the power of changing our conditions by our own acts to an incomparably greater extent than any animal; and for this very reason it is our duty as far as possible to suit our habits to these altered conditions of life. This is no easy matter, for, as I have said, instincts are conservative and tenacious. Thus, since the invention of knives we no longer use our teeth upon our enemies, though throughout all the centuries we have never ceased to show them our teeth. When we realized how much there was to be gained from an organization of the world, then was the time to have subdued our once useful instinct for war. I do not mean this as a reproach to a great many persons, because in their case this process is a very slow one; but human beings who still continue enthusiastically to abandon themselves to their lust for war always involuntarily make me think I see a dog on the asphalt. No one is readier than I am to admit, what ought to be admitted, that instincts are important to man, more important than many intelligently performed actions. After all, everything most essential to life is rightly removed from the domain of understanding, which is easily deceived. We are, it is true, aware of hunger and thirst, the sexual impulse and maternal love, but all are regulated by

instincts; and what is still more important, the beating of the heart, respiration, and digestion proceed safely and surely without our being aware thereof.

The understanding may err, but never instinct; at any rate, not if its province be restricted to things which, being part and parcel of the very physical constitution of man, are virtually unchangeable. Unjustifiable generalization from this, however, has induced many to deny any real progress in the world. The bacterium, they argue, always acts rightly; man mostly wrongly. Hence what has been the use of the whole cycle of evolution from the primitive cell to the human being? This point of view, however, is based, I should like to say fortunately, upon imperfect knowledge; for although instinct is indeed infallible, which is an advantage, it is also blind and incapable of learning, and this is its doom. Whenever an animal comes into new surroundings with instincts unsuited thereto, it still continues doing what according to its nature is right; but in so doing it dies out. Thus one species of animal after another has died out because it cannot change. And is man also to die out because he *will* not change? Man, moreover, *can* change. He is not like a bacterium, always obliged to do what is "in accordance with his nature." Man is able to act differently, and, being capable of perpetual modification, to adapt himself to circumstances. Man alone, in short, can achieve the impossible in that he can choose, in doing which, of course, he may err. But this curse of liability to error is the necessary result of liberty and the direct outcome of the blessed capacity for change, in other words, for learning.

Verily the old Bible is wiser than the panegyrists of instinct when it makes man fall at the very outset of creation; for what constitutes a moral human being is precisely his being free to "sin" or "to do right." As long as man struggles, so long must he err; or, to put it the other way, were there no error, there would be no possibility of struggle.

For thousands of years past our ideal has been a sober,

self-controlled human race. Nevertheless, we have still not been able to rid ourselves of physical instincts such as raising the upper lip, while the more complex mental instincts are still more difficult to break with, it being in man's very nature to consider the old as venerable; and this traditional over-estimation of everything old can ultimately be traced back to hereditary instincts which we have unconsciously come to revere. Such instincts in themselves have a tendency to persist, and since we do not clearly realize this, but merely vaguely suspect it, we imagine that by religiously adhering to everything old we are preserving what is of permanent value. This imperfect knowledge explains why we think it nobler and more honorable to be out of date, and consequently warlike, than up to date and peaceful. -

Enough has now been said, I think, to show that the comparative value of warlike instincts can be correctly estimated only if it be known what conditions originally gave rise to bellicosity. Otherwise it is not possible for any one to decide whether these conditions still persist; that is to say, whether the war instinct still serves any purpose, or whether, like our rudimentary appendix, once also very important, it is now merely a cause of disease.

2.—TRIBAL INSTINCTS

§ 11.—*Man's Original Tendency to Live in Hordes*

We may begin by observing that warlike instincts are not necessary or even characteristic attributes of the human race. On the contrary, they rather tend to prove that the conception of humanity has become debased, inasmuch as man, according to his true nature, must necessarily have been a peaceful and social animal. This, indeed, may be inferred from the very anatomy of man, who, as every one is aware, is one of the most defenseless creatures ever known to science, possessing neither horns nor fangs, claws nor hoofs, hard outer shell nor poison glands; so that his equally defenseless ancestors,

monkeys, could survive only owing to their being, at any rate, somewhat protected by dwelling in the swaying branches of trees. A climbing animal, however, could not develop into a human being, walking upright, except by coming down from the trees and walking about the ground until it acquired a foot.

Now, the foot being henceforth used for purposes of locomotion, the hand was free. The earliest vertebrate animals—for instance, the frog—already possessed this primitive five-fingered hand, which, however, in the case of all animals became converted—or, if the word be preferred, perfected—into a special organ, usually either a claw or a hoof for defensive purposes. Only in the case of the defenseless monkeys did it remain a hand and acquire skill in tree-climbing. The hand, in its origin peaceful, since it could neither strike nor scratch, but merely grasp and seize,¹ was superfluous as an aid to locomotion on the ground, and thus became free and able to lay hold of something besides trees. Consequently it clenched and laid hold of tools, thus becoming the means and symbol of all man's future greatness.

What is even more important, however, is that had man been a solitary animal when he first attempted to quit the protecting branches of the tree-tops, he would never have been able to do anything of the kind, as he would infallibly have been exterminated by his very much stronger-armed enemies. The fact that he nevertheless did take this decisive step, as a result of which he conquered the world, proves that even then he must have possessed some means of defense; and as he did not find the stone which he used as an ax until he descended to earth, his only "powerful means of defense" must have been the fact that weak persons become strong by uniting to help one another. Man, in short, could conquer only because he was a social being.

Not a single serious argument can be urged against the

¹ Deep significance, into which it is impossible to enter in detail here, is contained in the fact that the expression "grasp" in the sense of

social origin of the human race. The sole objection of which I know is "that it is just the anthropoids (the so-called human monkeys, the ourang-outangs, chimpanzees, and gorillas) which live only in family and not in social communities." But this is based on the long-disproved theory, wrongly ascribed to Darwin, that man is descended from these monkeys. We know that the anthropoids are only our cousins, and that we must seek our direct ancestors in very much lower monkeys. Now, all these lower monkeys live in hordes; and how they club together to rob plantations, at the same time setting some of their number on watch, and how they perform other tasks such as removing heavy stones, in order to get at the worms beneath, are matters of common knowledge. Our ancestors, therefore, were social animals living in hordes or nomadic tribes, and we were social beings long before that family life began, to which persons blinded by the traditional sacredness of the family formerly endeavored to trace back our social and government communities. Were this the case, then man's deep-seated social aspirations would indeed be of secondary importance. It is not so, however, for man did not voluntarily unite to form any community (the family first, for instance, then the tribe, then a class, then a community, and so on); but it was the primeval community which made the evolution of man possible.

In reality, the lowest peoples, such as Bushmen, Tierra del Fuegians, Eskimos, Andaman Islanders, and whatever their names may be, always live in nomadic tribes or hordes even when they have still no tendency to form families. Similarly all their habits are directly traceable to tribal instincts. For instance, the chattering and grimacing of savages, repeatedly described by travelers, are the most vivid reminder of the behavior of animals that live in hordes, such as monkeys, and of certain birds that go in flocks, such as parrots. Naturally, nothing of the sort is ever observable in the case of thoroughly understand comes from the use of the hand, just as does the word *apprendere* (learn) of the Romance languages.

racess originally living solitary lives. Savages in general are extraordinarily gregarious, and for them solitude almost always portends mental and physical ruin, just as solitary confinement is still one of the severest punishments for the European, no matter how fertile may be his mind.¹ The vanity of savages and their capacity for imitation also clearly and certainly are due to their having originally lived together in communities; for to whom is the solitary person to "show off," whom is he to imitate, and with whom is he to chatter?

How far, moreover, it is possible to trace back this tribal nature and the habits arising therefrom in the gradations of the human race is shown, for example, by Le Moustier's skeleton of primeval man—a skeleton which, according to Klaatsch, exhibits signs of having received most careful burial. Now, as might be expected, we find all these primitive characteristics in children, for, after all, we know that every person must pass through the various stages of development that his forefathers underwent. The first impulses of a child's mind, in fact, find expression in vanity, desire to imitate, and chattering or babbling.

Perhaps the most decisive proof of man's originally tribal nature, however, is speech. No one doubts or can doubt that a human being without speech is no human being, and hence that the capacity for speech, at any rate, was acquired not later than the period when man became man, and probably earlier. Now, there is absolutely no need to insist on the self-evident fact that speech could never arise in the case of beings living alone, but only from life in common; and it is only in the case of social creatures, such as parrots, frogs, ducks, hens, dogs, horses, seals, and cows, that we find speech or capacity for modulating the sounds uttered. On the other hand, all creatures of solitary habits, even when, like birds of prey, cats, and whales, they have comparatively highly de-

¹ These words were, I think, written while the author was in solitary confinement.—Translator.

veloped brains, are mute and speechless, or at most can utter only love sounds, such as the mewling of a cat, or sounds to alarm their enemies, such as the lion's roar. In other words, they never utter sounds save when they enter into some sort of relations with creatures of their own kind, which they do when in love or at war with them. Speech presupposes relations of some kind, and the fact that man speaks proves that these relations have existed from all time.

Man, as even Aristotle knew, is from his very nature a social animal. Universal brotherhood among men is older and more primitive than all combat, which was not introduced among men until later.

3.—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND BEAST

§ 12.—*The Peaceableness of Animals*

When a wolf attacks a sheep, or a lion a gazelle, neither wolf nor lion is exposed to any danger. Similarly beasts of prey in general do not become dangerous to their pursuers save in exceptional cases. If, however, an animal attacks one of its own kind, there is always a possibility that the aggressor may be overcome by the almost equally powerful opponent. For a creature to begin to tackle one of its own kind is thus no light task; and as every animal instinctively avoids pain, it is not surprising that wars or combats between animals of the same kind should be of such extreme rarity that it may almost be said that war, like so much else, is a human invention. The argument in favor of this is the hypothesis, first submitted by the Englishman Pye-Smith,¹ that right-handedness, which occurs only in human beings, is due to warlike habits. It is the right arm which is used to fight with, in order that the left arm "may be used to protect the left side, in which the quickened heartbeats were visible."

¹ "On Lefthandedness," by Dr. Philip Henry Pye-Smith. Guy's Hospital Reports, III Series, Vol. XVI, p. 141. Cf. also Gaupp, "On Righthandedness": Jena, 1904.

Even the ancients noticed the remarkably peaceable character of beasts of prey. Lucretius, for example, says:

Quando leoni
Fortior eripuit vitam leo? Quo nemore unquam
Expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri?

(When did a stronger lion ever take the life of another lion? In what wood did ever a swine end its life through the tusk of a bigger swine?¹)

This is also the opinion of Montaigne,² who says in his "Apologie of Raymond Sebond," comparing the intellectual attributes of beasts with those of man:

As for warre, which is the greatest and most glorious of all humane actions, I would faine know if we will use it for an argument of some prerogative, or otherwise for a testimonie of our imbecilitie and imperfection, as in truth the science we use to defeat and kill one another, to spoile and utterly to overthrow our owne kind, it seemeth it hath not much to make itselfe to be wished for in beasts, that have it not.

Similarly Shaftesbury³ points out that the phrase "*homo homini lupus*" ("Man is a wolf to his fellow-man") is altogether absurd when we reflect that wolves are very gentle and loveable creatures to other wolves.

It is, indeed, worthy of note that only a very few animals wage genuine wars. In the case of most animals, for instance young dogs and cats, the so-called fights of which they are fond are merely sham fights, nowise intended to injure any one else taking part, but only as training for future fights with

¹ Lucretius. "De rerum Natura," Book II, 1, 323.

² Essays, fifth edition, 1588. Book 2, Chapter XII, Florio's translation. Nicolai, doubtless having no reference library at his disposal, quotes from memory only. I have quoted the original passage.—Translator.

³ "Moralists: a Philosophical Rhapsody," by Antony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, 1671-1713. II, 5, German translation by Karl Wolff: Jena, 1910, p. 86.

other kinds of animals. If, therefore, they could be compared with any other human institution, it would be only with sport, which is man's way of playing.¹

§ 13.—*The Impossibility of War without Property*

Except man, the only creatures that wage war properly so-called among themselves (Homer's *Polemon epidemion*), are stags, ants, bees, and a few birds. All these creatures live social lives, and how they came to fight one another, which, as we shall see in Chapter II, is contrary to the universal laws of life, is what needs to be explained. One thing is clear from the first, that to fight one's own kind is fraught with danger; and as an animal risks its life in so doing, the possible reward in the event of victory must be sufficient to compensate for such high stakes. At any rate, even allowing for an animal being unable to estimate so exactly what is and what is not worth while, there must be some possible reward in view which induces it to fight. But what can induce a tiger to fight another tiger? Tigers never eat other tigers, and in any case scarcely any animals ever eat their own kind, cannibalism, like war, being one of the blessings conferred by civilization and peculiar to man. The poor tiger has really nothing but his body which could tempt another tiger. The grounds over which he hunts do not *belong* to him; and if another tiger happens to covet them, he will go and hunt there, too. Then, if he is swifter, and consequently catches all the prey, so that the other tiger gets nothing, the latter, if he does not want to starve, must go elsewhere; but if the old tiger is the swifter, then the new-comer will be forced to depart. Thus the struggle goes on between the two without either needing to kill the other and without the loss of any tiger flesh.

No conqueror, however, can rob the tiger of what really belongs to him,—his strength, his swiftness, and his other

¹ Cf. Gross, "Die Spiele der Tiere" ("Animals' Games"). G. Fischer: Jena, 1907.

physical endowments,—for they all die with him.¹ War between creatures of the same kind is wholly unthinkable unless they are either cannibals or possessed of something of which it is worth while robbing them. This latter hypothesis is by far the more important of the two.

War, therefore, cannot occur until a certain level of civilization has been attained;² for man or beast, as the case may be, must have, at any rate, reached the stage of feeling that he or it has a right to possess some thing or other, whether it be merely an old bone which a dog has buried and which he often defends as vigorously as a human being his money-chest, or whether it be a female for the possession of which stags and cocks fight in truly human fashion. Genuine wars, however, did not begin except where actual property was accumulated; and as property is in a certain sense a sign of civilization, war might likewise appear to be so. Accordingly, we find that wars proper do not occur among animals except in the case of ants and bees, and that they are waged for the sake of honey, a habitation, and supplies. For such things man fights also. The property may consist in fields laid out in all manner of different ways, in weapons, tools, accumulated stores of gold, or in anything whatsoever; or it may be flocks and herds that are involved, or women, either as beasts of burden or as sexual property; or even man himself, who is handed over to the victor as a slave. Whenever there is nothing to be had, however, no fighting takes place, and Hume³ is quite right in saying that a savage is but little tempted to turn another savage out of his hut or rob him of his bow, being himself already provided with these things. Propertyless

¹ The fact that man, having become superstitious, hoped to acquire the physical characteristics of his fellow-men by eating them has always been cited by students of the lower races as one of the reasons which led to cannibalism. Just as superstition is a human characteristic, so also is the cannibalism resulting from it.

² Even cannibalism, as modern ethnologists all agree, presupposes a certain level of civilization. (Cf. *infra*)

³ "Treatise on Human Nature," Vol III, pp. 2, 8.

animals consequently live in peace one with another. In other words, even the fiercest beasts of prey do not fight among themselves save for quite exceptional causes, which very seldom occur, and which are rightly considered as usually betokening degeneration.

Would man but realize that there is nothing natural, nothing great, and nothing noble about war, but that it is merely one of the numberless consequences of the introduction of property! In short, war in its essence is a business, like thousands of others, except that it is unnatural and assumes certain violent forms. This, however, does not alter the fact that it is essentially the same thing.

It is not so very long since that the head of a business house as well as the leader of a troop of soldiers was called *captain*¹ (*capitano*), so that the lieutenant of to-day need not look down so proudly on a mere clerk.² They are both brothers.

4.—THE NATURAL PRICE OF WAR

§ 14.—*War and Slavery*

For whatever purpose a war may be fought, however great the spoils of the victor, mankind must always be exploited, either because the accumulated results of his labor are forcibly appropriated or because others are trying to use the results of his future labor for themselves. *Thus every war which has any practical result, and is not wholly superfluous, must necessarily result in the enslavement of a portion of mankind. One consequence of this, however, is that war was justified only so long as it was considered justifiable to impose some*

¹ This word is in English in the original.—Translator.

² Even the French word *commis* (clerk) (German, *Kommis*) is derived from the Latin *committere* (fight), although this word can never be proved to have had two meanings. Compare, however, the two meanings of *compagnie*, *campagne*, the same root as in *Commerzienrat* [councilor of commerce, a German title conferred upon distinguished financiers and business men—Translator] and *mercenarius*. Both derive their name from the same root, *capere* (take).

form or other of slavery upon the vanquished; while another consequence is that there can be only any object in war so long as it is possible to impose this slavery.

Even on superficial reflection it is obvious that the terms of modern peace treaties likewise attempt to impose some form of slavery. What is a war indemnity if not part of the labor of a vanquished foe, of which we as "exploiters" are depriving him? It is the same thing under a finer name, and Goethe¹ is not so very far wrong in thinking that there is not much to choose between honest soldiers imposing a war tax and a gang of thieves.

Private property to-day is supposed to be protected; but even if this is so, it is only to the extent of taking nothing from the person directly, but merely indirectly by imposing a burden on the entire conquered people, which, after all, amounts to very much the same thing.

Moreover, what can the conquest of a province mean except that we partly appropriate to ourselves what the enemy has done there, and thus are again guilty of exploitation? This is of course also the case if the conquered province is considered only as a colony to serve the purpose of national expansion, save that in this case it is not the individual citizen who is concerned, but the community as a whole, and that it is not merely material property which is involved, but also to some extent civilization and ideals. In principle, however, it is the same thing.

Whether war really does make such exploitation possible is another question.² At any rate, this is the object of war, and therefore, if slavery were really abolished, there would

¹ Goethe, who makes *Habebald*, in "Faust," II, 4, say to the *Kaiser's* myrmidons, who call him a low thief:

Die Redlichkeit, die kennt man schon,

Sie heisst: Kontribution,

Ihr alle seid auf gleichem Fuss:

" Gib her! Das ist der Handwerksgruss.

² Cf. § 52-54, about the advantages derived from war.

be no longer any object in war; and as a matter of fact, *there is no object in it in so far as slavery has been abolished.*

Now, slavery being forbidden by our present laws, and being also to a certain extent rendered impossible by present conditions, war has in a twofold sense lost all justification for its existence. In law it is no less contrary to morality than slavery, and there can be no greater advantages connected with it than with slavery. True, numerous relics of slavery, such as exploitation, still persist, and just so far as these relics extend can there now be said to be any object in war. *Every one, however, who defends war under any conditions whatever ought to know that in so doing he is advocating slavery.*

§ 15.—*The Uses of Enslavement.*

This inevitable connection between war and slavery points to the fact, however, that war, like slavery, had once some use; for there can be no possible doubt that at a certain phase of civilization it was not only a benefit, but probably also a dire necessity, for the majority of mankind to be forced to work for others. An animal's life is almost wholly taken up by the business of feeding. Vegetable feeders are, after all, obliged to swallow huge quantities of food, and when not eating, these are engaged in digesting the food or in chewing the cud; and even beasts of prey spend their days in hunting, eating, and sleeping, which merely means that they are resting so as to be ready for more predatory excursions. If to this is added the time which animals require for the business of love-making and for a certain amount of attention to physical cleanliness, there is hardly any spare time left.

Now, the life of primitive man can scarcely have differed from that of animals, for he, too, spent the whole day in the satisfaction of his physical needs. Man, however, in contradistinction to animals, has needs of a higher kind. When these needs began to assert themselves, while mankind was still

obliged to work virtually all day long in order to keep alive, it was right and necessary that the great mass of men should work rather more than was absolutely needful for themselves in order that a select few, without themselves working, might be enabled to live at leisure on the superfluity acquired by the labor of others, and devote themselves to the promotion of civilization. Similarly, it was equally necessary and desirable that a few people should be able to live on the product of the labor of other peoples in order likewise to have leisure to promote civilization. It is absolutely impossible that the marvelous civilization of the ancients could have existed without there having been slaves.

The time came, however, when another kind of organization rendered slavery superfluous. The community as a whole voluntarily gave up part of its earnings to be devoted to purposes of civilization; for when the state hands over to the ministry of public worship and education a portion of the funds it raises by taxation, it is putting something in the place of slavery. Again, a select few are enabled, as formerly by slavery, to live at the expense of the generality.¹

Moreover, there is the fact that—at any rate, in principle—a great deal of work once done by slaves can now be performed by machinery; and if, as is unfortunately the case, our requirements had not been increased so greatly by the introduction of new technical expedients as always to be in advance of what can be achieved by machinery,—if, for instance, we could still content ourselves, which would not be at all a bad thing, with about thrice the output of labor of the Greco-Roman period,—then workers would need to work only a few hours daily. As I purpose to show, our machines, in the hours worked at present, get through about ten times as

¹ The sums thus expended are, taken altogether, inconsiderable, although the amount necessary for an individual contributor to the sum of the world's knowledge works out fairly high. For example, in order that one Sanscrit student may have the requisite leisure to pursue his researches, from about 150 to 200 working-class families must indirectly hand over to him their surplus labor.

much as human hands; and therefore, in order to get through thrice as much, they would need to work only one third as long as is now the case. Consequently the workmen would require to work only one third as long as is at present customary.

The world, however, will have none of such moderation, and political economists, to suit many greedy people, invented the phrase about national well-being increasing with increased power of consumption. Possibly what is defined as national well-being may be thus increased, which, however, would only go to prove that the definition is meaningless; for in reality national well-being does not become greater because all manner of superfluous trash, such as oleographs and shell-covered boxes, is palmed off upon the working-classes to-day. But it is this artificially excited greed which in the end still continues to bolster up slavery in the shape of exploitation and war.

As property engendered theft, even so it has engendered war and, in its train, all crimes, although here and there it was an incentive to virtue. Thus, for feeble souls who will not exert themselves save in the hope of becoming possessed of some tangible object it is well that there should be something in the nature of a stimulus. So matters remained, and, as Greek and Roman heroic poets recognized, with true perception of the facts of life, the struggle went on for thousands upon thousands of years for the sake of the world's precious goods, for love, and for gold. Covetousness began with robbery, which in turn aroused in its victim anger and vengeance. The *Iliad* is the song of songs not only of a fight for a woman (*Paridis propter amorem*), bringing death and ruin in its wake, but likewise of the wrath of *Achilles*; while the burden of the Nibelungen myth is the fight for the sparkling golden treasure and the vengeance of *Krimhild*.¹

¹ These poems have greater unity than seems to be the case at first sight, for the wrath of *Achilles* was excited in the fight for the woman (*Briseis*), and the vengeance of *Krimhild* also in its essence has to do

True, for the time being, Venus had ceased to spur the Crusaders on to fight, her place being taken by the divine Virgin, and that red gold which once seemed the sole possession worth striving for is now merely the symbol of power and, above all, of possession; but the principle remains unchanged. Only very rarely does it seem as if a multitude of people—for instance, the Albigenses—make an effort to fight for a new idea. Even then I believe that they only seem to do so, and that closer inspection would reveal other motives. I cannot, indeed, conceive of men drawing the sword for an idea pure and simple, an idea wholly unconnected with any conception of power. For the conception of country and nothing else it is probably possible to fight, by endeavoring to express to the full in oneself, and therefore for others, the genius of one's own people; but it will scarcely promote any purely patriotic conception to begin shooting for it with cannon. The value of such material arguments cannot become clearly manifest until purely patriotic ideas have become closely intermingled with impure and covetous conceptions of power and property.

Fighting, in short, is intimately bound up with property and slavery, and Goethe¹ knew what he was writing about when he said:

"Krieg, Handel und Piraterie
Dreieinig sind sie, nicht zu trennen."

with the possession of treasure. In the medieval *Nibelungenlied*, which has been recast in a Christian sense, this appears less clearly. Wagner brings it out more strongly.

¹ "Faust," Part II, 5. *Mephistopheles's* words when he hands over to *Faust* the proceeds of a voyage. ("War, trade, and piracy are trinity in unity, inseparable.")

CHAPTER II

WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE

1.—THE BASES OF WAR

§ 16.—*Darwinism*

Eagerness to acquire property was originally the cause and object of war. In the course of evolution, however, the signification of any particular occurrence may change, which is what is known as a change of function. When our ancestors, for instance, were still swimming about in ponds, our lungs, which we now use for breathing, were a floating bladder; and later on, when they were already living in trees, our hands, with which now we grasp hammers, slate-pencils, axes, and swords, were meant for climbing. Thus the function of these organs of ours altered, and similarly the meaning of our institutions altered.

To-day marriage and the stage are moral institutions, but they arose, in the case of the former, from desire for possession, and in the case of the latter from pleasure in motion, as witness dancing, music, and tragedy. The like is true with regard to war. It arose as a means of robbery, but being virtually useless in this capacity at present, new functions were discovered for it, and now it is stated to tend to counteract materialism, degenerative tendencies, and so forth.

Love of possession, which was first aroused in man, merely explains how man, forsaking the habits of his peaceful progenitors, first came to wage war. Once this was done, however, war ceased to be a mere "action," and even became "a factor in education."

Now, we first perform our actions and then cannot shake

off the effects of them. Cain, who slew his brother Abel, was never the same again, and to this day mankind still bears the brand of Cain. In this respect war is nowise different from any other human action. We have created speech, agriculture, technical science, and much else besides, and they are now educating us. A great many human institutions, such as cannibalism, slavery, and idolatry, moreover, have been only temporary; but they, too, have left indelible traces on the human soul. Similarly, the fact that our ancestors waged war continuously for more than ten thousand years cannot be obliterated and leave no trace. It would be enough to give the most pacifically inclined human being a warlike bent.

The belief gained ground, however, that still greater influence might be ascribed to war, particularly an influence upon human evolution. War, in short, as one form of the struggle for life, was said to cause selection. Most of the theoretical defenders of war to-day are wholly ignorant of natural science. They have nevertheless heard enough of Darwinism to know that Darwin was said to have stated that all living creatures achieve victory by means of struggle, and that everywhere the unfit are exterminated and the fit survive, and thus the race is perfected. What could be more obvious than to apply this theory to war? The fit nations conquer, the unfit perish. This may be terrible, and a constant hindrance to progress in the case of individual nations, which is certainly regrettable, but it is the only way to sift the wheat from the chaff. Moreover, by this method perfection is eventually attained, even if the way thereto is long and leads over mountains of corpses. In short, it was believed that the right to make war was one of the so-called natural rights that are part of our birthright, and that war, like the struggle for existence, is profitable to mankind.

Now, apart from the fact that the expression "innate natural right" means nothing, and that the struggle for existence need by no means always be profitable, war does not at

all come within the conception of "struggle for existence" in the true sense of this phrase. This claim in behalf of war is therefore reduced to virtually nothing. We must not be surprised, however, at its having been advanced, for our generation can scarcely realize the feeling of enfranchisement caused throughout Europe by the publication, on November 26, 1854, of "The Origin of Species." All branches of science were immediately hypnotized by enthusiasm for the idea of struggle, and efforts were made to apply it to chemistry, astronomy, cosmology, and sociology. It is only with its application to sociology that we are concerned, and this was the most risky. Struggle, indeed, which is met with throughout nature, does not cease just at the time when man comes upon the scene, for he, too, is wholly subject to the law of struggle, and no one has ever doubted this.

The saying that life is a struggle is found in the writings of all the three nations to whom we owe our civilization, the Jews, the Greeks, and the Romans, and we moderns have all realized this. A Frenchman, Beaumarchais, chose as his motto, "My life is a fight";¹ an Englishman, Darwin, was the author of the phrase "struggle for life";² but for us it is a German, Goethe, who expressed it most finely, when he said:

Denn ich bin ein Mensch gewesen,
Und das heisst ein Kämpfer sein.³

From Job's time to Goethe's, however, it probably never entered into the mind of man that any one could conceive of its being possible to fight out with muskets or cannon the struggle which is supposed to fill man's life.

Struggle is everywhere: it is only the methods of carrying it on which vary. The fox's way of struggling with the hare

¹ In this form the phrase is due to Voltaire's "Mahomet," II, 4.

² English in the original. Darwin generally says "struggle for existence"—Translator.

³ In his "Westöstlicher Divan," 1819. (For I have been a man, in other words a fighter.—Translator.)

is to eat up her food; two species of mice struggle one against the other by one of them being, for instance, more capable of resisting cold than the other. Thus the diverse kinds of struggle in nature can by no means be compared outright; for every species of living creature struggles for its existence in whatever way is best adapted to it. Similarly it is a mistake to insist that struggle for existence must necessarily be horrible or even brutal. Such terms are meaningless, and old Busch showed that he had more understanding of nature than all the so-called Darwinian philosophers, whom he put to shame by his lines:

Mensch mit traurigem Gesichte,
Sprich nicht nur von Leid und Streit.—
Selbst in Brehms Naturgeschichte
Findet sich Barmherzigkeit!¹

Darwin himself, in Chapter V of his "Descent of Man," explained that social instincts are present even in the lower animals, thus admitting their importance. His successors, however, neglected this aspect of his teachings, and above all failed to realize that, if these social instincts are traced back, a principle is arrived at which has been developed in and owing to struggle, but cannot have originated in it.

It is not chance that it should have been almost exclusively Russians, the offspring of a race and inhabitants of a country in which the social system of the *mir* (village community) still prevailed who insisted upon this aspect of *Darwinian* Darwinism, thereby opposing the excrescences of modern Darwinism.

Indications of a belief in the existence of social instincts in the lower animals may even be found in Goethe² and in

¹ These lines, unless I am mistaken, are not by Busch, but by Bierbaum or Hartleben.—Translator.

² Goethe, writing to Eckermann on October 8, 1827, mentions that the fact that a mother bird feeds interlopers [young cuckoos, for example] is an indication of there being something "divine" underlying it. "If

the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause,¹ while Espinas² cites a great number of facts bearing on the subject. Lanessan³ also described the chief aspects of the social impulse in animals; but the first person to recognize its importance as a corrective of so-called Darwinism was the Russian zoölogist Kessler,⁴ who unfortunately died the following year. His work, however, inspired the great Krapotkin,⁵ to write in "The Nineteenth Century" a series of articles extending over seven years.

Finally, Novikow,⁶ in many of his writings has dealt with the same subject; but how slight has been the effect of all their writings on orthodox science may be gaged from the fact that such widely known names as those of Espinas and Novikow are not to be found in the latest edition of Meyer's "Konversationslexikon." I cannot, however, here do more than refer generally to these writings; but I would like especially to recommend every one interested in sociology in the true Darwinian sense of the term the works of Peter Krapotkin and Novikow.

Like every other species of living creature, man also carries on his struggle for existence, in which there is neither cruelty nor benevolence, neither of which, for that matter, occurs in insensible nature; and he carries it on in accordance with

this were a universal rule prevailing throughout nature, then it would explain much that is inexplicable."

¹ Krause's "Urbild der Menschheit" ("The Human Prototype"): Dresden, 1811. Cf. also a number of his other works.

² "Les Sociétés animales" by A. Espinas: Paris, 1877.

³ Lanessan's "La lutte pour l'existence et l'association pour la lutte," 1882

⁴ Kessler's "Comptes rendus der naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft": St. Petersburg. Vol. XI, 1880.

⁵ 1890-96. This series of articles was afterward published in book form, and translated into German by Gustav Landauer. A popular edition was published by Thomas: Leipsic, 1908.

⁶ Novikow's works, in particular, in "Les luttes entre sociétés humaines" 3rd ed.: Paris, F. Alcan, 1904, and "Die Gerechtigkeit und die Entfaltung des Lebens" ("Justice and the Development of Life"): Berlin, 1907.

iron laws, rigid and eternal. But—and this is the main point—it must be a struggle for existence, and not a struggle against existence, which war is. Now, to make this distinction clearer, it is necessary to expound the universal principle of struggle in nature (See §§ 19–21), and then, to consider the special conditions under which man has to struggle, (§§ 22–28). This will show that the struggle for existence is concentrated upon procuring free outlet for man's mental capacities, and thus rendering the maximum amount of energy available for mankind. Every struggle which helps to do this is justifiable; that is to say, it falls into line with human progress, and every struggle which does not so help or which hinders is unjustifiable; that is to say, it diverts man from the upward path of progress. Such justifiable struggles, alike productive and prodigal of life, are those to which Laotse refers as being "waged with living weapons." Every other struggle, on the contrary, is fought out with "hard, cut-and-dried weapons," and with these no victory can be won. To which category of struggle war belongs will presently appear.

§ 17.—*The Fundamental Law of Growth and the Limits of Size*

The meaning of this universal principle of struggle in nature cannot be understood without some knowledge of the most primordial biological law; namely, the law that everything which exists, above all everything which lives, tends to increase beyond all bounds. Struggle, indeed, can be explained only by the law of growth, for *in itself the earth would have room for a great many things at once, but as each thing tends to increase to an unlimited extent, they necessarily come into collision.*

We often meet with this law in the inorganic world. Owing to the effect of gravitation, the heavenly bodies, once they have taken shape, "grow" by attracting to themselves everything coming within their sphere; and even a crystal "grows" so long as sufficient mother-lye is present. In short, wherever

the phenomena of motion takes place there is an unmistakable tendency to "accumulate like substances,"¹ which is the same thing as growth. Even now, at any rate, in the domain of physics this can be accounted for theoretically, or at least it may be made to appear plausible, Zehnder² in particular having argued much on these lines. Whatever we may think of his and similar arguments, it is nevertheless a fact that everything, and above all every living substance, grows.

True, there are limits to this growth, three in number. A single cell, the most primitive structure, can scarcely grow beyond the size of a pin's head, because the interior of the molecule no longer receives sufficient nourishment from osmosis,³ and a limit is thus set to the single-cell form of life. The tendency to grow still persists, however, despite the fact that the individual cell cannot increase in size. Hence further growth is impossible unless the isolated cells join together to form communities of cells. Thus it is that individual beings or polycellular organisms come into existence. These, too, have an inherent tendency to become larger and larger, as we can see in tracing the development of animals. For instance, the oldest horse with which paleontology has acquainted us was about as large as a fox. Gradually, however, it grew, and is probably still continuing to grow; and so it is with all animals and likewise with us human beings.

But at length a limit is reached which even the individual polycellular creature cannot overstep. For mechanical reasons aquatic and swamp-dwelling animals very much larger

¹ Empedocles already had an inkling of this primeval law of growth, for he says (see Diel's "Fragments of the Pre-Socratics," 1st ed., Empedocles, p. 90): "Thus did sweet seek after sweet, bitter make a rush for bitter, sour after sour, etc."

² Zehnder's "The Origin of Life" ("Entstehung des Lebens"), 1910. Published by H. Laupp, Tübingen.

³ All that is necessary is, of course, that one dimension should not be exceeded. Cells can often expand to a comparatively large size in a flat shape. Compare, for instance, *Caulerpa*, which attains a superficies of several square centimeters. (Sap probably rises in plants and glands from their secretions through *osmosis*.)

than a whale, land animals very much larger than elephants, or aerial creatures very much larger than a swan cannot exist, for they could no longer have sufficient strength and stability; and paleontology teaches us that this limit, which Helmholtz among others calculated in theory for birds, and which could be equally well deduced for other creatures, is in practice not overstepped. In the course of thousands of years all species of living creatures gradually become larger,¹ and when they have attained the limits of what is possible, they have become extinct, as was the case with the mastodon of the Chalk Age.

Such creatures as the mastodon, however, enormous as they seem to us, are yet small in comparison with the size to which organic substance might grow and to which it tends to grow. But as mechanical limits are fixed by mechanical laws, and therefore cannot be overcome, individual creatures must do exactly as cells do in a lower stage of development; and, in obedience to the tendency to grow inherent in each of them, they must join together to form larger structures.

In a certain sense any number of creatures of the same kind—for instance, all the mice in the world, all rodents, all mammals, all animals, in short—may be considered as some such larger structure, in other words, as an organism. The fact, already mentioned that animals usually do not eat or even attack their own kind may be instanced as indicating that from the point of view of the struggle for existence an entire animal species is a single organism.

Anything so loosely welded together, however, cannot properly claim to be an organism, but may be compared to some extent with loose heaps of cells as they occur in *Volvox globator*. Unicellular forms of life, however, have developed into organisms properly so called. Similarly there gradually arose

¹ This applies primarily to mammals, but even here there are notable exceptions, although they can usually be explained by certain special circumstances, as is the case with the diminution in size of unicellular fauna. An exception to the principle are insects, as I believe the still living German zoölogist Otto zur Strassen was the first to point out; and they, with the brachiopodes, are the longest-lived breed on earth.

out of and together with these loose conglomerations higher-grade organisms represented by social communities.¹ Now, an organism is superior to a mass of cells; and likewise social communities, more especially from the point of view of the struggle for existence, present obvious advantages, the consequences of which is that animals living a social life of some sort certainly amount to more than nine tenths of the total animal kingdom.

Just as not all unicellular creatures have evolved into multicellular creatures, and an incalculable number of protozoa have remained in the air, in the water, and on the earth, so there are even now many creatures which live alone. The number of kinds of animals which have risen quite sufficiently high to unite together for social purposes is small, although many certainly live in herds, which is a good beginning. Properly constituted communities exist only among the highest insects, such as bees or ants, and among human beings. Consistently with the universal tendency toward growth, these communities are likewise incessantly growing. In the case of man we shall be able to trace this in detail, but even among animals we see it clearly. To cite one instance, the most ancient species of *Hymenoptera* (bees and bee-like insects) live solitary lives, after which come others, the nest of which contains only a very few compartments, whereas modern bees have hives with thousands of combs.

§ 18.—*The Impassable Barrier*

There is even a limit to the growth of these conglomerations of isolated beings, for the reason that the earth affords sustenance (in other words, energy) for only a limited number of organisms. But whereas the osmotic limit to single-cell organisms and the mechanical limit to multicellular organisms can be evaded by superior grouping, the limit fixed by the amount of energy available is final and impassable.

Now, many kinds of single-cell creatures and many fully

¹ See Chapter XIII.

developed species of animals could exist side by side and in process of evolution increase and multiply to the utmost possible extent. But if one kind were to attain its final stage of organization as required by the law of growth,—that is to say, if there were, for instance twenty-five billion elephants or a thousand billion human beings, or one hundred thousand billion guinea-pigs, or ten trillion mice,—then *in every single case there would be no longer any room on earth for any other living creature besides*. As every species, however, is striving toward this end, the law of growth necessitates struggle; but, what is equally important, it likewise prescribes the conditions of such growth.

At all events, this struggle must be incessantly carried on, since there is an enormous risk of being outstripped; and it would require an incredibly short time for one species of animal to increase to such an extent as to consume all existing supplies. It is the bacteria which possess the greatest amount of vital energy, and a single bacterium, which splits up every hour, has in ten hours produced about a thousand¹ others. In the ensuing ten hours each of these bacteria will again produce another thousand bacteria; consequently in twenty hours their number will be a thousand times one thousand, or one million. And this process would continue, were it only possible—as, of course, after a time it cannot—to provide the bacteria with the necessary quantity of food. That is to say, at the end of every ten hours three naughts would have to be added to the figure denoting the number of bacteria, which in 120 hours, or five days, would have attained a figure with thirty-five naughts, and in ten days one with seventy-two naughts. Taking even the smallest sphærobacteria of 0.0001 millimeter² diameter, it is easy to calculate that in one day the colony would be a just visible pellet of .0098425 of an inch diameter; the second day it would already fill a tumbler, on

¹ Thus: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024.

² About .00003937 of an inch.—Translator.

the third a four-story house, and on the fourth be a mountain as large as Mont Blanc. At the end of four days and four hours it would have increased to such an extent that it could cover the whole earth with a living coating of mucus of rather more than seven and three quarters of an inch in thickness, thus attaining the maximum quantity of living substance which could exist on earth.

Continuing this calculation, we find that by the fifth day the colony of bacteria would be as large as the moon, and that from the sixth day onward it would exceed all terrestrial measurements so rapidly that in ten days' time it would occupy the whole of the space visible with the aid of the best telescopes—space with a diameter of more than one hundred years of light.

Although the growth of the higher animals to-day does not proceed at anything approaching such a pace, nevertheless, supposing no impediment to exist to their increase, then one, or, as the case may be, two specimens of bacteria would multiply in about four days; rabbits and mice in twenty years; human beings, with four children per couple, in one thousand two hundred and fifty years; and elephants in about two thousand years, at such a pace as to attain the maximum of what is possible in this world. Thus in a comparatively short period each species left to itself would be able so completely to fill the whole world that there would be no room left for anything else. That this has not yet happened is due to this very fact that struggles occur between the different species, and that in the nature of things these cannot but be severe.

Yet it seems amazing that in all the millions of years that these struggles have been proceeding no single species should have come anywhere near dominating the rest, and in fact that all existing organisms absorb only a very insignificant portion of the energy actually at their disposal. Whereas each square meter of ground could accommodate 440 pounds of living substance, in reality it supports only about 0.4 grams of human

substance, or only two millionths of what is possible; ten grams of animal substance, only $\frac{5}{100,000}$ of what is possible; and a thousand grams of plant substance, or only $\frac{5}{1000}$ of what is possible.¹

In order to understand why the organic world has availed itself so little of the possibilities open to it, and in particular why man, this world's master, should utilize only a smaller and smaller fraction thereof, we must inquire more closely into the origin of life. Not until we understand for what purpose we are striving shall we realize that the reason why we have made no progress in this "natural struggle involving all humanity" is precisely because we have allowed our attention to be too much absorbed by "interhuman wars."

2.—THE STRUGGLE FOR ENERGY

§ 19.—*Why This Struggle is Waged*

The purpose for which this struggle is carried on is sustenance, using the term in its broadest sense; and the struggle for existence might perhaps be more aptly described as a struggle for sustenance. This alone explains why as yet no kind of organism has succeeded in ousting all other forms of life; for the fox, for instance, needs the hare as food, and if he had eaten up the last hare he must perforce starve.

Thus the eater has really far less to do with regulating the numbers of the eaten than *vice versa*, astonishing as this may seem at first to those who believe that they can regulate the course of the world with the help of cannon. Moreover, a

¹ At present each square kilometer in the world is inhabited by 11.4 human beings, whose weight amounts to about 882 pounds avoirdupois (that is, four grams per square meter). Owing to the absence of trustworthy statistics, the other figures are based on a comparatively arbitrary estimate, but as far as gradation of size is concerned they cannot be wrong. Moreover, the precise figures are not of importance in the question under discussion. Of the truth of the principle there cannot be any doubt.

similar, although generally a less simple, connection exists between all animals. Above all, however, every animal needs plants, for plants alone are capable of extracting sustenance from earth, air, fire, and water, the four elements of the ancients. Hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and carbon, the elements of which organisms are almost exclusively composed, are found in superabundance in earth, air, and water, and also trifling additions of other substances. A single shipload of iron, for example, would suffice to supply every one in the world with all the iron they require (that is, as a physical component), if it were merely a question of materials; therefore there would be nothing to prevent the entire globe gradually becoming converted into living substance, and henceforth revolving round the sun as a genuine organism.

What is lacking, however, is the fourth element, fire; for if the actual food be sufficient for fully one hundred trillion tons of organisms, there is only enough of the fire which gives them life and form (that is, the supply of energy in the narrow sense of the word) for about one hundred billion tons of living substance, or for the millionth part. Let me institute a comparison. Whereas the materials would suffice for a large Berlin block of flats, the energy would suffice for only one brick. Consequently the probability from the outset is that it is the comparatively trifling amount of energy-producing sustenance which will be the object of struggle. As a matter of fact, this is so. Expressed in terms of physics, life is equivalent to causing a current of energy to pass through a person. Whenever man eats and breathes, he absorbs energy, and whenever he works or thinks, he exhales it again, and the source of all this energy, as is now known with absolute certainty, is the sun.

Now, of all organisms it is plants alone which are in a position to utilize the radiating energy of sunlight, and with its aid to construct out of earth, air, and water complex chemical bodies, which, on combustion, like gunpowder, are capable of performing labor. The powder hurls the cannon-ball out of the barrel, and in like manner the sugar which I eat enables

my muscles to throw a stone, living substance, particularly that of animals, being capable of consuming the sustenance created by plants and converting it again into labor.

This is commonly called the rotation of life, a misleading phrase, because it is only the chemical substances of which plants and animals consist that take part in this rotation. The genuine life-giving principle, energy, however, does not proceed in a cycle, its action being rather comparable to the parabolic course of the comets. The energy liberated in the sun radiates thence to the earth in eight minutes, remains here a certain period, varying from seconds to millions of years, and then slowly, but for us irrevocably, quits the earth, and finally, transformed into heat, radiates into incommensurable space.

While on earth the sun's energy collects water to form clouds, raises winds, and gives rise to ocean currents, causes plants to grow, and by means of plants feeds animals. Without the sun this earth would be a body ever in repose—the repose of death. Not a breath of wind would ruffle the surface of the water, not a cloud arise in the sky. No rain would fall, and there would be neither trees nor shrubs, neither animals nor human beings. The sun's energy may remain long on earth, and in coal it has perhaps been lying for millions of years; but the day must come when it will leave the earth and find its way out into the realms of space.

Now, what is needed is to utilize this transient force, absorbing as much or causing as much of it as possible to pass through ourselves. This stream of energy, however, without which life could not exist, is of course limited in size, and to form an approximate estimate of its volume is by no means impossible. Pouillet, in fact, has already done this. As it is known how much energy must pass through every pound weight so that it may live, so it is also known, as has just been pointed out, that the earth cannot support more than a hundred billion tons of living substance at most. This quantity, however, *could* live; and if man were able to attract all the

available energy to his own race, then, instead of, as at present, 1.5 billions being able to live upon the earth, about three million billions could do so. Mankind, therefore, might increase a millionfold. Then, instead of only eleven human beings on an average living on each square kilometer of earth, as is now the case, twenty millions would do so, or, as some means would probably then be discovered of living on the water, six millions. In any case there would then be six human beings for each square meter, and mankind would therefore have to emulate the ants, and live in buildings of many stories, one above another.

Now, this number of human beings is attainable, although for reasons presently to be explained we shall probably never do more than approach it. At all events, not only is there room on earth for all those at present inhabiting it, but for countless billions besides.

Mankind is now in the midst of this colossal struggle, which is literally a struggle for a place in the sun; and this is the struggle which ought to be fought out. Whatever assists it means victory; whatever hinders it means defeat.

§ 20.—*Struggle in the Animal World*

The object of this struggle for existence is thus made clear beyond all possible doubt. Every animal and every species of animal must aim at conducting through itself and its own race the largest possible share of the universal stream of energy; but there are very many different ways in which this object might be attained.

The first and most primitive method consists in attempting to deprive others of something by killing them and endeavoring to utilize the energy formerly absorbed by them. If we reflect that the entire animal world does not use up more than one twenty-thousandth part of the energy available, it is evident that "theft" would be of even less use in this case than otherwise, and that this kind of struggle could not come into consideration unless the hitherto unused energy were abso-

lutely unusable. If all the bakers' shops were shut, it is conceivable that some one might commit murder for the sake of food; but if loaves were lying about by the thousand, it would be madness for any one to strike a wretched beggar dead to get a dry crust. As will shortly be shown, man, more than any other creature, is capable of utilizing for his own purposes all the energy hitherto lying fallow, as it were; and he, therefore, has absolutely no need to attempt to obtain it by any foul methods. However, it was just such methods that were invoked in order to popularize the struggle for existence, which for most of us signifies simply killing one another.

In long-past times open combat was of considerable importance, the means at the disposal of animals for the full utilization of energy being very inadequate. Before man could be lord of this world the big birds of prey had first to be exterminated, which caused even the old Roman statesman and philosopher Boetius¹ to ridicule war between man and man. "Ye draw the sword against one another," he said, "while ye yourselves are threatened by snakes and lions, bears and tigers." Nowadays, however, this does not really hold good any longer. Man, as if still an animal and with the ways of animals, fought to a finish his struggle with the animal kingdom; and all that he now remembers is his fight against bacteria, which, characteristically enough, are the smallest known living creatures. But this kind of struggle does not, even in the case of animals, really count as part of the struggle for existence, at any rate not in so far as it aims at effecting selection; for if one kind of animal destroys another, it does not on that account become stronger or fitter. The destruction merely proves that the victor was already stronger and fitter. On the other hand, it is a well-known fact that wherever they have no competition to fear, the old inefficient types have survived a remarkably long while. This is notably the case with Australia, where there are no native mammals.

Increasing the race by merely insuring its increased fer-

¹ Amicius M. S. Boetius (470-525), "*Consolatio Philosophiæ*."

tility might be considered a second form of struggle for life. If every creature uses up one calory,² then one hundred will use up one hundred, and one thousand will consume one thousand calories. This is so simple an example that it is at once clear to every one, and for a time the increase of the human race was considered a universal panacea and the one object to be attained. But the fact was forgotten that increase is valuable only in so far as the race is at the same time improved, and that greater fertility does little to promote selection unless more children are produced than can live under existing conditions. Many would then of necessity die young, and in accordance with universal law would be chiefly weaklings, so that the result would be a finer race than if few children were born and all remained alive without discrimination.

In Germany to-day the population, despite a rapidly falling birth-rate, increases in number, owing to decreased mortality, which may be a testimony to the excellence of German sanitation and public health regulations, but biologically is certainly not an advantage. This desire to increase population at any cost, this mad craze for numbers, moreover, is not due to scientific reflection. At the back of it is rather the desire, which I admit is often vague, for as many soldiers as possible. It is thus not a direct, but only an indirect, result of Darwinian teachings, traceable to the notion of struggle contained therein.

Increased population is supposed to be the consequence of higher evolution, but such increase is not itself likely to promote evolution, since the individual organisms and the different species of animals have arisen independently of one another, and their mutual dependence is so great that it is scarcely ever possible for one to increase alone. If the lion is to increase, then the gazelles must first do so also; if there are to be swallows, then there must first be more flies. Beasts of prey, in short, are dependent upon their prey, which in turn

¹ Term signifying the measure with which energy is measured. Man requires twenty-five hundred calories daily.

depends upon plants. Hence the old saw that in reality all animals and human beings are vegetable feeders, except that the ox digests the grass for us beforehand, which is only a way of saying that the animal kingdom is dependent upon the plant world.

Plants alone derive sustenance direct from the sun's rays, and thus they alone in the whole creation ought to be able to increase independently and on their own account. Even they, however, are dependent on animals in an extraordinarily large number of ways, of which here only the processes of fertilization need be mentioned. In principle, at any rate, they could so increase, and it is a fact that by far the greatest number of organisms upon earth are plant organisms. Whether animals are as one per cent. or more as compared with plants is perhaps hard to say, but in any case plants are in a very large majority.

§ 21.—*Human Struggle on Animal Lines*

In general, even man has hitherto contrived to increase only by breeding animals and cultivating plants. In this respect, therefore, progress seems to move in a circle, whence there is no escape, so that man can produce more only by making other creatures produce more. By this means, however, it is possible to make a sensible advance, for so long as man lived simply like an animal and took whatever he could lay hands on, probably at most one hundred million such human beings, of comparatively modest requirements and likewise comparatively unskilful, could have found conditions on earth under which they could have lived.

Then came the time when man made himself master of this world, although at first merely of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Now we arrange the world as we please, allowing only such animals and plants to persist as are most serviceable to us—cultivated plants and domestic animals. Thus mankind is enabled to take a good step forward, and so far we have already increased fifteenfold since the barbarous age

when man depended on what he could casually find; for instead of about one hundred millions, the world now contains fifteen hundred millions. Did we make the utmost possible use of everything in this the agricultural period of development, we might increase another fifteenfold; for if the very most were made of the whole world, probably one hundred and fifty human beings could live on each square kilometer, and the population would thus attain 22,500 millions.¹ There is, however, still energy enough for 100,000 times more human beings.

The following table is instructive:—

Population in round numbers which the earth could support at different periods:			
Barbaric period		100	millions
Agrarian period) present	1,500	"
" ") maximum	20,000	"
Period of full utilization of energy		3,000,000,000	"

We are, therefore, half-way through the agricultural period, which must already have lasted about twenty thousand years, perhaps longer; but we may rest assured that we shall be far less long covering the second half of the journey, as we are now directing our knowledge and efforts toward this end.

The reason why with agricultural methods we cannot rise above a population of twenty billions is by no means merely because we are obliged to provide sustenance for such vast numbers of plants and animals in order in turn to obtain sustenance ourselves, but mainly because we do not make ra-

¹ During the war Germany is proving that she is almost capable of supporting a population of 120 per square kilometer. But Germany is neither a very fertile country nor is the very most made of it as yet. Even China, not including Mongolia and Tibet, with her "unscientific agriculture," has succeeded in supporting a population of about fifty-two to the square kilometer, which, were the whole world equally densely peopled, would be equivalent to a population of about seven and a half billions.

tional use of energy, superabundance of which is nevertheless available. Most important of all, however, is the fact that we still continue to use plants in order, with their aid, to utilize the sun's rays. Plants, it is true, are the gift of nature, but they are, comparatively speaking, very imperfect, and we know that there are better methods than to have resort to them.

3.—THE STRUGGLE OF MANKIND

§ 22.—*Increase of Vitality*

This new method of combat, which, in its highest and most conscious form, at all events, is confined to human society alone, depends on the opening up of fresh sources of energy, which can be partly done by increasing the vitality of the individual person.

Animal organisms are capable of consuming vegetable food and converting it into labor,—that is to say, using it to move muscles, form secretions, and develop brain activity,—in short, to do whatever is useful to the living creature in question. But as life consists solely of such actions, it is clear that the more of this current of energy an animal can utilize for itself and its own purposes, the greater will be its vitality.

If an animal is to creep or run, jump or climb, swim or fly, faster and better, then, other things being equal, it must consume more energy; and if it becomes capable of reacting more quickly or with less provocation, then it must be able to use up its self-contained energy faster; that is, to consume more energy than before in a given period. Every advance, in short, whether in perceptiveness or in capacity for work is possible only by increased consumption of energy; and the whole difference between us and the lowest form of animal life crawling about sluggishly on the bottom of the ocean can be expressed in terms of energy.

This example suffices to show how much living creatures have already perfected themselves in the process of evolution; for the living substance of the higher animals actually is

capable of increased output of labor; that is, it consumes more energy. In their case assimilation of nutriment is said to proceed much more rapidly. The quantity of energy consumed per kilogram in an hour by polyps, for instance, growing almost motionless at the bottom of the sea, is comparatively trifling. The quantity of energy passing through insects, cuttlefish, frogs, and reptiles is decidedly greater; but not till we reach the higher animals do we find this current of energy attaining such intensity as permanently to warm the body. Man, for instance, has acquired the capacity of using up between one and two calories per kilogram and per hour; and one human being, therefore, consumes in an hour about a hundred calories, or even very much more in case of severe physical exertion. Although in course of millions of years the power of assimilating energy may have increased, yet man can scarcely be said to be better off in this respect than other mammals. Man's superiority is based on something different. By improving their physical substance and correspondingly improving their organs, animals have acquired the power of utilizing large quantities of energy. Thus, when the slowly quivering muscle of a worm evolves into the rapidly quivering muscle of an insect, the creature must simultaneously acquire increased capacity for work, else there would be no object in the improved muscle; and this principle obtains everywhere. Every new organ is conditioned by and requires a capacity for making use of increased and, if necessary, fresh sources of energy, which sources the more highly developed creature finds in eating more and consequently working more. It cannot, however, eat more than it can use up, and thus in the organization of any particular creature a limit is set to the struggle for energy.

§ 23.—*The Utilization of Extraneous Energy*

Man, however, can do more than this. As I shall show more in detail later on,¹ the highest animals possess about the

¹ See paragraph 26.

maximum number of organs which they are in a position to maintain. I also propose to show what an advantage it has been to man from the psychological point of view to have been able to use organs which can be laid aside or changed, as tools. Here, however, I wish to lay stress upon another aspect of this acquired capacity to use tools—the fact that it enables man to utilize for his own purposes almost unlimited quantities of energy. I admit that this is not absolutely without precedent in the animal kingdom, for man, after all, is responsible for hardly any absolute innovation.¹

For instance, when a bird of prey high up aloft circles round and round almost motionless, it is utilizing the energy of the wind, and when ants keep slaves, they are utilizing part of the latter's vital energy; but it was man from whose groping efforts something independent was first evolved. Man it was who first developed and extended the struggle for energy by learning to make use of extraneous energy without its passing through his body. The beginning of this phase of development may be traced even among the most primitive human beings, who made the ox pull for them, the horse run for them, the dog hear and smell for them, and the sheep protect them from cold. Every domestic animal, indeed, that primitive man tamed for his own ends became a factor in the production of energy. Animals, however, were, after all, utilized only by making them do that which was natural for them to do; and a further difficulty very soon made itself felt,—a difficulty which has become very manifest in Germany during the present war,—that a horse which eats oats is thereby eating man's food. If we can imagine the whole world ever being so full of horses and human beings as is Germany to-day, then it will be impossible any longer to import food from anywhere, and even in times of peace there will be keen competition be-

¹ In reality the only innovation in principle and without parallel in nature is the wheel, which, with its axle, cannot be formed by any single organism. The realization of this fact would simplify many problems, particularly in aeronautics.

tween human beings and the horses that they themselves have bred.

Obviously, if all horses were replaced by motor-cars, then more human beings could live on earth than formerly. In this case the motor-car represents the new principle according to which man is able to compel almost whatever quantities of energy he pleases to do his behests. Not domestic animals, but fire, it is which makes man lord of the world. When man first caused the solar energy stored up in plants to explode and catch fire, he opened up for himself a novel source of power, and thus lent such an extraordinary impetus to the conversion of energy that we are quite entitled to speak of things in general having taken a new turn, and to date the mastery of nature from the kindling of the first fire.

Now, in process of time, but more particularly during the last hundred years, this new principle has been developed to such an enormous extent that we may even now say that in future the old animal principles of struggle for existence will be subordinate to others; for already it is possible to see almost unlimited vistas of progress opening up, whereas, as has just been shown, nature has everywhere set bounds to the animal struggle for existence.

No one doubts that machinery has revolutionized the world, and what has now to be proved is that, in accordance with *the general rules of the struggle for existence, a machinery victory is the only possible victory which man can still win to-day.*

At present almost all the so-called natural forces have been pressed into our service, but in reality we still continue to use solar energy. The water which is drawn up by the sun and gradually flows back again to the sea drives our mills. The woods which grew up in the sunshine of prehistoric times, converted into coal, propel our railways, steamers, and electric works, or, changed into benzoin, our motor-cars and airships.

These are only a few instances out of many, and the original amount of energy which man can pass direct through his own

body has long been far exceeded by the amount which he includes in his own sphere of influence alone. In Germany, for example, a human being consumes physically between two and three thousand calories daily, whereas with the aid of machinery he consumes on an average from twenty to thirty thousand.

A great deal has been achieved in this way, but man can still make scarcely any use of solar energy except indirectly by taking it from plants, from waterfalls, from coal seams, or from petroleum springs. These sources of energy are considerable, and not yet fully exploited, but they are smaller and smaller in comparison with the energy which radiates from the sun to the earth, and most of which never assumes forms in which we could easily utilize it, but remains as heat, and in this way radiates, unused, back into space again.

In theory man can directly transmute solar energy into labor, and that in practice he does not do this is partly to be accounted for by his having found comparatively large quantities of energy conveniently accessible in the form of waterfalls, pit coal, woods, etc. But in the meantime, at any rate, he still needs plants, because they are the only machines in which solar energy is transmuted into food. Only in plants does carbon unite with water to form sugar, and if we could succeed in producing sugar and other food-stuffs without the help of plants, then we could really boast of having conquered plants. Indeed, we should not only have "distilled" life from the four elements, but at the same time solved the problem of the homunculus. True, not a single human being would be manufactured straight away in the retort, but there would be sustenance for thousands of millions; and as soon as sustenance is at hand, the spawn is not long in following. The last thing which the blind *Faust* realizes is that man cannot be made happy, but it is enough to open up a free way for a free people.¹

¹ See the last act of "Faust." Part II. The speech alluded to is the one beginning, "Ein Sumpf zieht am Gebirge hin."—Translator.

Faust would fain wrest new ground from the sea, and not rob others of what they have already occupied; and the doctrine of rightful or wrongful struggle may be summarized thus: *wherever new ground is won, struggle is justifiable, life-promoting, and good; but wherever it merely aims at depriving others of something, it is UNJUSTIFIABLE, death-dealing, and bad.*

For thousands of years the Netherlands carried on their slow, life-promoting struggle against water, and at the same time were a model of what a peacefully advancing people should be. It would be more than usually regrettable were a fine modern struggle such as this to be ended now by force.

§ 24.—*Creative Struggle and War of Extermination*

It is for us now to carry on in principle and on the largest possible battle-field this struggle for new ground which the Netherlands with their primitive means could begin only in the literal sense of the words.

Moltke,¹ when a young man, once laid it down that to increase population by one fourth in peace was of at least as much value as to conquer a province one fourth as large as the country. We might calculate on this basis the extent of possible conquests in the war of the future; and to any one who does so and who once realizes the billions of human beings implicated therein, and moreover realizes that every one of the present belligerents might, so to speak, conquer the entire globe, the present cat fights² with cannon in which at most a few millions are moved hither and thither will seem as insignificant as they really are.

Once solar energy is rationally exploited and made to serve

¹ Letter from Moltke, written in 1840.

² By the expression "cat fights" no disrespect is intended toward the victims of the battles now in progress, entailing as they do such trials and sacrifices upon the individual combatant; but despite all the respect we owe those taking part in them, such combats are, from the point of view of natural science, cat fights, scrimmages for the most trivial of objects.

us directly, like a domestic animal, then every acre of land, even land which at present scarcely supports a single human being, will be able to provide sustenance for thousands.¹ As regards direct utilization of solar energy as food not much has been achieved hitherto, but apart from this we do already utilize considerable quantities of extraneous energy. The world is inhabited by one and a half billion human beings, each of whom consumes every year not quite one million calories. Now, the world's total production of pit coal is about one and a half billion tons; that is, one ton of coal per inhabitant annually. As each ton produces about eight million calories, it follows that by means of his coal-driven machines man already works about eight times as much as with his arms.² If we include the utilization of water-power, of animal labor, and of several other minor sources of power, it is not too much to say that even now fully ten times as much labor is done by machinery in this world as by man. Moreover, every extension of coal-mining, every fresh source of energy opened up, confers increased vital powers upon man; and, were social conditions organized on anything approaching a reasonable basis, might also mean a saving of labor. Were the seventeen million horse-power energy contained in the Falls of Niagara profitably employed, about one third of all human labor could be performed by this means alone.

Obviously, with such forces the burden of overworked man could easily be lightened, as indeed has already been pointed out. (Cf. § 15.) I have also indicated the reason why this has hitherto not been done. All these problems, moreover, no longer belong to the dim distant future, but, at all events in

¹ To this subject I have already referred in paragraphs 18 and 21, where I quoted exact figures.

² A very perfunctory calculation, for neither man nor machinery transmutes into profitable labor the whole amount of calories received, and in both cases the percentage of waste differs. The above estimate, however, is sufficiently accurate to enable the reader to survey the general results; and it is beyond doubt that even now the sum total of labor performed by machinery many times exceeds the sum total of that performed by man.

principle, are already solved, and only awaiting practical application. Thermo-electricity enables us to make direct and rational use of solar energy, and the researches of modern chemists, in particular of Emil Fischer and his pupils, have already proved that the artificial production of food-stuffs is possible. Already we have succeeded in artificially producing most food-stuffs, in fact, everything except the synthesis of albumen. Of late years, however, we have made great strides towards producing this also.

But we cannot yet make practical use of these experiments in the laboratory, and in order to do this we have still need of struggle. Our object is within sight; on this round ball there is still room for great deeds,¹ and wherever we see "the purposeless forces of undisciplined elements" at work, we exclaim with Goethe:

"Hier wagt mein Geist sich selbst zu überfliegen,
Hier möchte' ich kämpfen, dies möchte' ich besiegen!"²

Compared with this marvelous human struggle, how pitiable does war appear! What has it to do with the struggle for existence? Assuredly nothing, save for the fact that it is perpetually destroying a fraction, even if only a small fraction, of mankind without in reality helping in the struggle. It is therefore simply and solely due to degeneration, as for that matter we have always considered it in the case of animals, to which we adopt an altogether more impartial attitude. In this human struggle alone have we an innate right to engage—a struggle requiring all our physical, mental and moral energies; and to "do our bit" in it is no less our inalienable right, our bounden duty.

War is right. Not yesterday's obsolete war, that of man against man, but rather a new life—dispensing war for man's

¹ "Noch immer gewährt der Erdkreis Raum zu grossen Taten" are the words in the text.—Translator.

² Roughly: "Here does my spirit dare even to transcend itself; here is something worth fighting for, here something worth overcoming."—Translator.

mastery over the earth and its forces, an ever-youthful war, of which we have probably not yet fought out a millionth part, but which our era is preparing to tackle with quite different methods from those which have prevailed in any previous era. Already, as I have hinted, we can catch a glimpse of wonderful conquests over nature—conquests portending victories such as no human being ever yet won. And here comes some one and insists upon our going into raptures over civilized human beings crawling about on the ground and shooting at one another!

Even *Faust* realized that a higher type of human being can find satisfaction only in struggle with nature. He, too, had dallied with love and waged wars for love. As philosopher he had dealt in the wisdom of the ancients, and as merchant with money and merchandize. In war and peace he had rescued countries and their rulers, and thus he would seem to have achieved the utmost that is possible for any one in this historic world. Yet on looking back over it all he confesses that all is vanity and vexation of spirit; and not until he turns to the simple task of building a dike in order that a new mankind may have new homesteads, does he experience the divine bliss of creation. It is this creative struggle which we have to substitute for the struggle for extermination.

Emil Fischer has produced an artificial substitute for sugar, and may perhaps find one for albumen. He is the founder, or at any rate the forerunner, of the new era of humanity, and all generations to come will gratefully refer to him as one of the great conquerors in the struggle for the foundations of life. He really practised that "divine art" of which Archimedes speaks. Professor Haber, who has utilized his scientific knowledge for the manufacture of asphyxiating bombs, will perhaps not be forgotten either; but he need not even dream of becoming as famous as Archimedes, "defending his native soil against the Roman legions."¹ First of all, that was two thousand years ago, and, secondly, all Archi-

¹ Schiller, "Archimedes and the School-boy."

medes really did was to defend Syracuse when it was besieged, and in so doing he made no use whatever of poison, which was still only used by certain classes of people; and, finally, the fame of Archimedes does not rest upon his having defended his native soil, which was allied with Carthage for two whole years against European ideas, then embodied or at any rate dimly conceived by Rome. It rests upon the fact that he was the first real physicist, and therefore all life-dispensing victories of the future may be traced back to his preparatory work.

4 — FREEDOM AND NATURAL COMPULSION

§ 25.—*Conformity to Law and Unfettered Harmony*

It is the custom to say that the struggle for existence selects from among living creatures those best suited to withstand it. Such selection, however, takes place not only in the animate, but also in the inanimate, world, and it is quite easy to see that, after all, suitability for a particular purpose and conformity to law are identical, except that we are accustomed to consider them from different points of view. Thus we might say there was "suitability" in the fact that, owing to the earth's comparatively slow rotation, centrifugal force is smaller than force of attraction, otherwise everything on earth would be hurled out into boundless space beyond hope of recovery. Further reflection shows us, however, that there is nothing really "suitable" about this for any purpose, but that at best it "could not be otherwise."

Wherever centrifugal force is greater than force of gravity, no central body at all can be formed; and if this were to be the case throughout the cosmic system, then there would be no fixed heavenly bodies, and the whole world would be different from what it now is; and in case any form of life had developed, it must have acquired equilibrium with the help of quite other forces, and must therefore have been quite different from what it actually is. But if it were to exist, it must

of course have been also adapted to this other kind of constellation of force. Conversely, no one need wonder that the shape of this world's mountains and edifices as well as the rotation of water and of life should conform in their smallest details and in every respect to gravitation; otherwise all these things could not justify their existence, or, to put it more accurately, could not exist at all.

Similarly with regard to every detail of the organic world. Undoubtedly it is important for vegetable feeders that there should be plants, and for beasts of prey that there should be prey; but if, after all, there were no plants, then no such animals as we now know could have been formed, and if there were no hares, there would be no justification for the existence of foxes.

Thus it happens that to any one who thinks along lines of natural science, this unity of the world, which used to amaze every one who contemplated it, seems a matter of course. The natural scientist sees no cause for astonishment in "everything being welded together to form one whole," knowing as he does that this conformity to law, which strikes us as harmony, must ever recur under the influence of the all-powerful force of nature.

Neither can man avoid this dependence upon others. For instance, in a country in which there were no subjects there could also be no kings. Nevertheless, in this harmony of nature man produces the effect of something out of place, for he with his free will takes upon him to withstand the compelling force of nature. And this, moreover, he is able to do.

Much destruction has been wrought owing to this freedom of man. He has everywhere carried pain and grief, unrest and confusion, into the safe recesses of "perfect" nature, war between man and man being only one of the many forms of error into which the human race has fallen. But as earnest of good to come, man cherishes the belief in a new harmonious order of things, which he himself will create according to his own free will. True, animals' instinct can never err, while

with man, error and endeavors are inseparable. But it is not less true that endeavor is made possible by error, and this fact is worth more to us than any mechanically arranged harmonious order of things, however perfect. With man came sin into the world, but likewise virtue; slavery, but also liberty; war, but also sweet peace. How can this apparent dualism be? How could man rise as it were above the laws to which he owes his being? How was it possible for him to overcome the force of nature?

§ 26.—*The Evolution of the Brain*

That there is some connection between this liberation of man and the evolution of the brain cannot reasonably be doubted. It is by his brain and by his brain only that he is distinguished from every other living creature. For all our other physical attributes there is not only some analogy in the animal kingdom, but, as modern comparative anatomy has shown, almost all of them have remained comparatively primitive even, and most of all the extremities, although the contrary always used to be supposed. The human brain alone has developed by leaps and bounds and with unexampled rapidity until its size (that is, as an organ of the intelligence¹ compared with the weight of the body), is about a hundred per cent. greater than that of the brains of all living creatures, even those of the highest order.

This sudden advance, which seems doubly enigmatic when we consider how particularly slow and steady has been the development of the brain in other living creatures, must be explained. All living creatures, as we have seen, are intended to absorb the utmost possible amount of energy, which with lower animals amounts to eating as much as possible.

¹This organ of the intelligence does not mean something merely proportional. It may be stated somewhat as follows: Brain weight = al plus bl^2 plus cl^3 plus i , l standing for the length of the animal, and i for its intelligence, and a , b , and c being constant quantities to be empirically fixed. Now the limb i in man has become greater by leaps and bounds.

They achieve this by having developed organs of sense for finding things, legs for running, arms for claspings, mouths for swallowing, teeth for biting, glands for digesting, and so on. Thus the animal body, with its manifold and apparently many-sided organs, came into existence, but in order that it may work as a complete whole, the legs must really run in the direction in which the nose has scented prey, and the mouth must snap where the eyes see prey; in short, every muscle of the body must do what the organs of sense require it to do. Some means of communication is therefore necessary between the organs of perception and the organs of action. Hence the nervous system arose, and, in the higher animals, for reasons which it would take too long to explain here, the brain, not as an end in itself, but as something of secondary importance. The brain was originally merely the servant of the organs connected with the business of feeding. 'In this capacity it was certainly important, but had no independent influence on the real significance of life.

This dependence of the brain on the organs connected with food persisted. Whenever the organs of sense or prehensile organs improved, there was a corresponding improvement in the brain. It readily kept pace with the development of the body, but could not advance a single step beyond it. How indeed could a special organ have been developed for understanding speech if man had had neither a mouth to speak with nor ears to hear with? *The development of the brain thus was and is dependent on the development of organs* the number of which is, after all, limited.

Even Aristotle knew that no animal with horns or antlers has also the teeth of a beast of prey. In other words, that animals are provided with only one means of defense. Similarly, animals have either good eyes or good noses: they are "seeing animals" or "smelling animals," but never both at once. This economy is necessary, for if an animal were overprovided with organs, it would no longer be able properly to fulfil the purpose for which, after all, it exists—feeding.

Thus throughout all these thousands of years the brain continued faithfully to serve its master until the revolution came which first liberated it and then placed it on the throne.

Man alone has undergone this revolution, for man alone by grasping a stone converted his unarmed hand into an armed one. In so doing he may not have created any new bodily organ, but, as Kapp,¹ unfortunately now almost forgotten, phrases it, he planned an *organic extension*, thus acquiring new capacities, just as if he had really added another organ to his body. But—and this distinction is profoundly significant—this acquisition does not inconvenience its owner. If he no longer needs his new organ, he can lay it aside or even exchange it for other organs, and is thus gradually enabled to acquire a multiplicity of organs such as no living creature would ever be able to carry about.

The human brain has been influenced to a quite extraordinary extent by this circumstance. These new organs cannot fail to affect and perfect the brain, just as the old organs did; but whereas the brain used to be forced to wait until the new organs were there, now it acquires its new organs itself, and perfects itself through them by its own force. By thus "creating organs for itself," therefore, the brain acquires freedom and independence, first of all from its body, be it noted.

All animals depend greatly upon physical advantages, but in man these are of comparatively little moment. Of what use are the best eyes, since they cannot do what comparatively inferior telescopes and microscopes can do? Of what use is a good nose or tongue to us in comparison with the benefits

¹ Kapp's "Outlines of Technical Philosophy" ("Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik"), 1877. G. Westermann: Brunswick. Pp. 29-39. Cf. also Noiré's "Tools and Their Importance in the History of Human Evolution" ("Das Werkzeug und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit"), 1880. J. Diemer: Mayence. Both these works are based very largely on L. Geiger's "Origin and Development of Human Speech and Reason" ("Ursprung und Entwicklung der menschlichen Sprache und Vernunft"): Stuttgart, 1868. This idea, however, was first expressed by Ferdinand Lassalle, who in 1880 said, "Absolute self-sufficiency is the lowest pitch of humanity."

conferred on us by chemistry? Our telephones and microphones enable us to hear farther and better, our mechanical scales and other metrical instruments to feel more than any animal with the best special organs of sense. For what do we need great physical strength when we have steam hammers, hydraulic presses, and giant cranes to work for us? Or speed, with railways and motor-cars to run for us? We need learn neither to swim nor to fly, since our steamers and submarines, our aëroplanes and airships can do so. Every achievement of excellence produced at any time during millions of years in the animal kingdom man's young brain has likewise produced and brought to greater perfection.¹ We see more clearly than falcons, smell better than dogs, hear farther than elephants, and have a finer sense of touch than bats' wings. We are stronger than the rhinoceros, while in speed we easily excel the horse on earth, the eagle in the air, and the shark in the water.²

§ 27.—*The Autonomy of the Brain*

From henceforth the brain, now free and powerful, is the decisive factor in the struggle for existence, for to-day intellectual struggles are of more importance than hand-to-hand fighting. Even if all the dwellers upon earth stuck knives into one another, they could not, if the worst came to the worst, do more than kill one another all out, and there would be a billion and a half dead, which, after all, is scarcely conceivable. If, however, a single person succeeded in directly utilizing solar energy for the production of food, this would mean enabling a billion and a half living beings to live (that is, a thousand times as many), which will one day actually come to pass.³ Truly our tools are weapons, but to be used

¹ Even Helmholtz once said, "If an optician were to bring me an eye, I would refuse it as bungling work."

² Our airships, however, cannot yet overtake the falcon, and the dolphin is probably swifter than even our latest racing yachts.

³ The three thousand billions mentioned above are conceivable, and the billion and a half mentioned here are probable, indeed, in so far as such a statement can be made as to the future, they are a certainty.

against nature and not against man. Our first tool, a stone, was a weapon, but a weapon in the struggle for food, and a tool for turning up the soil.¹ Afterward this weapon for attacking earth and wood was used against animals, and finally against man also.

But this is contrary not merely to morality, but also to truth, for we are not simply a part of nature. In man's small brain the whole of "creation" was pondered over and imitated, and as a result of the freedom thus achieved we are enabled to "live according to laws of our own." Therefore it is that *human action differs from any natural event, and therefore it is that we must not consider war in the light of an earthquake.* Even were it true, which, as has been shown, it is not, that war is nature's only outlet, this natural compulsion would still not apply to us, for man ought not even to draw his sword except of his own free will and with a sense of his responsibility in so doing. The struggle for existence is no excuse, nor does it afford any analogy.

Even the usages of war unconsciously admit this, for any one who wants to fight to-day must arm others, since an isolated person, be he never so brave, is too weak. Arming others and winning allies, even among one's own people, can be done only by persuasion, by influencing men's minds; that is, by words. As this present war clearly shows, and as its issue will show still more clearly, therefore, nothing is so important and essential as persuasion, as intellectual struggle,

Between one and two thousand years after the introduction of the synthetic reproduction of food-stuffs, they will have been reached, and then the world in general would be as thickly populated as a garden city.

[In England and Germany a billion = a million millions (1,000,000,000,000; in France and America, however, the word (French *milliard*) generally means a thousand millions = 1,000,000,000. In the case of the first figure Dr. Nicolai uses the word *milliarde*, and in the case of the second figure the word *billion*.—Translator.]

¹ Cf. Lazarus Geiger's "Origin and Development of Human Speech and Reason" ("Ursprung und Entwicklung der menschlichen Sprache und Vernunft"). J. G. Cotta: Stuttgart, 1868. Geiger shows that the most ancient tool was used for turning up the soil.

even if such struggle should appear to be temporarily in abeyance. In any case, we must never lose faith in the freedom and omnipotence of the intellect; and even now all who hope for any improvement must in their heart of hearts be convinced that the power of persuasion is mightier than that of the brute force.

No one should take this comfort to his soul more than the friends of peace, forsaken as they may at present seem. It has been somewhat scornfully said of them that such a handful of men attempting to withstand the war giant are like a small dog barking at the engine of an express-train going at full speed: the engine would run straight over the dog without being affected. No doubt, for the dog has at most one millionth part as much living force as the express-train, and if man could do nothing but throw his body in front of threatening evil his power would not avail much either. Man's will, however, is not bound down to the strength supplied him by his body, but he has the power of releasing almost indefinite forces. Only think. One screw in the rails loosened, and the whole stately express engine is a heap of dust. No dog can do this; but man can.

The influence which man exerts upon his fellow-man cannot be expressed in terms of energy. We know only that there is no limit to the power of a word.

“Johannes Huss und andre Ketzer brieten,
Ihr Wort jedoch erklang von Ort zu Orte:
Welch eine Tugend ist die Kunst der Worte.”

(Roughly: “John Huss and other heretics burned; yet their words resounded from place to place. Ah! the virtue lying in the art of words!”—Translator.)

Christ, Darwin, Luther, and Voltaire all knew the art of words, and they were to their time as a lightning flash setting in motion the accumulated stores of energy of an entire world. And the power of that one small word “war,” how it trans-

¹ Platen, prologue to the “Abassiden,” 1829; lines 102–104.

forms all Europe and forces all mankind to abandon their accustomed ways for the sake of some new and unknown goal! This we all felt, to our joy and sorrow, in the summer of 1914.

"In the beginning was the word," always, and the word alone, for the power is always in the hands of the "old," and the "new" at first never had any weapon save the word. But the word need only be left to itself, and as yet it has always come off victorious. And this conquest of the word which is carried away by the wind over all worldly power is, after all, merely what Kant meant by the autonomy of practical reason and the dignity of mankind. True, there is an essential difference between the autonomy of practical reason and that of the brain, to which alone I referred above; for that "absolute autonomy" insisted upon by Kant cannot exist save as an idea pure and simple. The autonomy of the brain is likewise limited, but it would be quite enough if we made full use of such autonomy as it has.

In order to have finished with war, this freedom of the true natural scientist, the freedom of the thinking brain, would be quite sufficient; and Frederick, in this respect really *the Great*, was quite right in saying, "If my soldiers began to think, not one would remain in the ranks." Unhappily, however, Schopenhauer also seems to have been right in saying that "Men are not thinking beings."

Schopenhauer, however, was a pessimist, and to-day there is cause rather for optimism, for we now know at any rate one thing that Schopenhauer did not know for a fact: that even *if men do not think, nevertheless their brains are capable of thinking*. It is one of the most interesting facts which modern brain physiologists have taught us that the brains of animals and man contain more extensive capacities than any that have ever been evolved from them. As a matter of fact, the brain is more developed than the soul, which is, after all, only what is to be expected, for the instrument must first be there before any one can play upon it. A calculating-machine, for example, already contains within its iron framework the

calculations $481 \times 1617 = 777,777$, and that $5621 \times 13,857 = 77,777,777$, although neither may ever have been actually made. Similarly in every brain there are very many trains of thoughts ready waiting that have never yet been used. Nowhere is more striking proof of this afforded than in the works of that Russian man of genius, the physiologist Ivan P. Pawlow, works which open up an entirely fresh train of thought, into which, however, it would take too long to enter now. To make my meaning clear two examples will suffice. Animals, particularly monkeys, which are much with human beings can learn from them things which in themselves far transcend the limits of their intelligence; but this causes no modification of their brain, which consequently must already have been in a state to undertake these new functions. Again, the Japanese, who, if they had had to acquire Western civilization by their own exertions, certainly would not have done so under hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of years, have copied it from the Europeans in only a few years, just as they very quickly copied Chinese civilization. Moreover, as soon as either monkeys or Japanese have really adopted new habits, they adapt themselves to these perfectly. "Missie" smokes her cigarette no less elegantly than any Tauentzien girl, and Soyen Shaku writes books on ethics, the arguments of which lead to conclusions precisely similar to those at which German ethical writers arrived independently.¹

Many things even in the lives of nations may be explained by this fact of there being all manner of possibilities latent in the brain without man having the slightest inkling of them. This explains both the conservatism which often drives us to despair by its persistent adherence to antiquated grooves, and likewise the suddenness with which a new order of things comes about the moment any one once succeeds in opening up these "dead tracks" to traffic or in wresting a single sound from these "slumbering bowstrings."

What we know of brain physiology, therefore, justifies us

¹ Cf. § 194.

in being optimistic. However noisy and self-assertive the impulses of hate may be, the social instincts, their opposites, our oldest inheritance, have long been lying dormant in our brain, although as yet they give out no sound. But one day they will be touched, and then their sound will drown that of all ghosts of the past, whether medieval or modern. That we have "dead tracks" in us, and that love is older than hate, it is the purpose of Part III of this book to prove.

§ 28.—*War as a Free Human Act*

As long, however, as the world does not know this, and does not believe that nature's organization, of which each person is a part, makes it as it were physically incumbent upon us to observe certain rules and mutual relations, so long might it be objected that just because man is free and not subject to natural force, he can make war because he chooses to do so; and that as he always has chosen so in the past, he will continue so to choose in the future, for "there always was and always will be war." It is not worth while examining such arguments, for they could be equally well urged in defense of cannibalism or of the Stone Age.

Now, war has indeed been called *logos*, ratio, or reason—not human reason, it is true, but, characteristically enough, only the reason or argument of kings. As Calderon¹ scornfully wrote, in war powder and shot are the last word of kings. But kings did not understand irony, and "*ultima ratio regum*" was inscribed on the cannons of the Roi Soleil of Versailles, and afterward upon those of Frederick the Great. In France the National Assembly, on August 17, 1791, erased these overbearing words; but in Prussia they still remain, although, strangely enough, only on field guns, intended for attack, and not on fortification guns, intended for defense, thus still further emphasizing the fact that cannon are not the argument of man, but merely that of kings.

¹ Calderon: "Es esta vida todo es verdad y todo mentira" ("Everything in this life is truth and everything untruth").

These words are not only engraved on the cannon for tradition's sake, but only a few months ago, Loofs,¹ singularly enough a theologian, referred to them as a valuable maxim. Herr Loofs, who is probably a good monarchist, has no conception of what a disservice he is thus rendering to kings, for if war really does amount to "the last argument of kings," then there would be all the more justification for the republicans making a fitting rejoinder. There is, however, a grain of truth in these words, and hence Kant insists on the necessity for a federation of "free republican states" if perpetual peace is to be maintained.

We hear it repeated over and over again that we are bound in honor to go to war, and that "it is a worthless nation which will not joyfully sacrifice everything for honor's sake." No doubt; but the only question is whether honor can be retrieved by force of arms. A nation which can conceive of this being possible has no more genuine honor in it than a good pistol-shot who has made his notions of honor fit in with his sureness of aim.

Does any one really believe that the distressingly deep feelings of hatred, fear, and contempt with which the majority of mankind at present regard Germany would not be greatly increased if the Germans were to succeed in imposing their rule upon still more non-German-speaking territories? It is moral conquests which we need to make, and if Germany were to win, and nevertheless to fulfil the elementary demands of humanity (which would, of course, then be more difficult), *then* she would have retrieved her honor.

Does any one believe that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Germany lost her honor because she succumbed before the Corsican's superior military methods? Or that Denmark or Belgium have lost their honor because of having had to yield to their stronger neighbor? Again, was it in any sense an honor for Napoleon or William I to have conquered

¹ Friedrich Loofs, "Internationale Monatsschrift für I. Wissenschaft, Kunst, und Technik," 1915. Vol. IX, No. 1.

unfavorable for both combatants, yet it is almost always the victor alone who has to endure economic depression, whereas in the country of the vanquished a period of commercial prosperity usually sets in. Most instructive for Germany in this respect are probably the results of the Franco-Prussian War, since which time economic conditions generally in France, now freed from the demoralizing rule of the empire, have been noticeably prospering. All who know France have attributed this to the fact that, after being invaded, she, who before 1870 thought she, too, might attempt to domineer over the whole world, learned to work again.

In Germany, on the other hand, the huge war indemnity made every one imagine that all was going on very prosperously, until the so-called "boom" came about in 1872.¹ A great deal more champagne was drunk, and traces of this period are even now observable in the showy and tasteless decoration of the houses, furniture, etc., of the period.

All this extravagance, which had nothing substantial behind it, led to an excessive desire for commercial expansion. Hence the great "smash" and the ruin of thousands of people. Even Bismarck said in the Reichstag, on May 9, 1872, "We know that France is bearing the difficult commercial conditions at present prevailing in the civilized world better than we are; and that her budget has increased by a million and a half, a sum not raised by a loan; and we see that her resources are better than ours, and that, in short, in France there is less complaining about hard times."


As a result of the commercial depression, there was an enormous increase in emigration from Prussia. Before 1866 this amounted on an average to about 40,000 annually, but in 1873 it had reached about 150,000. This immense waste of human material of course alone represents a capital very, very much larger than all the thousands of millions received from France.

What, therefore, did Prussia gain by her victory or from

¹ "Die Gründerzeit" it is called; the "business founding time."

her war indemnities or from the commercial treaty in her favor? Merely to show what I mean and without laying any undue stress upon this single instance, I give here the following diagram, the curved line in which indicates the number of vessels belonging to the Saxon-Bohemian Steamship Company. The influence, small though it be, of the disturbances which led to the war of 1859 is clearly traceable, as also are the after effects of 1866 and 1870-71. The after effects of 1866 were of course considerably felt by such a company as this.

Fig. 3.




Number of vessels owned by the Saxon-Bohemian Steamship Company between 1850 and 1880

I should like to add that the number of steamers rose from three to seventeen—that is, by fourteen—in the fifteen years between 1850 to 1865; while in the next fifteen years (1865-80) their number rose only to twenty,—that is, by three,—which in absolute numbers is a nearly five-times-smaller increase. In the years of peace, therefore, the increase was almost five hundred per cent., while in the ensuing period, of equal length, but broken by wars, it was only eighteen per cent.

The following diagram, the curved line in which indicates

the increase in the population of Berlin, should likewise prove interesting.¹



Increase in the population of Berlin in the nineteenth century.

It is impossible to calculate all the economic advantages and disadvantages of a war, but there is one point to which I wish to draw attention. The surest indication of a country's industrial development is probably the increase in the number of its steam-engines. Now, if we consider the multiplication of steam engines in the period 1860-70 as compared with the decade 1870-80, we shall arrive at the following diagram, which throws the effects of war into strong relief:²

Name of Country.	Increase or Decrease in number of Steam-engines used
Germany	—30 per cent.
Austria and Belgium	—20 per cent.
France and America	0 per cent.
England	15 per cent.

It is obvious that the heaviest decrease occurred in the victorious Germany, whereas vanquished France at all events maintained her former standard. The country which comes out best, however, is England, the smiling onlooker who took no part in the game.

¹ The figures are based on the Festival Publication of the Royal Statistical Office of Prussia for 1905.

² The figures are taken from an article by K. Th. von Heigel and W. Hausenstein on "Das Zeitalter der nationalen Einigung" ("The Period of National Unity"), to be found in J. von Pflugk-Hartung's "Weltgeschichte" ("History of the World"), Vol. VI, p. 353.

We are altogether far too often deceived by the fact that diagrams frequently show how this, that, or the other national source of wealth has increased in Germany since 1870; and we forget that it generally increased still more *before* 1870. What makes such comparisons more difficult is that before this year the statistics of all the different component states in Germany were issued separately, whereas after 1870 we have generally only the statistics for the whole German Empire. I have gone through numbers of reports from chambers of commerce and commercial undertakings, and virtually always found that the increase in their prosperity recorded before 1870 was greater than that recorded after this year. To go all through this material, however, would greatly exceed the limits of this volume, and indeed it would require to be dealt with separately.

Even if we review the whole export and import trade of the world, we arrive at the same result. In the thirty years between 1870 and 1902, the world's total trade increased from about £2,470,000,000 to about £4,710,000,000; that is, by eighty-seven per cent. Mainly owing to the growth of American, Japanese, and Canadian trade, the percentage of trade in almost all European countries decreased; but whereas in France trade fell off only 3.7 per cent., in Germany it decreased by 9.8 per cent., or nearly thrice as much. The more exact figures for Germany, France, and England, and also for the world as a whole, are shown in the following table. Exclusive of the precious metals, the value of exports and imports was as follows:

	In thousands of millions of marks (One thousand million marks = £50,000,000)				In percentages of the world's total trade		
	The world	England	Germany	France	England	Germany	France
1872	49.4	12.2	6.0	5.3	24.7	12.2	10.7
1902	94.2	16.7	10.3	9.7	17.7	10.9	10.3
Decrease of the world's total trade by					28.3	9.9	3.7

Here, again, therefore, the effect on the conquered nation has been good.¹

Similarly with regard to agriculture. If we examine the interesting curved lines showing the increase of domestic animals in Prussia² we shall find that horses, pigs, goats, and horned cattle begin to increase in or about 1855, and sheep in or about 1864, and that thenceforth they continued steadily increasing. After the Franco-Prussian War, no trace of any considerable increase is to be found. When we keep to conditions more or less reflected in all branches of trade and industry, and avoid singling out special instances, we shall arrive at similar statistical results.

The conditions after 1870 were not in any way due to mere chance. After the Russo-Japanese War the finances of victorious Japan were completely shattered, while for the first time in twenty years the budget of vanquished Russia showed a surplus. After the Boer War British consols fell twenty per cent., while the conquered Boers, since losing the war, have become a great power, whose wealth has increased to an enormous extent. Even Spain's regeneration dates from the time when she was conquered and all her colonies taken from her, among them the "Cuban Pearl." Spanish Government stock speedily doubled in value. For further instances Norman Angell should be consulted.

How, indeed, could this be otherwise, since as a rule victory belongs to whosoever is best and most strongly equipped for war? These military institutions are almost automatically extended to the subject nation, and first of all, of course, to the

¹ These figures afford all the more conclusive proof of the truth of my contention because even in 1870 the value of Germany's total trade exceeded the value of France's by 700 millions. Despite the very much greater increase of population in Germany, this difference has become less in the last thirty years.

If British trade shows an even greater relative decrease per cent. than that of Germany, this is because in 1870 England enormously outdistanced the latter. In the intervening years Germany to some extent caught up.

² Jubilee Atlas of the German Royal Statistical Office, No. 58, p. 71.

provinces taken from the enemy. The vanquished, in short, think that in the next war they must have their revenge, and therefore they endeavor to imitate their enemy's institutions, seeing that these seem to answer well in war.

§ 60.—*National Influence*

Thus in the case of every subjugated nation there is an increase of the outward signs of civilization, such as wealth, order, and health. If, therefore, such a nation has only a latent tendency to increase, then it is likely to do so faster than before. It has always been thus. In the Second Book of Moses (Chapter I, v. 12) we find: "But the more they [the Egyptians] afflicted them [the Jews], the more they multiplied and grew." Every one must know that this is also the case with the Poles to-day, as can easily be proved by statistics, although our official statistics unfortunately do not take this important fact directly into account. In the eleven administrative districts of Bromberg, Marienwerder, Oppeln, Arnsberg, Dansie, Posen, Gumbinnen, Königsberg, Breslau, Köslin, and Münster, in which more than ten per cent. of the population is Polish, the average birth-rate is forty-two per 1000: but in the remaining administrative districts, where there are only a few Poles, it is only thirty-six per 1000.¹

In the Polish provinces, therefore, $16\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. more children are born than in the German ones. Now, these so-called Polish provinces are by no means purely Polish, the proportion of Poles being only one third. But if this Polish third causes a $16\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. increase in the birth-rate, then the Poles themselves must have about fifty per cent. more children than the Germans. That is, to a thousand Germans thirty-six German children² are born. To a thousand Poles fifty-four Polish children are born. Basing our calculations on the pro-

¹ Statistics (Jubilee publication) of the Royal Prussian Statistical Office, 1905. II, p. 24.

² This figure is taken as representing the average birth-rate in the comparatively pure German administrative districts.

portions of the Poles as proved by German statistics for Prussia in the year 1910,—357 Germans to 35 Poles,¹—we get the following algebraical equation:

$$lg\ 357\ \text{plus}\ n.\ lg\ 1036 = lg\ 35\ \text{plus}\ n.\ lg\ 1054.$$

Here n equals the number of years, which is easily calculated; and the equation proves that in the year 2045 there will be as many Poles in Prussia as Germans.

Besides these purely biological considerations, psychology also intervenes, for in every oppressed people the national sense becomes very much stronger. In general this, of course, applies only to modern times, for except the Jews no ancient nation had any genuine racial national sentiment; it merely felt that it adhered to a particular form of civilization. (Cf. Chap. VII.) This is quite understandable, since a people cannot fail to think it would be better for it to become strong if it has just had a practical demonstration of its being allowable for the strong to subdue the weak, and if the unpleasantness of such subjection is daily impressed upon it by numberless petty subterfuges. Moreover, it will naturally assume that there must be many advantages in subjugating another nation, and it will consequently strain every nerve to attain a national prestige equal to that of the nation by which it has been conquered.

We have seen this in the case of every oppressed nation of modern times. Not till Poland was partitioned did the Poles awake to national consciousness; at any rate their national consciousness was incalculably increased thereby; while that of the Italians can be proved to have been awakened by the Irredentist movement, and France's national feeling now mainly subsists by thinking of her "lost provinces." Even Germany is no exception to the rule, and German national feeling awakened under the oppression of Napoleon's foreign dom-

¹ Huber: "Geographisch statistische Tabellen" ("Statistical Geographical Tables"), 1914, 63rd ed., p. 11.

ination. As Bismarck said to the Jena students:¹ "Without the oppression of foreign rule the awakening of German national feeling in Prussia would scarcely have been possible. Even now, in Austria, German patriotism is the strongest, at any rate the noisiest, where the German, although ruler in name, must nevertheless fight for its existence against a foreign people. German patriotism is most noticeable in Prussian Germany, where the German has to contend against French and Frenchlings, Danes and Poles."

The practical lesson from all this, a lesson which might assuredly have been arrived at more easily, is to annoy foreign peoples as little as possible. Any one not observing this obviously common sense precept injures himself alone.

To cite one instance profoundly affecting every German, how is Germany the better for the Poles being oppressed? For Prussians and German-speaking Austrians,² Polish oppression simply means a thorn in their flesh. In Austria the Poles have already to a certain extent the upper hand, while in Germany their power is daily increasing. Even Westphalian soil, where perhaps the most pure-blooded Teutons live, is in danger of becoming a Polish wedge, and a Westphalian Pole has already only very narrowly missed being elected to the Reichstag. It is just those who believe in the future of Germany and the "German idea" who ought sorrowfully to contemplate Austria. In this land, which has been built up only on dynastic principles and on contingencies such as the celebrated Hapsburg marriages, millions of Germans are slowly going under simply because the conquerors conquer too much and are now a minority as compared with the mass of the people, who are of foreign origin.

Even Grillparzer,³ Austria's greatest poet, who all his life long believed in the significance and power of the sword,

¹ *Kommers* is the word used. Bismarck spoke at a students' convivial evening or drinking bout.—Translator.

² "Austrian Germany" is the peculiar phrase actually used.—Translator.

³ Grillparzer's "Sämtliche Werke," 1870. Vol. III, p. 238, Cotta.

resigned himself at last to the melancholy conclusion that victory on the battle-field means nothing; and his last poem, written shortly before his death, and in celebration of Austria's most famous victory, contains four lines testifying to this conviction:

“Marchfeld! So ist dein Sieg nicht wahr
Aus unseres Herrscherhauses frühesten Tagen!—
König Przemysl Ottokar
Hat den Rudolf von Habsburg geschlagen.

Despite all the successes on the battle-field, two identical conceptions—those of the internal strength of a nation and of inalienable right—have carried the day. In vain were the triumphs of cannon and battle-ship; in the last resort it was still living weapons which decided the issue.

§ 61.—*The Sword for the Weak*

The fact that defeat has “tonic effects” and victory enervating effects means that the scales of Justice, wherewith war must weigh the nations, can never rest. The oppressed are forever gathering together to avenge themselves in war on their enemies; and again and again they will succeed. Hence the wearisomeness and sameness of history, which is merely a ceaseless ebb and flow of ever-ending wars. Over and over again has it appeared, and it will appear again in the future, that no country can in the long run be greater than its people; and no changes can come about unless man, perceiving that things cannot continue thus, makes a change of his own free will.

It almost seems, however, as if no one would ever profit by all these lessons, and Hegel rightly maintains that “the only thing history teaches is that it has never taught any one anything.” In the case of the present war every nation is clearly anxious to prove that it is still youthful and vigorous, and therefore it behaves just like a child, scattering the teachings of its elders to the winds and making experiments on its own

account. And the experiments will be made, but it will be too late!

Empires have endured only when, as in Rome, the spade followed the sword, or when, as in England's case, a colonizing civilization has followed the cannon. Yet this does not go to the root of the matter; for the most deep-seated cause for the success of these two empire-building countries lies in the fact, by no means fortuitous, that both Romans and Britons called and still do call their conquered people not "subject nations," but "confederates." A world-wide empire cannot be welded together and govern itself except freely; and wherever this principle of liberty has not been respected, conquest with the sword, no matter how thorough it may have appeared, has never availed aught. Anything may be done with bayonets, only, as Lassalle once said, we must not sit down upon them, and must not use them for trying to conquer countries. Every people ought to try its best to colonize and to spread; but for this purpose it must endeavor to increase its *vital forces*, its living weapons, to the utmost possible extent. Any one imagining he can colonize with the point of the sword is a fool and a weakling. *None save the weak and foolish need a sword; the wise and strong need none.*

CHAPTER V

HOW WAR IS BEING METAMORPHOSED

1.—THE DUSK OF THE WAR GODS

§ 62.—*The Growth of Armies*

The purport of this chapter is to show that, as time has gone on, wars and war losses have become greater. Not much can be claimed to have resulted from any attempts made to "humanize" warfare, and that valuable sense of solidarity that used to prevail in armies is tending completely to disappear.

These historical facts might at first seem to destroy all hope of perpetual peace ever prevailing. On reflection, however, it will be seen that in the complete change which is coming over war there are so many obvious symptoms of decline that a rapidly nearing end may be prophesied not only for the present war, but for war in general.

That war once consisted of duels we are even now strongly reminded by the name *bellum*, which is derived from *duellum*. Then "friends" used to lend a hand, and even in Homer's time it was an event of historical importance when a few dozen Grecian princes with their servants besieged a medium-sized provincial city such as Troy, round whose walls a good runner (Hector) could run twice without being incapacitated, and which, therefore, cannot have been very large. Originally, indeed, wars meant the administration of comparatively mild thrashings, such as are unavoidable among peoples wandering about in small gangs or living in remote villages.¹ In those

¹ Cf. the description of Ithaca.

times it was already an event for a hundred men to be confronting one another.

Even when we come to ancient history we must not form exaggerated conceptions of the size of the armies.¹ The accounts of the vast armies of Darius and Xerxes are mythical. At all events, they were beaten at Marathon by fifteen thousand Greeks, all told, and the ten thousand Greeks who fought at Cunaxa² were a mighty army according to the notions of those days. Even the Roman armies were comparatively small, and their actual numbers must mostly have varied between forty thousand and eighty thousand, since the total number of men in the Roman garrisons in three parts of the world did not exceed two hundred thousand. At present this extent of territory produces about a hundred times as many soldiers.

During the Middle Ages armies tended to become smaller; indeed in most matters pertaining to external civilization this period was one of general retrogression. Even the "vast squadrons" of the famous generals of the Thirty Years' War seldom exceeded thirty thousand men, and when fifty thousand imperial troops were assembled together once at Nördlingen, this was considered a very large number. Not till the time of the Roi Soleil of Versailles (Louis XIV) were there armies of a hundred thousand men, which the "Philosopher of Sans Souci" (Frederick II) made slightly larger still. Once, indeed, in the spring of 1757 he had actually brought 150,000 soldiers together.

Then came the French Revolution, and the *levée en masse* of 1793 produced an army of 700,000, while in 1812 Napoleon

¹ Cf. Hans Delbrück, "Geist und Masse in der Geschichte" ("Intellect and Numbers in History"), 1912. Verlag der "Preussischen Jahrbücher." Delbrück mentions the fact that at Hastings only four thousand Normans fought, and not 1,200,000, as reported; and that the Polish army at Tannenberg did not number 5,200,000, but only from sixteen to seventeen thousand; and so on.

² About sixty miles northwest of Babylon, on the Euphrates. The battle was fought in 401 B. C., between Artaxerxes Mnemon, King of Persia, and the rival brother, Cyrus the Younger, who fell.—Translator.

had actually 750,000 soldiers under the colors in Russia and Spain alone. Prussia, on the contrary, despite her considerable expansion, had in 1806 only 200,000 soldiers, including the fortification garrisons, half of them foreigners. After the peace of Tilsit, Scharnhorst¹ thought it out of the question for Prussia, with her five million inhabitants, to have an army exceeding 120,000 or at most 150,000; while in reality he did not insist upon the army numbering more than 70,000 on a peace footing and 87,000 on a war footing. According to Scharnhorst's principles, therefore, the strength of the German Army on a war footing would even now be allowed only slightly to exceed one million; and in any case he would have considered more than 1,600,000, or at most 2,100,000, out of the question in Germany to-day. Even the mass levy of 1813, when Germany's "whole military strength was strained to the uttermost," did not succeed in raising her army beyond 128,571 men,² inclusive of men fit for garrison service, which to-day would mean an army of only 1,700,000.

These facts therefore show the sudden and enormous increase of armies within recent years. From time immemorial armies have been comparatively small, and now all of a sudden we are overwhelmed by disaster. That it is a disaster is manifest from the direction of the curved line, which in the nineteenth century shows an upward tendency, and now seems as if it would never cease mounting upward. This, however, cannot be, and the following considerations will show that we shall again be overtaken by disaster, and this within measurable distance of time. Thus, supposing the tendency of the curve to remain the same as during the last century; that is, supposing it to increase very much in accordance with the equation:


$$\text{the strength of an army} = a \times at^5$$

¹ "Mémoires des Generals von Scharnhorst vom 21. 1807."

² According to C. von Plotho in "Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich." ("War in France and Germany.")

in which a stands for half a million and t for time. Then in about three generations we should already have armies numbering billions. Now, as these would exceed the population of those days, even allowing for the utmost possible rate of increase, it will be seen to be *logically* impossible for armies to continue to increase as they have done during the last

FIG. 5.



THE GROWTH OF ARMIES.

hundred years. Some cause *must* come into operation which will once more force the curved line to descend.¹ This is not merely a mathematical, but also a scientific, necessity.

¹ Even assuming that all human beings increase faster in the next hundred years than any nation has done hitherto, and that then all nations upon earth will be involved in war, and all available men and women take part in the war, there would still be nothing like enough of them. On the other hand, it is worthy of note that, according to this curve, still greater armies will be possible in the next few years.

That wars now involve so much larger numbers, therefore, need not alarm any one, especially as this is, at any rate, partly due to the growth of social impulses and to man's increased tendency to form associations. Even Homer says that fellow-countrymen do not make war on one another, and this is still so. The only difference is that the aggregates of people who feel as fellow-countrymen have grown larger. Once it was the tribe, then it was the city, and now it is the state, or rather, the union of states, which feels itself a separate entity. The greatness of such entities must of course always determine the greatness of war. That wars should become greater is in itself no proof that human beings have become more warlike and cantankerous, but rather a sign that they have become more peaceful and conciliatory.

§ 63.—*The Death Agony of the War Giant*¹

But there is yet another cause for consolation in the fact that wars continue to get bigger and bigger. Whenever anything is to die a natural death, it must first grow great; that is, reach its maximum size. In Germany mice have not become extinct, but first the aurochs died out, and the bison and then the bear and the wolf; and now even our proud stag is kept alive only by artificial means. In nature it is only the big creatures which die out; but everything which is big must and will die, because, in conformity with the inevitable law of growth, it will grow beyond the limits of what is possible.

¹ The word here used (that is, *gigantiasie*), signifying the death of giants, hints at one of the most important principles of self-regulation which can be deduced from paleontology. Bones found show that in the course of centuries all living creatures except insects, which have thus never become extinct, grow and grow, and then, when they have become very large and apparently all-powerful, they suddenly become extinct. The facts can be proved, and the reasons for this phenomenon have been hinted at in §§ 40 and 41. In reality it is the same thing as is called in the German legend "the dusk of the Gods" (*Götterdämmerung*).

This is the profound meaning which the natural scientist attaches to the phrase "the dusk of the Gods"—a meaning so easy to understand and yet so full of mystery. Idolized as war is, it, too, will be hurled from its pinnacle of power. In my opinion, indeed, any one dispassionately contemplating the spectacle of the present war cannot fail to see in it already many signs of the approaching downfall of wars. Across the vast battle-fronts blows a chill, warning breeze, betokening the approaching dusk of the gods.

Everything beautiful and characteristic about past wars has vanished; the gay camp life and the bright uniforms, the soldiers' wild spirits, the gorgeous heroism of the valiant "summoners to the fray," the men who used to fight in glorious single combats, and then, mounted on "white chargers" visible from afar, show themselves to their men, and last of all, standing on a distant hill, fix all eyes upon them, if only because of the noise made by their trumpeters.

The general has left the battle-field, and now the soldier has left it also, the former to sit in his villa, holding the telephone-receiver to his ear, and the latter to keep watches in the trenches. But the battle-field itself is empty and desolate, though the noise of battle can be heard for miles around.

It is impossible not to think that the battle-field has ceased to be the first consideration. Formerly the place of battle used to be carefully selected; now we lie down round the countryside and dig ourselves in. Where we do so, after all, matters not at all; only there must be a nice long line, as straight as possible, and there the armies lie, often, it is said, only a few yards apart, and make "war."

The bulk of the work is done in quite another way. One man calculates how much copper, gold, or iron there is; another, how best to make the supplies of corn, meat, fat, etc., "hold out"; a third, how the railways must be run; a fourth, where, according to the map, his missiles will hit; and a fifth, the general himself, for how many troops he must ask in order

to have the necessary "density" on a particular "space." They must not be too few, otherwise the attacking columns will not be deep enough, and there will be too few reserves; and they must also not be too many, otherwise there will be difficulty in feeding them. And many other persons are making many other calculations. Whoever calculates best wins. The fact that, instead of having a single man of genius as general, we have now the impersonal mechanism of the general staff may be taken as showing the extreme length to which this new order of things, which first showed itself in Prussia, has now been pushed.

Not for a moment do I assert that this mode of waging war is easier than the old way. Quite the contrary; and I am firmly convinced that it takes up more time. Frederick II and Napoleon, when in camp, not infrequently spent some time in "agreeable converse"; for Napoleon's many-sidedness, even when on campaign, was admirable. But I am quite ready to believe that Hindenburg does nothing but wage war. But there has been a change since Napoleon's time, a complete change; and there can be no doubt that the old lively, merry war is dead, its place having been taken by something new, something which to me seems to show signs of approaching decay, but which to others may seem to contain possibilities of further developments.

And it may be that they are right, for war has not yet attained its zenith. Once, while Freiligrath was still writing good poems, he described a wondrous vision of the last battle in Europe:

Zwei Lager heute zerklüften die Welt
Und ein Hüben, ein Drüben nur gilt.

This last die in the old game is not yet cast. Neutrals there still are, and perhaps old Freiligrath was right that there must first be some Armageddon, some battle in which the whole world will take part.¹

¹ Cf. what has been said (§ 34) about Europeans and Mongols.

If mankind does not recollect itself in time, then this last battle will come to pass; but then it will be an end of all things. One thing is certain: if war ever does attain its utmost possible size, then its death must ensue; for if once one half of mankind has had a victory over the other half, who is to go on fighting?

The course, however, is laid down along which human evolution, whether voluntarily or not, will proceed, and our good railways and steamers, our airmen and radio-telegrams of the future will insure this course being followed. The horrible aspect of human evolution in the past was just this, that while our technical knowledge and means of communication impelled us to be constantly forming new and larger, more comprehensive organizations, we crazy human beings, instead of using them as a source of ever-increasing benefits, converted them into a means of ever greater destruction.

However this may be, war will one day have attained its utmost limits, and another thing is certain: the last war will also be the greatest and most terrible, even as the last Saurian was the hugest of all. This being so, he who knows can afford to smile calmly, despite all the horrors going on, and even though he may perhaps feel the absurdity of these atrocities more keenly than any one else. Our technical knowledge, in brief, is causing war to grow to a gigantic size, and will then slay it. In nature it is always so. "Ajax fell through Ajax' strength," and the enormous speed at which our technical knowledge is progressing affords us this consolation, that the dusk of the war gods will not be long in coming.

§ 64.—*Defensive Warfare and Lying*

We have yet another cause for confidence. War is no longer accepted as a matter of course, but an attempt is made to impose verbal limits upon it. Cabinet warfare and offensive warfare, it is said, are wrong, and only defensive warfare is right. If those who talk thus meant what they said, this would be already something to the good; for before any

one can claim the just right of self-defense he must first have been attacked, and any one who approves of *defensive wars* only is really condemning the possibility of wars occurring at all; and if every one held such views, there would really be no more wars. But men in general do not yet hold such views. All they do, as Thomas Upham¹ says, is to turn war out at the front door in order secretly to let it in again at the back.

But let us put ourselves in the place of some particular nation which always believes that it was the other side which began. The question still remains as to what may really be justifiably defended. In primitive conditions it does not seem to have been difficult to decide in such a case. If a band of soldiers plundered and robbed in any district the farmers from the neighboring villages clubbed together and killed the peace-breakers, and this was looked on as legitimate self-defense. Matters at present are far more complex, for this apparently most legitimate kind of defense is now solely confined to those "wild beasts in human shape" denominated franc-tireurs. Moreover, for a long while past the defense of one's native soil has not been considered a distinguishing characteristic of defensive warfare any more than crossing the enemy's frontier is supposed to be at all a distinguishing characteristic of aggressive warfare, as Belgium's example proves.

This love of lying makes the expression "defensive warfare" a mere phrase. It goes without saying that if any one breaks into a house or invades a country, those concerned have a right to turn him out, although in civilized countries the police are generally used for such purposes. To have a police force capable of hanging or executing justice not merely on petty private individuals, but even on great generals and republics is precisely what the chivalrous opponents of robber barons are aiming at.

But who is to be considered the aggressor? He who fired

¹ Thomas Upham's "Manual of Peace."

the first shot, he first crossed the frontier, or he who sent the ultimatum? It is just he who will always say that he was merely acting in self-defense. Hence to-day it is more usual to seek for the *aggressor* and not for the *guilty party*. But to find him is much more difficult. In my student days I once wanted to defend myself against an obvious literary wrong done me, but my revered professor, the great physiologist, Ewald Hering, dissuaded me from doing so. "You say Herr X— made a mistake," he argued, "but he will reply that you are stupid. You object that abuse is no proof, but he will retort that you began abusing him. And so it will go. You will reproach each other with making misquotations, will make unimportant side issues the main issue, and will gradually get more and more insulting, till at length you stop without any result except that you will be enemies for life."

Most of the absolutely unnecessary so-called scientific controversies actually do arise in this way, without any one being really able to say who first began to adopt an unprofessional tone. A tavern brawl or a street fight comes about in just the same way, and so do wars. Men talk and act and misunderstand themselves into war.

From time immemorial the attempt has been made to convert every war into a defensive war by shifting the question of the blame from oneself on to some one else; but apparently Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, was the first systematically to set about doing this. When this monarch sailed across the Baltic to conquer Germany, he did so not as an aggressor, but as "*defensor fidei*"—Defender of the True Faith. This different point of view explains the many different opinions held about him. The wholly ignorant peasants of those days abided by hard facts only, and they have preserved such evil recollections of the Swedish knights and their Swedish jargon and other pious expedients that even now in North Germany the time of the Swedes is synonymous with a "time of terror." Historians, however, at all events those of Protestant inclinations, "rightly" consider that Gus-

tavus Adolphus was on the whole greatly to be admired for having gone to war.

A hundred other things can be just as well defended as religious beliefs; and, to give only one instance, in wars all over the world it is only too often evident that one combatant is defending his so-called rights and the other his liberty. Now, no one any longer attaches the least importance to rights which are mere matters of form. York formally broke the treaty of alliance existing with France, and in the middle of the war went over to Napoleon's enemies, thus instituting the war of liberation, which afterward received the king's sanction. Nevertheless, even in the opinion of still-living Frenchmen, Prussia is undeniably entitled to speak of her "Holy War" and of her defense, although it must never be forgotten that the "tyrant of the French" also believed that he was defending the civilization of Europe united under his command against the threatening inroads of Asiatics, which was his way of describing the hordes of Russian Cossacks. And if we would now solve the questions then raised, we should find that the solution depended upon whether we adopt the Russian, German, French, or European point of view. The institution of just defensive warfare was considerably extended by the introduction of preventive warfare, the chief characteristics of which have been revealed to us with considerable candor by Bismarck.¹ You must choose the time for striking your blow, which, in parenthesis, is, after all, only the "best way to cut a fine figure." For strategical reasons this time must be that in which "it is more to our advantage for matters to come to a head quickly than for them to drag on."² Skilful diplomacy must contrive to make out that it is we who have been attacked.³ Then, if things go ill, there is nothing more to be done; but if they go well, you can

¹ Bismarck's "Gedanken und Erinnerungen" ("Reflections and Recollections"), Vol. II, Chap. XXII, about the Ems telegram.

² Moltke's words, spoken at a luncheon on June 13, 1870.

³ Bismarck's "elucidation" on the same occasion

throw overboard any such old wives' tale as defensive warfare, and proudly admit a flourish of trumpets in order to show your statesmanlike qualities.

There are now such a host of conceptions which are possessions worth defending in consequence that every one nowadays insists upon having gone to war solely for purposes of defense. In proof of this we need only read the speeches delivered by the ministers of the powers taking part in the war of 1914. It should be noted that even if perhaps not all the ministers of all the ten powers were really convinced of the justice of their cause, yet obviously the overwhelming majority of the people were so.

Serbia is defending herself against "absorption" by Austria; Russia and Montenegro are defending their "brother by race"; Austria her "prestige in the Balkans"; Germany her "fidelity to the Nibelungen"; France is waging a war of liberation and defending the annexed provinces against the "conqueror"; England is defending the rights of neutrals; Japan the "Mongolian Idea" in the far East: and Belgium alone is defending her own soil, while as for Turkey, no one yet knows what she really is defending, although it would seem that, like Belgium, she did not enter the war entirely of her own free will.

Additional support has been lent to the foregoing definitions of war aims by the attitude of the socialist parties in the belligerent countries. These parties are certainly pacifically inclined and averse from any but defensive warfare. Hence their whole-hearted coöperation proves that these official assertions are really believed by the great mass of the people in belligerent countries. The German Social Democrats are assuredly the best disciplined of all, yet their papers contained statements to the effect that the only reason why Germany began her defensive war against Russian czarism by attacking Belgium was to be able to invade France by the line of least resistance, and that even the military subjugation of

France was to be merely a strategical episode in the defense of Germany against Russia!

But it is not only the mass of the people who think thus; even the educated classes do so. In England idealists of a pacifist turn of mind stultify their appeals for peace by suggestively intimating that (English) civilization must be defended against Prussian militarism; while their fellows in Germany think they must defend German civilization against English narrow-mindedness.

That all these views are subjectively true we are quite convinced, but for this very reason we must not allow them to be objectively true. Nothing could better show the impossibility of accurately defining the conception of defensive warfare than the constant repetition of such dicta. They simply prove once more that from the purely national point of view every war must be just and right if a nation enters upon it of its own free will. It was really not necessary to write any pamphlets on the subject, for they would never convince "the other side," to whom, of course, "their war" appears no less just and right. Whoever, therefore, desires to investigate the justness and rightness of war as war must adopt a higher point of view, the point of view of humanity. But in this case a war seems neither just nor right unless it in some way benefits mankind.

If therefore all these discussions concerning the defensive character of wars are absurd, and merely prove the absence of discerning, critical minds then every time any one attempts to justify his eagerness for war this must be considered as betokening that he is somewhat ashamed of himself. Furthermore, it is a proof that our views concerning war are undergoing a change, and that we are unconsciously condemning war for war's sake. A new truth may even be heralded by a lie.

2.—THE HUMANIZING OF WAR

§ 65.—*The Principle of Humaneness*

Perhaps the most marked characteristic of modern wars is that while, on the one hand, the scale on which they are waged is increasing, on the other hand, an attempt is being made to humanize warfare. All great men without exception have told us about the beauty of humaneness. There is nothing surprising in this, for, after all, the conception of humaneness is the logical deduction from the scientific fact of there being only one *genus humanum*, only one human species.

Among the dull mass of mankind there is probably a vague notion that such ideas are great and fine, but they are no less instinctively felt to be profound and terrible. Hence men substitute for this dangerous living conception the safe *dead* symbol of a transcendent, but unattainable, God, whom they need neither resemble nor follow. Thus the deification of Christ in the second century meant simply a falling away from Him. Imitation of Christ had ceased, and a stage was erected for revering Him.

Not one of us but is aware that society to-day does hateful and inhuman things, but it is these very things which it is thought possible to beautify by covering them with a cloak of love of mankind, about which otherwise no one troubled their heads; else it could not have come to pass that the word humaneness is now never used except in discussing the inhuman. No one talks of treating his own kind humanely; but when there were still slaves, we used to endeavor to be "humane" to them; and even now the conquerors of a country are "humane" to the conquered.

No one considers the question of the desirability of maintaining the death-penalty from the point of view of the laws of humanity, but from that of practical expediency. It must, however, be "humanely" carried out. The guillotine was a "humane" invention, and the fact that we now only shoot,

hang, behead, or electrocute our fellow-men proves how much "more humane" we have become since the Middle Ages, when executions were sometimes performed by a wheel.

Thus we have invented humane warfare! A general belief prevails, in fact, that wars can be made juster and less unpleasant by waging them according to methods sanctified by tradition, and now also established by the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, by the Paris Convention of 1856, or the Declaration of London of 1908, by the First or Second Hague Convention (of 1899 and 1907), or by some other mutual agreement.

True, some juggling with words is still needful. War in general and in principle substitutes might for right, as all great military writers, Clausewitz, for instance, quite candidly admit as something which goes without saying. Consequently, all manner of artifices must be resorted to in order to bring in the right. Thus Kahl, the well-known authority on criminal law, lays it down quite simply that "war is a struggle of one state against another, but not murder committed by one human being upon another." On this principle he adds, the humaneness of modern wars is based.

Now, these are at best empty words, for as yet no one has discovered how to carry on war between one country and another without killing human beings in so doing. It might be said that it is man's business to find out how to fight his wars without needing to kill persons. But, then, modern warfare would have to be condemned, since it is unthinkable without slaughter on both sides and without one man murdering another. In principle this view has always been put forward even by the supporters of war. William Lloyd Garrison, founder of the "Non-resistance Movement," scoffed at such humbug when he wrote: "A man must not kill, else he is a murderer. Two, ten, or a hundred men are murderers if they kill. But a nation may kill, and for ten thousand men to murder one another is even a good and praiseworthy action."¹

¹ I have not his *exact* words by me.—Translator.

Having stated this fact, he then innocently asks *how many human beings must there really be for them to be allowed to break God's command?*

Victor Hugo likewise asks, perhaps still more pointedly: "When will nations realize that to *magnify* a crime can never make it *smaller*? If killing is really wrong, then it cannot possibly be an extenuating circumstance that it was done on a large scale; if stealing is disgraceful, then there can be nothing glorious in taking a province."

In La Rochefoucauld's "Maximes"¹ the same opinion occurs, ironically put: "Il y a des crimes qui deviennent innocents et même glorieux par leur éclat, leur nombre et leur excès. De là vient que les voleries publiques sont des habilités, et que prendre des provinces, s'appelle faire des conquêtes."

And now let us see what a German has to say. Schiller puts similar words into the mouth of his *Fiesco*: "It is disgraceful to empty a purse, impudent to embezzle a million, but inexpressibly grand to steal a crown. The shame decreases with the increase of the sin." Schiller's Genoese character, it is true, does not mean this ironically, but he, too, has to die, and just because he has said this.

Thus English, French, and German men of letters seem to have agreed upon this question. Above all in Germany, the land of justice, this reflection frequently occurs in one form or another. For instance, Johann Gottfried Seume² has the following striking lines:

Wenn Banditen nur mit Dolchen morden,
Bleicht man ihren Schädel auf dem Holz.
Aber wenn der Heldentross in Horden
Länder würgt, so sind die Helden stolz.

¹ La Rochefoucauld: "Maximes et réflexions morales," 1795.

² J. G. Seume, "Aus der Elegie auf einem Feste zu Warschau," ("From an Elegy on a Warsaw Fort"), 1794. Seume knew something of war, having fought in the American War of Independence, although as a German constrained to fight on the side of the English oppressors.

Durch der Politiken schiefe Brille
 Ist Moralität ein Possenspiel,
 Und Gerechtigkeit nur eine Grille,
 Die in Philosophenschädel fiel.

Friedrich Hebbel¹ phrases it still more pathetically when he says mankind cannot but blush for its worst members:

Der Räuber braucht die Faust nur hin und wieder,
 Der Mörder treibt sein Werk nicht ohne Grauen,
 Du hast das Amt zu rauben und zu töten!

§ 66.—*The Theory and Practice of Noble War*

The privilege of theoretically explaining how it may be right to apply force was, however, reserved for our own times. We used to be content to describe the formalities connected with placing might before right as legal, or at any rate as fair.

From time immemorial endeavors have been made to draft rules which would enable an enemy country to be decorously destroyed. In so doing the false analogy of "peaceful competition" has often been quoted, or, as was done recently by the German Emperor, Chrysippos's² words repeated, that "in running a race not even the runner must lay a hand on his competitor's shoulder, or put out a leg to trip him up."

But even for sports these rules fluctuate, and the Idi Jidzu allows a leg to be put out. War is assuredly no sport, but deadly earnest, and the essential distinction between sport and serious fight is that in the latter there is no doubt about its being allowable to put out a leg; at all events, it is done.

Whoever abides by rules and regulations, however, "saves his face," and accordingly there has always been a code of honor for belligerents; and the more horrible the methods of warfare and the more highly civilized the combatants, the more stress was laid on its outward application. "Thus in the savage wars of the Diadochi a chivalry was observable

¹ Friedrich Hebbel, "Die menschliche Gesellschaft am Schleideweg" ("Human Society at the Parting of the Ways"), 1841.

² Cf. Cicero "De Officiis," Book III, Chap. 10.

seldom found otherwise in fighting in ages long past.”¹ This code of honor, however, varied very greatly. In Alexander’s time night attacks seem to have been proscribed. At any rate, he is reported to have said to Polyperchon, who advised him to attack Darius by night, that “he would rather have to bewail a defeat than blush for a victory” (“*malo me fortunæ poeniteat, quam victoriae pudeat*”).²

The Florentines considered surprise attacks improper. At any rate, Machiavelli³ says how, four weeks before declaring war, they rang the “Martinella,” a particular bell kept for the purpose; while as for the ancient Teutons, it is known that they made sure that wind and sun were equally in favor of themselves and their enemies.

The ancient Islamites were not allowed to wage war in the holy month of Rhamasan, and in Christian countries not so long since it was the general custom for fighting to cease on Sundays and holidays. Similar customs are narrated of many other peoples, but they seem to have been merely exceptions, resorted to when victory was believed to be assured. In any case, no such scruples prevented Alexander from crossing the Danube by night in order to surprise the Getes, whom otherwise he was unable to conquer, or from similarly attacking the careless Illyrians by night. The Florentines, indeed, never had much opportunity of ringing the Martinella, for in their palmy days they chiefly devoted themselves to science and art, and did not wage any serious wars until the days of the republic were numbered. Consequently they could not become expert military strategists; but, after all, Florence did produce Machiavelli, and even supposing him to have been as utterly unscrupulous as we were taught at school, yet the tendencies of his “seven books on the arts of war” and of his “Prince” are very much against any such things as Mar-

¹ W. Wagner, “Hellas, Land und Volk der alten Griechen,” II, p. 662. Leipsic.

² Quintus Curtius IV, 13.

³ Machiavelli, “Istorie florentine”: Florence, 1532.

tinella bells. Even that greatly extolled Teuton Hermann von Cheruskia, departing from what was supposed to be German tradition, contrived skilfully to exploit the climatic conditions of the Teutoburg wood to his own advantage. In order to be able to make war even in the holy month, Mohammed simply modified his religion, and Sunday rest in warfare has long been abolished. Indeed, despite all the pope's efforts, it was not possible to induce the belligerents to have a brief armistice to keep Christmas, when, according to Christian tradition, the angels announced "peace on earth."

Fine words in general were always chiefly reserved for official ministerial utterances. In practice Lysander's¹ saying was followed, that, "if a lion's skin is not enough, a fox's hide must be taken." If strength did not suffice, then a little craft was resorted to as well.

Any one trusting too much to international rules of war; any one who went as a flag-of-truce man to the enemy, as for instance Count Montfort went to the Count von Nassau at the defense of the Pont-à-Mousson, which has again become celebrated of late, was only accounted a fool, and taken prisoner.² Similarly even Napoleon on the *Bellerophon* did not find that "hospitality" for which he had hoped, and which he was perhaps entitled to expect.

In reality it has always been thus. The oldest war was decided by a horse being smuggled in, and Socrates's pupil, Xenophon, in his "Cyropædia" recommends many and abominable military stratagems, and, what is more, in his "Anabasis" he applies them. The Japanese attacked the Russian fleet without having declared war; the *Emden* stuck on a fourth funnel; the English use the flags of neutral countries, etc.³ But every one considers his own particular stratagem allowable, and only those of the enemy not allowable.

¹ Cf. Plutarch's "Lysander," C. IV, c.

² Cf. Montaigne's "Essais," Livre I, Chap. 5, 1580. ("Whether the captain of a place besieged ought to sally forth to parlie.")

³ Even Dr. Nicolai does not seem always above repeating unproved

Non armis sed vitiis certatur—war is not waged with weapons but with crimes. The victor is always right.

Fu il vincer sempremai laudabile cosa
Vincasi o per fortuna, o per ingenio.¹

And since this is so, and since strategy evidently always succeeds better than strength, and nothing matters but success, wars in all civilized nations are gradually becoming more horrible and unchivalrous.

The "noble war" between Cæsar and Pompey, in which neither general ever forgot his respect for the other, was followed by the struggle between the triumvirs and Cæsar's murderers, which was carried on with every kind of slander and contemptibleness. And will any one deny the Franco-Prussian War having been more chivalrous than that of 1914?

Treaties, however sacred, make no difference, for, as Bethmann-Hollweg quite rightly told the British ambassador, in war-time they are scraps of paper. In actual fact, even now violations of the so-called Geneva Convention are the order of the day in all armies. Doctors, military hospitals, and churches are fired upon as often as "tactical conditions" require. Men anxious to surrender are killed, either "because the enemy abuses the white flag," or even without any excuse, merely in obedience to instructions to "give no quarter." Furthermore, every one is killed now if, in view of the situation in general, it may be taken for granted that they would surrender if only they were asked. Within the same category of actions must be included the dropping of bombs by airmen on undefended towns, and likewise the sinking of trading-vessels without allowing the crews time to save their lives. No one can be reproached for such actions; they are the laws or, rather, the customs, of war; and it is no mere chance that both the most modern weapons of war have made

and unprovable statements of the German press during this war.—Translator.

¹ Ariosto, "Orlando Furioso," Canto XV, v. 1. 1516.

it possible still further to enhance the horrors of war. "We have not got used to such weapons yet," it is alleged, which of all the surprises afforded by this war seems to me the most melancholy.

Two innocent, age-old dreams of mankind are now fulfilled, man, being the only genuine tribion,¹ has used his brain for the invention of contrivances which make of him both a bird and a fish, for he is master of both the heights and the depths. He can fly over frontiers and dive under them. The idea germinates in the heads of the fortunate inventors, and the frontiers collapse; and what makes the inventors still prouder is the consciousness of having promoted not merely technical science, but also the brotherhood of man. But, lo! the military commandeers the invention, and use it solely to carry war over those frontiers hitherto erected against it by man's free will.

How little specialists thought of such a possibility before the war came and more or less disturbed their mental balance may be shown by a single instance. A few years ago, when Sir Arthur Conan Doyle² warned England to be prepared for emergencies, urging that with the help of submarines her supplies might be cut off and her people starved out, Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald wrote that he considered any such forward-looking measures unnecessary, for he did not believe that any civilized nation would torpedo unarmed and defenseless trading-vessels.

Poor, sentimental Fitzgerald! So you, too, thought war was a game to be played in accordance with the rules of some congress or other, and now thousands of people must pay for your folly. But it may be that there are still people who would rather have been wrong with old Fitzgerald than have won a victory by means of submarines.

¹ Amphibion is an animal living in two elements; as the frog, for instance, lives in the water and on land. A tribion is one living in three elements, as man can now do, and man only.

² Conan Doyle, "Danger! A Story of England's Peril." Published in 1911 in the "Strand Magazine."

§ 67.—*The Value of Humanitarian Effort*

Despite all these absurdities, deep meaning and justification underlie all efforts, even those of the lowest nations, to make it appear as if there were a chivalrous side to war. Even the military honor of barbarians, for instance, forbids the use of poisoned weapons, though in the case of these primitive folk this was not agreed upon by any convention, but corresponded to deep-rooted and at the time very valuable instincts.

The fighting on the plains of Troy and even the knightly battles of the Middle Ages consisted mainly in hand-to-hand fighting, in which the object was to vanquish your opponent by physical valor and skill. A poisoned lance-point would then have meant that victory would have been not to the better warrior, but to him who had contrived merely slightly to scratch his adversary. Hence the horror of "cowardly murder by poison," which is an innate and ineradicable instinct of all normal human beings.

For like reasons formerly the "insidious bow" was proscribed in the wars of Teutonic peoples, and the Second Lateran Council in 1139 forbade the use of the crossbow, of course only among Christians. To cause the death of heretics by this means was permissible.¹

Even then this was of very slight avail, for only fifty years later Richard Cœur de Lion founded the first Crossbow Shooters' Companies, and the crossbow soon became the favorite weapon of the Germans. It must be admitted, however, that these nations, in thus disregarding the papal injunctions, gave proof of a sound instinct; for even then fighting was beginning to develop into battles involving numbers of human beings and in which chivalry could no longer exercise any selective influence. Now and not till now did such prohibitions become meaningless, for an enemy miles away is fired

¹ A. Demmin, "Die Kriegswaffen" ("Weapons of War"), 1869: Leipzig. P. 69.

upon or the trenches are "peppered" with machine-guns, more or less at a venture, and therefore it must be a mere chance whether any particular man is hit. The plain truth is that the more effective a projectile is to-day, the better it is for use in war.

Yes, say the advocates of these wonderful humane theories, but all that is wanted is to put the enemy out of action; he ought not to be killed unnecessarily. In their wars against the Hottentots, they say, the British noticed that these savages, if wounded only in the arm or even in the body with our modern small-caliber rifles, often continued to advance. In such case it was needful to have more powerful rifles; but in Europe they are not needed.

Now, first, it often happens with us that wounded men continue to fight or at any rate to shoot, and in particular experience shows that these slightly wounded men return to the front after a few weeks. In Germany eighty per cent. of all men included in war losses are said to be "slightly wounded." Now, even if they are out of action for the time being, they are by no means incapable of taking any further part in the war, and indeed they continue fit for service until at length, even without Dumdum bullets, they are shot dead or crippled. At best, therefore, a "*humane bullet*" may be compared for mercifulness with cutting off a dog's tail bit by bit. The operation is not over till a certain amount of the tail is cut off, or, as the case may be, a certain proportion of the nation is out of action.

Even those who do not or will not see the brutal logic of this, however, ought to be ashamed thus to tamper with the conception of humaneness. To-day, when all the most refined technical methods are in use, when wolves' lairs are dug, in which soldiers get impaled on stakes, and then slowly expire; when barbed-wire entanglements are constructed, which are then "cleared" with machine-guns when enough "stuff" has got caught in them; when wire trellises are made, charged with electricity, and men left hanging dead in them like flies; when

the enemy's trenches are syringed with petroleum, so as to burn the people in them, or their unsuspecting occupants blown into the air by subterranean mines; to-day, when poisoned bombs are used; when "airmen's arrows," dropped from the air, pin the enemy, "like a frog," flat to the ground; to-day, when shrapnel and grenades, prepared with the utmost care in view of an explosion on the largest possible scale, are employed, and human beings are torn to pieces therewith; to-day it is insisted that the Dumdum bullet is the acme of brutality. A German journalist, Herr Binder, calls it "bestially cruel," "one of the most barbarous methods of warfare known to history," as it is put in the telegram of his Majesty the German Emperor to President Wilson.

The immense excitement caused in September by this Dumdum bullet question, whereby even the German Emperor was induced to take the unusual step of addressing a formal protest to the President of the United States, can be explained only by man's instinctive craving for genuine humaneness—a craving which has assumed such proportions, owing to this most cruel and horrible of all wars, that even the smallest "token of humaneness" appears worth striving after.

Even Sternickel, the murderer who committed in cold blood a dozen murders and robberies combined, was proud of never having caused the death of a child, thinking this a sufficient concession to justice. Thus in every human being there is some trace of a sense of shame, and even the combatants to-day say, "True, we do murder and set on fire, plunder and pillage, and offend against the laws of Christian and human justice, but—we do not use Dumdum bullets"!

Such reasoning is not merely foolish, but even dangerous, for it makes men think that war is consistent with humaneness, and thus helps them to become accustomed to a horrible state of things. *But we must not become accustomed to anything of the sort.* If we want to remain members of the society of human beings we must consider war as at any rate something extraordinary and abnormal. Modern humanitarian en-

deavors to lessen the horrors of war are, it is true, frequently charity misdirected, but still they do proceed from charity, and a charity which, as might be proved, is fundamentally sound.

Now, just as the war instinct shows that courage and love of action still survive in mankind,—courage and action which only need directing into other channels,—so does this longing for humaneness prove the existence of something in mankind which is a guaranty for the future. We may, for instance, consider rules about Dumdum bullets virtually useless and possibly even ridiculous; yet we may and even ought to do everything in our power to insure the observance of such rules. However small may be the concession made, it still is a concession, and we are thereby rid of a bit of war.

From this point of view even the Geneva Convention and the prohibition of Dumdum bullets are valuable; and it is some satisfaction to be able to state that *no* nation seems purposely to have infringed this prohibition. True, such bullets have been found in the hands of subjects of *all* nations. Dumdum bullets, indeed, are manufactured by government ammunition factories in all countries,¹ for hunting and other purposes for soldiers' rifles. Whenever towns are conquered, parcels of such bullets are of course found, in Government wrappers. Besides this, it has happened in all armies that a few men, particularly officers who procure their own ammunition, were intentionally provided with such cartridges; but it is one thing to make this statement and quite another to assert, as has been done by both belligerents, that the enemy systematically makes use of such bullets.

There are other reasons, however, why such regulations are valuable. They are self-imposed limitations, adherence to which is a recognition in principle of the fact that the attainment of its objects in war is not a nation's highest goal.

In 1839, when Belgium's "perpetual neutrality" was pro-

¹ The official name for them in Germany is "*Halbmantelgeschosse*," which might be rendered as "half-length cheat bullets."—Translator.

claimed, Germany and France in particular made war between each other more difficult; and from that day forth they knew that an impassable wall was erected along the frontier of this neutral land—a wall based on their own agreement.

In 1856, when the Declaration of Paris insured captured vessels being brought before a proper prize court,¹ man made it impossible for himself clandestinely to sink vessels, of which the old naval ballads of all seafaring peoples used to boast as a heroic action.²

In 1899, when the Second Declaration of the Hague Convention forbade the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gases, mankind voluntarily deprived itself of one of the most effective weapons, and one which, with the ever-increasing discoveries of modern technical science, promised every day to become more valuable.

But whatever our opinion of the value or importance of such conventions, the fact remains that, once they have been concluded, discussion about them must cease; for henceforth, if they are violated, not merely is harm done to the enemy, but the violator's own honor is irreparably injured. Nothing in this war, therefore, is so deplorable as the violation of Belgium neutrality, submarine warfare, and the use of asphyxiating gases; for thereby not merely are human lives destroyed, but human honor.

3.—THE COMPARATIVE RETROGRADENESS OF WAR

§ 68.—*Reasons for This*

It takes two players to play chess, and to play at war it takes only two generals, though the armies in this case do not

¹ The details were enacted for Germany by the law of May 3, 1884. "Short proceedings" are perhaps allowable on board captured vessels in certain circumstances, but at any rate their papers must be properly examined

² Cf. for instance the English ballad, "There was a ship that sailed," in which the captain's boy swims up to and secretly bores a hole in a Spanish galleon.

consist of wood or ivory figures, but of flesh-and-blood human beings. True, of late even war has become an industrial undertaking, and thus even here machinery to a certain extent competes with the laboring classes, so much so that those persons ever anxious to find catchwords, and wrong catchwords, for everything have even spoken of a "*machine war*." But mankind has not yet got so far. In other branches of life machinery, it is true, has become marvelously independent of assistance from human hands; but in war the musketeer is still more important than the musket, and the gunner than the gun.

That war should be so surprisingly retrograde, considering the high standard of our technical knowledge, is due to quite simple and universal human characteristics. First, there certainly does still lurk in men's minds an instinctive feeling that war to-day is some kind of degenerate sport, which is scarcely worth while unless one is actually there oneself. Moreover, sportsmen have an "antipathy" to all modern improvements. Thus a "true yachtsman" would rather be in constant danger of capsizing than get a practical patent reef. There are many more of these harmless sportsman-like prejudices, such as the huntsman's preference for his double-barreled gun rather than a modern "Browning," and the old angler's preference for his lob-worm rather than an artificial fly. A rider of the good old school despised the comfortable English trot,¹ which until recently was actually forbidden in the German Army; while, as for the South Sea Islander, he does not even think of exchanging his bow for a modern rifle.

Now, the soldier takes a similar point of view, thereby making himself more indispensable, and hindering the development of military science. Another instance of the soldier's tendency to lag behind the times is the following. Two remarkably practical inventions, such as torpedoing in the dark and destroying whole regiments by poisonous gases, meet with

¹ For a year it has been called a "light trot," but riding-masters sometimes make slips of the tongue.

considerable resistance, for the soldier continues to lag behind technicians and chemists, who are bound by no chivalrous traditions.

What has chiefly stood in the way of military science being vigorously developed, however, is that the modern soldier is so cheap. Formerly a soldier had a certain value. A general had, let us say, fifty thousand soldiers, and used them, and when they were all shot down, the war was simply lost. Consequently, he was careful how he made war, and sacrificed as few men as possible. Now, however, he has an inexhaustible reservoir to draw upon in the shape of the nation as a whole; and wherever this reservoir is largest, as in the case of the Russians, then, judging from the reports of the general staff, men are sacrificed most senselessly and cold-bloodedly. Even in Germany, especially in the early days of the war, there was not much economy of human lives, at all events in comparison with former wars. Cheap human material, however, is always and everywhere used for all manner of things that could quite well be done by machinery, just as the cheapness of the coolie in China at present has hitherto prevented modern machinery being used to any very great extent.

In naval warfare alone, with its torpedoes, floating mines, etc., machinery is now perforce somewhat used to replace human labor, although in this case ships are involved of which each dozen cost about \$250,000,000 to build, and therefore represent very considerable sums.

Moreover, war is essentially unproductive. "Necessity teaches man to pray," it is said, and perhaps it really has taught many to pray. But, at all events, necessity teaches man to work, and necessity is the mother of invention; for, as Goethe says, "necessity is the best counselor." Professor Ostwald even thinks that necessity was the mother of all great inventions, because the only inventions ever made have been those necessitated by circumstances.

Now, necessity being so good a teacher, it might be thought

that the great necessities of war must necessarily have produced great inventions. This, however, is not the case, for the method and purpose of war are to appropriate the fruits of others' work without working oneself. War therefore, does not teach man to work, and consequently does not teach him to invent either, inventions being always the fruit of labor.

Again, war is generally merely a passing phase, and there is not time to profit by the necessity it brings, which, moreover, is too great, and too great necessity acts as a check. For instance, arctic peoples, who have had to contend too much against the severity of nature, and have produced no original inventions of their own. Of course if a war lasts as long as this one, and absorbs all the intellectual and material forces of the nations, it is not surprising if there should be a few inventions while it is going on. There can be not the slightest doubt, however, that future statistics will prove that the average annual number of inventions in Europe during the war was smaller—much smaller in comparison—than in any correspondingly long period we may select in the last few decades. At any rate, it is a fact that not a single past war has ever anywhere been the cause of any noteworthy invention, which again is but one more proof of the comparative unimportance of war for the human race.

Hunger and anxiety about daily bread have sought out many inventions. They taught man how to cultivate the soil and how to breed domestic animals; they invented the plow and all other agricultural implements and machinery; they taught man to hunt and to fish, and even effected improvements in firearms. And it was love, that other great necessity to which man is subject—love and the impulse to make advances to others, which led to speech and writing, to the building of roads, the equipment of ships, and eventually to all modern means of communication. War, however, as I shall now proceed to show, has virtually taught mankind nothing.

The one astonishing result of this war is that the economic

distress caused by it is not giving rise to more inventions; but this is understandable when it is reflected that men of high attainment used to take scarcely any interest in war, and that workshops and laboratories are now mostly deserted. In particular the young men, whose ideas are still young and new,¹ are all at the front.

Moreover, upheaval in all commercial life must of course stand in the way of any really serious efforts to promote civilization.

§ 69.—*What Are the Facts?*

When first invented, the sword, in the true sense of the word, was meant for a plowshare, and not used by men of war until later.² But now that they had their weapon, they were actually incapable of improving it; it is an ascertained fact, to which Peschel³ first drew attention, that weapons requiring some skill in their management, such as bows and arrows, have been evolved only among hunting peoples, while agricultural peoples fight with the spear, which is much easier to handle.

This continued to be the case even in historical times. Between ancient times and the beginning of the nineteenth century war material hardly improved at all, and military science hardly developed at all. Even the use of black powder for shooting, which came into vogue in Europe in the thirteenth century, made little difference; and after the first blunderbusses reëchoed at Crécy in 1346, there was no further change in anything for half a century.

Moreover, firearms came into use very gradually, and nowhere did they produce any far-reaching effects. James Fenimore Cooper's Indian novels made us imagine that the "rifles

¹ As the contemporary Swedish physiologist Tigerstadt has shown, virtually all men of genius made their principal discoveries before the age of thirty, and, we may certainly add, before their forty-fifth year.

² Cf. Ludwig Noiré's "Das Werkzeug" ("Tools").

³ Oskar Peschel's "Völkerkunde" ("Ethnology"), 1874, fifth edition, 1881, pp. 183-186.

of the palefaces'' conquered the redman. There is of course some truth in this, but the importance of the rifle is overestimated. Cortez, for instance, after his "*noche triste*" ("night of sorrow") had not a single rifle left, and the victory of *Otumba*¹ was decided in his favor by "crossbows and Toledo swords."

It is likewise significant that, even at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Machiavelli,² according to his "Art of War," would have had half the infantry armed in "Roman fashion" with sword and shield. Of the other troops he would have provided some "with pikes, like the Swiss," and some with long-distance weapons, such as "crossbows or muskets." In the Spanish armies shields were not given up till some time in the seventeenth century, and in the armies of the Thirty Years' War there were, on an average, twice as many pikemen as musketeers; consequently only about one third of the foot soldiers can have been provided with firearms. Only gradually did the proportion of soldiers with firearms increase, and in the Wars of Liberation the first file of the Prussian last line—one third of the whole number—were originally armed with pikes. In general, however, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the pike had been replaced by the bayonet, at all events in regular armies.

Lances, or weapons resembling them, such as scythes, however, continued to be used till far on in the nineteenth century in revolutionary armies, volunteer corps, and whenever the last line was called up. Every one has heard of the Paris pikemen of the French Revolution, and of the Polish and Hungarian scythesmen, and even in this war, for instance, in the fighting near Arras in the autumn of 1914, dismounted French cavalymen, armed with lances, have taken part in infantry bayonet-fights. Even now there are good "military instructors" who assert that the most important engagements are decided only by hand-to-hand fighting; and

¹ July 7, 1520, over the Mexicans.

² Machiavelli's "*Dell' arte della guerra*," 1535. I, VII.

if, owing to a quite natural tendency to overestimate modern military science, there may have been an inclination to doubt this, there are our general staff reports to prove that in this war there really has been a reversion to methods of fighting which are comparatively very primitive.

Thus on June 14, 1915, the Austrians attempted to destroy the Italians, as the latter were advancing in the gorges of the Cima Norre, by means of boulders, which they hurled down on them from the rocky sides of the Belfiore. Now, history teaches us that this is a method of fighting to which even the anthropoids used to resort. Again, the German colonial forces in East Africa are said to have used bees as a means of defense,¹ which is unquestionably practical, but which had been forgotten in Europe since the Thirty Years' War, and, as far as I know, had never been used in the interval save by a few Australian blacks. As to whether the statement of our general staff that Russian troops were armed with "oaken clubs" is to be taken literally or not, no opinion need be offered here. After all, certain present-day methods of warfare are absolutely medieval.

Let us consider how much has been invented since the year 1300. Compasses, clocks and watches, thermometers, barometers, telescopes and microscopes, enable observations to be made with an accuracy undreamed of before. From Germany the art of printing spread over the whole world; the primitive weaver's loom was replaced first by Cartwright's mechanical loom, and afterward by that of Jacquard. The magical science of alchemy became metamorphosed into scientific chemistry. Galilei and Newton laid anew the base of physics; the foundations of electrical knowledge were established, and it was speedily put to practical use in the lightning-conductor; steam-engines and balloons were invented; gas was introduced for lighting purposes; the technical processes of glass and porcelain manufacture were modernized: in short,

¹ Beehives are thrown into the enemy's ranks, and the angry insects cause disorder among the soldiers by stinging them.

science and technical knowledge everywhere advanced. War, however, had neither part nor lot in all this, albeit in this period there was no lack of war. Nor did any one even take any trouble to utilize a single one of these inventions for military purposes. Matters continued thus until about the end of the eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century national armies came into existence, and the average middle-class man had to devote his wits to the noble business of warfare. This did not have the effect of making war more creative, but at all events military men learned from thenceforth to take advantage of inventions already made.

Accordingly, explosives were considerably improved. In 1800 an Englishman, Edward Howard, invented fulminate of mercury, and eighteen years later Egg, the engineer, constructed percussion-caps from it. In 1846 the German chemist Schönbein invented gun-cotton, and a French chemist, Sobrero, the following year invented nitro-glycerin. Twenty years later Alfred Nobel produced the first dynamite. All these inventions, however, were nowise intended for war, but for mining and mining only; and it was almost as if he wished to atone for the disastrous use—a use which he did not intend—made of his invention for the wholesale destruction of human beings that Nobel founded his peace prize.

Meantime not only explosives were being perfected, but also firearms. Napoleon's soldiers still fought with the old flintlock, in which scarcely any improvement had been effected since the Thirty Years' War. Drevse's needle-gun of 1827, Colt's revolver of 1831, the Mauser rifle in 1863, and Mannlicher's repeating-rifle of 1878, are all phases in this new development. At the same time in cannon the transition to breech-loaders was proceeding, calibers were tending to become larger and larger, and resort was being had to technical inventions, such as recoiling-barrels. The invention of the Whitehead torpedo in 1867 must also not be forgotten.

That war had an indirect influence on these improvements in firearms cannot perhaps be denied, although in war itself

no improvement has ever been made; but here again it would be necessary to inquire how much must be ascribed to improvements in guns for hunting purposes. Even if we set everything down to war, however, this would be the sum total of what war has achieved in the domain of inventions; and what is that in a century of such unparalleled technical advance?

It is true that war has gradually learned to utilize inventions for its own purposes. Here, again, war is a Moloch, devouring everything, and usurping for himself inventions made for peace. Just as war commandeers wheat and gold, so does it take possession of ideas, which is perhaps the worst thing about it. The telegraph and the railway, steamers and motor-cars, have been drawn into its service. Hardly had Monier suggested making buildings of concrete than fortifications began to be built of it. Graham Bell's telephone and Marconi's wireless telegraphy were immediately utilized for war. When Schuckert constructed his search-light, or Gruson or Krupp invented some new steel composite material, all were instantly used for some military purpose. Some few modern inventions, indeed, such as airships and submarines, are used almost exclusively for war. If it occurs to our military men, however, to use the airships presented to them for attacking England, they are no more inventors on that account than Mr. Brown when he has his private house connected by telephone with his office.

§ 70.—*The Mischief of Overestimating the Art of War*

To apply inventions in this way is cheap; and just because the European military spirit has suffered a great many inventions to be reserved for military purposes, and because a new invention can scarcely ever command any government assistance unless it seems as if it might be of some importance in war, an erroneous impression might prevail that war in some way or other promotes technical advance. There is no doubt whatever that in a sense the science of arms, which is very handsomely supported by government, can develop

in quite a different way from the peaceful science of mechanical construction, which is embarrassed by considerations of what will pay and what will not. Circumstances have so greatly favored the manufacture of iron plates, for instance, that it has really been the case of many improvements, by which the business of iron foundries in general and, indeed, all technical science have benefited.

But it would be wrong to call technical science an enemy of civilization because it has been responsible for various murderous contrivances. Similarly it would be wrong to ascribe to war as war a beneficial effect on technical science. If government would pay the iron industry as much for its peaceful products as it now pays for its warlike ones, the results would be fully as satisfactory. True, the largest incomes in Europe were those of Krupp, the Cannon King, and Nobel, the Dynamite King; but in more peaceful America there are wheat kings, steel kings, pig kings, and beer kings.

Airships and aëroplanes are a melancholy confirmation of the truth of what has just been said. They are a new means of getting about, whereby men are brought closer together. Zarathustra's dream of the overstepping of all boundaries seemed on the eve of fulfilment, and, lo! militarism intervenes and converts this admirable instrument of peace into a weapon of war, albeit at present not a very dangerous one; and it seems as if every future success must have to do with war. We are still under the same delusion as that which led the youth athirst for knowledge to ask Archimedes to be good enough to initiate him into the "divine art wherewith he had defended the walls of Syracuse against the Roman attacking machinery." But we have never yet understood what Archimedes meant by his reply that art was indeed "divine," but that was "before it was in the service of the state."

Inventions which serve a warlike purpose are no less over-estimated than war itself. The invention of powder alone has

actually passed into a proverb,¹ which would never have been the case had people known that Berthold Schwarz did not invent it for any warlike purpose, but that gunpowder was a very ancient invention of the Chinese, who used it for purposes of amusement and for fireworks.

The enormous quantities of materials used in war have deeply impressed many persons, but even from this point of view war will not stand the test of serious criticism. Our estimating a country's technical development by the number of dreadnoughts which it is able to construct simultaneously merely proves that in our iron age there is no money for peaceful works of civilization. Moreover, large as men-of-war may be, modern liners are larger. A forty-two centimeter Morser is assuredly huge, but our own telescopes, rotary presses, etc., are still huger. Architecture has certainly added more to its laurels by building churches and modern market buildings than by building fortifications and barracks. With the two and half million cubic meters of stone from the Pyramid of Cheops alone it would be possible to build thrice over the Aurelian Wall encircling the Eternal City—a wall which is one of the most powerful defense works that have ever existed.²

Even the very extensive excavations necessitated by modern trench warfare are as nothing compared with what was needed in the construction of the Panama Canal, for instance. If Germany were entirely surrounded with a triple line of trenches, each six feet six inches deep by two feet six inches broad, it would only be necessary to throw up 20,000,000 cubic meters of earth, not much more than was dredged up out

¹ For instance, "*Er hat das Pulver nicht erfunden*" (French: "*Il n'a pas inventé la poudre*"), which may be rendered as "He'll never set the Thames on fire"; and "*er ist keinen Schuss Pulver wert*," "he is not worth powder and shot."—Translator.

² According to Diodorus, indeed, 15,000,000 cubic meters went to build the walls of Nineveh, but his statements, as Rich and Ainsworth have shown, are pure invention. Still more fantastic and equally untrue are Herodotus's statements about the walls of Babylon, which were supposed to have required about 80,000,000 cubic meters of material.

of the Panama Canal every year. In short, even in the matter of vastness war has no remarkable achievement to its credit.

War utilizes all technical expedients, but did not create them. Even so astonishing a construction as the forty-two-centimeter howitzer is not really in any sense a revolutionary invention, but at best an enlargement of and perhaps also an improvement on something already existing. Even the old Mongol chief Batu Khan¹ knew that those who throw stones had best throw as large ones as possible; and he is said to have caused the fall of the fortress of Kieff² in an amazingly short time merely because of the enormous size of the stones from his stone-throwing machines. Yet no one has ever called this ancient Mongol prince a "Goethe of action";³ and all I should like to know is whether the newspaper scribe who once ventured to insult the German people by comparing one of Krupp's officials with Goethe can now even remember the former's name.

Can even asphyxiating bombs be considered an invention? Why, even Hannibal ordered the throwing of earthen vessels filled with poisonous snakes, and later on beehives were frequently used for the same purpose. Consequently, it is no very epoch-making idea to replace an animal poison by a chemical one. Moreover, here again the Mongols were before us, for it is narrated that even in 1241 they caused confusion in the ranks of the Polish and German armies by the use of

¹ Died 1256. Grandson of Jenghiz Khan.—Translator.

² Kieff fell in 1239.

³ My friend Rössemeier has succeeded in proving by very painstaking investigations that the Tatars (Mongols) were by no means the nation of barbarians they were long thought to be. They were far in advance of their age, and five hundred years ago had already attained a degree of military efficiency which the European nations of to-day are slowly struggling to attain. In this respect they were doubtless even in advance of Prussia. [Dr. Nicolai's friend, Dr. Hermann Rössemeier, who until September, 1914, was political editor of the "Berliner Morgenpost," was forced, because of his democratic views, to take refuge in Switzerland during the war.—Translator.

asphyxiating gases. This cannot be absolutely vouched for, but there is nothing incredible in it. Even supposing it were not true, however, the fact of the idea having been handed down by tradition proves it to have existed in past times; and if it were not put into practice, this would merely indicate that the Mongols shrank from doing certain things from which we to-day no longer shrink. Let us hope, therefore, that this particular Mongol story is true.¹

And what else is there? Airmen's bombs, petroleum squirts, trenches, felt-covered helmets, field gray or khaki uniforms—these are the other most remarkable "inventions." The fear of a shortage of food and raw materials generally has, it is true, given rise to all manner of suggestions in Germany. Hans Friedenthal of Berlin recommended making flour out of straw, and Professor Gräbner of Dahlem making it from bulrush heads. Professor Jacoby, an analytical chemist, of Tübingen, "discovered" that "reindeer moss" could be used as a substitute for starch; Dr. Kobert, a Rostock professor, urges having bread baked out of blood, adding as a recommendation that blood-cakes taste better than black puddings,² but without stating how black puddings do taste. Yet another suggestion, in which there is nothing new, is that sugar, if fermented, can be converted into albumen, in doing which, however, a great deal of nutriment is wasted. All which has hitherto proved of scarcely any practical value. Moreover, the suggestions quite obviously relate to comparatively unimportant trifles.

What really might be argued with some reason is that the extraction of ammonia from the air with the aid of electricity, a process long known to science, has become of more practical importance owing to the exhaustion of the supplies of salt-peter, and that in this respect our industry really has ad-

¹ "*Tartarenmachricht*" is the German word, which means a blood-curdling story. The play upon words is impossible to give back.—Translator.

² The word used for "black pudding" is "*Blutpudding*."—Translator.

vanced during the war. Similarly the substitute for manganese in steel production,¹ the substitution of home-grown india-rubber for india-rubber proper, and many other substitutes all betoken progress. But here again it must be left to the future to decide whether these war substitutes will be able to hold their own in the open competition of peace. In any case they are only a very indirect result of war, and their true cause, like that of all inventions, was economic necessity.

War, in short, is the enemy of the civilian and of all civilian labor.

4.—WAR AND THE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY

§ 71.—*The Decline of Comradeship*

Solidarity and soldiery are two words which sound much alike, and also mean much the same thing. Even the ancients held that fighting brought men nearer one another, which Diodorus explains thus, "When primitive men were attacked by animals, they used to lend one another assistance, as necessity taught them to do." There can be no doubt whatever that old Diodorus was right. Man's utter defenselessness forced him to help his fellow-man, and thus stern Nature forged for her poorest child the weapons wherewith that child afterward ruled his teacher.

Modern man is not such a conscientious thinker as Diodorus. He does not believe that the struggle against animals and the elements gave rise to the oldest form of association, but actually presumes to talk of association when a handful of human beings join together in order to oppose the conception of human solidarity. The army, which is there to give practical demonstration of man's not yet having reached the level of considering every one his neighbor, is instanced as the best and most striking expression of good fellowship.

¹ The new hard-tempered kinds of steel are said to be much superior, making it possible to bore big guns now much faster than formerly.

The things of this world, however, are such a topsy-turvy mixture, that even here there lurks a grain of truth; and although the army has not been a school of brotherly love, we can still, as time goes on, trace the growth of brotherly love in connection with and about it. One thing is certain: not until two combatants' friends go to their help does a duel become a war (*duellum* become *bellum*); and the assembling of an army proves at all events the presence of social impulses, and is assuredly one of the oldest ways consciously adopted by human beings of acting in concert.

That others come to the assistance of a single combatant, moreover, proves that they consider his claims justifiable, and for this cause war is on a higher rung of the social ladder than is a dispute between persons. But this fundamental idea of obtaining justice, which quite probably led to the formation of the first armies, was afterward lost sight of. Gradually a separation came about in the army, and the old duke, whom the peoples once chose as *primus inter pares*, became an officer belonging to a special caste apart from the mass of the people: and as in the army this severance is more rigidly enforced than anywhere else in the social scale, and splits it up into two entirely distinct parts, it may now be described as something more like a model of bad fellowship.

Frederick William I knew what he was about when he abolished the principle "that to obtain a commission in the army all that is necessary is considerable skill in dealing with army mechanism,"¹ thus converting the officers from merely a superior class of soldiers into a "class apart," whose members were as a matter of course not common soldiers from the ranks, but scions of the nobility (pages or squires).

This is still the case to-day, and the system is more or less imitated in other armies also, even in France, where every soldier is supposed to carry a "*bâton de maréchal*" in his knapsack, any private can, at all events in theory, still attain

¹ "Geschichte des preussischen Landwehr" ("History of the Prussian Militia"), by R. Bräuer. Mittler & Sohn: Berlin. P. 25.

to the highest dignities, whereas in the German Army this is not even legally possible. That the nobility were originally specially selected to become officers ought not to surprise us. Perhaps there was nothing else to be done because the comparatively well-educated middle-classes would then have flatly declined to degrade themselves by becoming drill sergeants of the despised soldiery.

German Liberals are fond of ventilating the question whether the nobility is favored in the army, and whether the prerogatives of nobility are or are not identical with an officer's prerogatives; but this is of comparatively little importance. No one doubts that the officers as a body are absolutely exclusive. True, there is no legal basis for this exclusiveness, nor indeed any other basis beyond the fact that an officer has a right of precedence at the Prussian court. This privilege, however, trifling as it may seem, has sufficed to cement court and officers together for all eternity; and as the higher officers could be absolutely depended upon, it eventually became possible to utilize the whole nation for manning the regiments without the latter developing into a people's army. The officers as a whole remained the cornerstone of reaction, preventing the "democratic institution of a nation in arms" from really getting into the people's hands. Hence it can now truly be said that "the world is not so firmly fixed on Atlas's shoulders as Prussia on the shoulders of her army."

Whenever there was any real work to be done—in war, that is to say,—even in early days ordinary citizens appeared among the officers as if by magic, and in 1813 these humbly born officers were even suffered to lay down their lives for their country, which they did with enthusiasm, albeit often without due recognition. Shortly after the regeneration of Prussia, for instance, we find the more recent official military writers endeavoring to prove that in 1806 the Prussian nobility was equal to the occasion, and that in 1813 it was not the people who saved the ruling caste, but, on the contrary, the ruling caste which saved the people. It is characteristic that an

attempt should just now be made to prove that a citizen, Friccius, Major in the militia, is wholly undeserving of the monument erected to him at the Grimma Gate in Leipsic, and that it is Mirbach, a noble and an officer of the line, to whom a monument ought to have been erected. It must not be forgotten, however, that even such men as Treitschke blamed "the anxiety to screen the Prussian Guards, who as long ago as 1814 created so much ill feeling."¹

This recent division among the officers themselves gradually increased, for we must now look for good-fellowship even within the German officers corps. Some German regiments are composed of nobles and others of ordinary citizens, some of guardsmen and linesmen, and others of members of the general staff and troopers. Then there are the gradations of cavalry and artillery, infantry and convoy-men; officers properly so called and ambulance officers, non-commissioned officers and commissariat officers, subalterns and military officials; and each one of these classes and "class-lets" is a world in itself, anxiously defending its prerogatives.

But this is not all. In the incalculably long and destructive war of 1914-1917 capable men are needed, not merely ordinary middle-class citizens, but even working-class men. But in peace-time what on earth is to be done with people "who themselves admit that their father was a carpenter"? So, as the favorite deputy officers had not enough authority, the temporary expedient was resorted to of creating color-sergeant lieutenants for show, as it were. That is, they were officers only as far as the enemy was concerned.

§ 72.—*Results of the Separation Between Officers and Men*

Now, the overwhelming majority of the German people consider this separation between officer and "ranker" as quite right and proper. Therefore this state of things, regrettable

¹ Heinrich von Treitschke's speech at the War Memorial Celebrations. July 19, 1895. Hirzel: Leipsic. P. 9.

as it may be, is not really unjust, though it does prove how little the army has done to promote the universal equality of man. Indeed, it proves how it has actually eradicated every vestige of feeling of equality. Moreover, as Germany has the best army, this has of course been done there more thoroughly than elsewhere.

Among the common soldiers equality does exist, but an equality without liberty, the equality of a pack of slaves, all of them tools in the hands of their superiors. Such equality, of course, must not be confounded with the instinct of human solidarity to which armies owe their origin.

Formerly, when tribes were too distant to be able to exert any influence on one another, tribal community was the highest form of association that man was able clearly to imagine; and this he defended, as a tribal community, as a nation, or as an army. Man felt that there must be some such association, and if the internal conditions of the different countries had only continued as free and natural as when army and nation were one, then military associations would quite naturally have become enlarged as intercourse with other human beings began to produce effect. Meanwhile, however, the army, which was originally a product of the people, had become independent of its creator and a tool in the hands of the ruling class; and continued so, even although of late population has constantly increased, and likewise the army was constantly increasing. The people, in short, no longer decide issues but are themselves decided upon.

Genuine social sentiments can never exist without the twofold check of liberty and responsibility. Soldiers in general, however, are not free, nor are they, taken as a body, responsible. Hence the organization uniting them can not be called social. However much comradeship in the army may be talked about, it can be only a matter of outward form.

Now, it may be argued that this may be the case in time of peace, but that in time of war a new kind of comradeship is created between officers and men owing to the existence of

a common danger; but this is only true to a limited extent. Of course both officers and men do their very utmost at present to rub along well together while the war lasts and each depends on the other. Often enough it happens in "trench casinos" that men give so much rein to their feelings that the distance between officer and private is undeniably to some extent bridged over. But this is all, and when peace does come it will not need to prove that in reality the distance between man and man is just as great as ever. On the contrary, the fear of spies in this war has added one more partition to the many that divide up modern Germany, and one which even splits up the army. Every one believes himself to be the repository of specially important secrets.

For instance, when acting as army doctor, I once asked a sailor who said he had injured his heart by overstraining it how he had done this. He stood at attention and said, "Beg pardon, a sailor must n't tell secrets." Unfortunately, such answers are very characteristic nowadays. A hundred times have I read in an officer's eyes, when a brother officer was asking him some harmless question, the anxious query, "Perhaps, after all, you're a spy, too?"

Very often this mystery-making showed itself in strange ways. Thus at first the radio-telegraphists in a certain place did a little innocent bragging about the important telegrams they received. Afterward, when they themselves no longer knew the contents of telegrams, they took refuge in "professional secrecy." Probably there have been many such instances, but the fact that there is nothing behind these uncommunicative official visages does not make matters better. This uncommunicativeness, in short, is a characteristic of mankind to-day.

Does no one wonder what is to be end of all this? The army is on the high road to convert our people into a kind of Jesuitical order. The Jesuits also have a chief college, which every one of them blindly obeys. None knows why he does so: he simply obeys. Not a soul *speaks* of what he is doing:

he does it; every one keeps a relentless watch on every one else, and every individual impulse is stifled for the good of the order in general. Man ceases to be an individual person, and becomes a mere wheel in an organization.

The Jesuits also talk of comradeship, and even call themselves brothers, and this Brotherhood of Jesus has achieved something in the world, in fact, a great deal. Time was when we did not envy them their success, and if we used to say we meant to be a nation of all brothers, we did not mean that we wanted to be Jesuits or to belong to any organization consisting of officers and common soldiers. We meant something which might perhaps best be defined as the opposite of both. We meant a free brotherliness, in which, of course, there would be room for both Jesuits and officers, but which as a rule was not ruled on the principles of either.

CHAPTER VI

HOW THE ARMY HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED

1.—NATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ARMIES

§ 73.—*The Invincibility of a National Army*

The wheel of time, therefore, has come full circle, and the old days have returned in which every man must be armed. Once again the world bristles with arms; once again every man has become a soldier, and this condition we Germans proudly call that of a nation in arms, and talk about our national army.

Now, it is certainly beyond doubt that despite all their faults, national armies have given a better account of themselves on the whole than professional armies. Even the Theban militia of Epaminondas were superior to the Spartans, a special caste of whom had been trained to be soldiers, as witness the battle of Leuktra, in 371 B. C.; and in 275 B. C. the Roman peasant militia conquered both the Greek mercenaries of Pyrrhus, King of Epirus at Beneventum and the professional armies of Carthage, although they had a genius such as Hannibal to lead them. (At Cannæ, characteristically enough, comparatively few Punic citizens took part in the fighting.) Even the Sicilian city militia had already beaten the proud Africans.

The vast national armies of the Albigenses and Hussites were for long invincible, and the latter, under their great general Ziska, had no difficulty whatever in utterly routing the Emperor Sigismund and his experienced knightly armies, as for instance at Deutsch-Brod, in 1422.

Similarly the Swiss peasants at Morgarten conquered the

knightly hosts of Leopold of Austria, the people of Dittmarschen¹ conquered the flower of the Danish Imperial Army, and the Steding peasants yielded only to a feudal army enormously superior in numbers. Even in Germany the very ill-equipped peasant armies could not be conquered until the city militia joined the knightly armies, which had everywhere been beaten.

Under the popular leadership of Jeanne d'Arc the citizen defenders of Orléans conquered the English Army, although the latter had utterly routed the French knightly armies at Agincourt. As long as the Swedish Army was a truly national people's army, it was invincible; and in a single year, after an unparalleled succession of victories, it even reached the Danube. Not till afterward did the Swedes also become professional soldiers,² and then there was an end to their conspicuous good fortune.

The American militia under Washington, although at first heavily defeated, eventually won the brilliant victory of Saratoga over the British regulars. Similarly the disorganized masses of soldiers of the French Revolution very soon managed to overthrow the experienced armies of Austria and Prussia. On the other hand, in 1813 and 1815 Prussia's insufficiently trained masses proved superior to Napoleon's Old Guards.

The value of national armies, however, has been tested a hundred times, and although since the outbreak of war Prussian military experts in particular have succeeded in exalting the achievements of "professional soldiers" as compared with those of civilian soldiers, it is only in the pages of biased historians that their so-called "successes" need be sought. Apparently it is not really so very difficult to master the business of war. The last linesman who had never served in the army and who was trained in from four to six weeks, has once

¹ Marshland coast region of Germany, now part of the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein.—Translator.

² Toward the close of the Thirty Years' War a large part of the Swedish Army and almost all of the cavalry consisted of Germans.

more learned virtually the same things as used to take twenty times as long to learn.¹

A set of soldiers with experience in war, on the other hand, have very often failed to give a good account of themselves. The German journalist Karl Bleibtreu, for instance, writes that at Gravelotte and Colomby it was among the Old Prussian troops that panic broke out. It was they who took to flight and who shirked, and similarly with regard to the Old Bavarian troops at Loigny. Even Frossard's picked French troops conducted themselves badly at Rezonville and Gravelotte, and Canrobert's did likewise on the terrace of St. Privat and at Sedan. By this it is not intended to assert that troops differ essentially according to the kind of training they have received. Instances, though not so many, could be alleged to prove the contrary.² But it undoubtedly does show that an army's real superiority must be based on something else than technical training.

The reason why it is so difficult to perceive wherein lies that principle of invincibility which manifests itself throughout all the hurlyburly of victory and defeat is that hitherto men have been firmly convinced of the necessity of deciding all

¹ Nor does it seem so very difficult to "learn to be a general," as was proved by the Napoleonic marshals of France. Lannes was a dyer, and Murat, a waiter; Ney, Böttcher, and Oudinot, clerks; Soult a copying clerk; and Massena a vagabond. And they all understood their business; and were far more capable than Augeran, who had served as a professional soldier in the Prussian Army, or than such persons as the Marquis de Grouchy and Count Lasalle, who had served in a like capacity in the Bourbon Army. Even von der Goltz, in passing judgment from the point of view of a German military man on Gambetta, the lawyer, says that in many respects it would have been much better for France had she listened only to him. It goes without saying that, since old Derflinger's time, it has not been possible to cite any Germans as instances of this superiority of non-professional soldiers.

² Cf. Adam Smith's "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," V, I, 1 (1776). Adam Smith's view is that only a very small percentage of soldiers are possible and necessary in a civilized community, and that they had best be a police force, paid a fixed salary. In proof of the truth of his contention he cites instances in which well organized armies have beaten badly organized ones.

their great struggles by fighting like animals. Thus they have generally fought and fought until at length, after varying successes, the victor on the battle-field was the combatant predestined to victory from the first—namely, the combatant with the *stronger vitality*. Hence the delusion that anything can be decided by a battle being won. In reality, however, it was the national army which won, not the flower-decked hosts which, armed to the teeth, go to meet death on the battle-field, but that national army of workers and inventors, artists and scientists, whose vital force creates new life.

That fine nations, especially in former times, should likewise often have been fine soldiers is not surprising, but has helped to obscure the truth, since it thus frequently happened that victory on the battle-field and genuine victory coincided. For this very reason the exceptions are all the more instructive. Perhaps the most striking instances of nations which have obtained a foothold without having ever won a victory are the Chinese and the Jews. And modern Italy, proof of whose efficient labor is that Italian workmen may be found shoveling up the ground all round the globe, has she not won something from each one of her lost wars? And have not Russia, Germany, and Austria, the three empires concerned, all promised the Poles autonomy? Polish workmen are to be found, like Italian, all over the world; yet the Polish people have never waged war on their own account; indeed whenever they have attempted to bring about a revolution by force of arms, they have failed miserably. And is not Hungary also a case in point? In 1849 she was cut to pieces, and to-day she has the decisive voice in the Dual Monarchy.

Why cite all these examples, however, since any one who keeps his eyes open will find in the history of nations proofs and to spare of my contentions? Moreover, no one will be able to adduce any fact to disprove them.

It is national superiority which decides issues, and not military success; and this is the sense in which the nation decides, or, if you prefer, a national army. The founders of

modern armies had an inkling of this truth, but, spellbound by tradition, they thought they must equip the people with rifles. We shall never attain our object until this delusion has vanished, and until the "fighting army" is identical with the nation at work. Then will we try to help our people by making them fitter for life and no longer fitter for bearing arms. Then will the true, genuine struggle begin, one which will perhaps be far more terrible, but more worth fighting, because it will mean the survival of the fittest and not of those most skilled in bearing arms. Thus one day will militarism be overcome, and by an army of the nation.

§74.—*A Question Wrongly Worded*

In order that this may one day come to pass, however, it was perhaps first necessary for the people to be admitted into the professional army. It is regrettable, but may have been unavoidable, that the number of soldiers in Europe should have increased since the Middle Ages by from two thousand to four thousand per cent.; for whereas in the Middle Ages out of a thousand human beings not more than four to eight were soldiers, at present from 120 to 150 are so.

Now, this increase, which is absolutely senseless and useless, since all countries have done the same thing, must be explained, if it cannot be justified. It is the one solid fact from which everything else has resulted. Hardly any one refers to this main fact, however, but only to all manner of absolutely immaterial side issues. For instance, we argue as to whether the recruited soldier or the mercenary is the better. True, the German word soldier (*Soldat*) is derived from "*Sold*" (pay); but in general it is imagined that the soldier to-day fights voluntarily for his country, which the mercenary (or *Söldner*) does not. When Frederick the Great died, in 1786, this distinction may have existed; and it was a symptom of the great changes then preparing in Europe that public opinion severely condemned those petty German princes who, in return for "subsidies," allowed their mercenaries to fight for England.

Only twenty years earlier public opinion saw nothing to condemn in transactions of this kind. Even in 1813 the "new" Prussian army consisted, at all events a small part thereof, of enthusiastically patriotic volunteers, whereas the "old" army was raked together by craft or forced from all parts of the world.

But now it is the English who are dubbed "hirelings," although, at any rate in the first twenty months of the war, they were all *volunteers*, whereas in Germany the troops are invariably compulsorily recruited.¹ On either side are none but German-born or British-born, as the case may be. Both receive pay also, and that the German is paid less is quite beside the point.

From the purely technical point of view, the professional soldier will, of course, achieve more, but this scarcely matters. The one really important point is the "*spirit animating the army.*" This, in an army based on universal service, may be "bad," as was proved in the case of the Russians during the Japanese War; and in an army voluntarily recruited it may be "good," as Americans and British have frequently shown. The contrary, however, may be the case; and although voluntary service as existing in England until recently is preferable for other reasons, this does not affect the quality of the army.

Even the question whether "standing armies" or militia are the better is due to a play upon words, for in reality in every country to-day there is a compromise between these two systems. The ancient profession of a mercenary no longer exists except for officers, beginning with generals, who still sometimes die in harness. All other soldiers, after more or less training, are transferred to the "reserve," which, after all, is the principle of the militia. Officers serve about twenty

¹ The only persons in Germany who can be compared with England's volunteer hirelings would be the comparatively well-paid officers, who in war-time are even very well paid. But from the political point of view this is very much more dangerous, of which Spinoza was aware, when, in his political tractate, chap. VI, § 31, he particularly insisted that soldiers should receive pay, but officers not. Cf. below.

years, subalterns twelve, the Russians, four, German and French cavalry, three, and German infantry, two years. What may be called upper fifth-form boys, or what corresponds to them in Germany, serve one year; German doctors and the Serbians, six months; the Dutch, three months; and the Swiss, ten weeks. Here, then, we have all grades. How greatly the meaning of all these military titles varies, moreover, even among experts, is proved by the fact that in the "1824 Military Hand-book"¹ the Prussian Army of Jena is described as an "organized militia."

All these alleged contradictions in terms, such as soldiers under obligation to serve in the army or hirelings, professional or national army, standing army or militia, matter nothing to-day. Every nation tries to squeeze as much as possible out of the material at its disposal, and for this purpose universal service is of course the best. No reasonable person can be in any doubt about this.

The only possible question, therefore, is whether it is worth a nation's while to sacrifice its best sons for a purpose attainable by means of an army. For this is what it all amounts to, and this must determine the purpose for which an army is used. Originally, it is true, an army really was meant for war, and existed only in war, which simple folk probably took to be a matter of course. Indeed, when the business of war was not, as it is now, something wholly apart from man's ordinary habits of life, it would naturally have been absurd to have kept an army together even in peace-time. Every one used to go about his business, and if war came, then every one used to take up arms.

§ 75.—*The Three Reasons for the Introduction of Professional Armies*

This gradually changed. First of all a change, often wrongly called degeneration, came about in man. Peaceful citizens, whose days were filled up with work, forgot how to

¹ "Militärisches Taschenbuch 1842."

ride and fight, and consequently were obliged, even in peacetime, to practice the increasingly difficult art of war, for which they had no time. Thus professional soldiers came into existence, most of them "international artisans," who traveled from place to place, carrying on their occupation at the same time. Such familiar names as Xenophon, Pyrrhus, G. von Frundsberg¹ and Gattamellata prove that this arrangement was not peculiar to any nation or to any period.

Secondly, as time went on, the community was constantly requiring a larger and larger police force, as the number of prohibitions was continually increasing, and the minority engaged in perpetually exploiting the masses more and more were forced to maintain troops for their individual protection. That this and not by any means fondness for waging war was the main reason for the introduction of standing armies is plain from the fact that almost without exception these can be proved to have originated in a mere princely bodyguard, of which we have a reminder of this in the names of the oldest divisions of the standing armies—Pretorians, Guards, bodyguard, "Maison du Roi," myrmidons, gentlemen-at-arms, and others.

For this very reason standing armies were virtually never recruited from the country's own sons, since it was against the latter that they were to be used. The Roman Pretorians were Germans or Parthians; the French Guards were Swiss; the first army of the Hohenzollerns consisted of South Germans; and up till the Prussian Wars of Liberation recruiting abroad was preferred. Indeed Frederick William I, the real founder of the Prussian Army, expressly forbade any attempt to induce the country's sons to take their places beside "common fellows." Accordingly, no one thought it strange that scions of the same fatherland should fight against one another. Thus at Malplaquet, Swiss were pitted against Swiss, and at Pavia, in 1525, German mercenaries under Frundsberg fought

¹ Georg von Frundsberg, 1473-1528, leader of the German free lands under Maximilian and Charles V.

against the French "Black Band," which, for that matter, likewise consisted of Germans under the leadership of a Lower Saxon junker.

Thirdly, there was yet another cause for the establishment of standing armies, and this, strange as it may sound, was men's longing for peace. At a time when there were as yet no standing armies, old Cicero¹ innocently wrote: "we must wage war one day in order afterward to be able to enjoy peace," thereby correctly describing what is at present actually a fact. In the Rome of Cicero's days there were still so many savage elements, that he was obliged, in making such an observation, to hold forth some attractive subsidiary prospect. But when Rome became more highly civilized, and consequently, perhaps partly under the influence of the Christian conceptions of fraternity then spreading over the world, not enough men were anxious to become soldiers, Vegetius,² a Christian, wrote that whoever desired peace ought to prepare for war, connecting this statement with Cicero's words, but absolutely reversing their meaning.

Thus we ought to prepare for war in order to avoid it, whereas otherwise no one prepares for anything unless he wants to bring it about. An analogy to this can be found only in the confused reasoning of scholastic theologians. Here also we find the assertion that as no one can positively know that it is not, after all, dangerous to deny God, therefore it is safer, especially for His enemies, to believe in Him, "since then He cannot be angry with them."

Lessing has already admirably exposed this "safety" kind of argument. He describes a Jew, who, being asked whether he would prefer to believe in a living or a dead Christ, replies: "Rather in a living Christ, for he could always be killed afterward; but it is difficult to make the dead live

¹ Cicero: "*Quare, si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est.*" Phil. VII. 6, 19f.

² Vegetius: "*Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum.*" Epitome just, rei milit. 3 p. vol.

again." It has been just the same with war. Timorous persons think it dangerous to believe even in the possibility of peace, for then war might come like a thief in the night and devour them; and therefore, for safety's sake, an ever-living—that is, a standing—army must be kept. Else the other armies would kill it.

These standing armies for peace, therefore, a condition which even Logau¹ stigmatized as an "armor-clad peace," arose for the following reasons:

1.—As a result of war having become unnatural and nations being engaged in peaceful occupations.

2.—As a sign of princes' dread lest the disinherited should take vengeance upon them.

3.—As a sign of the people's dread of the horrors of war.

Armies, therefore, were not at all created for war, but for peace; and they are not a warlike, but a peaceful, symptom. But since, perhaps, nothing could be less adapted to the awakening desire for peace, all they have succeeded in doing is to make wars ever greater and more horrible. This is always so when we try to cast out the devil by Beelzebub, which, for that matter, is not generally a sign of particularly great wickedness, but always one of particularly great stupidity. Thus modern armies in themselves are not wicked, but they are the *ne plus ultra* of human folly.

2.—DEFENSIVE MILITIA OR AGGRESSIVE ARMY²

.6.—*The Origin and Meaning of Militia*

I hardly know a single book on militia which does not begin by asserting that originally the principle of universal service

¹ Logau's "Sinnegedichte," No. 1802, 1654.

"Krieg hat den Harnisch weggelegt, der Friede zeucht ihna an,
Wir wissen, was der Krieg verübt, wer weiss, was Friede kann?"

(War has put off its armor, and peace puts it on. We know what mischief war can do; who knows what peace can do?)

² Where not otherwise stated, I have relied for my facts mainly upon "Die Geschichte der preussischen Landwehr" ("History of the Prussian

prevailed in Germany, in accordance with the old feudal system. In one sense this is true, though it is both saying too much and too little. It says too little because universal service existed not in Germany alone, but throughout Europe and even throughout the world. After all, it is quite natural that the inhabitants of a country should have defended themselves against enemy invasion, as they would generally have done absolutely of their own accord in order to avoid being killed, and which they were everywhere bound to do. Almost all primitive states have been founded on some such necessity for defense and offense.

But it also says too much. Whoever goes to the roots of that patriotic feeling from which ancient Germany sprang ought never to forget how marvelous rich and expressive is our mother tongue. In Germany there is no "*conscription générale*," which might mean anything, but only the quite clearly defined "universal military service." This does not mean that it is every one's duty to attack or inflict chastisement on others, but simply and solely that it is every man's duty to bear arms. More clearly it cannot be expressed.

The Ottoman is commanded by his religion to attack, but the German's duty was only to protect hearth and home, and it was left to his own free choice whether he would take part in military excursions into other countries. No one was compelled to take part in the "*Ver sacrum*," and this ancient Teutonic custom survived longest in free England, where until quite recently every one was liable for home defense only, while the yeomen voluntarily obeyed the king's call to attack, partly because they hoped for plunder (though now they can hope only for pay), and partly from patriotism.

Originally this system prevailed in Germany, as everywhere else; and in Prussia, which is somewhat off the beaten track, it survived a particularly long while. When the word militia (*Landwehr*) first occurs in Prussian documents, it is used to

Militia"), by the Prussian Minister Bräuer. Mittler & Sohn: Berlin, 1863.

mean a model peaceful institution, which, it is true, the Hohenzollerns were not long in abolishing.

In the old monastic country of Prussia, after its secularization, the militia formed an integral part of the so-called "defense works." As Polish was at first spoken there, they were called "*Wybraniek*,"¹ and there is no official mention of militia until 1613. Ten years later the Elector George William and the Prussian Estates of the Realm came to an agreement concerning this militia, "whereby every tenth man was destined to go to the frontier, while the rest were to remain in the interior of the country to defend it."

Had this idea of utilizing the inexhaustible reserves of universal service only for home defense been further developed, wars would have become impossible. For instance, if to-day only one soldier in ten were allowed to cross the frontier and the recruiting systems were all alike, then even if all Europe united in an attack on the Central empires, there would be only one man available for attack as against more than four for defense at the disposal of the Central empires. Contrariwise, every soldier of the Central empires would encounter about thirty enemies on the defensive. Indeed, even Germany alone, defending herself against all Europe, would have more than twice as many troops as her aggressors could put in the field.

This "sacred duty of bearing arms," which would almost automatically have prevented any attack, became so completely metamorphosed in the course of ages that now nothing but the name is a faint reminder, and this only for the learned, that the civilization of the German nation was once peaceful in character.

It was Charlemagne who first attempted to force the German people into aggressive warfare; and we ought to reflect, espe-

¹ *Wybraniek* means selected. Here again, therefore, the fine title and meaning of the militia is not traceable, though it is characteristic that those who translated the word did not do so literally, but freely adapted it, being mindful of the trend of ancient German civilization.

cially just now, that even he did not succeed in calling out the whole nation for more than a few decades, and then only by dint of great difficulty. Charlemagne wanted to uplift and protect the peasant class. Hence he gave his people whatever land he conquered, hoping thereby to induce them to defend it of their own accord. If he freed the peasant class, he hoped to have a nation capable of bearing arms; but he very soon perceived that this was like arguing in a circle, for the perpetual wars ruined the very class of peasants they had originally created.¹

Thus this agrarian reform of Charlemagne, which aimed at establishing a class of peasant soldiers, failed because it was essentially inconsistent. Similarly all agrarian reforms had failed, in ancient Greece (the Spartan reforms of Agis and Cleomenes, for instance), and likewise in Italy, from those of Servius Tullius up to and including those of the Gracchi; and similarly all such reforms were destined to fail in the future, even those of Frederick William III of Prussia until 1813.

§ 77.—*The Rise of a Hireling Army in Germany*

Even under the Carolingians men raised by general levy proved unsuited for fighting abroad; but in the long run the vassal army likewise failed. In this army the vassal was not a proper professional soldier, but pursued his soldier's calling as a permanent secondary occupation.

Attempts to conquer foreign countries with vassal armies failed utterly, for the German people could not be induced to dream dreams of conquering Italy, as did its emperors. Henry the Lion,² for instance, flatly declined to fight Barbaros-

¹ When the wars ceased, indeed, when one nation was at length victorious, then perhaps it might have been possible to discuss whether it was all worth while; but even in those days the conquered were wont to revenge themselves.

² Henry the Lion (1129-1195), Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, cousin of Barbarossa. Married Matilda, daughter of Henry II of England, and spent three years in England. He founded Munich, and did much to promote the development of Hamburg, Lübeck, and other towns. Owing to his having acted disloyally to Barbarossa in 1175, the latter

sa's battles, and even the second Frederick von Hohenstaufen was obliged to employ foreigners, mostly Saracens. Subsequently the question whether the "obligation to serve" might be enforced for some object outside the empire, and, if so, to what extent, gave rise to endless dissensions. Indeed, to describe these would mean writing a large portion of medieval constitutional history. At all events, the rulers did not as yet have their own way, and as they cared little about a "universal obligation to serve in peace," they allowed universal service in general gradually to fall into disuse.

A middle course was then agreed upon, which suited both parties concerned. The citizen bought himself free for good and for all from the obligation to serve; and with the proceeds of this tax the lord of the soil bought himself a smaller, more convenient army, one which was not always wanting to go home, but, ready either for peace or war, could be used for making wars on foreign countries as well as on the rights of the lord of the soil's fellow-citizens, irrespective of all ordinances concerning the duty of military service. Thus it was that in England and Denmark German mercenaries were used to quell the risings of the harassed peasantry, while the Hapsburgs in the Anti-Reformation movement used Italian and Walloon troops against their Protestant knights, cities, and peasants. General levies of the people lingered on only in a few democracies, such as Switzerland; and except in Poland, even the nobility were not always called upon to serve. Thus national armies were abolished by the ruling caste, because it was still impossible to exploit the nation's strength in the interests of any dynasties. What softened this blow for the rulers was that early in the Middle Ages firearms began to be used now, and not every one was skilled in the use of these; hence the necessity for "trained soldiers" again arose. At all events, just at this time princely guards,

put him to the ban of the empire and forfeited his lands. As he submitted in 1181, however, he was suffered to keep Lüneburg and Brunswick.—Translator.

gentlemen-at-arms, bodyguards, or whatever their names may have been, began almost everywhere being converted into genuine armies of mercenaries, for the most part a scourge rather than a protection to the country in whose pay they were.

Once the princes found they could depend upon their hirelings to support them steadfastly and independently of the people, they hardly ever kept to their agreement with the latter, but repeatedly demanded not merely their money, but their blood also. Wars were very frequent, but those who delighted in war comparatively few. Thus demand exceeded supply, and an army of foreign mercenaries cost a pretty penny. Hence the thoughts of any prince anxious to manage "economically" could not but be perpetually reverting to universal liability to military service, which, after all, was a way of getting soldiers comparatively cheap. But sometimes he realized that, at any rate in those days, there was danger in making his fellow-subjects fire on their own fathers and brothers; and sometimes he perceived that, after all, these fellow-citizens of his could be better employed for other purposes. Then he sorrowfully reverted to the plan of recruiting his soldiers abroad. So matters went on, never for long the same.

§ 78.—*The Rise of an Army of Mercenaries in Prussia*

Conditions did not become more stable until Frederick William I's time. This "soldier-king," who loved parading about with his "set of longlegs," first disbanded the militia established by his predecessor for home defense, alleging that it was "insufficiently trained." To this militia it was "expressly promised that it should never be taken out of the country." Under penalty of a hundred ducats' fine, he even forbade the word militia to be used, and he also forbade any homeland recruiting, which, however, he afterward allowed from pecuniary considerations. But an edict of 1721 restricted it to "such subjects as may come forward of their

own free will, and are not already engaged in the cultivation of the soil, in the promotion of commerce," and in certain other occupations.

The twenty-seven years of Frederick William I's reign were, by the way, among the most peaceful which Prussia has seen. With a small "show guard" of soldiers it was impossible to make war, for, as the impartial historian cannot fail to notice, that to whomsoever God gives an army, He sooner or later gives the war belonging thereto.

Frederick William I's army was small and consisted solely of "mercenaries," being thus as unlike our present monstrous national armies as possible. Yet he is universally, and rightly, regarded as the founder of the Prussian military system. To him is traceable the root principle of the Prussian Army, a principle which all modern prating about national or hiring armies, one year's or three years' service, etc., merely obscures. He it was who caused the Prussian Army to be classified into "common soldiers"¹ and officers, and since his time it has been impossible for any soldier to become an officer.

All who speak of this monarch as the founder of the Prussian Army testify, perhaps unwittingly, to the fact that this contempt for the "common soldier," which in no other army is so marked, is really characteristic; for this sharp delimitation is all that is now left of his system, and to-day it is sharper than ever; and this monarch's contempt for "common fellows" (that is, foreigners or, later on, the good-for-nothing dregs of his own people), has in course of time become transferred to the mass of the German people. They are still good enough to be "common soldiers," while promotion to be an officer is reserved for the rich or noble.

This standing army proper remained much the same until the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, but in times of real national danger, the people also always used to fight for their country. Thus, after the dangerous concentric attack of the

¹ "*Gemeine*"—common soldiers, commoners.—Translator.

Allies on Prussia began, the Pomeranian Estates equipped five thousand yeomanry and offered them to the king, and the provincial cities of the Marches and of the domains of Madgeburg and Halberstadt did likewise, adding, it is true, the stipulation that these troops should be maintained only for the duration of the war and used only for the defense of the country. But what a king has, he has, and in the last years of the war these troops were unlawfully employed as reserves. The great king, however, unlike his successors, did disband these battalions on the conclusion of the war, although his empty treasury may certainly have had something to do with this.

§ 79.—*Attempts at Organization Before the Battle of Jena*

After the death of Frederick II no change took place until the cannonading of Valmy, the victory of the French at Jemappes in 1792, and the conquest of Toulon made the Allies realize that with the French Revolution new forces had gained the upper hand. When we are in a tight place, we always think of the people. Consequently in 1794 an edict of the Prussian Military Department¹ approved the offer of the president of the chamber, Stein, to collect a militia. The following year, indeed, even the imperial court at Vienna began to discuss the question of a "universal arming of the people." But the Prussian Government, which in 1795 still believed in Frederick the Great's army, opined that such a general levy of the people would not suffice to get the better of the enemy and, moreover, was dangerous. Once more did the Prussian bureaucrats prove that they knew better how to attain their end than did the Viennese; for, after all, the whole century of German reaction is contained in these few words of August 25, 1795, "a people in arms is a danger in itself."

Yet the time came when even Prussian bureaucrats were forced to appeal to the people in arms, which, for the time being, did not get beyond the stage of plans. For eight long

¹ *Ober-Kriegs-Kollegium*.—Translator.

years, moreover, nothing was said about it, and meanwhile Napoleon's new armies were turning the world upside down. Then, in 1803, we suddenly hear of General von Rüchel's scheme for raising fully fifty thousand yeomanry, who, significantly enough, were to be under the command of "semi-invalids." General von Courbière had also a plan, which, however, left the militia wholly out of account, and merely proposed to call up more recruits, and dismiss on leave an equal number of experienced soldiers, thus creating a supply of "thoroughly trained" men to increase the standing army for war purposes.

A high and mighty military organization committee, which had been sitting since 1795, was particularly incensed over Major von Kneesebeck's plan for the introduction of a genuine militia, to be called the "Patriotic Legions." Degrading punishments, moreover, were to be abolished. The committee angrily pointed out that the Prussian military constitution was a "venerable original document and of matchless perfection," something which could not be meddled with without everything collapsing. When such principles prevailed, the wonder is not that the organization committee should have kept silence so long, but why it should ever have existed at all.

General von Rüchel's scheme was supposed to be accepted, but in reality nothing whatever was done; and when war broke out, only a few Polish battalions could be scraped together, and then in Silesia. Fruitless as the labors of the military organization committee were, however, they cannot be ignored when the value of soldiers is being inquired into. There is again an inclination to consider that at Jena the officers did not fail so very badly, "for, after all, such a lot of them did stick to their guns," as if the value of a human being depended on some one else shooting him dead. If this were the case, then hares would make the best officers. The really important fact is that until the Peace of Tilsit the army was entirely in the hands of high-born military men, who,

as their organization committee proved, were *absolutely incapable*.

§ 80.—*The 1807 Reorganization Committee*

When the bill for all this incapacity had been settled at Jena, and the State of Prussia was prostrate, then it was seen that something must be done. Accordingly the organization committee was converted into a reorganization committee, and, what was of more importance, civilians were appointed members of it. To them it is due that afterward some vestige of a new spirit prevailed. It was, however, only a vestige, for in this reorganization committee two opinions fought for predominance. Every one was agreed as to the desirability of having as many soldiers as possible, and as to its being the duty, if practicable, of all citizens to enter the army. That is, something resembling a national army was desired. The question, however, was whether the people or the army should be the first consideration. On the reorganization committee were such men as Baron von Stein¹ and the financial expert Schön. Under the fructifying influence of French Revolutionary ideas, they wanted to create a genuine national army, based on moral qualities. But they had the military party against them, and particularly Gneisenau, who wanted to have as few changes as possible, and to resort to universal service merely in order to squeeze out a larger contingent of recruits for the standing army.

An interesting memorandum² has been preserved, submitted by Herr von Schön on December 4, and then handed to Herr von Gneisenau for his expert opinion thereon. Herr von Gneisenau made marginal notes on it, which clearly show that he and his colleague, eminent men as they both were,

¹ Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl von Stein, 1757–1831. In 1804 he was appointed to the Prussian Department of Trade and Manufactures, where he introduced apparently too many reforms to please Frederick William III, and in 1807 he resigned.—Translator

² Printed in the Supplement to the "Militärwochenblatt," for 1846, pp. 68 and 69.

were as wide apart as the poles. One citation is enough to show this. The civilian committee member says that soldiers in general must be considered as the flower of the nation, righting all wrongs, and consequently having the highest vocation. This did not please the military men, and Von Gneisenau made a marginal note insisting "that the whole nation must realize that the only way to maintain its national existence is to uphold its military honor."

Two fairy godmothers, therefore, stood together by the cradle of the new Prussian Army. The gift which one wanted to bestow upon it was the power of righting wrongs; while the other wanted to raise it above the rest of mankind by endowing it with "a soldier's special honor," a phrase which must then have been newly coined.

Prussia, therefore, was faced by the problem of whether she meant to become a national army or to remain a military state. These two phrases show quite clearly that we have here a distinction which cannot be expressed in concrete terms. Both signify that army and people are one and indivisible, and yet we know that the two notions are worlds apart. The result of the one is Switzerland, that of the other Prussia and Germany, the other countries lying somewhere between these two extremes.

It is easy to divine why the democratic tendencies of Stein and his followers were not allowed to prevail. General von Boyen,¹ many years Prussian minister of war, once expressly stated that "the example of the free States of North America and of Switzerland proves that even now it is possible to manage by arming the people in this way." The militia, indeed, he continued, must not be considered as "resulting from the republican form of Government"² in these two coun-

¹ "Beiträge zur Charakteristik des Generals v. Scharnhorst" ("Side Lights on the Character of General von Scharnhorst") by H. von Boyen.

² I have added the word "republican" in order to make the quotation from Boyen intelligible. The author himself is very careful not to use any such word, and leaves it to the reader to guess.

tries." Other republics, for instance Holland, Carthage, Genoa, and Venice, have maintained considerable standing armies, as Boyen himself quite truly observes.

Thus, although Boyen arrives at no result, nevertheless his few words of comparison contain the truth, indeed the whole truth. He did not, indeed, express it, but possibly he suspected it. The kind of government matters no more than the particular kind of army. What matters is what is intended to be done with the armies. Carthage wanted to conquer Spain and Sicily; Holland to conquer the East Indies and neighboring territory; Venice and Genoa fought for the predominance in the Mediterranean. Switzerland and North America, however, do not want to conquer anything; they use their armies only for defense, and consequently manage with truly national armies.

Boyen must have held some such opinion, for he was a great student of Scharnhorst, and Scharnhorst expressly states that *militia is only suitable for defensive warfare*. It is obvious, indeed, that a national army composed of citizens all engaged in various occupations ought never to take up arms except when compelled to do so in self-defense. The robber attacks, the citizen defends himself.

Now, in every country peacefully inclined persons are in the majority, and the circumstance that aggressive armies were formed from these peaceful citizens did much to deprave politics in the nineteenth century. Imaginary contrasts had to be drawn, and, at any rate, some enthusiasm artificially created, which partly explains the enthusiastic attachment to the hereditary monarchical principle and the racial patriotism characteristic of the nineteenth century.

Genuine national armies, however, and true militia are in reality eminently peaceful institutions, being in their very nature suited to home defense, but not for aggression. What causes the professional soldier to look down on them, causes the civilian to admire them. And these are the kind of armies we must have if we are serious in our desire for peace.

Whoever advocates other armies is forging instruments of war, and is therefore responsible if his instruments in their turn do not infallibly bring about war.

§ 81.—*The Reaction of the Military Party*

Scharnhorst, however, wanted armies for war, and it was his plans which were approved by King Frederick William III, in whose absolute power the ultimate decision lay. The people about this time were beginning to think of themselves as Germans; and in 1813 they went to war not to maintain Prussia, but to obtain Germany. Then and even later it would have been easy to have had a large German National Army, if it had been desired to do so. But nothing of the sort was desired, and the only concession to the new era at length wrung from those in power was craftily to allow the people to imagine themselves to be forming a national army.

It has often been scornfully observed that the only democratic idea which has gained a foothold is that of national armies, and that they fought the battles of 1914. Such a reproach does not apply to Germany; she has never had a true national army, and what feeble attempts at anything of the sort were made during the troublous times of the Wars of Liberation were strangled by professional soldiers before they could really come to anything.

The military party is to be admired for the logical persistency with which it has succeeded in enforcing its will. In the first period of alarm civilians were appointed to the reorganization committee; and the first thing done was to bow them out with vast politeness. Thus the military men were by themselves once more, and could reorganize. True, it was not upon extremists such as Gneisenau that the work of reorganization fell, but on the more moderate Scharnhorst, who, however, was always, as Herr von Schön called him, a "regular" (soldier of the line).

In his first memorandum of July 21, 1807,¹ Scharnhorst still

¹ Reprinted in the "Militärwochenblatt" for 1846, pp. 88-90.

insists absolutely on the aristocratic importance of the *standing* army, which he thinks ought to continue to be obliged to serve twenty years. Besides this, however, he wished to organize a provincial militia or yeomanry, but solely for the purpose "of maintaining order in the country itself, assisting the police, protecting the country from the depredations of marauders, and preventing enemy incursions." He also thought it possible that later on the militia "might *defend* the country, together with the regular troops."

Scharnhorst therefore, is chiefly thinking of somewhat better organized citizen guards, and it certainly never occurred to him that such a national army could be used for purposes of aggression. Gradually, however, this "militia," as it was intended to be, became increasingly diverted from its original purposes of defense pure and simple. The very next year he completed his "Preliminary Draft Constitution for Provincial Troops,"¹ in which he goes a step further. In § 8, for instance, he says: "The Provincial Troops are intended to insure order within the country itself, and to defend it against enemy *attack*. They shall only leave the province when the safety of the monarchy requires them to do so." Here we have the troops already permitted to leave their province and available for use throughout Prussia. There is still no word, however, of their being employed outside the kingdom. Moreover, certain democratic guaranties are provided, as, for instance (§ 17), that the militia should be under officers chosen by themselves, chosen first of all by "all the members in a regiment," and so forth.

But nothing came of all these projects. The only thing which did come about was the so-called Scharnhorst system, the sole purpose of which was to increase the standing army. The military men had failed to keep abreast of the new times.

¹ Reprinted in the supplement to the "Militärwochenblatt" for 1846 (Jan.-Oct.) pp. 62-67. The number of soldiers provided for would correspond to about two millions in modern Germany, taking account of the population.

3.—THE PRUSSIAN MILITIA

§ 82.—*The People's Militia*

In January, 1813, came the astonishing news that Napoleon's great allied army had perished in the arctic Russian winter, and, as can be imagined, all German patriots immediately desired to fall upon the prostrate tyrant. But the standing army was not large enough, and there was no militia. Then the estates of East Prussia set to work, and what the Government, with all its discussion, had not been able to do in twenty years, the people achieved in ten weeks.

On December 30, 1812, York von Wartenburg had gone over to the Russians, and on January 8 he reached Königsberg with his troops, thus conferring a certain amount of freedom of movement on the citizens. On January 31, Minister von Stein arrived in Königsberg, and although he lost no time in falling out with York, and was in fact officially ruled absolutely out of count; still, in the ensuing deliberations, there is no mistaking his influence and likewise that of President von Schön, who was also in Königsberg. On February 5, Privy Councilor von Brand being in the chair, a meeting of deputies of the estates was held, which appointed a committee of seven, consisting of Dohna, Heidemann, Hinz, Keber, Lehndorf-Steinorth, and Schimmelpfennig; and on February 7 the "Königsberg Decisions," together with the complete draft of a scheme of organization, were sent to the king. Thus the deliberations were over in four days, and in four months the troops were levied, thoroughly trained, and already confronting the enemy.

These militia regiments were welcomed. To be grateful for anything long being distasteful, however, military men soon set about proving that it was not the estates who suggested the training of the militia, but the king. It was actually asserted that Scharnhorst was the father of the militia; that he had discussed his project for it with his disciple Clausewitz,

who had worked it out in detail and afterward taken it to Russia; that then he had gone with the Russians to Königsberg, and thus Count Dohna had come to know of the plan. For us, however, this question of who was first is of small interest.

As already stated, there were many projects for a national levy; and in any case it can hardly be called particularly original to suggest that, if an army is destroyed, the surviving civilians should come to the rescue. Everything depended on the spirit which was to animate this new army. Stein and Schön wanted it to be as far as possible purely for *defense*, and therefore a factor in the promotion of civilization: whereas Scharnhorst wanted it to be for *attack*, and consequently something which many consider opposed to civilization.

Eventually the military party was victorious; and this being so, and Stein being, after all, merely an episode in Prussia, it must unquestionably be admitted that it is not he and Schön who were the fathers of the modern army, but Gneisenau and Scharnhorst.

The main points of the Königsberg decisions are as follows:

The militia was not to be called up unless and until the enemy was advancing *over the frontier*, and it was to be employed only in its own province (§ 1).

It was to be based on universal liability to serve; but men in holy orders and all descriptions of teachers were absolved, except officiating priests exceptionally highly qualified for their office (§ 2).

The military authorities must have a say in the appointment of officers (§ 7).

§ 83.—*The Royal Militia*

In course of time all these regulations were modified. The king and his advisers took only six weeks to revise the decisions; but this was long enough to enable them to abolish the purely defensive purpose of the militia. Being still anxious, however, to get something out of the people, they were

careful not to let their intentions be known. Hence, quite contrary to custom, the royal ordinance of March 17, 1813, contains no indication whatever as to the object of the new army regulations. The ordinance, indeed, is so very skilfully worded as at first sight to create an impression that the militia were in general to be employed only in the country itself. Thus in § 16 it is expressly stated that the militia may also be employed "outside their own district," which every sensible person would interpret as meaning that they could be employed anywhere in their native province, as stated in the Königsberg Decisions. But any sensible person would have been wrong, and the Government quite right. France, for instance, and all the rest of the world, are also outside any particular district.

A few unimportant apparent liberties were temporarily maintained, but election only by the soldiers themselves was manifestly a farce, and of the 237 higher and staff militia officers only two per cent. were civilians, and not a single brigadier was so. Moreover, in § 17 it was decreed that the militia was subject to the discipline of the standing army, which amounted to its being virtually wholly at the mercy of the caprice of the chief war lords. This set the final seal to the fate of the militia as a defensive organization. It was now to develop into the most powerful instrument of attack ever known in the history of the world.

In the succeeding century the Prussian militia was systematically transformed into an instrument of war. It had acquitted itself admirably of its original task; but even when it mustered the advantage of the voluntary system was clear. Those who did not come spontaneously, like the East Prussians, did not come willingly in obedience to the king's command six weeks later. In Pomerania the militia took a very long while to assemble; in West Prussia hardly any one responded to the call to arms; in parts of Silesia and also in Brandenburg rebellion broke out.¹

¹ Thus Herr Flesche, chief of police, reported on April 19, 1813,

In the West Elbe provinces, however, where the general level of education was higher, particularly in Westphalia, matters went very badly. Here the people knew not only what French occupation, but also what French democratic rule, meant, and the Prussian commissioners met with angry resistance everywhere. Moreover, when the line troops and gendarmes at last succeeded in hunting up the people, they forthwith began to desert. It is important to form a true idea of how matters really stood then. Some certainly did volunteer, but the great majority of the army followed the drum only because compelled to do so.

Nevertheless, the militia did free and protect the country, and it did achieve distinction (and likewise suffered heavily) in the battles of 1813. When the year ended, the enemy had been driven back across the Rhine, and the work of the militia was over.

§ 84.—*The Transformation During the Wars of Liberation*

Meanwhile the guardians of the country, who ought to have been standing keeping faithful watch upon the Rhine, had come "to think there was something very fine about hunting," and on January 1, 1814, when the first army corps under Blücher crossed the Rhine and thus advanced into enemy territory, it included about seven thousand militiamen. They were thus actually employed even outside the country for offensive purposes, although they did not give a particularly glorious account of themselves. Indeed, the 1814 campaign in general added little to the glory of Prussian military annals.

Gradually, however, even the decision that universal liability from Potsdam, "that a large proportion of the militiamen did not appear, and those who did ventured to manifest their displeasure by making a noise. Some did not take the oath at all, and tried to encourage those about them to do likewise." The chief of police was grieved "to have to say this about the inhabitants of a city which at all times has enjoyed the favor of your Majesty to quite an exceptionally great extent." Most other people, however, will think it scarcely astonishing that the very town to rebel was the one which knew better than any other what militarism meant.

to serve should be merely a temporary expedient for the war was evaded. True, after the Allies had taken Paris, after Napoleon's abdication and the return of the troops to their own country, Frederick William III would fain have kept his promise, and repealed the ordinance imposing on every young man the obligation to present himself for military service.¹ The king's loyal intention, however, caused a revolution in the palace: there was a change in the ministry of war, and his Majesty was informed once for all that kingly promises must not be put on an equality with those of other mortals. Consequently on September 3, 1814, a law was promulgated, countersigned by all the ministers (Stein, of course, was no longer minister), and enacting, without any beating about the bush, that "the institutions therefore, to which this great success is owing, and the maintenance of which *is desired by the whole nation*, shall form the main principles of the country's military constitution."

Now, if a national army had been then introduced, perhaps there would have been some justification for speaking of the desire of the nation; but the Government had realized that the popular institution of a militia could quite well be utilized to increase the army proper, and this new law was intended to cover the transition from the defensive militia to the large and offensive army.

First, in the preamble to the bill, the character of the militia is clearly defined even for peace-time.

Secondly, reservists who had served their full time were consigned to the militia (§ 8, b. and c.). Hitherto the militia had been an independent institution, and it was allowable suddenly to put it on a level with the standing army, especially in view of popular sentiment. From henceforth this distinction begins to disappear.

Thirdly, it was expressly decreed (§ 8) that the first-line militia (up to the thirty-second year) was to be employed *abroad*, though it is true that the second-line militia (up to

¹ Order in cabinet of May 27, 1814.

the thirty-ninth year) might be employed in general only in the country itself, and the last-line (thirty-nine and over) only in their native province.

Many passages of this law are by no means clear, which is not surprising when it is remembered that the people had not yet forgotten the freedom promised them in 1813. It was first put in force in 1815. In 1814 the militia overstepped its original limits only because the military rendered this imperative. But now that Napoleon was for the second time on the throne of France the Allies determined to attack that country; and although on this occasion the seat of war was territory which was and always had been outside the country, yet the militia were instantly called up and sent abroad. It was thought needful to tell them in extenuation that, "having won their independence, it was now necessary to fight to insure it." Thus still more of the defensive nature of the militia was laid aside.

4.—MILITARISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

§ 85.—*The New Militia*

Here endeth the history of the old militia. Its place was taken by another, new in almost every respect save the name and the cross, as Bräuer himself admits in his "History of the Prussian Militia." It was an adroit piece of statesmanship on the part of the Prussian Government to have used the popular name of militia in order, in the course of half a century of peace, to forge therefrom a keen-edged, passive instrument of aggression. That it meant to do this and did it justifies the charge of militarism against the Prussian Government; but its success also proves that there must have been some militarism among the Prussian people.

The authorities behaved as if they still conformed to the 1814 law, and on November 21, 1815, they issued a "Militia Ordinance." Even here provision is made for the civilian authorities having a voice in the election of officers, but with

restrictions. The preamble still states that militia exists for home defense, and the second-line militia are still to be employed only in their native provinces. Moreover, a few untrained men were still included in the militia, thus making it appear more or less an improvised force intended for defense. But already the metamorphose was being prepared. Whereas in 1814 it was frankly stated that the militia were to be disbanded in peace, the staff-officers and a few soldiers are now retained, about fifty per regiment; but these staff-officers were before long developed into so-called *nuclei* of about 150 men per battalion. Each year this standing army was enlarged, until by 1819 their number had risen to 635. And all, as the king used to say, "in recognition of the splendid enthusiasm shown by the inhabitants with regard to the militia." By ordinance of March 25, 1814, even the militia uniform was altered, "in order intimately to connect them, even in externals, with the standing army."

The game could now begin, and, after all, its rules were very simple. As the entire "nation in arms" could not be included in a standing army, or in any other organization of the kind, at all events not all at once, the militia was first of all *reduced* (!), and then assimilated to the standing army. Then, after the public had had time to get used to this measure, the militia was increased again. In principle the same thing happened afterward almost every time that the standing army was increased. New regiments were created without adding to the number of troops, but merely by transferring them from one regiment to another. For instance, three regiments of four battalions would be converted into four regiments of three. Then after a certain lapse of time these small regiments were declared "unsuitable for active service," and men were called for to make up the missing four battalions.

Thus militia reserve regiments, militia instruction battalions, and other new formations came into existence, and in 1821 the Government could already dispose of over 126,000 militia so-called, besides 136,000 troops of the line. The mi-

litia were intended for incorporaton in the army for active service, and thus were quite openly included in the offensive army. There were besides some 100,000 second-line troops, mainly militia, described as an army of occupation.

§ 86.—*Army and Revolution*

These organizations were altogether very adroitly created to insure closer connection with the troops of the line. In this there was a twofold object: to acquire one uniform weapon against the foreigner, and also, as must never be forgotten, at the same time to glue the "enemy at home," utterly routed as he was, so firmly into the army as to be able to use them as a weapon for fighting this very enemy. That is, to fight the militia system with militiamen. Thus officers in the militia guards were entirely abolished, and their places taken by officers of the guards who had served their time. Yet conservative soldiers of the stamp of General von der Marwitz still spoke of the whole military system as a damned democratic idea, and although the militia gave a good account of itself in suppressing the Polish insurrection of 1830, even until 1848 it was a question as to how it would behave in case of a revolution of the German element in it, despite all the officers of the guards.

As a matter of fact, even when the militia was called up in 1848, a large number of them proved refractory, and "outrageous excesses" occurred, resulting in many bodies of militia being deprived of their colors, in token of their unworthiness." But now that they stood in battle-array between the soldiers of the line, they learned fast enough to fight against their fellow-citizens. Indeed, it seems as if the militiamen bore a particular grudge against those who had caused "unseemly tumults" and thus obliged them to do anything so much against the grain as to join the colors. Bräuer (Vol. II, p. 162) even states that this hatred frequently found vent in "shooting prisoners dead and massacring enemies found concealed in conquered places."

At this period, indeed, the German militiamen do not seem to have lost all sense of shame, for Lieutenant-Colonel von Bonin says, describing the evacuation of some insurgents' houses: "The invading parties came out again with blood-stained bayonets without boasting further of their performances. This testified to a certain bashfulness on the part of the young soldiers, as if they were not sure whether they had done right."

To cure such bashfulness, the authorities had a good remedy. They recollected that in general it was better in civil wars to employ soldiers from other parts, and indeed the Prussian militiamen in Posen, in the Rhenish Palatinate, and Baden could not have been accused of any lack of dash. Moreover, it was the militia who were most energetic. Thus Staroste writes:¹

I have endeavored to ascertain the feeling and opinions of Prussian military men concerning the Palatinate movement. I have not found a single real democrat among them, at all events *not one who would have expressed his democratic leanings*. Whenever they catch sight of a tattered individual, they at once call him a democrat. Even the Rhineländer is boiling over with hatred of democrats and political agitators, and the Prussians are still worse; but *worst of all* are the *militia*!

The so-called "Baden" campaign at least proved the capability of Prussian militia. There was no doubt whatever that it was not really militia at all or a people's army, but a princely guard. Old Marwitz and men of that sort were "idiotic pessimists," and thus nothing any longer stood in the way of the militia being speedily and very greatly enlarged.

A beginning was made by simply not entirely disbanding it when this ought to have been done, after the mobilization of 1850, but keeping back two hundred men as the "nucleus of a company." Then followed events too well known to

¹ Staroste's "Tagebuch über die Ereignisse in der Pfalz und in Baden" ("Diary of the Events in the Palatinate and Baden"). Vol. I, p. 199.

recapitulate, the organization of 1871, which led to another dispute, and then the enormous increases of the army after 1871, which led to no more disputes. And then the German Empire's wonderful military mechanism was ready, emperor and princes, parliament and people, having all slaved together hard to bring it about.

It took precisely a hundred years. In 1814 the militia invaded France. In 1914 even the last-line troops were employed in attacking the enemy abroad. A year ago, when this first happened in Belgium, a reassuring notice was issued about its being "merely to occupy the newly acquired parts of the country, which were already as good as German territory." Since then, however, last-line troops militia and line troops have been used absolutely indiscriminately, thereby effacing the last reminiscences of the militia having once been an integral part of the country's "system of defense."

The German last-line troops now are virtually *nowhere* fighting on German soil. The majority of the German people are glad about this, as they are quite entitled to be; but in so far as they have still any desire to think for themselves, they must admit that it means that the militia are being employed for purposes the opposite of those for which they were originally created. There may be a great deal to be said for this, but from the point of view of peace and progress it is singularly regrettable.

§ 86a.—*Universal Military Service in Europe*

In all countries, free Albion excepted, events have taken a similar course, thus bringing about the institution of standing armies, which theorists ignorant of the world and self-seeking politicians¹ have described as guaranteeing peace, and which could not fail to lead to the disaster of 1914.

I have endeavored to describe how this singular institution

¹ *Real Politiker*. I have intentionally chosen this courteous epithet, but future generations are more likely to call them, more aptly, "fools and criminals."

actually came into existence, and in particular to show that in reality universal *liability to serve* is merely a great historical misconception of the universal *duty of bearing arms*. This is so clear from the facts cited that the attentive reader will perhaps even believe it; but I am convinced that a dry record of facts and figures cannot possibly touch any one's feelings. But as I want such events to stir the conscience even of the dullest mortal, I am recapitulating all the facts in this chapter, clothing them in the words of a poet¹ trying to make a foolish world give ear to his words of wisdom and despair. As for his chief character, *Choulette*, in his view "le régime actuel n'était qu'hypocrisie et brutalité. Le militarisme lui faisait horreur." *Choulette* says:

"La caserne est une invention hideuse des temps modernes. Elle ne remonte qu'au XVII^e siècle. Avant, on n'avait que le bon corps de garde où les soudards jouaient aux cartes et faisaient des contes de Merlusine. Louis XIV est un précurseur² de la Convention et de Bonaparte. Mais le mal a atteint sa plénitude depuis l'institution monstrueuse du service pour tous. Avoir fait une obligation aux hommes de tuer, c'est la honte des empereurs³ et des républiques, le crime des crimes. Aux âges qu'on dit barbares, les villes et les princes confiaient leur défense à des mercenaires qui faisaient la guerre en gens avisés et prudents: il n'y avait parfois que cinq ou six morts dans une grande bataille. Et quand les chevaliers allaient en guerre, du moins n'y étaient-ils point forcés; ils se faisaient tuer pour leur plaisir. Sans doute n'étaient-ils bons qu'à cela. Personne, au temps de saint Louis, n'aurait eu l'idée d'envoyer à la bataille un homme de savoir et d'entendement. Et l'on n'arrachait pas non plus le laboureur à la glèbe pour le mener à l'ost. Maintenant on fait un devoir à un pauvre paysan d'être soldat. On l'exile de la maison dont le toit fume dans le silence doré du soir,

¹ "Le Lys Rouge," by Anatole France. Calman-Lévy: Paris, pp. 116-118.

² Anatole France is a Frenchman, a good Frenchman, too, and thus naturally feels doubly keenly the responsibility of his own country. Consequently it is mainly France which he accuses.

³ Did Anatole France perhaps intentionally omit to mention the United "Kingdom" of Great Britain?

des grasses prairies où paissent les boeufs, des champs, des bois paternels; on lui enseigne, dans la cour d'une vilaine caserne, à tuer régulièrement des hommes; on le menace, on l'injurie, on le met en prison; on lui dit que c'est un honneur, et, s'il ne veut point s'honorer de cette manière, on le fusille. Il obéit parce qu'il est sujet à la peur et de tous les animaux domestiques le plus doux, le plus riant et le plus docile."

In this last sentence of Anatole France there is much truth; it may be the whole truth. I do not wish to detract from the weight of his words by dissecting them; I would merely ask the reader to reflect for ten minutes on the following—that universal service is a sign of man's fearsomeness and docility, of his willingness to obey and his ever-readiness to smile.

As I write, the last act of the drama is coming to an end. England seems inclined to introduce universal service. "Only for the war," it is added soothingly; but in Prussia it began in just the same way—"only for the war." It is not for me to advise England, but I would remind her of Schiller's reference to her in his "Fleet Invincible," the finest utterance of a free man to a free people:

"Soll wirklich denn mein Albion vergehen,
Erlöschen meiner Helden Stamm,
Der Unterdrückung letzter Felsendamm
Zusammenstürzen, die Tyrannenwehre
Vernichtet sein von dieser Hemisphäre?—
Bang schaut auf dich der Erdenball
Und aller freien Männer Herzen schlagen,
Und alle guten, schönen Seelen klagen,
Teilnehmend deines Ruhmes fall."

This time, however, matters are more serious. A foreign military power then menaced England's coast, and it was scattered to the winds, as happens to all military power; but this time militarism is gnawing at England's marrow from the inside outward. It is even ready to throw open the door

to the tyrant, and then the last bulwark against tyranny will be overthrown.

It may be that England's trial to-day is severer and her position more difficult than ever before; but all the more does it become the bounden duty of all Europeans to assert their proud determination to break in pieces their old swords and to forge no more new ones.

For if England now introduces universal military service, all Europe is her accomplice, and every man in Europe is as much responsible therefor as for the "unavoidable consequences of the militarism of 1914."

CHAPTER VII

WHEREIN PATRIOTISM IS ROOTED

1.—PATRIOTISM CONSIDERED AS AN INSTINCT

§ 87.—*Inevitable Decadence*

War is wrong, harmful, and needless. Then why do we wage war, we twentieth-century mortals? And why do we even love war?

The external causes for this love of war have already been set forth, but there is the further fact that, without our being fully aware of it, war stirs us to the very depths of our being; and that it is perhaps the last great carouse of which even a degenerate nation can dream. Such simple things as truth and beauty, freedom and progress, evoke merely a tired smile, like that of an old man recalling his youthful follies. Something stronger and more tangible in the way of a stimulant is now needed to arouse the enthusiasm. Such a stimulant for a nation is war, for an old man, wine. Verily, war is as sweet wine, and should a nation drink itself young again with wine, this is what Goethe meant by a "precious quality." It is a reminder of its youthful days, with their wonderful light-heartedness, their pardonable selfishness, and their boundless capacity for self-sacrifice.

This intoxication is what is great about war. This it is which has inspired poets and painters, and any one who has ever witnessed the outbreak of war will admit that the elemental force of sudden enthusiasm with which vast numbers of people are suddenly carried away creates absolutely the impression of their acting instinctively, but never of their acting intelligently. Yet no one will own to having warlike instincts, for it is with war, as with wine, which we love not

for wine's sake, but for the sake of the feeling which it produces in us. Similarly human beings, at any rate superior human beings, do not love war for its own sake, but because it awakens primitive and hallowed sentiments in us—sentiments which we collectively call patriotism. We love war because we think it necessary to our mother-country, but without patriotism war would be inconceivable to-day. Tolstoy¹ is right: so long as patriotism survives there will always be war; for, as Maupassant² says, it is "*the egg of wars.*" The war giant, like Antæus, cannot be vanquished as long as it is perpetually deriving fresh strength from contact with that love of country wherein it has its source.

To-day patriotism seems more powerful than ever. Even nations which have no historical claim whatever to love their country are behaving as if this were not the case. All the separatism of past centuries has been revived again in this patriotism which even the smallest tribes, hitherto held together by nothing whatsoever, have suddenly discovered in themselves. Even the Jews, who for two thousand years were scattered about among all peoples that on earth do dwell, have found out that they, too, have a patriotism, and are becoming national Zionists; even the Americans, who are, after all, quite a recent conglomeration of miscellaneous peoples, are becoming patriots and imperialists. Such a paroxysm of patriotism, however, is suspicious, and resembles the flaring up of a candle before it flickers out.

Men did not become really fond of yachting and horse-racing until sailing-ships and horses had been superseded by better methods of communication. Similarly patriotism did not grow out of bounds until it had already ceased to be a valuable factor in civilization. The principle, "my country right or wrong"³ could not get a hold on the world until there

¹ "Patriotism and Government," in Tolstoy's religious and ethical pamphlets, Vol. II.

² "Mon oncle Sosthène," by Guy de Maupassant.

³ In English in the original, but in bad English—Translator

was no longer a law student in existence, not even the humblest, who would have ventured seriously to defend such a dogma; and "the Country" never became a conception transcending all others, and throwing all others into the shade, until mankind had already begun to create "universal unions" and other "world-wide institutions."

Such is the fate of decadence. But though a man should speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and prove with flawless logic that war is foolish and despicable; and then were another to come and say, "Quite true, but the country wants it," there would be nothing to be done. The second man would come off victorious.

§ 88.—*The Commanding Position of Patriotism*

Being in the nature of an instinct, patriotism seems as if it could neither be exterminated nor overcome. The reason why war against war is so hard is just because virtually every one loves his own country more devotedly than anything else whatsoever. The thorough bass of patriotism drowns or silences all other sentiments. In peace the Christian may love God before all else, and the free-thinking monist the brotherhood of man; the esthete may put art and its wondrous works before everything else, and the workman place socialism first: yet so soon as war breaks out against God's ordinance, when cathedrals are reduced to dust, and the international bonds uniting the working-classes and men of science throughout the world are broken in sunder, Christian and freethinker, esthete and working-man, all look on and approve, while all our other conceptions of truth, goodness, and beauty dissolve before the magic words, "*for the sake of the country*"—that country which men put before religion and art, science and politics, and therefore even before civilization, which, after all, is only an abstract fusion of them all.

In thus setting the country on high, we forget one thing. At best our country cannot be more than the form in which, in our opinion, religion, art, science, and politics, civilization

in short, can best prosper. Who would really stoop so low as to esteem a people more highly merely because he himself belonged to it unless he were profoundly convinced of its being in every respect superior to other nations? This is so self-evident as far as any patriotism which can be taken seriously is concerned that I do not believe any one will venture to assert the contrary.

But this being so, then the noblest love of country, after all, merely amounts to setting too high a value on the form in comparison with the contents. This is the commonest mistake that half-educated people make, they being fundamentally incapable of distinguishing inward reality from outward show. With patriotism, in short, as with religion and science, it is the same thing: if allowed to go too far, it becomes a dogmatic commonplace.

When a man has once realized, however, that all patriotism which can be taken seriously must to a certain extent inevitably do away with patriotism, or at any rate set a limit to its growth, then, despite all instinctive enthusiasm, he may perhaps set about inquiring more closely into what patriotism is really based upon.

We want to be just to patriotism. It is not the "greatest thing in the world," neither is it such an altogether bad thing as extreme Internationalists endeavor to make it out. Just because they did so represent it, however, they failed to carry with them the sane-minded mass of the people, or even to make them see how much there is wrong and unjustifiable in so-called "modern patriotism." There is, in short, no unconditional patriotism, for it, too, depends on circumstances, and cannot be judged aright save by taking these into account.

Patriotism is three-rooted in three sentiments. Two of them, a man's love of his native land and family love, are hereditary instincts, which we can all easily understand and which are probably common to us all, because of our common past. But the third root reaches out into the future: it is man's social longing, his desire to join with other men to form

large associations. Now, as no two persons view the future alike, it is here that patriotism divides, and here that the good parts company with the bad.

2.—OUR LOVE FOR OUR NATIVE LAND

§ 89.—*An Animal's Love for His Native Surroundings, and a Human Being's Love of Them. Attachment to Surroundings Indicates Suitability for Them.*

Our love for our native land is an inheritance, originally transmitted to us by animals. The less an organism is adapted to the general conditions of the world and the more it is suited to the special conditions of its own surroundings, the more deeply rooted may it be said to be in its native land. In this respect the history of evolution shows ups and downs. The lowest forms of life, for instance, many bacteria even now, need only certain omnipresent conditions such as air, light, water, and some few food-stuffs which occur everywhere in order to exist. Thus, being cosmopolitan, they do not need to be limited to a native element.

Gradually, however, every creature becomes more and more closely adapted to peculiar conditions. The fish must swim in water, and the trout, if it is to thrive, even requires spring water; the monkey can live only in warm woods, and the orang-outang, indeed, only in the primeval tropical forests of the East Indian archipelago; birds need air, but the condor needs certain special conditions besides, which he can find in the Andes alone. This increasing adaptation to a specific climate and this growing disinclination to depart from a certain area, which may be compared with growing attachment to our native land, are interrupted when the youthful human race makes its first tool.

This is not the place to show how man used his tools to acquire freedom in every respect. I shall content myself with pointing out the obvious fact that the use of tools abolishes the natural compulsion exerted by love of country, since

with the aid of tools (using this word in the broadest sense) man learns to adapt himself to the most varied conditions. Unlike the countless tools of animals which have grown to be part of them, such as beaks, teeth, prehensile tails, probosces, burrowing feet, etc., human tools can be laid aside or changed at any moment. With his clothing of various thicknesses man can live in the tropics and at the north pole, whereas an animal has either a bare skin or a thick coat.

The tiger must fall upon his prey, and consequently inhabit a district where prey abounds; for his claws are part of himself. The mole must dig, and consequently creep into the earth, being unable to lay aside his burrowing foot. The horse must be a fleet animal, and therefore cannot quit the steppes; for he cannot put his hoof to any purpose except running. Man, however, can exchange his sword for a plowshare, and be both farmer and warrior at once. By making a tool of the horse, and hoisting himself on to his back, he can even appropriate his swiftness; and he can actually intensify this speed by building railways and steamers, airships, and motor-cars. Thus he is able to live everywhere.

Owing to man's free intellect, therefore, the foremost person is no longer he who is best adapted to certain surroundings, but he who has most unlimited control over the outer world. Man's attachment to his native soil, therefore, is a relic of the animal in him, and originated in the savage's dread of the unknown. No one, moreover, who has endeavored to judge human nature impartially can have failed to observe that love of country is in the case of most of us a romantic sentiment, strongly tinged with the influence of Chateaubriand and the many others who have invented modern love of nature for us. We love German forests not merely for their own sake, but because from Dürer to Leistikow thousands have painted them; because, from Walter von der Vogelweide to Eichendorff, thousands have sung their praises; because Tieck coined the phrase *lonely as the woods*; because there the German oak grows and the German lime-tree, too. In

short, we love the forests not only for their own sake, but because they have come to be a symbol to us.

Honest love of country, however, is wholly different. It is a genuine necessity, and is greatest among backward peoples, who have really grown up part and parcel of their native land. Once forcibly transplanted therefrom, they can never settle down properly anywhere else. Who are the people in Europe most famous for their attachment to their native soil before ever modern affectation¹ had insisted on every one's worshipping the art of his own country? They are first and foremost the Swiss mountain peasants, who could not live without their mountains and cows; the fishermen of the Volga, to whom Mother Volga means the world; and the Icelanders, who prefer their stern native land to all the luxury of central Europe. All these folk have remained comparatively primitive, and the lower we descend the scale of ethnology, the stronger we shall find this unconquerable attachment to the ways and customs of the mother-country.

Surprise has often been felt that the sons of primitive peoples, Indians and Maoris, for instance, whom supposed good fortune has transferred to comfortable European surroundings, could yet never be at home there; in fact, that even many civilized savages, who had apparently become quite inured to European ways, having even completed their courses as university students with distinction, should yet have taken the first opportunity to go back to the bush and become naked savages again. But there is nothing surprising in this, for their primitive brains are simply incapable of feeling at home in such complex new conditions. Hence there are absolutely natural reasons why they should be attached to their native soil in a way which to us at first seems incomprehensible.

¹ "*Snobbismus*" is the word used, but all students of modern French will perceive that Nicolai means what the French call "*snobisme*" rather than what we call "snobbishness." There is, so far as I know, no exact English translation of "*snobisme*," but it is, I think, nearer "affectation" than snobbishness.—Translator.

§ 90.—*Overcoming our Love of Our Native Soil.*

If I mistake not, it was Macaulay who first pointed out that although love of a man's native soil and patriotism were identical in small communities, such as the Greek republics, the Swiss cantons, and the German imperial cities, for here the narrow confines of "home" really represented a definite conception, yet in the larger communities of to-day this is no longer so in the least. As Ratzel¹ truly says: "Meantime, the German's associations are only with his country or bit of country. In the case of the Old Bavarian, however, this country does not extend to Franconia, and in the case of the Prussian not necessarily west of the Elbe." On the other hand, the dweller in the low-lying plains of North Germany finds what is to him a more kindred homelike land in the Asiatic lowlands as far as the Yenisei than in all southern Germany.

The natural mother-land of the South German, on the contrary, extends far beyond Germany southward and westward; indeed, the dweller in the low-lying plains of the upper Rhine would more easily feel at home in Lombardy than on the Lüneburg Heath.

Thus a man's natural attachment to his native soil must of necessity tend toward narrowness, and really it is just the highly, far-seeing nations who have grown beyond this innate love of their native soil; for they have learned not to dread the unknown and to have open eyes and ears for appreciating beauty throughout the world. The educated Greeks of a later day were at home everywhere in the then known world; the Romans, again, were more attached to Greece than to their own country. Indeed, they not infrequently called themselves barbarians; and Tacitus and others even discovered perpetual beauties in the misty land of Germania. From time

¹ "Deutschland. Einführung in die Heimatkunde" ("Germany An introduction to the Knowledge of our own Country), by Friedrich Ratzel, p. 312. Leipzig, 1898.

immemorial we Germans have had an uncontrollable longing for the South, and it is just the "most highly civilized" nation on earth which is freest from this kind of love of country, for the proud Briton knows that in a sense he is able to take his country round the world with him. He has conquered the world just because he hunts elks in Scandinavia, tracks bears in Russia, shoots tigers in India and lions in Africa, always *like an Englishman*. He has conquered the world, in short, just because "Home, sweet home" for him is no longer anything but a romantic idyll.¹

Thus this primitive root of patriotism, love of our native soil, or native heath or native steppes, has in process of time ceased to be of any value as a factor in evolution. Even Gottfried Keller,² whom assuredly no one would accuse of want of attachment to his mountains and to everything German, recognized that modern patriotism was becoming a clog upon the minds of men.

Volkstum und Sprache sind das Jugendland,
 Darin die Völker wachsen und gedeihen,
 Das Mutterhaus, nach dem sie sehnend schreien,
 Wenn sie verschlagen sind auf fremden Strand,
 Doch maenlmal werden sie zum Gängelband,
 Sogar zur Kette um den Hals der Freien;
 Dann treiben Längsterwachsene Spielereien
 Genarrt von der Tyrannen schlauer Hand.
 Hier trenne sich der lang vereinte Strom!
 Versiegend schwinde der im alten Staube,
 Der andere breche sich ein neues Bette!
 Denn *einen* Pontifex nur fasst der Dom,
 Das ist die Freiheit, der polit'sche Glaube,
 Der löst und bindet jede Seelenkette!

¹ Dr. Nicolai, like every one else, is entitled to his own opinion. His writing affords much more proof of knowledge of biology than of knowledge of English character, his notions of which seem to be purely theoretical.—Translator.

² "Nationalität," in Gottfried Keller's "Collected Poems," 1889. Wilhelm Herz: Berlin.

§ 91.—*The Organic Family Instinct. Nomadic Tribe or Family?*

The primitive tribes which human beings united to form in olden times owe their origin partly to the human tribal instinct and partly to the family instinct. Neither were ever wholly separate, nor are they now. The family instinct gradually widened until it became a racial instinct, if it be allowable to speak of a race all of whose members spring from a common stock. The tribal instinct simply compelled a fairly large number of human beings to club together to form warlike nomadic tribes, and therefore has really nothing to do with their having sprung from a common stock. It merely indicates that human beings feel more at ease with a number of their fellows than alone.

Originally the family instinct was confined to maternal affection, which, with the impulse to feed, is perhaps the oldest instinct known to us. But whereas feeding is purely selfish, maternal affection is the most primeval impulse which is not devoid of "*altruism*" and which has nevertheless not ceased to be selfish; for although the child is already another being, yet the mother feels it to be something belonging to her own self. Not till maternal affection expanded into family affection and finally into universal fraternal affection did the altruism in it become manifest. The original nature of the sentiment, however, remained unchanged. Once more we see that in nature there is no beginning, and even what seems to be new and wholly unlike anything in the past is in reality only a development of the old. It was long believed, indeed, that maternal affection was solely due to the mother's feeling a child is flesh of her flesh and bone of her bone. But something similar to maternal affection can be proved to have existed even before any question of sentiment can have arisen, since the parents did not as yet know their own offspring, indeed often never saw them.

In common parlance, it is true, we no longer speak of

maternal affection or even of maternal instincts, but of "nature's maternal forethought." For this Autenrieth introduced the fine and appropriate name of "organic instinct," by which he virtually means that as a matter of fact in creatures on so low a level no modification takes place in the rest of the organism. There are countless instances of such organic maternal instincts. The fact that the more offspring an animal produces, the smaller and more helpless these offspring are must not be forgotten, for the only object in these vast numbers being born is that, despite all persecution, some may still survive. The creation of pectoral glands which secrete suitable nourishment, of birds' crops for the purpose of predigestion and of pouches for carrying young, are all facts proving how mother love has triumphed.

Then comes a series of facts which may, indeed, be connected with instincts, but which are also wholly and solely attributable to mother love, although at first sight they seem to have nothing to do with it. Among these facts are rutting periods, which are always so timed that the young are not born in the cold of winter, but when young, juicy plants or young, easily digestible animals are to be found.

Countless instincts of insects serve similar purposes. When laying their eggs, many insects seem to exercise almost incredible foresight, so that the future larvæ may be able to creep forth in suitable conditions; and yet no such insect has ever survived the birth of its offspring. In the case of the higher animals, particularly birds and mammals, such compelling instincts constantly tend to become freer, that is, to depend more and more on the intelligence. As their brain constantly increases in activity it must learn to think for the offspring; and if this is to be the case, some feeling must necessarily exist. Such a feeling is mother love.

§ 92.—*The Change in Racial Instincts*

Thus mother love, like most of our sublimest sentiments, can be traced backward through the animal kingdom to the time

when it was still an organic instinct; that is, a purely animal quality. This in nowise detracts from the value of such a sentiment, but once we perceive that, after all, it merely represents the equivalent of former physical qualities already partly extinct, we shall cease to be convinced there and then that such sentiments are eternally valuable. To offend against them, therefore, becomes no worse than inflicting bodily injury; and we realize that in certain circumstances even maternal love may have to yield to something higher. If mankind in general should one day care for all children, as is not beyond the bounds of possibility, because it has realized that this would be a good thing, then maternal affection would be nothing but a rudimentary instinct, perhaps even in the way, just as the appendix, once useful, is now useless, and merely a cause of disease.

If, however, this applies to maternal affection, how much more does it apply to its derivative family affection and, above all, to racial affection! Both family and racial affection are of very mixed origin. Thoroughly human and occasionally anything but desirable elements are intermingled with both. The reason why maternal affection could expand into family affection was that not only did the mother love her child, but the man his descendants. Modern research long since ascertained that monogamous marriage is no natural institution. Man is by nature polygamous and philoneistic. Originally promiscuity prevailed between all men and women belonging to migratory tribes, just as all animals living in herds are polygamous, and only a few creatures living alone—a number of birds, for instance—are monogamous. We now know with absolute certainty that everywhere the monogamic period succeeded the so-called matriarchate period only after the wife had become the slave of the husband, who regarded her as a valuable domestic animal and wished to make sure of his right to own her, as if she had been a cow or a sheep. At the same time that the woman was enslaved and taken possession of by the husband, private ownership of other property began to

come in. To inherit this legitimately the husband then desired to found a "legitimate" family within certain well-defined limits. The sacredness of the family, therefore, is really based merely on the sacredness of private property; and the very nations that to-day set most store by the possession of material property (the Jews, for example), are those who still consider the family most sacred. The sources of family affection, therefore, have at all times been not only the pure well-springs of mother affection, but also the turbid waters of slavery and property ownership.

As for racial affection, it is, after all, nothing but expanded family love. We love human beings whom we believe to be descended from the same ancestors as ourselves, and whom we therefore suppose to belong to the same great family. Thus we see that even the second source of patriotism consists of troubled waters, and how foul they often are we shall realize more clearly in analyzing race patriotism (§ 99).

3.—THE SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS OF MANKIND

§ 93.—*The Explanation of Public-Spiritedness*

An association of human beings seems to us more important than an individual man, and by general consensus of opinion the origin of associations is put at a later date than that of human beings. Some thought sex accounted for the formation of associations. A human being, it was said, founded a family, branches of this family then arose, and these formed into villages and towns and afterward into states. Others saw the explanation in civilization, arguing that certain occupations, such as agriculture, or, as Schiller says, Ceres, caused man to associate with his fellow-man.

As was shown in discussing man's original tendency to herd together, and as anthropologists long ago proved, these views do not really go to the root of the matter. *It was not man who founded society, but society, which was his primary state, was the collectivity which first produced the individual*

man. In other words, society is older than man, and man's ancestors lived in herds when they were still in an animal state. Man, therefore, always has been of Aristotle's *Zoon politikon*—the social animal. The universal brotherhood of man and humanitarian ideas generally are in no sense abstract notions, but the most solid facts. Thus what we have to explain is not how bloodthirsty animals became peace-loving human beings, but, contrariwise, how it happened that man, the social animal, should have become warlike.

But deeply rooted and at all times innate as is this humanitarian instinct of man's, yet it must everlastingly be struggling against the no less inborn instinct of egoism. We are inwardly cast in human form, and the instrument for using our humanity to the uttermost is at hand, only we human beings do not yet know how to play upon it. Hitherto the pure sound of this music of harmony to come has never been heard on earth; only the favored few heard the soft strains of the future and delighted therein.

Mankind's social aspirations, therefore, are beckoning to him to advance toward an ideal which is not something vague and unknown, enveloped in the mists of ages to come, but something which we can already see as clear as daylight before us, if only with the mind's eye.

CHAPTER VIII

DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PATRIOTISM

1.—LOCAL PATRIOTISM

§ 94.—*Natural Patriotism*

German patriotism, like every other, is something large and complex, containing very many almost indefinable elements. There is, first, attachment to our native tongue, in whose accents we first learned to make our wants known, which first made us feel intelligent beings, and in whose accents we first learned about goodness, truth, and beauty in our childhood's years, when we were still sensitive to beauty and goodness. This attachment includes others—attachment to all the kind people whom we knew when we were children, and who were almost all Germans; to all the great men who first aroused our enthusiasm, Goethe, Kant, Beethoven, and many hundreds of others; to much that is beautiful; to our forests and lakes, our old churches and ballads. We are not always aware of this, but so it is, and the patriotism of those very persons who are now declaring that it is unpatriotic to like the Lorelei song because Heinrich Heine wrote it is partly based on this oft-sung song. Then there is also the recollection of many things endeared to us merely by trivial custom, and not simply such things as German beer and German jollity. A great deal else besides for which other nations envy us—for instance, German thoroughness and love of order, German music and German humor—cannot be understood or judged aright save by those born just on the little spot between the Rhine and the Memel; while Silesian and Bavarian dumplings help to develop another and more special

local attachment. German forests and Strasburg cathedral, the Colmar Crucifixion and the North German steppes are all integral parts of our German patriotism.

French patriotism is altogether different. In it traces of the Renaissance survive, and of the great Revolution, of Burgundy and champagne, of the marvelous delicacy of a Corot and the Gallic wit of a Voltaire. The Napoleonic legend also intervenes, the cupola of the dome of Les Invalides glows in the setting sun, and the Provençal troubadour sings freely of the "*Donna franca et cortezza*," and extols the "*gesta dei per francos*," the divine deeds of the Franks.

The solid basis for these human aspirations will be discussed in Chapter XIII on "The World as an Organism." It is enough to point out here that mankind can never be completely in harmony unless all human beings feel as brethren and comrades. Thus man's primeval impulse to look forward is not only the root of all patriotism, but also the crowning point of all genuine, true, and eternal love of country.

§ 95.—*True and False Patriotism*

True and false patriotism here part company, and do so of their own accord. Wherever local patriotism, however local it may be, tends to make humanity more human, or, if the phrase be preferred, to promote patriotism of the human race, it is justified; but wherever it tends to hinder this one great aim of man, it is reprehensible.

This idea is part and parcel of mankind. It was not realized all at once, however, for first the egoism of the individual man had to be overcome, and for this it was necessary for men to unite together. Municipal patriotism was justified in overcoming the selfish designs of the robber barons. The conception of a state triumphed when it had to be applied to whole civilizations, such as modern national governments. Hence no one will ever succeed in undoing what has been done once and for all by the struggles of the nineteenth century, in which men patriotically joined together, thereby insuring the victory

of national patriotism. National states now exist, needing only to be perhaps slightly improved. Hence national patriotism would not now be justified save in a few oppressed territories.

New problems are now awaiting us, only we are attempting to solve them by the same methods as answered in the case of the old problems. Patriotism is no longer a springboard for man in his endeavors to take heaven by storm, for its aims are no longer progressive, but retrogressive. The patriotisms involved in the present conflict bring us no nearer the final patriotism of mankind; there is no genuine patriotism about them.

What of England and English patriotism? it may be asked. Newton and Faraday, Cromwell and Shakspeare, the Habeas Corpus Act, the World's First Parliament, Scottish ballads, whisky, British soldiers in the desert, Trafalgar and Aboukir Bay, a world-wide empire, and plum pudding—all these create a feeling against which no Britisher could ever be quite proof. And this is as it should be, for this absolutely natural attachment to those who were young with us to the place of our birth and the habits with which we grew up needs no explanation, and is nowise disrespectful to any other place, any other human being, or any other habits.

As every man loves and ought to love his wife, albeit he knows that other women are perhaps more beautiful, wiser, and better, even so every human being not only may, but ought to, love his own country. Only he must not forget that this is a matter of personal predilection, and that other men are just as much entitled to have predilection for another country.

Above all we must reflect that patriotism is not a simple, unvarying sentiment, but is variable and composite. Certain elements, such as attachment to our mother-tongue, are almost invariably present, but apart from this we must realize the fact of a glow of pleasure and satisfaction coming over us all at the sound of our native country's name has many and

complex causes. The sources of the sentiment of "home," although in general traceable to the three cardinal causes I have set forth above, vary immensely in the case of each individual person. Every one fixes upon what seems to him most essential, and makes his patriotism symbolical thereof. In this universal form the sentiment of home is one of the sacred mysteries of mankind—a priceless possession, like art and beauty.

2.—DYNASTIC OWNERSHIP

§ 96.—*The Affection of Subjects*

Such vague love of our homeland, however, is not of much practical value. It is only in ballads that kings talk as Henry did to Douglas:

Der ist in tiefster Seele treu,
Der die Heimat hebt, wie Du!

They generally demand an outspoken attachment to one well-defined fatherland. By old Roman law the father was he whose name was mentioned in the marriage contract (*Pater est quem nuptiæ demonstrant*). Similarly, whatever country is to be accounted a man's fatherland or his mother-country must have the proper colors flying over it. Countless elements go to make up patriotism, yet here we have the least important selected as its distinctive characteristic.

Almost everywhere in Europe for about a thousand years we have known none but railed-off countries on a dynastic basis. Thus, owing to unconscious association of ideas, attachment to the hereditary ruling house has become almost the same thing as patriotism; and modern Prussia, where this dynastic patriotism is most strongly marked, was quite right in substituting the motto "With God for king and country" for the old motto "*pro patria et gloria*," thus placing king before country.

This time-honored fidelity to a dynasty really meant some-

thing so long as a prince represented or symbolized a community not dependent on him for its existence, as was formerly the case with the Teutonic dukes, and is still so with the English King. But when princes began making considerable territorial and tribal acquisitions by conquest, purchase, or marriage, then genuine love of country and dynastic patriotism excluded each other, and there were not a few who realized this. What had attachment to the Bourbons to do with the Spaniards', Neapolitans', or Sicilians' attachment to their country? How could Burgundy, Spain, and the Netherlands be attached to the House of Austria, which for them was represented by the insignificant house of Hapsburg, of Swiss origin? Or what has the patriotism of the Poles, Alsations and Danes to do with attachment to the Prusso-German Empire of the Hohenzollerns?

The bonds uniting a nation together, however, are so vague and indefinite, and the state with its ruler and the often very beneficial array of officials representing it, are something so impressively real, that as time went on, attachment to the state everywhere supplanted patriotism. Indeed, history proves the awakening of patriotic sentiments to have always been connected with attachment to some particular ruler.

In the eighteenth century what we now call patriotism was still unknown, but the *Roi Soleil* was looked on as the glory of France, and Frederick II as foreshadowing Germany's greatness; Maria Theresa was loved as representing the new unity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and even now the Russian peasant would have no conception of Russia were it not for the influence of the Orthodox Church and the idea of the czar as the Little Father. This state of things continued till the great Revolution, after which the "subject" gradually became more important as compared with his ruler. Consequently, at any rate in advanced countries, the conception of nationhood and of a national state became more and more vivid and clear. Meanwhile the irresistible historical tendency of the nineteenth century to unite Europeans into

national states became increasingly manifest. Yet the conception of nationhood remained only a sentiment, and no attempt was made to define it more exactly.

§ 97.—*Prusso-German and Austro-German*

Pure and unadulterated medievalism is still not defunct, and in Germany, to go no further, it is obvious that even in the nineteenth century the dynastic principle can win the day. After the upheavals of Napoleon's time there were in Germany two powerful dynasties, the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. Behind both lay a long and glorious past. The influence of French conceptions of liberty gave rise to dreams of welding all territory "so far as the German tongue is heard" into one great nation; but this could be done only if one of the two dynasties were abolished. Traditional ideas, however, got the better of modern ones, sanguinary wars set the seal upon dismemberment. The old German Empire was turned into the country of the Hapsburgs, and beside it the youthful Prussia grew up into the new and vigorous German Empire of the Hohenzollerns. Neither country represents any distinctly defined nation. The German Empire, however, approaches thereto, inasmuch as, according to German statistics, it contains only nine per cent. of non-Germans (Poles, Frenchmen, and Danes). On the other hand, a large number of Germans live abroad, particularly in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, where, however, they are greatly in the minority. Indeed, they number only about twenty per cent. of the total population as compared with the Poles, Slavs, Magyars, and Romance nations. But in German territory the dynastic idea has so completely prevailed over the national that instead of condemning Bismarck as the "disrupter" of Germany, we extol him as its "uniter." Yet he it was who, in the interests of Prussia, his smaller fatherland, really brought about the present state of things.

If we would see Germany a great power on a national basis, then first of all we should have to liberate the millions of

Germans who, as becomes daily more apparent, are gradually perishing in that chaos of nations called the Hapsburg monarchy. That is, matters being as they are, the ancient dream of German unity cannot be realized save by Austria being broken up and the German Empire annexing what is really German property.

Fanciful dynastic notions, however, are so closely interwoven with our national conceptions that we do not even perceive what a violent contradiction in terms it is that, at any rate according to the official explanation following on the ultimatum to Serbia, we should have taken up arms in 1914, full of enthusiasm and with flying colors, for the support of our Austrian ally. Imagining that she was drawing her sword for the so-called national unity of Teutonism, Germany really drew it in the interests of Austria, which is composed of more than a dozen nations, and is an outrage on the very notion of race purity.

In reality the existence of Austria is the sole obstacle to the constitution of a German nation wherever the German tongue is heard. The German, therefore, as is so often the case, stands in his own light by maintaining the Austrian dynasty. But apart from these facts, the inevitable result of this alliance between the protagonists of dynastic and those of national patriotism is that neither honestly believes his own kind of patriotism to be the wisest possible. Nor can any one seriously believe in the ultimate possibility of these two divergent kinds of patriotism being fused into one, for the very existence of Austria makes it impossible for Germany to develop into a single united nation.

Hence we are confronted with two alternatives. Either Germany has once and for all abandoned the idea of becoming a single united nation, or else she went to war intending afterward to attack and dismember her present ally.¹

¹ If such an intention exists at all, it can only be latent in the sub-consciousness of the nation. Naturally I have no thought of even referring to any "*mala fides*."

The inward signification of this war is the conquest of patriotism. As has so often been the case, Germany is fighting against her own self, and there can be no doubt that in course of time the small Germanies will disappear and their place be taken by one great united mother-country. So long as the small dynasties exist, however, attachment to the newer and greater country will be considered treason to them. The patriot Jahn,¹ Georg Herwegh, Freiligrath, Fritz Reuter, and many others besides were forced into exile or imprisoned because of their love for Germany. And even now every one who hopes for a united German mother-country is outlawed by Prussia and Austria, to the applause of the senseless mob.

The very men who talk about Germany's world-wide expansion dread her becoming united, and urge all manner of reasons why she should not do so. The adjunction of Austria would mean too many clericals in the Reichstag: the break up of Austria must mean that many alien nationalities would break away, and then Germany would be too weak from the military point of view. German territory as a whole is inconvenient from the point of view of trade, and so forth. All this may be true; but if so, then it simply proves that German national sentiment is a mere phrase, adopted whenever it is desired to pick holes in the Jews, Social Democrats, Poles, or French, but immediately thrown overboard if it threatens to become applicable to ourselves. Let us be frank. Let no one say he is a German to the core, but rather that he is a Prussian and a Hohenzollern to the core.

If modern patriots talked in this wise and were not always confusing everything with their wrong notions of nationality, it would be possible to come to some sort of understanding with them, and readily to admit that for a nation to be in a sort of water-tight compartment is no longer the one thing worth striving for, but that beyond all doubt the conception

¹ Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, known as the "Turnvater," father of gymnastics.

of the state as the only true form of association is daily becoming more important.

§ 98.—*The Free Association of States*

The association to form a state is a strong and essentially valuable bond of union, and wherever it has been based upon liberty it has proved even stronger than any nationality or, as they are now so often called, racial bounds, stronger even than the ties of religion.

In Switzerland Germans, French, Romansch, and Italians have united to form one free state. Every one being entitled to his own language, religion, and convictions, attachment to these is not lashed up to such a pitch as to supplant loyalty to the state. Moreover, the conception of the state imposes no fetters, but merely serves a useful purpose. Modest in its demands the state acquires solid power.

Similarly in the United States there dwell a medley of associated nations, Germans and Russians, Poles and Magyars, Italians and Englishmen, Irish and Balkan subjects, all living peacefully together and beginning to unite together to form a new race. In this case a medley of nations is strong and can maintain itself, whereas in Austria, held together as she is by force, it spells disaster. Furthermore, a new patriotism, American patriotism, is being formed, for, like everything else, patriotism cannot exist unless it be based on moral sentiment; in other words, on free will and free determination.

The British Empire, of which the conquered Boers have become absolutely loyal citizens in an incredibly short time, likewise seems to be standing the test. The Boers, after all, remain Boers. Not a word is said about the necessity of everything in the British Empire being English; it is recognized that the empire is merely a bond of union.

Both the German and Austrian empires also exist merely for a purpose, but we make the mistake of endeavoring to delude ourselves and others into believing that the German Empire is a national state, which of course annoys a great many

over whom the black, white, and red banner floats, since they neither can nor will become Germans by nationality, but would undoubtedly be excellent members of a German union.

Whenever an empire puts forth no extravagant claims, such as to be a sort of center to which enforced sympathies must gravitate, then it is far easier to see how far it can help to centralize material interests. Unfortunately, however, every one who disapproves of certain institutions, especially those to which the rulers for the time being attach importance, is called an enemy of the empire; and thus every one who really thinks for himself is tempted to regret being a member of that empire. All great imperial conceptions, indeed, originated with the opposition parties. Germany now prides herself upon her social legislation, and indeed we owe it to applied state socialism that our economic life goes on smoothly even during the war. But time was when Liberals and Socialists alike were the country's enemies. The opposition will not and cannot demand that its advice should be followed, for then it would cease to deserve its name; but it is justified in insisting on being heard and on its opinions, like every one else's, being respected.

To-day there are also some whose views of the war differ from those of the majority, and who believe that it would not be for Germany's good to win a victory. It is of course their duty to do whatever work their fellow-citizens in the majority demand of them; but equally of course they are entitled, indeed, they are bound, to remain true to their convictions. In 1850 King Frederick William IV actually said to the British envoy that he considered it the greatest blessing that a victory of Prussia over Austria had then been avoided, for, he added, in view of Austria's internal dissensions this would have been inevitable. Similarly every citizen of the country should now be allowed to say what he considers most in the interests of its greatness. Patriotism, in short, should be a moral sentiment, and this is possible only in a state of freedom.

3.—RACE PATRIOTISM

§ 99.—*The Problem of Race*

The obstacle to us Europeans developing this free patriotism at present is the so-called race patriotism of the small European countries. This has become far too petty for modern world politics, and, after all, it has nothing whatever to do with race. Now, this question of race is one of the most melancholy chapters in the history of human knowledge. Consciously or unconsciously, knowledge, supposed to be impartial, has never placed itself so unconditionally in the service of ambitious and self-seeking politicians as in this race question. Indeed, it might almost be said that the various theories of race have really never been put forward except with the object of advancing some claim or other. The writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Anglo-German, afford perhaps the most distressing example of this.

As we all know, this author has been endeavoring to claim every eminent man throughout the history of the world, Christ and Dante included, for the Teutonic race. It may seem surprising that other demagogic representatives of other races did not make a similar attempt, and that they did not is a testimony to the good sense of foreign men of science. The French anthropologist, Paul Souday, on the other hand, recently endeavored to prove that probably all Germany's eminent men are of Celtic origin; and as a matter of fact South Germany, to which most of them belong, was originally a Celtic country, while the foreign origin of some of the few eminent North Germans can be proved. Thus Nietzsche was a Slav, and Kant's family emigrated from Scotland. It is worth while to refer to a French edition of Houston Stewart Chamberlain such as Paul Souday, for it may perhaps make even deluded neutrals realize the worthlessness of such arguments. But most Germans hold some such views as this. True, they say that they feel as German patriots ought to

feel, just because they are Germans; but in reality they believe in a German race because they think it their patriotic duty to do so. Now, if we consider the foundations on which these race theories are based, we shall see that they are very slender. They are, first, that in general it is not proved that a pure race is superior to a mixed one, and, secondly, that it is impossible exactly to define what a human race is.

§ 100.—*The Value of Race Purity*

A pedigree dog is said to be worth more than a mongrel, and this probably explains the strange view that a human being of pure race is worth more than one of mixed race. In the case of dogs, and to a less extent in that of other domestic animals, this can be understood; for man originally selected for breeding such dogs as he liked or as were useful to him. Thus he bred a small, long-bodied race, with crooked legs suited for scratching holes in the ground, a dog spirited, strong, and rapacious, the Dachshund, which he used for hunting animals living in holes or caves. Then he bred another kind, tall and slender, with long legs, the greyhound, to hunt hares for him; and similarly he has bred vigilant Pomeranians, sharp-nosed setters, bloodhounds, and so on till we come to life-saving St. Bernards.

Now, each of these kinds has its own peculiar qualities, and in other respects its capacities have become quite deadened. Thus the greyhound cannot smell, and bulldogs are inclined to bite. In short, a biologist would say that these pure-bred dogs were by no means particularly well equipped for life; but man will have them so, and therefore he attaches less value to cross breeds, in which the special characteristics of particular kinds of dogs of course vanish. The proof that, from the purely biological point of view, pedigree dogs are inferior is simply that the most highly bred usually die out before long. Thus St. Bernards survived only for four generations, and there are no longer any absolutely pure-bred pug-dogs; but to atone for this, new pedigree kinds are con-

stantly appearing. It is certainly remarkable that police dogs, which from the nature of their employment must be highly trained, are not called "pedigree dogs." Such dogs, in short, are useless except for some special purpose, and as only dogs are used for so many purposes quite foreign to their nature, it is chiefly in their case that purity of race is greatly insisted upon.

In the case of all other domestic animals, whether horses, cows, goats, pigs, or what not, skilful crossing, or what breeders call improving the breed, is considered of more importance than anything else; and whenever a particular breed is bred comparatively true, new blood must be from time to time introduced into it. The sole exceptions to this rule are race-horses, which are kept for sport only, and a few fancy breeds of pigeons; but for work none but half-blood horses can be used. German horse-breeders, moreover, have had to pay dearly for having acted on the suggestion of Bruce Low, and for a time bought none but pedigree horses. It must not be forgotten also that the strain of English pure-blood pedigree horses has not been known for more than two hundred years at the outside, and therefore is still comparatively young.

Thus in the animal kingdom we find scarcely any warrant for the assertion that people of unmixed race are superior to others, and in mankind no warrant whatever for it, since there are absolutely no pure-bred races, with the possible exception of a few peoples on a very low level. Europe, at all events, is an absolute national medley, and any one who does not consider the Jews the flower of the human race should not make such foolish assertions as that concerning the superiority of unmixed races.

Suppose now that it is asserted that although nations owed their origin to crossing, yet in course of time a uniform race is formed from these crossings, and that these ancient races are superior to more recent conglomerate races. Even this would not be true. On the contrary, it is a remarkable fact

that the legends of *all* peoples which have attained greatness tell of their having entered their countries as conquerors. Doubtless this is a reminiscence of another fact of which history affords repeated confirmation—that powerful nations which leave their impress on the world always arise just where two national migrations came into collision, and a new young empire resulted. This is also true of the ancient empires of the East. But—not to depart from Europe—Hellas and Rome arose out of that great migration which we describe as the Doric migration and the Greek colonization of the Mediterranean. The Roman Empire was, moreover, very closely connected with the Etruscan migrations.¹ Again, the German medieval empire took its rise from the onslaughts of popular migration. It was Arab invasions which, in Spain (and therefore in a foreign land) gave rise to that Arab empire which was in every respect the most important; and subsequently the Spanish Empire arose. The Norman invasions of France and England in the tenth century gave the impetus to the greatness of both these countries. Prussia arose precisely where there was the greatest blending of Teutons, advancing from the tenth to the twelfth centuries over the Eastern marches, with the conquered Slavs.

Quite possibly everything must not be set down to mixture of blood, but something to dormant energies being aroused. The foregoing brief historical summary, however, suffices to disprove older races having in any way the advantage. Those who urge that all these instances are taken from ancient history, may be referred to the unexampled progress of the United States. Here we see actually before us the rise of a young, vigorous nation composed of the leavings of old Europe, sometimes inferior leavings, with a dash of negro and Indian blood, which, though slight, nevertheless cannot be ignored. Here is a nation which might well be called New Europe. Now many, it is true, will say that, though America

¹ Mommsen's opinion differed radically from this, but will not stand the test of modern research.

has progressed, she has not done so in the right way; but probably such things have always been said by those over whom the wheel of blooming civilizations has passed.

§ 101.—*Historical and Linguistic Races*

It is by no means too much to say, therefore, that there is nothing to prove the superiority of a pure human race over a mixed one, and that this is not even probable.

Now, as regards the differentiation of the various races, the unfortunate thing is that we have no absolute criterion for the definition of a race. All manner of expedients have therefore been resorted to. Thus an attempt has been made by historical investigators to separate human beings into communities having a like origin or into groups speaking cognate languages, and to classify them according to various similarities or differences of civilization; and finally an endeavor has been made to base a definition of race on physical characteristics. There is some justification for all these attempts, and all appear to be successful so long as we confine ourselves to the one special line of investigation. But unfortunately these diversely formed national groups do not coincide.

There are peoples, whose existence is historically attested, such as the Teutons of the migratory period, whose descendants might be sought in Italy, Africa, Spain, and Byzantium. Again, there are linguistically allied races, for instance, the "Germans," to which not only Teutons, Slavs, and Celts, but even negroes and Mongols belong. Finally, there are anthropological races, for instance, the long-headed North European type, who chiefly live around the Baltic and the North Sea (except Pomerania, West Prussia, and Finland).

Now, as nobody knows what is really the proper method of classifying races, every one can select whichever best suits his own particular inclinations; and what is worse, and what has led to hopeless confusion, is that every one who has pegged out a "nation" in accordance with one set of characteristics only tries to make all other characteristics conform thereto. Thus

some persons have attempted to find the same specific characteristics prevailing over the whole territory formerly subject to the inroads of national migrations, while others have tried to prove all German-speaking or all Slav-language territory to be inhabited by one single race, and even to consider the Jews or the Teutons as all belonging to one type of civilization only. All these attempts show but too plainly the cloven foot of partiality.

Historical research in particular has been misapplied, and extravagant claims made in its name. The Italian believes in an Italian people extending as far as the sound of Roman legionaries' footsteps were once heard, or, as they prefer to put it now, as far as the Lion of St. Mark's once roared. The Germans would fain claim for themselves all territory over which the hosts of the migratory period once passed. The French Napoleonic Empire alone is still historically too young to have any traditional justification for its claims. These need not be expected for a few centuries to come; that is, unless in the interval the world becomes wiser.

Now, as regards the question of race, historical research may be left absolutely out of account. Suppose that in a territory inhabited by millions of people only one single person of foreign race has survived or immigrated. Now, if this solitary person has characteristics such as are invariably transmitted in case of his crossing with another race, then, owing to continuous crossing, in a few hundred years the entire population would possess these characteristics.

In order to realize this, we must consider that, allowing four children to a generation, a single human being has in the fifth generation—that is, after 125 years—one thousand descendants; ¹ after 250 years this number has increased to a million, and after 375 years the number of his descendants would equal that of all living human beings.² The historical fact

¹ After 25 years, 4; after 50 years, 16; after 75 years, 64; after 100 years, 256; after 125 years, 1024 descendants

² In the case of physically vigorous national elements it is scarcely too much to allow four children. But allowing only 3 children, a

that at any given time a nation was racially pure and has not since received any considerable infusion of foreign blood is therefore of comparatively small importance.

Linguistic researches have likewise led to no definite results, for we know that it may happen that nations, almost to a man, adopt a new language in a short time. Thus the Slavs in the East Elbe provinces almost all speak German well, and, it might be added, feel quite German. The Bulgarians, originally a blend of Turk and Tatar, have become so much impregnated with Slav civilization and the Slav language as to forget all about their origin; while Slavs who have emigrated to Greece have become just like Greeks. The Goths in Spain and Lombardy likewise soon absolutely forgot their Teutonic origin. Any number of like instances could be adduced. Moreover, all other civilized institutions can be shown to have altered even more rapidly than language.

§ 102.—*Physical Racial Characteristics*

The physical characteristics of animals are studied almost solely with the object of classifying them into species. In the case of man it is also the only method of attaining any practical results, and it has proved a reliable method of dividing the great human races into white and black, yellow and red. In the demarcation of the small European sub-species frequently described as races it has, on the whole, not answered, and for the following reasons:

1.—These peoples probably never were genuine species. They had not time to develop so much because they did not split off from the so-called Indo-Germanic race until a comparatively late period.

2.—A great hindrance to investigation is that it is not known whether the original inhabitants of Europe, the race whom the immigrants encountered, were homogeneous or not. This

billions is reached in 19 generations (475 years). Allowing 2 children it would be reached in 30 generations, or 750 years; that is, not even then in such a very long time.

point, however, will be gradually cleared up when we become better acquainted with prehistoric discoveries.

3.—Most important of all is the fact that, in historic times, there has been so much crossing and recrossing that no one need expect to find more than the ruins of any particular nation anywhere. Rome's legions penetrated as far as the Pontus, to Ultima Thule, and Heaven knows where besides; and what is more, they founded numerous colonies, to which the altogether Roman names of Rhenish cities and the Roman cast of countenance frequently noticeable in Rhineland girls afford eloquent testimony.

Again, before the migrations, some inexplicable impulse toward expansion drove Cimbrian migratory tribes far southward. Then came the period when the Teutons as Roman mercenaries encircled the known world, until finally they became independent nations, and as such took part in the migrations which overwhelmed all Europe. These migrations have not yet ceased, especially in eastern central Europe, between the fifteenth and thirteenth parallel of longitude, that is, in the Balkan regions and in the quadrangle erected upon them, including the corners of Stettin, Trieste, Petrograd, and Constantinople. The Courland and Siebenbürgen Germans in Slav and Rumanian territory, the Sezkler Magyars in Rumanian territory, and the Wends and Czechs in German territory may be cited in proof of what I say.

But war and peace brought about many changes besides these. All the nations of Europe and the surrounding territory, Mongols, Moors, Finns, and Magyars included, fought battles, particularly in Germany. Frequently, however, especially in the case of Spaniards, Frenchmen, Swedes, and Poles, troops were garrisoned in Germany, often for a long time, or else German and Swiss mercenaries were garrisoned all about the world, leaving descendants behind them, sometimes forcibly begotten, sometimes not.

Besides this, religious and commercial persecution caused people to emigrate to freer or more enlightened countries.

The refugees in Ansbach and Brandenburg, the Palatinate and Holland, and the Salzburg people in East Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden are instances of religious colonization; the Italians in Germany and the Poles in the Rhine country and Westphalia, of commercial colonization.

Besides the historical difficulties of sorting out the different races, there is another difficulty, this time biological. For example, the examination of skulls is in itself an absolutely reliable method of race classification, except that we do not know whether the characteristics of skulls, like other physical peculiarities, are variable, and if so, why they vary. Thus if by means of skulls found and statistics it is easy to prove that in Germany the round-headed (or brunette) type is gradually increasing, or if in America a certain Indian type has lately somewhat frequently occurred among the whites, we still do not know, or at any rate we cannot ascertain from skulls, why this is so. Is it because a certain portion of the population, originally in the minority, but possessed of characteristics which are always transmissible, is gradually forcing its way to the front? Has it to do with the signs of adaptation to certain outward conditions at present unknown to us? Or is the increase due to unsuspected immigration?

In the face of these difficulties it might justly be said that, were ethnology to demonstrate the racial purity of the people, this would be convincing proof of its worthlessness. In reality, however, recent investigations have made an end of all such racial purity. Whereas most nations used to pride themselves on being of racially pure origin, tracing their descent usually to a god or demigod, or at any rate to some famous hero, to-day it is probably only the Russians and Germans who passionately lay claim to racial purity. Or, rather, it is claimed by a limited part of both these nations, and one taken far too seriously by both,—the Panslavists and Pan-Germanists and their scientific protagonists.

As for the Russians, they, like the Scandinavians, have remained fairly isolated in their Eastern seclusion; and it is a

fact that in Scandinavia the north European type (the Teutons) and in Russia the East European type have remained purest.

§ 103.—*The Mixture of Races in Germany*

To claim race purity for Germany, where all European types come in contact with one another as in a melting-pot, is absolutely preposterous. Perhaps she owes her cosmopolitan capacity for understanding "the voices of the nations" better than do other nations to this very circumstance that in her the descendants of all European nations live. At any rate, there is more justification for such a contention than for asserting that every racial conglomeration—what Houston Stewart Chamberlain would call a chaos of nations—must necessarily be inferior.

It matters not, however, whether the results of this mixture of races be good or bad. We have to put up with it, since there is no doubt about the fact. But as Chamberlain's bulky volume is very much read in Germany, and as this unjustifiable race pride is one of the worst evils of modern Germany, I do not wish to pass it over in absolute silence. Moreover, its false, but seductive, reasoning is or appears to aim at proving that the Teutonic race is a pure race.

All race theorists assume that among measurable physical attributes the most important ethnologically are the formation of the skull, the color of the hair and skin, and the dimensions of the body. Now, the German anthropologist Deniker,¹ basing his conclusions on principal external attributes, has attempted to explain the present race distribution in Europe by the measurements of school-children and recruits, of which in some cases there are a great many. He assumes the existence of ten races altogether, including six main races; and shows how they are distributed quite indiscriminately, without regard to language or frontier delimitation, over the whole

¹ "Bulletin de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris." Tome VIII, 4me Série, pp, 189 and 291.

European continent. Certain races, however, seem chiefly to be found in districts bordering on the sea. Thus the Teutons mainly live around the Baltic and the Irish Sea.

The results of these investigations, which may be found in a valuable work by the German anthropologist Hirt, are of interest to all European nations. I shall refer to them, however, only in so far as they relate to Germany, and then only so far as the district within the boundaries of the present German Empire is concerned. As for the complete racial mixture of Austria, no one would probably question this. The map on the opposite page gives an approximate idea of conditions as they actually are. The colored portions represent districts where one of the ten European races to some extent preponderates; the white portions indicate territory where there is a heterogeneous mixture of races. [Diagram between pp. 242 and 243.]

This diagram can be comparatively easily brought into line with ascertained historical facts. The ancient Teutons (red) were settled about the Baltic, whence they advanced into other countries. In so doing they encountered Celts (yellow) in South Germany, and Slavs (blue) toward the southeast. As for the Slavs, who still predominate greatly in Posen and Silesia, they have also occasionally made considerable advances, particularly toward the sea. It is easy to understand this advance seaward, and it accounts for the fact that in Pomerania and Westphalia the Teutonic elements have now no longer the upper hand, as they had originally. The Teutons mostly passed through South Germany, and then before long utterly perished in the far South, which was obviously unsuited to them. Consequently the Celtic race has remained comparatively pure in Baden and Württemberg (South Germany), while elsewhere it is apparent that there has been an immigration of the Adriatic races (green) as a result of Roman rule and of the round-headed "*homo alpinus*." Apparently the Romans found the kind of life here to their taste. Most of central Germany, however, is peopled by a

mixture of races, or, as Houston Stewart Chamberlain neatly phrases it, by a national chaos. Wilser¹ bears out this fact when he says, "Scarcely one in a hundred of our fellow-countrymen to-day has a type of skull or framework like the skeletons found in the rows of graves of the migration period." Elsewhere he says, "If to-day we would discover *true Teutons*, we must go to our Northern sister nations—to Sweden, the Netherlands, and England."

§ 104.—*Germans and Teutons*

We call German those common characteristics and traits which have arisen out of this mixture of races by reason of a common language and civilization. We call Teutonic those original and primary qualities which were inherent in a people of unknown origin. This people is to-day so intermingled with other peoples that, at least in Germany, it no longer exists.

Germany consequently is a civilized state built up on the basis of a common speech. It is not a national state² built up on a common race. The identification of Germans with Teutons is entirely misleading. It is true that this new complex of peoples has taken its most important formative element, its language, essentially from its Teutonic element. The German is therefore justified in designating himself as the spiritual descendant of this people. But this very fact shows how much more important civilization is than race.

¹ "Rassen und Völker" ("Races and Peoples"), by Ludwig Wilser, 1912. Theodor Thoma: Leipsic.

² A civilized state and a national state are not antitheses. The word "national" does not fundamentally imply merely a racial affiliation. The words "people" and "nation" no longer retain a clearly defined meaning, because intentionally and unintentionally their distinguishing characteristics have been confused. It would easily be possible to define these words; others have done so. This seems superfluous, not to say harmful, to me. The fact that no one really knows what a people and what a nation is, proves more conclusively than any words that peoples and nations are no longer definite realities. There is no such confusion about the conception of state. From this conception the future development will take its departure.

It is difficult to see how men like Chamberlain have arrived at their conclusions. In the case of Chamberlain, in particular, I believe that he often writes things of the correctness of which he himself is not convinced. For instance, for the fantastic statement, "that the Goths in large numbers have accepted Judaism," he gives as his authority "a learned specialist of the University of Vienna," but he does not give his name.¹ Again he quotes letters,² which he claims to have received, and their contents supplement one another in an extraordinary fashion. The impartial, critical reader cannot help but feel that in such cases the author was more interested in giving a pleasing artistic form to his work than in facts themselves. It might have been preferable, if, like his great master, Gobineau, he had chosen a purely fictional form of presentment.

It is also possible that the entire Pan-German theory depends upon nothing more than a most regrettable misunderstanding. The claim is made that the various European nations have resulted from a mixture of the original primitive inhabitants with the Teutons who overran them during the later migrations. In Germany, on the other hand, Teutons were merely mixed with Teutons, and that thus the race here remained pure.

In fact, however, skeletons and other remains show conclusively that there was a race of primitive inhabitants in Germany as well, going back as far as the diluvial period. At the time of the Cimric invasion and later, when the stream of the Teutonic migrations burst upon them, this population partly emigrated, or at least withdrew into the mountainous regions, partly perished, and partly mingled with the newcomers. A primitive population dwelt here as well as in the other European countries at a time when the rhinoceros and

¹ H. St. Chamberlain's "Die Grundlagen des 19 Jahrhunderts" ("The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century"): Munich, 1904, 5th Edition, vol II, p. 104.

² *Ibid* (1915), "Neue Kriegsaufsätze" ("New Essays on the War"), pp. 17, 18.

the elephant still roamed through Europe. A mixture of these primitive inhabitants and Celts seems to have lived along the Rhine at the time when the Romans arrived. However dear Scheffel's old song, "Es wohnten die alten Germanen zu beiden Seiten des Rheins" ("The ancient Germans lived on both sides of the Rhine"), may be to us, it is not a fact. Ariovistus racially was not a Teuton, but a Celt. If at that time any one lived on both sides of the Rhine, it was the Celts. But Tacitus called these people *Germani*, and this name was later applied to the tribes which broke forth from the region in which Ariovistus had lived. They were Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Vandals, etc. The error dates from that time. The *Germani* of Tacitus and those of the Teutonic migrations are something quite distinct. For a long time no one definitely knew what the Germans were. Even as late as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the French were the more likely to be called Germans.¹

In the meantime another name arose. In France a distinction had been made at an early period between the *lingua romana rustica* in the West and the *lingua theodosica* in the East (that is, in Germany). These words designated a language only and not a people, just as to-day, when we say some one speaks High German, we do not mean to imply that he belongs to a definite racial division.

Later in the eleventh century the substantive *Teuton*² was formed from *theodisk*, which was used only as an adjective, merely resembling the other in sound, but in no wise related to it.

This word denoted from the very beginning a cultural and linguistic, not a racial, relation. The absurd legend of the giant Theuto, as the common ancestor of all Teutons, in-

¹ Joh. Kinnamos (*circa* 1200) I, II, c. 15, 18 (ed. Meinecke: Bonn, 1836, p. 77 and 84) calls the Germans "Allemani" and the French "Germani."

² Müllerhof and many others with him regard the term *Teutonic* as a Celtic word.

vestigation has shown was not invented until the thirteenth century.

This linguistic division accords with the fact that a transition had taken place in the mean time. The Teutonic hordes had become inhabitants of German territory. The Teutons, Celts, and Slavs were German in so far as they spoke the German language. In this way the German nation was founded; but we cannot reiterate it often enough that the element of race had nothing to do with it.

The facts to which attention is here called are in no way complex; they are accepted as established by the unprejudiced. The difficulty for ordinary readers arises through the continual confusion of Teutons with Germans. For instance, Ratzel¹ in his popular work states, "There was a time when the greater part of our country was not inhabited by Germans"; and again, "it is historically established that southern and western Germany were not inhabited by Germans when the Romans first penetrated into those regions." Despite this, he maintains that the people described by Tacitus must have been Teutons. Of course, Ratzel's conception of "Germania" is broader than "German," but no matter how comprehensive the term, even Ratzel would hardly include the Celts among the Teutons. Conflicting statements like these, however, simplify things only for writers like Chamberlain.

§ 105.—*The European Race*

In a broad general way there are no pure races in Europe, no true species in the zoölogical sense, not even constant varieties.

The only question that may arise is whether there is a "European race," which can be distinguished from the Asiatic Mongols, the African negroes, the Australasians, and the American Indians. Even this would hardly be the case if race meant to us some clearly defined or even zoölogical con-

¹ Fr. Ratzel, "Deutschland" ("Germany"), p. 273.

ception. The old traditional division according to geographical regions is to-day discredited. It was easy to show that the actual relations were often dependent upon something quite different. The unfortunate term, "Indo-Germanic peoples," was largely responsible for this, for this term was based not upon race, but upon language. Linguistic relationship has been made the keystone of the problem of race. Without wishing to underestimate the scientific importance of this relation, we must nevertheless confess that it has caused a complete shift in the meaning of the word "race."

It may be true, and probably is, that pure races no longer inhabit definite regions of the world. But by a geographical arrangement we may at any rate obtain human groups which in a broad general way have certain relatively uniform characteristics in their history, civilization, language, and physical attributes that differentiate them fairly sharply from other races.

The concept, a people, a nation, a group of peoples, and even that of a race, depends not only upon a common origin, but also upon common language, civilization, morals, and habits of life. It would be absurd to exclude, for instance, the Finns and Hungarians, the Welsh and Basques, the Prussians and Mecklenburgians, from the community of Europe simply because they unquestionably are racially distinct from the other Europeans. No German would ever think of regarding the Mecklenburgians and Prussians as anything else but Germans, and of stressing his relationship to the Hindus.

There is no such thing as a patriotism based upon racial descent. Just because it is vague and indefinite, extravagant claims are made for it. They are usually grotesque and irritating in effect. It is likewise impossible to establish German patriotism on a racial basis. But if we say that the German peoples have been welded into a new unity by their common civilization, we are within the range of possibility and fact. But more of this will be said in the next section.

There is one thing to which I wish to call attention. Since Germans have no common ethnological origin, Germanism is not an inherited possession. A common civilization has to be won and secured anew every day. It is well that this is so.

4.—CIVILIZATION AND PATRIOTISM

§ 106.—*The Multiplicity of Combinations*

The national and racial kinships which we have so far considered constitute only two forms of an infinite number of possible combinations.

The combination of human beings into larger groups can as a matter of fact take place on the basis of innumerable common interests. Religion and art, science and occupation, similar predilections, and similar antipathies, divide humanity into larger or smaller circles. These circles will never entirely correspond; on the contrary, they frequently intersect. For instance, a man may feel a kinship with a thousand other men through the bond of his religion, with other thousands through the bonds of a common belief in art or interest in sports, or merely through a common occupation. FIG. 7 shows how numerous such combinations may be. Germans and French and Catholics and Evangelicals are each represented by a circle. The overlapping parts of circles show the number of separate combinations resulting from this pair of opposites. It is furthermore assumed that there are only bonds between Germans and French (Lorrainers), but not between Catholics and Evangelicals; consequently, four groups are excluded: the Catholic-Evangelical Germans, French, Lorrainers, and other human beings.

The term in the second column indicates the concept that might result. This term does not fully comprehend the concepts proper, formed solely out of the two opposites. There are many additional circles representing nuances, and the number of possible combinations rises very rapidly, as follows:

1	pair of opposites	results in	5	possibilities	
2	" "	" "	15	"	
3	" "	" "	63	"	
4	" "	" "	255	"	
5	" "	" "	1023	"	, etc.

Let us consider some of the applications according to which people in Germany may be grouped. There are those who speak German, Polish, French, or Danish; there are Catholics and Protestants, Jews, and dissenters, nationalists and cosmopolitans, materialists and idealists, employees and employers, professional men, state officials, conservatives, and liberals, social democrats and non-voters, and those who have artistic, scientific, technical, or philosophical tastes. These are only a few of the fundamental applications, but they allow for a vast number of possible combinations. Accurately worked out, there are 16,770,215, and in this list many determining factors have been omitted, such as whether a man is a collector or sportsman, a vegetarian or prohibitionist, or any other "ist."

However great the diversity when it comes to the issue of one's country, each one is supposed to be cut to the same measure. We are supposed to shed everything that gives individual distinction to a human being. The abstract "average German" alone is supposed to remain. He is represented by a circle which in itself has perhaps the smallest actual contents. It seems important only because for a multitude of people it serves as a substitute for many other circles.

Rümelin¹ feels this conflict. He indicates the different relations, and then continues: "One motive may draw us to one circle, another to a different one. . . . But we feel and regret every such division and incompleteness of our mood. There is always a silent yearning for a full and complete community of life." But he fails to offer a solution when he demands that human beings shall renounce their individual

¹ Rümelin, "Über den Begriff des Volkes" ("On the Conception of People"). "Aufsätze" ("Essays"), I, p. 103.

desires and attach themselves to the fatherland as the "central group which embraces all objects of life." The present form of fatherland, essentially built up by historical force, no longer satisfies the claims of free men. A fatherland must be a living organism, capable of change. It must represent, as Eduard Meyer¹ once said, "A conscious, active, and creative will." For this reason a nation which we can respect must be reconstructed day by day by the plebiscites of a free people.²

Each human being is an individuality: no two are exactly alike. More is required than mere co-citizenship in one and the same state.

"Even in our fatherland we must have the power of choice, though our sympathies should lie on the other side of the frontier."³

A human being ceases to be a human being—that is, a personality—when he has to praise his country simply because it is *his* country.

§ 107.—*States within a State*

A Goethe student—I think it was Bielschowsky—once justly said that every one who has read Goethe has become in part German. So, too, every one who loves Beethoven's music, who has studied Kant's philosophy, or who admires Robert Koch's technic, is in part German, even if he does not know the work of these men directly, but merely follows the paths which they have laid out. It is just as much true that whoever admires Shakspere, Newton, or Darwin is in part English, and he is part Russian who puts high store on Tolstoy, Pawlow, or even the Russian folk-song. Whoever has been

¹ Eduard Meyer, "Die Anfänge des Staates" ("The Beginnings of the State").

² Ernest Renan, "L'existence d'une nation est un plébiscite de tous des jours." ("Q'est-ce qu'une nation," p. 27.)

³ Arnold Ruge, "Zwei Jahre in Paris, Studien und Erinnerungen" ("Two Years in Paris, Studies and Recollections"), vol. II., p. 221. Jura: Leipzig.

brought up on Homer, or, as was frequently the case during the Middle Ages, on Aristotle, or more recently on Plato, is a Hellene. Whoever believes in the liberty which resulted from the French Revolution is French. Our admiration for Dante or the *Cinquecento* makes us to a degree Italian, and Cervantes beguiles us to become Spanish.

The nationality of a civilized human being is very diverse. Richard Dehmel was quite correct when he once said that he owed his little bit of brains to ten nations. Each human being is his own world. The more highly cultivated, the more differentiated two human beings, the more difficult it is for one to say to the other unreservedly, "You, too, are of my world." Great men especially feel the weight of the loneliness which results from their exceptional endowments. Is there any one who has not felt the resignation of Schubert's song, "The folk that my tongue speaks, the distant folk, I find it not," at moments when music has borne him above the level of every day, or who has not applied to himself Schiller's phrase, "I, too, was born in Arcady."

This sum-total of civilization is too individualistic to have been able to serve as the foundation for states. Certain particular elements were selected. There is no common heritage of present-day civilization which has not at some period in history served as an element in the formation of states.

The nations of Islam owe much to their common religion. The contrasts and similarities resulting from it are still an important political factor in the near East. The Christian Church also at first tended strongly in this direction. It announced the communion of saints and the kingdom of God upon earth. The latter was surely conceived as a religious state. It failed, perhaps, for the very reason that its aims were in advance of their time, and in that it sought the brotherhood of all men. Indeed, at the time of the crusades there was the beginning of a homogeneous Christian Europe. The Thirty Years' War, on the contrary, showed that Christianity was not adapted to be the groundwork of a single unified state.

During the period of the Reformation diversity in religion was, nevertheless, sometimes a more powerful motive than diversity of state or nation. Swiss Catholics fought on the side of Spain, and French Huguenots on the side of England. To-day religion plays usually only a subordinate part. In countries like Poland, Alsace, the Trentino, and the Baltic Provinces, where the nationalities are mixed, it is quite true that the priest employs religious enthusiasm for national ends, but the importance of such efforts should not be overestimated.

This has again been shown in Italy. The hopes based on the old conflict between the Clericals and the House of Savoy, which were fostered especially by Erzberger, failed completely. Even intransigent cardinals like Ferrari have prayers said in the churches for an Italian victory. The *jihad* also was a blow into the blue. This holy war, of the frightfulness of which people have been telling marvelous tales for decades, appears not even to have lured a single dog from behind the stove. It seems as if the utmost possible fanaticism was for the time being concentrated among the civilized nations of Europe.

During the Middle Ages the groupings according to occupation or trades played an important rôle. The guilds and crafts were efforts that extended far beyond the boundaries of individual states. They formed simultaneously a state within a state or between different states. A genuine tendency toward the formation of a state occurred in the Hanseatic League, the league of the Rhenish cities, and the peasant movements. Whether the international endeavors of the proletariat will lead to further developments is questionable. The occupational instinct was completely vanquished by the national instincts at the outbreak of the War in 1914.

That the various castes form states within a state or between the different states is well known. So the church is international, and so are the proletariat, the nobility, and the rulers of nations. It is not every German who is the equal in birth of the German Kaiser; his equals are a large, very mixed

class of international old families. We may abuse Russia as a "louse-land" to our heart's content, but its "louse-prince"¹ remains the kaiser's equal in birth, and no German, however high his position, can ever become so. There are no national princely dynasties, only international ones. During the course of the war the English have often been taunted with the fact that their kings have German blood. German princes usually have also much English, or at least foreign, blood. The czar himself was not a Russian by blood. This likewise is true of the greater and lesser nobility.

Purely negative elements like antipathy or hatred may likewise tend to form states or leagues of states. There have been many wars of coalitions in Europe. The special object of the coalition against France was to attack the French conception of liberty.

It is by no means necessary that such coalitions should always be directed against liberty. In America representatives of the most diverse nations flock with a new love about the Stars and Stripes. This is partly due to the weariness and aversion with which the European immigrants view their old home. It would be desirable if some such coalition could be organized against the various medievalisms of Europe. If it once came into being, it would prove more lasting than previous coalitions have been.

It seems as if all these forms of patriotic civilization would have to remain ineffective because there is too much dispersed effort. Religion and art, occupation and preference, rarely make a complete human being. They are not determining factors in the history of mankind.

§ 108.—*Language as a Formative Element of States*

There is one factor in civilization which is of superlative importance. It is more comprehensive than any of those hitherto mentioned. It is so exclusively designed for definite

¹ Alluding to the last syllable of *Nicolaus* (English *Nicholas*), the name of the last czar.—Translator.

groups of men that it automatically brings about a certain natural grouping. This is language. It is the depository in which man places as permanent legacy all the conceptions that he has acquired in the course of time. It is to him art and religion and science and more; for this reason it is self-evident that a society built up on the basis of language must be of incomparable importance.

Every one feels that a man who speaks his own language is a fellow-countryman, and that he who speaks another language is a foreigner. It is natural that when German patriotism began to stir the first desire was to have a German country coextensive with the regions where German was spoken. In his address of welcome at the first Congress of Germanists at Frankfort on the Main, Jacob Grimm, its first president, said:

“By a people is understood an aggregate of men who speak the same language. This declaration should fill us Germans with pride, for it indicates that inevitably linguistic boundaries will win the victory over boundaries arbitrarily set.” All those present acclaimed this statement. Among them were poets like E. M. Arndt and Ludwig Uhland, politicians like Dahlmann and Beseler, jurists like Welker and Mittermaier, Germanists like Lachmann and Wilhelm Grimm, historians like Ranke and Gervinus, as well as Falk, who later became Prussian minister.

This elemental feeling of homogeneity among those who use the same language exists everywhere. The Italian irredentist is indifferent to the fact that Germanic descendants of the ancient Longobards dwell in the plain of the Po, or that the region of the upper Isonzo is inhabited by descendants of the *homo alpinus*, who was anything but Italian. He merely says that wherever Italian is spoken the Italian flag should wave. Even he who for political reasons opposes this interpretation cannot help but feel in his heart that his opponents are in the right.

It is more or less correct that since the beginning of Euro-

pean history we have understood by a German one who speaks German, and by a Frenchman one who speaks French. We may assume that this will continue to be so. The line of historical development has been in this direction ever since the great French Revolution for the first time virtually enunciated the doctrine of human liberty and self-determination. The only states which exist at present are those whose boundaries are reasonably in accordance with language. The only exception is unfortunate Austria, and it is a relic of medieval times. All geographical rearrangements which have occurred since then, such as the unification of Italy, the partial unification of Germany, and the creation of national Balkan States, have been made in the sense of linguistic uniformity. Nice, Lorraine, and northern Schleswig are exceptions.

In addition to these three anti-national events, there are Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Belgium. Here the linguistic boundaries overlap as the result of the diplomatic shifts of earlier days. A certain recognition of the abnormal status of these countries is seen in the fact they are not fully accepted as countries, but are neutralized. That language is the reason for their neutralization rather than their relative unimportance is apparent when we consider that many much smaller countries are not neutralized.

§ 109.—*The Ideal of European Patriotism*

Formerly people were devoted to an ideal, or, when they had no ideals, to material advantages. Whenever there was any likelihood of realizing this ideal or these advantages in or through one's country, people loved their country. It represented the ideal. They fought and sacrificed themselves for it. But when a man's country failed to realize his ideal, he could repudiate the country, stand apart sadly, for no one likes to be alone, or he could even fight against his country. The noblest men in history have acted in this way.

In ancient Greece the exiles, whether they were oligarchs or democrats, calmly fought against their native country. They

placed a higher value upon the imperishable ideal than upon the accidental place of birth. Coriolanus fought against Rome. This has been the case for thousands of years. In Germany especially there have been innumerable instances; in England also. Just to mention a few examples, the Stuarts accepted the help of France, that is to say, the help of the arch-enemy. During the period of the Reformation all the world was divided according to religion, quite independent of country. Swiss Catholics fought on the side of Spain; French Huguenots supported Protestant England. Dante in all tranquillity and without being blamed for it rose against his native Florence. Algernon Sidney, the great English republican, entered into negotiations with Louis XIV.

Even after the French Revolution the French nobility fought on the side of the Allies against the republic, and, conversely, later many French republicans fought for Germany during the struggle against Napoleon, as, for example, Moreau at Leipsic. And even later, in times which we to-day would call full of a stirring nationalism, as during the Greek War of Independence, the motive force was liberty, not a generalized love of one's country. Miaoulis of Hydra, the great victor over the Turks, for reasons of petty particularism burned the entire Greek fleet in order that it might fall into the hands of the opposing party under Capodistria.

If in those times, when liberty of decision was still possible, a man felt patriotic, his patriotism was an ethical act, because it depended on liberty and the primacy of reason. To-day such liberty of decision is almost unthinkable. No matter what a person's ideals may be, it is in all seriousness demanded that he regard the country of his birth and the institutions which surround him as the best possible. Such a patriotism is no longer an ethical demand; it is the slave-like or, better still, the animal-like, gregarious love of an ant-hill or bee-hive. No one can escape the pressure of this modern idol. Even the most radical Russians, who probably hate czarism more vehemently than anything else, released their

adherents to join in the battle against Germany. This was only done after considerable reflection, but was not due to external pressure. The leaders who made the decision lived at liberty abroad, partly in neutral Switzerland. They did it because to-day patriotism as such is regarded as more precious than the most sacred rights of man.

This excessive and exclusive patriotism is scarcely more than one hundred or one hundred and fifty years old. Let us cease, therefore, to compare our present-day patriotism with that of the ancients. Even those who appraise the modern type of patriotism highly should at least realize that it is something different. Let us grant that it has its roots in venerable traditions, but it is not identical with those roots. Let us hope that it is merely a flower which will not blow for more than a season.

May the old type of patriotism return. It did not love without the liberty of choice, but only after stern testing. Let it be rooted in the old, let it include love of one's native country; but do not let it degenerate into hatred. Let it take into consideration the old elements of religion and morals, but let it pay heed also to the new, young convictions which are in a state of development. Above everything else, let it turn the dynastic patriotism into a belief in a democratic citizenship.

Let it be the completion of what has gone before; let it be love for that which is individualistic, which, nevertheless, will not exclude the love for that which benefits all.

In this final generalization both the high aim and the difficulty are apparent. The timid may feel that the one excludes the other. But here fundamentally, as in everything else, the question is merely one of liberty. Let there be a general cohesion and development in accordance with the principle of liberty. Let there be, on the individualistic side, an unquestioned possibility to exercise one's interest in the general good, even beyond the narrower boundaries of one's country. Compel no larger group of people to be part of an alien state.

By these means the possibilities of conflict will be removed.

"Before science and art all barriers of nationality disappear," says Goethe. "The re-birth of Poland is identical with liberty in Europe," says Brandes.

These two statements are so self-evident that they can hardly be disputed. Whoever has really accepted them need have no fear concerning the vitality of patriotism.

As a matter of fact, it already lives on the other side of the Atlantic. In America the meaning of this new cosmopolitan patriotism is already evident; there the restrictions that are still necessary also appear.

The old tiny nationalities have grown too narrow for a free patriotism, just as in Germany Hessian, Bavarian, and Prussian patriotism was too limited. The time for a universal brotherhood of man has not yet arrived. The clefts which separate the white race from the yellow and black are still too deep. In America this European patriotism has awakened. It will doubtless be the type of the immediate future, and we should like to be its precursors. When Americans say, "America for Americans," what they really mean is America for the free descendants of white Europeans. Despite all the enthusiasm for the emancipation of slaves, racial antagonism toward non-Europeans is more marked in America than anywhere else. In the Southern States it often assumes ridiculous and grotesque forms.

In America they have understood what the struggle is about. It was possible for the new patriotism to be born there, because the old dynastic patriotism of European states was there transmuted through liberty and responsibility into a true civilization patriotism, even if it is still inseparable from race. The new Europe is already born not in Europe, but in America, where there are no ruined castles, no worn-out and grotesque medievalisms.

The new Europe is born. We who have remained here in Europe should take heed that it may also become a living force in the older countries. Otherwise civilization will be

permanently transferred to America. This would be humiliating to us, though objectively considered not nearly as bad as if might were permanently transferred to the Mongolians. Both civilization and might require a European patriotism.

CHAPTER IX

UNJUSTIFIABLE CHAUVINISM

1.—SELFISHNESS AND LOVE

§ 110.—*Love of One's Country not Real Love*

Like goodness, justice, and the feeling for beauty, love can become so idealized that no trace of defect can be found in it. No one can call the love that Christ preached and practised evil. When, in contradiction to its essence, love is directed toward one's self, accentuating the instinct of self-preservation, it may become a vice. Its normal function is to mitigate this instinct.

These kinds of selfishness are called love only because of the poverty of our language. People in general, who have a fine instinct in such things, have invented new words to designate them, apparently because the word "love" had a deeper significance to them. Whoever loves himself is not self-loving, but self-seeking. Excessive love of one's family is called "monkey-love" (doting affection). Excessive love of one's country is called not patriotism, but "chauvinism." Such linguistic usages disclose the fact that love of one's self and of one's own interests, and consequently, in certain circumstances, of one's country, can be exaggerated. It is only relatively a virtue, at least at the time when these terms arose. This was the opinion of the overwhelming mass of mankind.

We have already gone beyond the naïve over-estimation which children and savages have of themselves. No one with good taste or education will boast excessively about himself. If he does so, he becomes a ludicrous figure. But to him as

the one sixty-seven millionth part of an entire people any amount of boasting and self-praise is permissible.

It is a human trait to believe in one's own virtues and in another's vices; consequently we call only the patriotism of other countries chauvinism. Only the greatest men retain impartiality enough to admit that there is also chauvinism at home. Goethe ridicules the "fatherland" talk of the Germans, Chateaubriand and Taine that of the French, and Shakspeare and Shaw that of the English. Lessing calls patriotism a "heroic weakness," an expression which probably gets at the root of the matter best of all.

Christ and Tolstoy have discarded patriotism; as a matter of fact there is no truly great man who has ever been patriotic in the current sense of the word. Not even great statesmen like Frederick II and Napoleon, who surely were ready to die for their country, were patriotic in this sense. Frederick II lived and thought in the literature of his enemies; Napoleon was perhaps the first one who, beside Goethe, dreamed of the Europe to be. Bismarck, who knew better than any one else how to play on the patriotic passion as on the keys of a piano and whose life-work consisted in wisely making use of such feelings, was much too wise to yield himself up to such passions. This Brandenburgian Bismarck, who loved his home as no one else; Bismarck, the junker, more wholly devoted to his family, rank, and people than any one else; this Bismarck, who grew to maturity in the storms of 1848, who understood the necessity for national unity better than any one else—this man never uttered a patriotic or chauvinistic word of the caliber that is now heard on every side.

Not even his principal enemies can deny that Bismarck was a man of exceptional intelligence. Any one who will only superficially study his life will recognize that excessive patriotism is less a vice than an error of thought. Bismarck's life will show better and more clearly than I can do it that love of one's country is not a real love, but a means for agitation. Love for Prussia, love for the German Empire, and love for

the dream of a national state of all Germans were all jumbled together in his many-sided brain. He drew upon each specialized love wherever he could put it to best use.

Many will say that this was permissible to a statesman sure of his ground, who wished to bring about a realization of his plans through the passions of others, but that a "subject" should dutifully have only the kind of patriotism which may be proper at the time. To argue this point is useless. When the conception of "subjects" disappeared, the duty of a submissive love likewise disappeared. Just as we demand liberty in all things, so we must also be free in our affections. Love may be blind, but only after it has chosen with seeing eyes. If it is condemned to blindness before choosing, it is not love, but madness.

2.—MASS SUGGESTION

§ 111.—*Mass-Feeling Among Animals*

Patriotism grows out of love of home, the family, and the social instinct. When we know these three sources, we know its essence. But if our knowledge is restricted solely to this threefold origin, we shall never know its full greatness and its far-reaching effects. A certain excess quality seems always to be associated with the functioning of patriotism. This tendency "to run to leaf" can be explained only by mass suggestion, which, like a tropical sun, always fructifies anew and poisons love of one's country.

It is a peculiar phenomenon, when several animals or men undertake to perform something in common, that this very fact of acting in common causes a change in the action of the individual units. The ancients already knew this. There is the well-known story of the legendary king who, on his death-bed, had a bundle of twigs brought to him. He tied them together, and then asked his sons to break the bundle in two. Not one of them could accomplish this. He loosened the string, and with his feeble, dying hand easily broke the in-

dividual twigs one after another. "By this you can see that in union there is strength," he said.

We have begun to appreciate these mass effects. We know that two men can carry more than twice as much as each one alone. We have long since learned from physics the reason for this. We know why a large ship can make greater speed than a small one, and why the hundred horse-power of an automobile, concentrated upon one point, can produce a more powerful and intensive effect than a hundred individual horses. With these facts we may compare the fact that a mass of men reacts in quite a different fashion from an individual man, and usually much more powerfully.

We know that the same thing occurs among animals. Every horseman knows that his horse in column formation can perform deeds and overcome obstacles that alone it would have failed to accomplish. Every huntsman knows that a pack of hounds is more courageous than an individual dog. Forel states that among ants the courage of the individual ant increases in direct proportion to the number of friends and companions, and similarly decreases the more isolated the individual ant is. As proof he instances that fact that a worker-ant among its fellows will undergo a tenfold death, but grows timid when alone. Even within twenty steps of the nest it will take flight before a much weaker ant. He also states that generally the inhabitants of a populous ant-heap are much braver than individual ants of the same species from a very small community.

Rouget reports similar facts among wasps. According to him, the greater their number, the more excitable they are. He also believes that the sentries which wasps post here and there can transmit their excitement to their companions in some intensified form. In this way only can we explain the frightful intensity which an enraged hornets'-nest sometimes assumes.

§ 112.—*Mass Feeling Among Men*

These observations among animals are likewise confirmed among men. The reaction of an individual man is augmented in an extraordinary way by the feeling of mass. We can see this effect in the case of public speakers. If we estimate the intensity with which a speaker addresses an assembly at unity, the response which his words call forth may be ten or a hundred times as great. This is the unique effect of the spoken word. Nordau aptly points out that often speeches that had a tremendous effect upon an audience seem very commonplace when later read in stenographic report. This is also true of the theater. A play which seemed rather indifferent on reading, may, when produced, have an unprecedented success or be a complete failure. Even the most experienced director rarely dares trust his judgment before the first performance.

The same thing is shown in the reports of latter-day miracles. Some one in a crowd sees a gleam of light which he interprets as the Holy Virgin, and promptly the entire assemblage sees the phenomenon just as clearly. Probably no one can wholly escape such mass suggestion. An Indian jungle tale, whose author, unless I am mistaken, was Kipling, is very characteristic. Several Europeans are sitting together in a forest toward eventime. An old Hindoo magician arrives with his son. He plants a bean, and to all appearance the stalk grows endlessly upward toward the dark sky. The boy climbs up it, and disappears in the darkness. The old man dances a wild dance, then cuts the stalk, which collapses, and at the feet of the spectators lies the crushed body of the boy, which his father covers with a mantle. After a few minutes father and son take leave in perfect health. Every one of those present, however, is firmly convinced that he has actually witnessed the horrible scene with his own eyes. This is a significant example of mass suggestion. An illusion like this would never succeed if the performers attempted to impose it on a single person.

Among animals this mass feeling depends upon inherited instincts; among men in part surely upon acquired suggestion. While the causes have not as yet been investigated with sufficient thoroughness, it is nevertheless comparatively easy to obtain an approximate idea of the origin of such mass suggestion.

When we hear an incredible report for the first time we are skeptical. When we hear it repeated a second time or still more frequently the thought begins to grow in us that there may be some truth in it, after all. Thus by the simple fact of constant repetition our belief grows stronger and stronger. An anecdote, was once published in "*Fliegende Blätter*." Some one meets a group of school-children, and says to them, "Go to the Braugasse; a fish is taking a walk there." In the next street he meets hurrying servant-girls, and in reply to his question where they are running so fast they say, "To the Braugasse; a fish is taking a walk there." Then he meets soldiers and students, all of whom are hurrying to the Braugasse, because a fish is taking a walk there. Finally he says to himself, "Confound it all, I fancy I had better take a look in at the Braugasse; maybe a fish is really taking a walk there."

There is a serious substratum in this anecdote. We may express an opinion under external compulsion, knowing that it is untrue. Then every one about us, perhaps under the same external compulsion, repeats it. Finally we come to a point where we are more and more firmly convinced of the correctness of the opinion, though originally we had very little faith in it.

Intercommunication between people takes place not only by means of words, but also through gestures. In this way instinctive gestures alone, rightly interpreted, may call forth a certain feeling in us or accentuate one already present.

This is most clearly seen when a speaker addresses a large assembly. At his first words a small part of the speaker's excitement is communicated to each one of his auditors. Let

us say that it is on the average a one one-hundredth part. If the audience consists of a thousand persons, there will be present in the assembly a total amount of excitement ten times that of the speaker. It will be manifested in increased attention and visible tension, and perhaps ultimately in applause. The sum-total of these sudden activities will bring about a certain excitement, which in its turn reacts upon each individual auditor, in whom it calls forth greater excitement. The greatest effect is upon the speaker himself, who is carried away by the sight of his emotion-swept crowd. A direct speech, even a poorly prepared or improvised speech, is usually more effective than the most carefully thought-out speech read from manuscript, because the former is modified by the direct contact between speaker and audience. This reflex action is the reason why so many inexperienced speakers lose the thread of their discourse by the very success of their words. The effect which they produce is reflected back upon them so powerfully that it overwhelms them, as it were. If, however, a speaker can control his own emotion, and cause it to react upon the crowd, there must inevitably arise a series of reciprocal shocks, resembling electrical shocks, between him and his auditors, causing both to transcend their customary moral equilibrium at certain moments.¹

3.—THE CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHAUVINISM

§ 113.—*There is no Demarcation between Patriotism and Chauvinism*

Where is the line of demarcation between patriotism and chauvinism? In all soberness, I do not believe there is any real line of demarcation. If chauvinism is only patriotism in excess, how can there be such a line? It is always a perilous matter to draw a line between too much and too little. According to ordinary usage, chauvinism is said to be perverted

¹ The last sentence is a quotation, I believe from an English author, but I have lost the source.

patriotism; but what does this mean? If I am permitted to discuss the question of love of one's country, if this love is to be subordinated to my other perceptions of good and evil, patriotism loses the uniqueness which is said to be its distinguishing feature. It is merely a love like any other love. If I am to reject chauvinism, I must have the right to regard as objectionable that which other people call patriotism, for no one ever calls himself a chauvinist.

If, indeed, there is a difference between chauvinists and patriots, it is this: a chauvinist loves his country in all circumstances, whether it is good or bad. He regards this love as the greatest thing in life, and, if he is a courageous and moral man, he serves his country with every means at his disposal. A patriot, on the contrary, is he who loves and supports whatever is good in his fatherland, as in everything else, and who hates and opposes whatever is bad. By reason of his instincts, habits, and reflections he has come to the conclusion that for him personally it is most advantageous and best to live in that particular country and to serve it according to the best of his powers and abilities.

This latter type of man may be intensely and passionately devoted to his country; but he will not let his love carry him away to the extent of committing a wrong, for the very reason that he respects himself and his country. Men of this type, however, are not as a rule called patriots.

The other type of man, who is ready to commit wrong for his country, may act, of course, according to ethical principles, provided his ethical principles are such as to permit him to commit wrongs. Usually he does not act in accordance with ethical principles, and it is in no way necessary for him to love his country, and often he does not love it. He is either too weak or too cowardly to withstand mass suggestion. Often his cowardice goes so far that without for a moment intending to do so he gives his life for his country. Such men call themselves patriots, and their compatriots do so likewise

In what follows I call them chauvinists and patriots. It is now necessary to explain how men may become chauvinists. There are two reasons.

The first is the inability to hold out against mass suggestion. Its influence in heightening the feelings of a person is more powerful in the case of patriotism than in any other field. By its very nature patriotism can be built up only on this feeling of number.

Furthermore, every weakling seeks support from others, and feels himself strong only when he acts in conjunction with others. It is only the truly strong man who is strongest alone. In general all these weaklings have no real personal civilization value; they have no feeling of solidarity in civilization. Whoever is without intelligence cannot have any intellectual kin. Therefore, in order to be able to attach themselves to anything, these people will have to seek some external bond. And what could be more adapted for this than nationalism? Every blockhead feels himself uplifted when, with several dozen millions of other blockheads, he can form a majority. Thus in the course of time this need for attachment on the part of several dozen millions becomes an unconquerable force.

Ein Vorzug bleibt uns ewig unverloren,
Mann nennt ihn heute Nationalität!
Das heiszt, dasz "irgendwo" der Mensch geboren,
Was Freilich sich von selbst versteht.—Grillparzer.¹

The less character there is in a nation, the greater, naturally, is such a nation's patriotism. Never did the *civis Romanus sum* sound more proudly than during the decadence of the Roman Empire.

This is the positive condition of chauvinism; negative conditions are chiefly hatred and envy for what is foreign. The most intense love of one's country, filling a human being so

¹ (Roughly: "One advantage we can never lose: it is to-day called nationality. That is to say, that 'somewhere' a man was born, which after all is something obvious.")

completely that there is room for nothing else, will remain clean, provided there is no hatred toward other nations mixed with it.

This inability to overcome with one's intelligence the mass suggestion of one's people or with one's character the hatred toward the enemy—these two factors stamp a man as a false patriot, or as a chauvinist.

§ 114.—*War as a Necessary Condition*

War is the solvent, and at the same time the sounding-board. For without war no one would be interested in patriotism or chauvinism. The man who loved his country would have an additional form of happiness, but if a man did not love it, no one would disturb him. The merchant and manufacturer of their own accord try to increase their trade and sales, and thus add to the national welfare. The scientists and artist do their best by reason of some power within them, and thus add to national civilization. They do not require a special stimulus.

When money is to be appropriated for a school, theater, harbor, or canal, certain questions are considered, or at least should be considered, such as whether the costs will be proportionate to the increased comfort, wealth, civic improvement, or any other advantage that may ensue. In accordance with this the decision is made; no patriotism is required. In short, patriotism does not play the slightest practical rôle in any of the activities of peace.

But whenever the question is one of an army increase, of new cannons, or of new battle-ships, we have to appeal to patriotism, because such armaments are *per se* unproductive, and demand deprivations on our part. Therefore even during peace patriotism has to be stirred up by the threat of possible war. As a rule the glowing spark is just barely kept alive. Were it to flare up too brightly, it might disturb the activities of the diplomats, and governments are almost as proud of them as they are of the deeds of warlike valor.

When war has once begun, such considerations are superfluous, for war generally puts many deprivations upon a population both in respect to mental and material necessities of life. Consequently, patriotism must be augmented, for only the highest patriotic tension can bring about long-continued and voluntary self-denial in a people.

This augmentation automatically comes into being through the sudden common activity of a people, which in its turn calls forth an increased sense of action; this again conditions an increased mass feeling. Then, too, the uncertainty and the fear with which the possible horrors of war are viewed brings about a closer association of all those who are weak.

Both these feelings are played upon and artificially stimulated. A closer study of the press shows that the wire-pullers have an empiric understanding of the instincts of the crowd. Probably few people, except perhaps the late Mr. Barnum, would envy them this understanding. The whole performance essentially amounts to this. Either there is exaggeration of things favorable to one's own country or of those favorable to the opponent. In the one case the desire is to stimulate the mass feeling by the feeling of activity; in the other to increase the need for cohesion.

§ 115.—*Self-Praise and Fear*

In time of war people apparently can put up with any amount of self-praise. We have taunted the French for a long time because they believed that they marched *à la tête de la civilisation*; but the fact remains that for a hundred years all Europe followed the French lead, one might say almost slavishly followed it. To-day we calmly accept statements like the following, "Germany is the most perfect thing ever created by history."—Lasson.¹ W. Rein² calls it the "heart," and

¹ Lasson, "Zwei Briefe an die holländische Zeitschrift" "De Amsterdamer" ("Two Letters to the Dutch Journal 'De Amsterdamer.'")

² W. Rein in "Der Tag" ("The Day"), August 18. This furthermore is a parody of Hölderlin, who once in an entirely different sense said that "Germany was the nations' sacred heart."

G. Hauptmann,¹ "the soul of Europe." According to R. Eucken,² Germany is "complete civilization," in contrast with the French formal and the English material civilization. According to Kohler,³ all foreign countries owe "the best of their culture" to Germany. Among others there is an over-abundance of epithet. Lasson,⁴ for example, says, "Sincerity and idealistic depth are peculiarly German qualities, and all really vital feeling for nature is German. Peculiarly German, too, is truth and fidelity, the overcoming of difficulties and love of work, thought and conscience, will, scientific impulse, and justice." With similar pleonasm R. Dehmel⁵ declares "Germany is more humane, has better discipline, morals, intellect, soul, and imagination."

Statements like these could be found daily in the newspapers during 1914. Usually they were much worse. The passages above quoted are those of well-known personalities; we do not give any of those of journalists, which by reason of their anonymity were wholly unrestrained.

This self-praise was accentuated by calumny of the opponent. It is comprehensible that Eucken and his associates should speak of Russia's brutal despotism, and make the people responsible for a government which they formerly highly regarded. Opinions like these were prevalent even before the war. It is incomprehensible, however, when R. Dehmel calls it a barbarous state *par excellence* or a monstrosity of primitive instincts and imported refinements. A poet should at least respect creative literature sufficiently not to call barbarous a nation which has produced a trinity like

¹ G. Hauptmann, "An meine amerikanischen Freunde ("To my American Friends"), Berliner "Tageblatt," Oct. 21.

² R. Eucken, "Erster Vortrag in der Urania" ("First Discourse in the Urania").

³ Kohler, Berliner "Tageblatt," Sept. 18, 1914.

⁴ Lasson, "Fünfte Rede in schwerer Zeit" ("Fifth Address in Serious Times"), according to the Berliner "Tageblatt," September 26, 1914.

⁵ Dehmel, "Brief an meine Kinder" ("Letter to my Children"), Berliner "Tageblatt," October 10, 1914.

Lermontov, Dostoievsky, and Tolstoy. Besides, R. Dehmel is personally acquainted with a sufficient number of Russians whom he knows to be men of unprecedented delicacy and fineness of feeling. Why, then, all this talk about a "monstrosity"?

Most of them were more friendly toward France, but the half-pitying smile with which men like Carl Hauptmann, Roethe, and Richard Dehmel tried to dispose of the poor Gauls was hardly dignified. Wholly unworthy of German liberality of thought were the insults heaped upon the Japanese, Serbians, and Belgians. I omit further reference to them because every reader, if he has not unfortunately repeated them himself, has, at any rate, heard them a dozen times over.

The things said of England are almost unbelievable. Harnack¹ called the English traitors to civilization; Haeckel,² said they were the greatest criminals in the history of the world; Gustav Roethe said the Englishman was the great cold hypocrite. England's actions were motivated, according to Eucken, by a "repulsive frivolity" and, according to C. Hauptmann, by "a shopkeeper's envy," and so on, almost *ad infinitum*. Here, too, Richard Dehmel achieved the masterpiece. In addition to calling the English a "wild beast," he did not hesitate to declare that Shakspere and Byron "were cynics when you really fundamentally analyzed them."

If such statements could come from men of letters and thinkers, it is not difficult to imagine how far Philistines and journalists went. As far as I can judge among the daily newspapers, the prize goes to the "Deutsche Tageszeitung"; among other journals "Simplizissimus" and "Jugend"³ are close competitors.

The daily reading of things like these results inevitably in

¹ Harnack, *Rede im Berliner Rathaus am 11 August, 1914, und Brief vom 10 September* ("Speech in the Berlin city hall on August 11, and Letter of September 10, 1914").

² Haeckel, England's "Blutschuld" ("England's Blood-guilt").

³ Two well-known Munich humorous weeklies.—Translator.

that a man considers his own people the best, and that its defense will not only further his own interests, but also those of mankind at large. In this way war and chauvinism reciprocally augment each other. Here is the reason for the declaration of 3016 high-school teachers,¹ that "the welfare of the civilization of all Europe depended upon a German victory," or for Carl Hauptmann's² statement that "only by the complete victory of German arms can the independence of Europe be established." Juliusburger³ aptly says, and men like Haeckel and Ostwald support this, "It is Germany's historic task to organize Europe under its leadership."⁴

The one-sided reports concerning the bravery of our own troops and the cowardice of the enemy belong to the same category. Here, too, belongs the more or less skilful attempt of both sides to put the blame for the war upon the other side. This has been characteristic of all wars. A thousand other things also belong here; used all together they condition the horrible campaign of calumny, which, unfortunately, always runs parallel with the campaign of arms.

This boasting and assumption of a terrifying aspect is an ancient animal heritage. The lion roars before he attacks, the elephant tramples down the ground while awaiting the enemy, the serpent distends itself and hisses; the Trojans made long speeches, full of self-praise and belittlement of the enemy.

On the other hand, the attempt to stimulate patriotism by exaggerating the danger is purely human. This attempt has a rational purpose only when its aim is to cause a half-way intelligent citizenry, apparently of their own free will, to sub-

¹ Erklärung der Hochschullehrer des Deutschen Reichs" ("Declaration of the High-school Teachers of the German Empire"), October 10, 1914.

² C. Hauptmann, "Gegen Unwahrheit" ("Against Untruth"), "Tägliche Rundschau," August 26, 1914.

³ Otto Juliusburger, "Europa unter Deutscher Führung" ("Europe under German Leadership"). "Monistisches Jahrhundert" ("Monistic Century"), November 13, 1914, p. 657.

⁴ (cf. § 16 in regard to the germ of truth in this unjustifiable assertion.

scribe money, endure privations, or furnish soldiers. Volition does not exist in the animal kingdom.

This method was employed chiefly by the world-powers. In England the Zeppelins were used for this purpose, and entire sections of cities were darkened. In general all the clamor about the cruelty and barbarity of the Germans was raised for this purpose. In Germany it was possible to employ this principle only in the early days of the war, because later the military situation appeared relatively too favorable, or was made to appear so. But at first the attempt was made to spread fear and trembling in our own camp by all manner and means of wild reports. The figures "four against one" were hammered into us by way of suggestion, just as though there were no Austria or later Turkey and Bulgaria. Even Adolf von Harnack seems to have succumbed to this suggestion, for on September 10, 1914, he wrote, quite contrary to facts, in order to excuse the invasion of Belgium, that, "one hundred and ninety millions had attacked sixty-eight millions." The Austrians were entirely left out of his calculations, despite the fact that they nominally were the main issue. The enemy and his might were exaggerated, especially in their more loathsome aspects. His spies were said to be omnipresent. They were blowing up our tunnels and bombing our cities even far in the interior of the country. French physicians were poisoning our wells, and huge masses of gold were being shipped through Germany.

It is not immaterial whether such senseless stories are believed or not. The fact remains that the story about the poisoned wells was for the time being believed by at least seventy-nine million men, assuming that there are approximately eighty million Germans in Germany and Austria.

§ 116.—*The Consequences of Chauvinism*

The form of suggestion described in the preceding paragraphs was everywhere successful. The preparations for the War of 1914 had been more thorough than those for any other

war hitherto. Patriotism rose to unmeasured heights. There was also another result, an unintended one, let us hope. The hatred of nations simultaneously rose to unmeasured heights. The saddest part of this is that the suggestion will disappear, but the hatred remain.

This wallowing chauvinism concentrates every human capacity for love upon one's self and one's own country; for others only hatred remains. There is no room for any other potentiality of the human soul beside these two passions. The results cannot be described in detail. Every one who will re-read the newspapers of the first year of the war can for himself find a fullness of melancholy facts. A few arbitrarily selected instances will show what is meant.

Reasoning power broke down completely. Everything was believed. No one seemed to notice that the passage of an automobile through closed borders was impossible, or that it was impossible to transport the weight of the sums mentioned in an automobile. The authorities, at least indirectly, unfortunately aided in the building up of such legends. There was no timely official denial of the rumors of the arrest of French physicians who were said to have been caught in the act of poisoning wells, or of the shooting of the innkeeper Nikolai. Despite the censorship, the demonstrably false reports about gouged-out eyes, chopped-off hands, assassinated gamekeepers, etc., were allowed to circulate through the press, and their success was unexampled. Gradually no rumor was absurd enough not to find believers. This paroxysm of denial of the intelligence seized German science also, where surely there should have been the habit of exact investigation of truth. In the proclamation by the German savants to the world of culture, the statement, "it is not true," is repeated seven times. And this document is signed by thirty-five scientists, despite the fact that in each of the seven cases the question involved is one which by its very nature makes it impossible to give a categorical judgment concerning its truth or falsity.

That there is no room for ethics in war is evident *per se*. Yet the chauvinist tries to lay claim to it for himself and his side, entirely without reason, entirely *à tout prix*. A characteristic article is one by Paul Ernst.¹ It deals with the question, "whether Yorek's action in the Convention of Taurorgen was unethical and whether he committed treason toward his confederates." Paul Ernst's conclusions are as follows. Yorek was a German, a pious, moral German, standing firmly on the foundation of Kant's ethics. Such Germans commit only ethical acts, and consequently his treason toward his king and his confederates was an ethical act. Verbatim Paul Ernst writes, "A Southerner, even a Frenchman, cannot understand the conflict; Yorek, the man of iron and of stern, inflexible honor was permitted to take this step. It is to his personality we owe the fact that at the apex of our national liberation there is not an iniquity, but a great, heroic sacrifice." The deed, consequently, was bad in itself, and would have been if a Southerner or a Frenchman had committed it, but done by a German, it was heroic. I hope the time will soon come when Germans, even Paul Ernst himself, will look back upon such times with deep shame. For a chauvinism under the cloak of philosophical considerations is doubtless the most dangerous of all, because it is most likely to lead innocent persons astray. They do not even notice the cloven hoof.

Certain German daily newspapers have demanded that prisoners and pigs should be fed together. Others have commented on the report of our general headquarters that "numerous German sailors were rescued by the English," that rescue by this English riff-raff should be forbidden. This is chauvinistic immorality of the grossest and crudest kind. If a person is not nauseated by it on his own accord, further argument is useless.

Unfortunately, there are to-day still very few with whom argument would be worth while. Not long ago one of our

¹ Paul Ernst in "Der Tag" ("The Day"), March 25, 1915.

most highly educated military men asked me whether it might not be possible to hurl bombs loaded with cholera germs or plague bacilli behind the lines of the enemy. I suppress his name on account of his great services, and also because, after peace is reëstablished, he will probably regret his question. When I told him that this seemed rather purposeless and hardly humane, he replied, with a contemptuous wave of the hand, that humanity had nothing to do with this war; that Germany had full license for whatever it wished to do.

Unfortunately, millions of people think like this particular man of high achievement; only, usually, they are much worse. For instance, the chief of the medical staff at Graudenz told me that he had often considered whether it might not be possible to steal through the Russian lines and inoculate the Russians with living bacteria. He held that the employment of any means was justifiable against such vermin. Degenerates like these no longer see in the enemy human beings like themselves; or, more correctly, they see in him a reflection of themselves—that is, only an animal. To them hatred has become a religion. It is a hatred without reflection, without meaning or reason, without justification.

In Lissauer's "Chant of Hate against England," this absurd person does not even try to tell us why he hates England. The entire so-called chant consists of a reiterated, shrill protestation that he hates England, and when we have read to the end of the verse, we might feel inclined to ask the author, "And now tell us, why do you really hate England?" Lissauer himself once correctly remarked that his verses should not be spoken, but hissed. Admirable self-criticism! The breed of serpents and vipers has always existed, but hardly any one would have believed that so many of them also understood German. Julius Florus,¹ the Roman historian, reports that the ancient Germans were in the habit of tearing the tongue of the mouths of such people with the words, "to the

¹ Julius Florus, *Tandem, vipera, sibtare desiste* (Epitome rerum romanorum, lib. IV. cup. XII.).

end that the poisonous serpent may cease to hiss." At present our measures are milder. But let us hasten to forget as soon as possible that such a song was ever popular in German, or that words like "Hiddekk"¹ and "Gott strafe England"² ("God punish England") had currency.

In antiquity foreign languages were unknown, and with the best will in the world it was impossible to understand the foreigner. Consequently it was only natural that the foreigner should come to be looked upon as a barbarian; that is, one speaking a strange language. No contemptuous secondary signification was originally associated with this word before the time of the Persian Wars. Plato still writes, "Great also are the races of barbarians," but to Aristotle³ it already seems self-evident that the Greeks are the superiors of the barbarians. At the present time the intellectual life of a foreign nation is almost as accessible to every one as is that of his own country, and to-day the mania of calling "foreigners" barbarians is merely a sign of defective education.

When the ordinary citizen over his beer boasts with booming voice that we are the most moral, bravest, most chivalrous, most intelligent, in short the best people in every respect, we can let that pass, with the assumption that his circle of vision does not extend beyond the walls of his beer-house. The case, however, is different when a man like Richard Dehmelt declares that only Germans have a true title to world-dominion, quite forgetting that he, too, once held the belief that the world's ultimate purpose was not that of being dominated; or again,

¹ According to the ordinary interpretation, H. I. D. D. E. K. K. is said to mean: "*Hauptsache ist, dass die Engländer Keile kriegen*" ("The important thing is that the English get a drubbing." In the pro-entente circles of German Switzerland it was translated by, "*Hauptsache ist dass Deutschland englische Keile kriegt*" ("The important thing is that Germany get an English drubbing").

² It is said that the English change this to "*Gott verzeihe Deutschland*" ("God forgive Germany").

³ Aristotle, "*Politica*," 1-2. Cf. also Roth, "*Über Sinn und Gebrauch des Wortes Barbar*" ("On the Meaning and Use of the Word Barbarian"): Nuremberg, 1843.

when a man like Cohen¹ states that only Germans can be philosophers, quite forgetting how much Kant owes to Berkeley, merely to give an example which may interest Cohen. It is in cases like these that we must confess, alas! that chauvinism has done its cruelest work. It has succeeded in reducing minds, noble and liberal in themselves, almost to the level of those who, except for their mug of beer, know nothing else of the world.

4.—THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN CIVILIZATION AND CHAUVINISM

§ 117.—*Civilization as an Organism*

What has been said so far touches only certain individual cases. They illustrate how injurious and hostile to civilization the tendency of a chauvinistic point of view is. They may not be convincing, because they may possibly be merely exceptional instances. But it can easily be shown that civilization and chauvinism, we may even say civilization and patriotism, are in and of themselves incompatible antitheses.

There is doubtless, as will be shown in the next chapter, a national civilization which must be preserved. Such a civilization, however, is possible only when we subordinate our national feeling to the ideal of civilization as a whole, but not when we reverse the order.

Nietzsche² once said that war made the victor stupid and the vanquished barbarous. This probably merely means that war destroys civilization, for Nietzsche does not indicate why in the one instance intellectual civilization, and in the other that of the feelings, should suffer. This voluntary division seems doubly odd in the case of Nietzsche, who more firmly than any one else clung to the belief in the possibility and necessity of a common civilization in the sense which obtained

¹ Cohen, "Das Eigentümliche des deutschen Geistes. Vortrag in der Kant-Gesellschaft" ("The Distinctive Quality of the German Mind. Discourse before the Kant Society"), 1914.

² Nietzsche, "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Der Krieg" ("Human, All Too Human. War").

hitherto only among the ancient Hellenes when they opposed *kalokagathia* (nobleness) to the conception of barbarians.

It is true that many earnest thinkers have felt that a "specialized civilization" is not a true civilization. So, for instance, Kant¹ says that civilization is "the adaptation of the capacity of a reasonable being to its appropriate function"; and Fichte² similarly, but not quite as clearly, maintains that, "civilization is the exercise of all forces to the object of complete liberty." Most definite and satisfactory, however, is Nietzsche's statement, "civilization is the harmony of mutually opposed forces."

A painter, musician, or sculptor can as little wholly represent civilization as a scientist, technician, or a philosopher. Not even the sum-total of a particular profession can by itself produce a civilization. The huge structure of a period in civilization consists in the combination of all those forces which have been mentioned, and many others, into a single organism within which no check will be placed upon the free development of the individual parts. There are indeed certain periods in which one or the other of these tendencies of mind was predominant. The Middle Ages were predominantly religious, the Renaissance was primarily artistic, the eighteenth century (the period of rationalism) was scientific, the present time is technical, and the French Revolution was political. But when this predominance is so powerful as to suppress the other impulses of the human spirit, such a period can no longer be called civilized.

Let us consider an organism like a human being. We cannot cut off a hand without simultaneously involving the brain; we cannot injure the brain without at the same time producing a detrimental effect on the hand. In general no individual part can be changed without producing a change in the whole. In the same way civilization becomes inferior when one of its

¹ Kant, "Kritik der Urtheilskraft" ("Critique of Judgment"), § 83.

² Fichte, "Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre" ("Foundation of the Whole Theory of Science"), VI, p. 86.

individual elements suffers. Any one who will reflect for a moment will see how intimately music is bound up with all other arts and sciences. Let us merely think of the origin of tragedy and lyric poetry, of Pythagoras, and of the various religions.

If there is any unifying principle amid the disruptions of the present time, that principle is civilization. It is such, and will remain so. However great the disruptions, civilization by necessity and by its inherent force makes for unity. Civilization cannot be disrupted either in space or in time. Neither the burning of Alexandria nor the burning of Byzantium; neither torture-chamber nor chair of St. Peter; neither war nor self-chosen emasculation on the part of certain so-called leaders of civilization can destroy it. A hand will always be there to pass on the torch from to-day to to-morrow, from country to country.

It is only as an individual part that a person can become faithless to civilization, and, perhaps, not even that is possible. It may be that what the war has shown is merely the falling away of a civilized shell, which we mistook for civilization, from a dissolute heart. There is no question that civilization is a homogeneous organism whose arms encircle the world.


Every organism can be subdivided in several different ways according to the mode in which it is viewed. A division can be made according to bodily regions (arms, legs, trunk, head, etc.), or according to systems of organs (blood-vessels, nerves, digestive organs, etc.), that is according to systems which more or less uniformly traverse all the bodily regions mentioned above.

Civilization as an organism can be similarly subdivided according to regions, as into Greek and Roman, German and Romance, Slavic and Chinese civilization, or we can divide it into systems, like intellectual, scientific, or technical civilization, which in their way more or less uniformly traverse all the regions.

For the benefit of those who are unfamiliar with the scien-

tific conception of an organism we have added the schematic Fig. 6. In it Germany, France, and England represent bodily regions, and the differently shaded ramifications represent systems of civilization. The latter are indicated by the names Newton, Kant, and Napoleon. In place of these, or rather in addition to these, any other names or intellectual currents might be put. It is readily seen from the figure that neither a system of organs (as Kant, or philosophy in general), nor a

Fig. 6.



bodily region (as France), can be removed without doing injury to the whole. If France disappeared, certain ramifications which Kant's German philosophy has there produced would simultaneously disappear. In other words, if Germany should destroy France, it would at the same time irretrievably destroy certain flowers of its own most inherent civilization. This intertwining of one zone of civilization with another, this "cross-stratification" of civilization, has, especially in more recent times, assumed greater and greater importance, because of the increasing possibility of international intercommunication.

§ 118.—*The Internationalism of Civilization*

In the matter of technical civilization, limitation to the boundaries of a country is virtually unthinkable. The posts, telegraphs, railroads, and steamship lines are in their very essence institutions for all the world. The regulations concerning them show a distinct tendency toward a more and more far-reaching unification. Where such international regulations are still lacking even in relatively unimportant matters, such as whether an automobile is to turn out to the right or to the left, every one concerned feels that this is an anachronism.

Scientific civilization also has not been national for a long time. Meteorology, the international determination of atomic weights, international archaeological study, seismology, and astronomy are merely examples selected at random. They adequately establish for every one familiar with the respective science that here certain organizations are spread throughout the entire world, irrespective of nationality. A national medicine, jurisprudence, or pedagogy would be an absurdity.

The condition described is officially recognized in that there are already numerous international bureaus,¹ administered by the totality of nations. The most important of these, which have a political complexion, were distributed, in order to guard their inviolability, among the three states, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, whose neutrality was guaranteed (alas! in vain).

In Bern are the Bureau of Telegraphs (1865), of the International Postal Union (1874), for the Protection of Industrial Property (1863), and of Copyright (1886).

In Brussels are the Bureau of Tariffs (1890), of Slave Trade (1890), and of the Sugar Commission (1902).

In The Hague are the Court of Arbitration and the Superior Prize Court.

¹ In what follows only the official bureaus and those under a permanent administration are given. There are in addition, of course, countless international associations and official agreements,

In the case of the international institutes it was assumed, unfortunately incorrectly, that the precaution of locating them in neutralized countries would not be necessary. For who would have believed that men of science would ever renounce their international labors?

Consequently, there are in Germany two bureaus: "The Institute for Earth-Measurement (1864), at Potsdam, and that for seismology (1903), at Strasburg.

In France there are also two: the Bureau of Weights and Measures at Sèvres (1875), and the International Bureau of Public Hygiene, at Paris (1893), with several branches in the Orient.

The international Institute for the Study of the Sea (1902) is situated at Copenhagen, and that for Agriculture (1905) at Rome.

There are besides numerous international agreements which govern the administration of individual countries. Fried¹ cites eighty-six, dealing with commerce and trade, law and police regulations, science and social endeavors, and war and politics.

A large part of modern civilization, such as manners, fashions, dances, popular songs, is international. No one can escape this. But every time Germans rush into war, those who remain behind determine to create distinctive German fashions. The attempt never met success. With the stubbornness of an unteachable mule the same campaign was started again in 1914, but, despite its noise, the movement broke down more quickly than ever before. The facts of internationalism are more powerful to-day than ever before, and cannot be denied. Manufacturers remembered that ready-made articles of dress had to be shipped to South America; others in a half-ashamed way pointed to our exports to England, and recalled how many people were dependent upon them for their livelihood. Then those came along who remem-

¹ Fried, "Handbuch der Friedensbewegung" ("Handbook of the Peace Movement"), I, 121 *et seq.*, Leipsic, 1911.

bered something of history—the former distinctively German shag hats and Jäger underwear, and the fact that it was once regarded as unpatriotic to wear these. Next came the upper ten thousand, who remembered that at some time in the future they might perhaps want to play again at Monte Carlo and engage in sports in the Engadine, and that on such occasions the wearing of distinctively German styles might be a disadvantage. So even during the period of the war the movement broke down despite the protests of the Gartenstrasse, and the winter of 1914–1915 saw Berlin wearing the same costumes as Paris. What is to-day called “German styles” is merely cunning advertising adapted to the present time. In this the power of internationalism is disclosed in an almost excessive degree, for there can be no real objection to any one’s dressing as individualistically as he pleases.

Habitations, like human beings, are also international and, unfortunately, colorless. Except for its historic buildings, Paris to-day can hardly be distinguished from London. Petrograd, Bukharest, Constantinople, and Madrid may perhaps still have individual characteristics, but here, too, the tendency to conform to an international type is unmistakable. Without the street-signs, it would be impossible to distinguish modern quarters in Milan, Berlin, or Stockholm from one another.

The water-front sections in Hong-Kong and Hamburg, in Port Said and New York, except for certain externals, are almost identical. There are the same dives for sailors and the same motion-pictures, the same international prostitutes and the same types of seafaring men. Wealthy sections, like Uhlenhorst (Hamburg) and Hong-Kong Hill, bear a closer resemblance to each other than they do to the respective harbor-sections of St. Paul (Hamburg) and Hong-Kong Harbor.

There is the complaint about the tourist who intrudes everywhere. Unless we bury ourselves in the solitude of the pampas, the steppes, the tundras, or the primeval forests, it is almost impossible to escape Cook’s standardized hotels.

Art, then, remains. It also has in reality become interna-

tional. The latest operetta is produced almost simultaneously in the various capitals of Europe. It is hardly possible any longer to designate Caruso as an Italian. Tolstoy, Ibsen, and Bernard Shaw have founded schools in all countries.

There are cross-strata, like Naturalism, Impressionism, and the recent Futurism, which became dominant in all countries almost simultaneously. Even the local-color school in art is in reality merely a form of international snobbishness which appeared simultaneously in all countries. In the case of art one might perhaps seriously speak of a national intensification, for art is something traditional, and points toward the past. But the men are lacking who could create such a retrospective art. Education is international. A boy sees and studies the same things everywhere. Even if he has grown up in the most forlorn district, his intellectual sustenance has been very much alike everywhere. Richard Dehmel, who grew up in a solitary forester's lodge in the swamps of Brandenburg, justly says that he owes his bit of brains to ten nations. As soon as a young artist has become famous, the international modern life irrevocably seizes hold of him.

The attempt on the part of the Werdandi League to revive the old characteristically German national art failed, as did similar efforts in other countries. An art like this would develop only in the narrowly isolated cities of the Middle Ages.

Thus to-day civilization as a whole has become international in its essence. Of course there are exceptions. But let us have no illusions; they are unimportant.

§ 119.—*The Effect of Chauvinism upon Civilization in General*

Since civilization and patriotism are each an ideal which by its nature must wholly fill a human being, a man cannot serve both. A man may be a patriot or a civilized human being. A man may say, "To the deuce with all civilization, if only my country has n't forgotten how to strike with the sword."

Whoever says this is at least a logical barbarian; he is illogical only in so far as he protests against the term barbarian. But whoever holds that his own country's civilization lies close to his heart should remember that it is joined by a thousand secret threads to foreign countries, and consequently is injured by the break of international relations.

If a monarch or a military person returns the distinguished Order of the Golden Fleece, this may be a matter of indifference to the world, just as was the fact that at some time or other he received it. The purpose of such an order is not to promote international civilization. The case is different, however, when men of science renounce foreign academic honors or when academics expel enemy members. Such an act is contrary to what an academy is supposed to stand for.¹ When Privy Medical Councilor Schwalbe issues an appeal that no further international congresses be summoned and advocates non-attendance at such as may be called, this fact concerns mankind at large. The purpose of international medical congresses is, or should be, the discussion of the "health of mankind," just as at international meetings of lawyers² the "rights of man" are, or ought to be, discussed. Neither Mr. Schwalbe nor Mr. Kohler have any authority to express an opinion concerning this because of their personal or national sensitiveness. They are, provided they are entitled to be heard as spokesmen at all, put in their high positions by the totality of mankind. Just as the soldier prefers to die at his post rather than to leave it on the approach of danger, so it simply is the duty of such men to hold out steadily at their posts. If they do not do this, they are bad soldiers.

The best proof of the hostility between civilization and patriotism lies in the following fact. Patriots in all serious-

¹ Waldeyer says (reprint from "Nord und Süd," p. 6): "When the question concerns the honorary commands of regiments and the like it is perfectly proper to hand in one's resignation. But in my opinion it is quite a different matter when it comes to the rejection of honors obtained in a purely scientific sphere"

² Compare Kohler's actions in this respect.

ness believe that they can rout out of civilization everything that does not conform to the higher demands of patriotism and yet leave civilization unimpaired. He who with contemptuous gesture of the hand disposes of all civilization prior to August 1 by calling it estheticism or mannered decadence acts not only irreverently toward his own past, but also sins against the conception of civilization.

It is not a matter of indifference that teachers to-day, instead of instructing youth, are in military service; that professors, instead of teaching, are drilling recruits; that our technicians, instead of aiding the progress of German industry, are building military telegraphs and manufacturing gas-bombs; in short, that all of a sudden the activities of our entire male population have been turned to a different end.

If of all the manifold endeavors of civilization that we formerly considered precious, we now pursue only those which are of value for the carrying on of war, this voluntary turning aside dismembers civilization. We shall, and inevitably must, pay the penalty.

§ 120.—*The Special Effect of War*

War encourages the tendencies which are hostile to civilization, for war changes the character of man. As long ago as 300 B. C. Menander¹ declared that not even a god could make a decent civilized human being out of a soldier; there is no difference to-day in the reverse after a soldier has been made out of a civilized human being. Only a cultivated man, for whom the conditions of life are more markedly altered, is more profoundly influenced than is the uncultivated man. Whether a Polish miner digs coal or trenches, and whether a German or English sailor serves on a merchant-ship or war-ship, is relatively immaterial. When a teacher is torn from his school, a banker from his office, a scholar from his study, and put gun in hand in the trenches there is in every case a

¹ Menander: Κομψὸς στρατιώτης οὐδ' ἂν εἰ πλάττει οὐδείς γένοιτ' ἂν.

great transformation. When a poet or artist is snatched from his dream-land and set amid the reality of cannons the contrast is absolute, quite independent of the question whether it is for the better or worse. This applies likewise to all other so-called leaders in civilization.

In the case of the physician alone, except in the matter of certain personal comforts, we are proud to say no change is required. Even in war he fights war, whose wounds he heals. That the cured are employed again to prolong the war is a fact for which the physician as such cannot be held responsible.

For every one else war means an overturn. Everything that the civilized human being has previously believed in is now valueless. The point now is to act, and so men of thought turn into men of action. But only the most exceptional among mortals can, like Goethe, who even under the thunder of the cannons of Jemappes retained his equable, cheerful calm, keep their self undivided. By this we mean, combine their intellect and will at any given moment to make of themselves a strong personality. Most people are either men of thought or men of action, and since the war relentlessly forces them to deeds, there is no longer room for thought.

These deeds, so hostile to civilization in themselves, we perform because of patriotism and because of patriotism alone. Professor Gerhard Gran¹ of Christiania indicates this when he declares that patriotism causes a tremendous augmentation of the human power for action, but simultaneously a tremendous diminution of the capacity for thought. The harmony of a true civilization arises only out of congruity between thinking and acting. In general it may even be said that thinking should precede.

Those who have remained behind are worse off than those in the field. The man who has been out there has subsisted

¹ Gerhard Gran, "Krieg, Wissenschaft, und Vaterland: Rede in der Universität von Christiania" ("War, Science, and Fatherland: Discourse at the University of Christiania"), October, 1914.

on poor and often inadequate food; his drink has been poor, but he has often drunk too much; he has marched in dust and heat; he has lain in mud and wet; he has hardly had any other thought but the purely vegetative one of self-preservation and of destroying his opponent. We may at least imagine such a man, when he returns home as after a long horrible dream, as looking at the alien life out there as something unreal, and as taking up his former life where he has left off.

But with the man at home it is different. Lecture-rooms are empty; schools are poorly conducted, and in them instruction only too frequently is subordinated to dubious celebrations of victory and to the organization of the pupils into a military reserve. The theaters are in large part given over to patriotic plays of inferior value. The political and scientific journals cannot keep away from the war. Factories for steel pens manufacture bullets, and electrical works grenades. Former actors sell the "Kriegszeitung" ("the Army Journal"), and painters paint only war-pictures. Gradually all the activities of peace become disintegrated, and the entire mechanism, though primarily destined for peace, is converted into a huge machine for war. Whoever has seen all this no doubt will deeply respect the stern will power of the nation, but at the same time a vast number of things will be broken in his soul, just as civilization has been broken before his eyes. We leave out of consideration entirely the miserable and demoralizing campaign of calumny which he is compelled to view at much closer range than the soldier at the front.

The direct destruction of the works of civilization is relatively unimportant in comparison with this subjective modification of the human capacity for civilization. And yet how much there is of this destruction! The fields are devastated, and cities are burned; industries are destroyed, and works of art are laid in ruins. Perhaps this is inevitable, but things also which have nothing to do with war are sense-

lessly and purposelessly destroyed. Humboldt¹ complains that his travels around the world were destroyed by war. The eclipse of the sun in 1914 went by, and it was impossible to take advantage of the opportunities offered despite all the preparations that had been made. The observations in southern Russia in particular were impossible, and they were to have been the decisive test of Einstein's theory of gravity.

This is the senseless logic of war. On the one side it sacrifices millions of men, and on the other side it holds that a single soldier is worth more than the most magnificent beauty of a cathedral, or the highest truth which might have completed the work which Newton began.

¹ Humboldt, Letter to F. Bollmann, October 15, 1799 (in the possession of the Carnegie Museum in Pittsburgh).

CHAPTER X

THE LEGITIMATE INDIVIDUALISM OF NATIONS

1.—THE CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY

§ 121.—*The Right to Individuality*

Probably never before have the friends of Europe and the opponents of a fratricidal European war felt as lonely as they do to-day; for this latest war has taken on an inconceivable magnitude. Of the 450,000,000 inhabitants of Europe almost 400,000,000 dwell in the countries at war. Almost ten per cent. of these, or 40,000,000, are under arms, and of these again ten per cent., or 4,000,000,¹ are probably already put out of action. These are numbers with which all the battles of the Roman Republic might have been fought.

A little more than ten per cent. of Europeans still live in neutral countries. But these seem so fascinated by the dominating vision of this all-pervading death that they, too, are yearning to enter the war, though, of course, only under the most favorable conditions. An intoxicating enthusiasm for war is running through the countries, as at the time when Peter of Amiens screamed his *deus lo volt* out into the world and made of it for two hundred years such a madhouse that finally even the children went forth to war. The shrill pipe of the rat-catcher is once again blowing its lure, and this time it is not *pro Deo*: it is *pro patria*. Mankind is always ready quickly to carve for itself a god or an idol. But never before have 400,000,000 rats fallen into the snare.

If it was possible for such an unheard-of fury of war to rage

¹ Since this was written, this number has doubtless grown much larger.

throughout all lands, it was quite to be presupposed that our conception of right and honor would be turned into ridicule, that our differently understood love of the fatherland would be treated as high treason, and that our belief in humanity would be reviled as folly. Only too clearly do we feel the destroying effect of aloneness, the opposite of mass feeling. We are in the position of the little ant which is left to fight companionless within a hundred paces of her nest.

Our point of view, because it is shared by few, seems to us for that very reason already discredited. It is of little use to gird ourselves in the pride of a deeper understanding and to wait for justification by the future. It will surely come when once the headache has followed the intoxication; but for the present we feel abandoned and lost. The vital force of the temporary majority is so overwhelming that it seems almost impossible to hold one's own against it. There are very, very few men for whom the rat-catcher blows in vain, who go through life wise and unmoved, like children or very old people. But even they are not to be envied, for very often it is just they who secretly yearn for once to participate in the folly of all mankind.

These are the men who stand apart, or rather walk apart, for it is just they who are making progress. They may have been anointed with a drop of democratic oil, and they may have been in the habit of regarding the impulses of a people as possessing in their general tendency a valuable capacity for evolutionary development, however misdirected this potentiality may be in individual instances. Such a man must almost despair, for it must seem to him as if this impulse of a people toward war damned utterly his unwarlike ideals.

The "thousand good Europeans" of whom Dostoievsky¹ once spoke are proof against all the fair and foul words of

¹ Dostoievsky, "Ein Werdender," Book III, ch. VII. These twenty pages contain some of the most beautiful things ever said by a writer about the coming European patriotism. I cannot very well quote them, and I do not wish to disfigure them by condensation. But every one should read them.

love of one's country and treason toward one's country. They know very well the value of this patriotism of the beer-garden, money-chamber, and school-bench. They know very well how easily a people is moved, crying "Hosanna!" one day, and "Crucify!" the next. They are not afraid of being called men without honor and without a country. But when the dark hours of doubt come which must come to every one who goes his way alone, the question again and again arises whether he as an individual man has the right to stand out against an entire people, or whether, after all, there is not, perhaps, a certain value in quantity, and even if right were a thousand times over on the side of the individual man, whether ultimately the emotional outburst of 400,000,000 is not worth more than the reason of a single person.

Is, perhaps, a people as a whole permitted to commit whatsoever follies it pleases? Perhaps it is one of the legitimate properties of group of humans that regards itself as a nation to put without punishment its emotions in place of its reason.

A dog may eat whatsoever it wishes; only a whip or a larger dog can keep it from doing so, never reason or law. It may be that human beings when they act in large groups still move on the level of dogs and are permitted to follow their inclinations provided the larger cannon of the opponent do not prevent them.

Why, then, this seemingly purposeless struggle? Why make oneself ridiculous and even undergo perhaps the risk of imprisonment? And yet there are people who, despite all these very good reasons for faint-heartedness, feel the imperative impulse of courage. They consider it necessary to do and say certain things even if they cannot conceal the fact from themselves that it is to no immediate practical purpose. They would rather act absurdly than dishonestly. They feel the right and the duty to declare themselves and to defend their own individuality. If a person has this right, perhaps a people also has the right and duty to defend its own legitimate individuality against every one.

§ 122.—*The Restriction of the Personality*

This is, in fact, the case, and is often difficult to decide both in a people and in an individual man whether individualism is legitimate or not. But the very conception of individualism seems to imply that each one may wear it according to his own taste. If no judge superior to the will of the person or of a people is recognized, this would indeed be the case. In general, however, a person ordinarily believes that reason, at any rate, must not be neglected. Otherwise the deviation is called not legitimate individualism, but illegitimate insanity.

We know both from the past and the present that insanity may affect large groups of people and nations. The dancing mania and St. Vitus dance, the children's crusades, and the suicide epidemics in ancient Rome and present-day Russia, the witchcraft trials and many other things, are counted by modern science as cases in point, as were also the sadistic orgies of the Roman circus and the self-torments in medieval cloisters. Every generation was always very liberal in this respect and always very much inclined to designate as insanity any hostile belief. This is meant not only figuratively, but literally. Heathendom once looked upon Christianity as a form of insanity, and when Christianity became dominant, it in its turn looked upon modern heresy as an insane delusion. Even in the last century (it is true, at a period of the worst reaction) a medical student wanted to offer as his graduating thesis a dissertation entitled, *De morbo democratico, nova forma insanix*. It was only due to Rudolph Virchow's opposition that a German university was spared this extraordinary doctor's thesis.

To-day people are very much inclined to interpret the war passion of the enemy as insanity. We in Germany were able to observe this at our leisure in the case of Italy. Ten months' experience in war had taught us. We recognized that the fear of spies, persecution of foreigners, overstraining of the censorship, poetic war rhapsodies, grandiloquent national pride,

in short, "the whole outward show of war enthusiasm," really belongs in a lunatic asylum. In order not to appear ridiculous, for the present in the eyes of their enemies and later, no doubt, in those of the world at large, nations should temper their capacity for enthusiasm by the employment of reason.

In Germany it is customary to distinguish two kinds of reason *pure* and *practical* reason.¹ This distinction is perhaps the most characteristic German quality. It would not be wholly incorrect to call "Germany the nation of dividedness produced out of itself." By this I mean not only political dividedness, but also intellectual and moral.

But more of this later (Cf. § 134). For the present we shall discuss this twofold reason only in so far as it offers us a means for separating legitimate individualisms from those that are unwarranted. All difficulties ultimately arise from the fact that one reason prohibits some particular individual quality that according to the other is permissible. Man, the unhappy creature with the two reasons, does not know what to do.

This difficulty was not invented by Kant; at the most he merely formulated it anew. The belief has always been common that there were two ways of viewing the world, but they were not both designated as "reason." Either we might try to understand it in accordance with our reason or we might comprehend it with love. The logical side of this was of principal concern to science, and the emotional side chiefly concerned religion, which by force of the feelings have attempted to arrive at some world view complete in itself.

Modern philosophy since the time of Socrates has tried to mediate between the two, but necessarily failed in the attempt. The latest and greatest attempt at a mediation of this sort was Kant's. In a certain sense we may designate this as final.

Kant meant to show, and in reality did show, that no true mediation was possible between these two ways of viewing the

¹ If we include *judgment*, there are three.

world, provided, of course, that we once had become cognizant of them. This is quite self-evident. That in his later years he tried again to deny this contrast, which in a certain sense he himself had created, merely shows the instinctive hunger of mankind for an all-embracing explanation. In his sublime system of antinomistic philosophy he showed that these two world views were simultaneously possible and simultaneously necessary. Since they are also simultaneously contradictory and irreconcilable, a bit of metaphysics must be dragged in, and in the mystical concept¹ of personality, the inapprehensible synthesis finds its completion.

This attempt failed, as is to-day probably generally admitted. At any rate, the practical difficulty remains as to which of the two intuitions at any given moment is the legitimate one. Let us grant that in the case of freedom, God, and immortality the standard of decision should lie in the primacy of practical reason (basically, that is, of the emotions); and, in the case of mathematics, the primacy of pure reason. Nevertheless, there is an extensive real world between God and Pythagoras. Where it belongs we must seek to discover in each individual case.

This rather inadequate result is what might have been expected. If we recognize two kinds of reason as simultaneously independent, there naturally can be no real permanent primacy. It must change just as an attentive host, who has two men of equal rank as guests, serves first alternately the one and then the other.

A decision can be had only if we recognize as a judge something that is higher than these two individual principles. Kant knew no such higher judge, and could not know one, for according to him the human spirit is something inviolable, and in a certain sense something which cannot be discussed.

¹ A concept is called mystical because it seeks to combine things which are of themselves incompatible. Such a concept can become real only if we can prove the existence of a new concept of personality. Personality must be primarily complete; its completeness must not be secondarily constructed.

He found in it these two irreconcilable principles, which he necessarily had to regard as innate ideas. It is a proof of the strength of his intellect that he did not try to explain away these things by hair-splitting, at any rate not in his "Criticism of Practical Reason." He put them side by side, hard and direct, as things of reality are.

For us, in this sense, at any rate, inexplicable things no longer exist, because there are no longer inborn qualities. All these inborn ideas under the weight of which science formerly dragged itself along have to-day become accessible to analysis in accordance with evolutionary theory. We know that two living beings, however disparate they may be, can always be joined if we go far enough back in the evolutionary series. There is always a point where the origins of these divergent evolutionary series meet in a single trunk. This applies to organisms and organizations as well as to the functions of life which are built upon them.

Our psyche did not spring complete from the head of Zeus like the fully armed Athene. It slowly and gradually developed in accordance with those laws and forces to the combined effort of which she ultimately owes her almost imperceptible origin (cf. § 163).

These laws consequently precede all human reason, and are, if one so will, above it and higher than it. At any rate, we must take our bearings in accordance with them if we are to decide which of the various possibilities of thought is legitimate.

In Kant the idea of evolution had not yet become a living force, though in many ways he anticipated it. For him, therefore, certain phenomena had to remain unexplainable. As a fruit is unexplainable when certain characteristics of the flower are unknown, just so the characteristics of the human spirit in its present isolated completion remain dark and obscure.

The prevalence of a rational view is to-day so firmly established that it seems at least possible to trace back all the high-

est ideas which fill mankind to things which can be rationally understood. This disposes of the question with which we started out. Virtue and the capacity for enthusiasm are not isolated domains of themselves; they are subject to the control of the general laws of a thinking reason. *Virtue, like everything else, can be taught.*

§ 123.—*The Primacy of the Reason*

This idea of the unique primacy of the reason is very ancient. Even the primitive man exerted his reason to the utmost. He preferred to invent spirits and dryads rather than to relinquish the employment of the law of causality. This belief was a vital element in fair Hellas. Socrates, the most splendid representative of the clear soul of Greece, announced the dominance of reason over all metaphysics even before that word was invented when he said that virtue can be taught.

We have no wish to preach a belief in authority, but we are happy to know that we are in harmony with this type of wisdom, for the "wise Socrates" is the only one to whom the infallible instinct of the people has given this title of honor.

Socrates not only declared that virtue could be taught, but he also indicated the way by which it could be learned when he called attention to the old Delphic words "Know thyself."¹

Virtue can be taught, but only through self-knowledge. This settles the subjective aspect of the matter, for there is no virtue which is identical for all. Every virtue, like every-

¹ Socrates himself never in this way brought into direct association with each other these his two most famous sayings. It would lead too far afield were we to show in detail that in all his works he supports this point of view, especially in reference to civic virtue and in reference to the memory of a previous existence. Every one will be surprised at the modernity of this ancient Greek if he puts in place of the Socratic conception, "memory of a previous existence," the modern conception of an inherited predisposition. These two conceptions are fundamentally identical, and hence it is quite appropriate to claim the designation "Socratic" for the explanations which follow.

thing else, is dependent upon the individuality of the one. But this subjectivism has its limitations. There is an objective and general principle of virtue that plainly proclaims that it is impossible for a virtue or even a characteristic to develop if the rudiment of it is not present in us.

Out of this natural impossibility grows a positive demand. All men should recognize as clearly as possible the powers and potentialities that lie within them and develop them to their highest perfection. The individual man should consider how or by what means he can accomplish a maximum achievement and best serve mankind. Shall he, if he has skilled hands, become a goldsmith or a mechanician; or, if his eyesight is sharp, a seaman or a huntsman; or, if he has intelligence, a man of science? This rule of virtue seems nothing more than the homely wisdom of the ancient proverb, "Cobbler, stick to your last," and Socrates often enough has been called middle-class. But people forget that Socrates adds, "Perfect thyself." By this he means a cobbler who indeed sticks to his last, but who in the sense of to-day founds, let us say, a shoe-factory. This example can likewise be transferred into the ethical sphere. The modern Socratic theory of evolution does not require a man to remain permanently in the place where a rational or irrational destiny has placed him; rather, it desires a man to seek out his place in the world in such a way that it will have meant progress to him.

In other words, man, too, is subject to the law of evolution. A person, a people, or mankind at large under its compulsion can accomplish something worth while only when they do it in the direction indicated to them by their hereditary mass, or, as Socrates calls it, their memory.

In the section on positive and negative selection (§ 29) we have already shown that this inescapable direction is, as a matter of fact, present, and that it is the only objective scale by which we can determine the value of all events and all endeavors.

Let us grant that for the rest of the world, both animate and

inanimate, such a natural compulsion also exists, but there it is not called virtue.

Man, indeed, has the possibility, as has been shown in § 30, of raising himself above this natural compulsion, because he can lay aside his implements. He can do this only in so far as he uses whatever existing forces there are; he cannot create new forces in himself. He can build machines and other aids for himself, but he cannot augment indefinitely within himself his capacity for building machines and aids. If a man has a special talent for mathematics, he cannot voluntarily transform this talent into one for writing good poems; and *vice versa*, the best poet, however much he tries, cannot become a good mathematician. But every one has the capacity to stimulate by intensive effort his inborn capacities to their highest point. The Goethean phrase that one-sidedness alone can produce a master has become a commonplace. But this means exactly the same thing as when Socrates says that virtue can be taught through self-knowledge. When every one of us follows his inborn laws,¹ he in his way best serves mankind.

§ 124.—*Nations as Individual Units*

What has been said applies to each one individually, but in a still higher degree to people in general. The latter are naturally more conservative, and it is more difficult to turn them into a new direction, because this requires a uniform variation of the majority. This, however, occurs only in very rare cases. Even the most many-sided nation can and will accomplish useful things only in the direction which conforms to its genius. A nation which attempts all things exhibits not virtue, but dilettantism.

This principle of the division of labor, which from our present view of nature we accept almost as a matter of course, was vaguely foreseen by the genius of Socrates. It supplies the bond between individualism and objectivism; it permits

¹ That is the daimon of Socrates, the Holy Spirit of the Bible, the hereditary mass (germ-plasm) of science.

unlimited individualism, but trains it in the direction of the most useful socialism.

Nations doubtless are individual units also in a certain sense. In the preceding chapter we have tried to show that a common home and a common level of civilization produces common traits among the individual units of nations, which in their totality and similarity constitute the individuality of a nation. If a nation consists predominantly of people who are predisposed toward mercantile pursuits, it will be a commercial nation. Such a nation would act wisely if it stimulated these potentialities as far as possible. It may be sure that this will result in the greatest advantages for itself and for other nations. It is an absurdity (or in the Socratic sense a non-virtue), if a man who has a natural aptitude for stone-cutting studies jurisprudence. In the same way, it is as a matter of course a non-virtue if a nation specially endowed in some particular direction turns its aspirations into an entirely different field.

People, indeed, speak of a harmony of nations, and understand by this the fact that each one of the nations in its way gives the best that it possesses. To what purpose would it be if the English should set up the pretension of wanting to teach the world music; or the French, quiet comfort; or the Finnish, mathematics; or the Tatars, painting? There surely are many things which are not inherent in a particular nation and which it cannot master; but every nation brings some particular gift that may be acceptable to all.

It may be objected that one-sidedness in the long run is injurious, and that one might very well remain a master in one's particular field without of necessity having to put aside all other things. That this is not true in the case of individual persons is to-day generally admitted. The very two men who are usually regarded in Germany as the two greatest Germans have taught us this. Goethe showed this theoretically when, as has already been stated, he said that without one-sidedness no one would become a master; and Bismarck,

practically, who, as is well known, deliberately refused to know anything about subjects which did not concern his profession. Among all novels he was fondest of "*Die Familie Buchholz*,"¹ and, if I am not mistaken, he declared that Anton von Werner's pictures were works of art. Goethe, indeed, did not always follow his own advice; he painted, and occupied himself with the study of physics. Apart from the fact that the great outlines of the man appear in all his works, his pictures are not particularly distinguished, and his theory of colors is incorrect. It is erroneous for the very reason that he was an artist, and did not wish to see the law running through the variegated manifoldness. He was on the contrary interested in each individual phenomenon.

The lack of one-sidedness certainly has never led to the highest achievements. Let us admit that those with an encyclopedic knowledge are often pleasant companions, and that journalism also is an occupation. But whoever is not merely looking for entertainment must prefer the one-sided, and this even more especially in the case of a nation.

In the case of an individual man we might excuse a temporary trying out of this and that by the fact that he must test out whatever potentiality there is in him in order that his best qualities may not be stunted. There is no such danger in the case of a nation, for it can try out its powers in quite a different fashion from the individual man. While each person must follow his own personal destiny, a nation, on the other hand, tests itself from within to discover those things which are suitable for the average members of this nation; that is, for the people as a whole. In a nation nothing can become stunted. Even if something is destroyed in thousands of its citizens, it will continue to live in thousands of others. Since they will be successful, their mode of action will be imitated and become law. Far more than for the individual man it is

¹ A famous German novel of lower middle-class life in Berlin, by Julius Stinde. A condensed English version by E. V. Lucas has recently been published under the title "*The Hausfrau Rampant*."—Translator.

necessary for a people as a whole to follow unalterably the way which has been indicated by the past. It is in this direction only that progress can be made, and for that reason it is important clearly to see the way, for then, and only then, will progress be more rapid. Every attempt arbitrarily to seek out new ways can only delay progress.

2.—THE INDIVIDUAL QUALITIES OF NATIONS

§ 125.—*The Excellences of Individual Nations*

Just as a person should be possessed not with selfishness, but with self-reliance, not with haughtiness, but with pride, so it is with nations. Just as the individual man, on the basis of his definite inherited qualities, and on the basis of his destiny and education, can almost always produce certain things which no one else can imitate, so it is with nations, and even in a much higher degree.

There are billions of human beings, and in each of the civilized nations of the present day there are millions of human beings. Schleriden once said that no leaf was exactly like another; so, too, each human being in all these millions has some particular quality which makes him appear unquestionably unique as a personality (cf. chap. xiv, 4). Yet, in view of the very large number of human beings, these differences cannot be very great, and finally, in reference to the practical utilization of the individual for the benefit of the totality, every human being can be replaced. It is different in the case of nations. Owing to the fact that all human beings included within them have usually grown up under approximately similar conditions, each person has received a certain common impress. This impress we may regard as the peculiar quality of the particular nation.

There are at the most a dozen of these civilized nations. Not one of this dozen is indispensable. It would be vain to believe that any single nation exists which is superior to all other nations in religion as well as in art, in science as well

as in politics, in technical progress as well as in commerce; in short, in every human sphere. Can French wit be replaced by English comedy or German humor; or *vice versa*? Would we want to do without a Faraday because we have a Helmholtz, or without a Lamarek, because a Darwin was born? Can Bismarck replace Napoleon, or Washington replace Cromwell? Jesus of Judea and Francis of Assisi can as little be left out of the Christian religion as Luther, the German, or Tolstoy, the Russian. The German Mathias Grünewald saw the Good Friday tragedy from a different angle than the Flemish Rubens, and Mantegna, the Italian, saw it differently from Greco, the Spaniard. But who shall say which vision was the deepest? The decision is just as impossible as is that whether the grapes of Burgundy, the Rhine country, or Spain produce the best wine. All these things, like Russian caviar, the char of the Königsee, the amber of East Prussia, and much else, are specific products of a particular country, which flourish nowhere else.

In an industrial way also each country may be notable for certain special products. The silk of Lyons, the linen of Silesia, the calicos of England, the furs of Russia, are, or at least were, famous.

It is true that industries may change, owing to certain technical advances in different countries. Thus once the Damascus blade was the most famous, while later that of Toledo was regarded as the best. It is true that in many fields of industry Germany need not fear comparison with other nations, but that is no reason why we should forget the nations which were our teachers in these matters. Something will always turn up again, even if it is only temporarily, in which they are in advance of us. Let us think for a moment of the appliances of modern intercourse. Automobiles came from France, the *aéroplane* from America, submarines and wireless telegraphy from Italy.

Certain particular products are always procured from abroad, as, for instance, Lumière plates from Lyons, tabloids

from England, gumboots from Russia, and straw hats from Italy. Some things are bought abroad because we do not care to produce them at home; other things because we cannot produce them, not for lack of raw materials, but because in certain respects the technical skill of other countries has progressed further. Many countries of a younger civilization have already caught up with Germany in many respects, and perhaps even have outdistanced it. It would be idle to make specific comparisons as to what certain nations do better than others. America's extraordinary achievements in the field of machine construction (instruments of precision and in electricity) are perfectly obvious.

As the individual man long since has been unable to make a living without the help of others, so nations have also become interdependent. Above all, it would mean impoverishment if each nation would not gladly learn and receive from every other. It is regrettable that in recent times the mischief of crediting every invention to some particular national inventor has become more and more prevalent. Yet this is at most harmless vanity; it would be worse if every invention had to be invented a dozen times over.

§ 126.—*The Excellences of Their Defects*

All this is so self-evident that Guizot, though he wrote the history of European civilization entirely from the French point of view, nevertheless says of civilization: "Though in general it is relatively uniform in the different countries of Europe, it is nevertheless infinitely diverse, and complete in no country. Its elements must be sought now in France, now in England, now in Germany, and now in Spain."¹

This diversity amid relative uniformity is still to-day the most patent fact. The question of the justification of an exclusive patriotism does not deserve discussion among sober thinkers. No one but a madman would do away with the totality of nations to put his own solely in their stead.

¹ Guizot, "Histoire de la civilisation en Europe."

In addition to its excellences, every nation has its defects. The English are bigoted and stubborn, the French are vain and fickle, Spaniards are proud, and Hollanders are phlegmatic; the Turks are indolent, and the Corsicans vengeful, the Russians drink, and the Germans love titles and liveries; the Cretans lie, and the Greeks cheat, the Americans put their feet on the table, and the Chinese spit.

All these things are proverbial, even if they are not always appropriate; nations, nevertheless, usually have other and serious defects—the defects of their excellences. There is hardly a single good quality which does not also have its shadow side or disadvantage. Whoever is very philanthropic cannot be economical; whoever has made goodness the principle of his life cannot always follow the dictates of wisdom; whoever makes a god of success cannot embody within himself the finest flower of civilization; and much more like this.

The Semitic race, for example, is predisposed toward transcendental dialectics and ethical legislation. In it was incorporated at an early period the relatively purest expression of the idea of God. It forbade the making of an image of its God, and so put art under the ban. It would have stoned Phidias, the sculptor of divinities, as Emil du Bois Reymond¹ once said. So it is everywhere, and every nation has its good and bad qualities, each necessarily conditioned by the other. For this reason a nation usually cannot put aside its defects without simultaneously losing its excellences.

The possession of all excellences is contrary to the economic law which runs throughout all nature. Even if the desire to achieve mankind's crown may be the best part of us, everything cannot be accomplished with Faust's words, "I will." A Mephistopheles always comes and whispers in our ears that we cannot.

Alle edlen Qualitäten
Auf euren Ehrenscheitel häufen,

¹ Emil du Bois Reymond, *Über eine Akademie der deutschen Sprache* ("Concerning an Academy of the German Language"), p. 11.

Des Löwen mut,
 Des Hirsches Schnelligkeit,
 Des Italieners feurig Blut,
 Des Nordens Dau'rbarkeit,
 Laszt ihn Euch das Geheimnis finden,
 Groszmut und Arglist zu verbinden,
 Und Euch, mit warmen Jugentrieben,
 Nach einem Plane zu verlieben.
 Möchte selbst solch einen Horren kennen,
 Würd' ihn Herrn Mikrokosmos nennen.¹

No one who has recognized this actual impossibility will believe that all good qualities are combined in his nation, neither will he blame another nation because he discovers ignoble qualities in it. On the contrary, he will rejoice in goodness and beauty wherever he sees it, and he will ultimately arrive at the Goethean wisdom, and be able to say even of foreign nations:

Was je ihr gesehn,
 es sei wie es wolle,
 es war doch so schön.

(Roughly: Whatever ye have seen, be it what it may, it nevertheless was beautiful.)

¹ Wear the crown, and show it,
 Of the qualities of his creation,—
 The courage of the lion's breed,
 The wild stag's speed,
 The Italian's fiery blood,
 The north's firm fortitude!
 Let him find for thee the secret tether
 That binds the noble and mean together,
 And teach thy pulses of youth and pleasure,
 To love by rule, and hate by measure!
 I'd like, myself, such a one to see:

Sir Microcosm his name should be.—Bayard Taylor's translation, "Faust," Sc. IV.

3.—THE PECULIAR QUALITY OF THE GERMAN SPIRIT

§ 127.—*German Civilization*

It is difficult to grasp the spirit of a people. We must base a judgment not upon a single person, but upon a vast number. We must select not what would be characteristic for one person, which would be relatively simple, but the characteristics of something of a hitherto unknown greatness; that is to say, of a people.

This has never been completely successful. What sense is there if the farmer philosopher Hermann Cohen¹ declares that "the peculiarity of the German spirit lies in its combination of rationalism and idealism; all mysticism is un-German"? And his colleague Lasson² says exactly the opposite, stating that, "the mystic trend is the most inherently German." Or again Lord Haldane³ says that the German acts "in accordance with a concept," in contrast to the Englishman, who acts "in accordance with an idea"; whereas Schopenhauer⁴ implies exactly the opposite when he writes, "the Englishman believes in the abstract concept of justice, while the German is a friend of the to him current idea of equity."

There is another interesting contrast. The lectures given by Cohen and Lasson during the course of the war seek to appropriate all the noble qualities for the German. Schopenhauer and Lord Haldane, on the other hand, seek to praise the foreign nation. In general the man of education is likely to overestimate the foreigner, because he also understands that which is different. If Germans formerly carried this to a further degree than the English, it was a national

¹ Cohen, "Kriegsvortrag" ("Lecture on the War").

² Lasson, "Kriegsvortrag" ("Lecture on the War").

³ Lord Haldane, "Great Britain and Germany," Oxford Address, August 3, 1911, in "Universities and National Life," 3rd Edition: London, 1912, p. 112.

⁴ Schopenhauer, "Über die Grundlagen der Moral" ("The Foundations of Morals"), III., § 17. Frauenstädt's Edition, vol. IV., p. 222.

virtue, which in the highest measure was the envy of all educated foreigners.¹

It would be easy to extend the list of national virtues which counterbalance one another. German flunkysism and love of liberty have been supported by equally good reasons. German faith and the gratitude of the house of Hapsburg are both proverbial. The belief in the purity of the German woman has not kept them from accepting a fallen girl (*Gretchen*) as her ideal type. Only very few, as Kölliker,² for example, have noticed this conflict at all.

Precise definitions of this nature are usually too narrow in view of the unlimited diversity of civilization. Just as we cannot describe a face, but have to paint it, so, for instance, the picture of German civilization becomes clearly perceptible only when we think of certain definite men like Goethe and Kant, Keppler and Heinholtz, Beethoven and Mozart. It may be held that these are exceptions. Let us, then, view such things as German philology and esthetics, German chemistry and optics, German steel and electrical industries.

The German is unquestionably entitled to regard these things as unique products of civilization. They cannot be omitted from the civilization of mankind at large. If a civilization could be based upon or overthrown by wars, the cruelest war itself would be worth the price for their sake. But in addition to this right the German has the duty to consider whence this civilization really derives.

The German spirit did not just happen to drop from the moon. It can be accounted for in, and owes its origin to, a very definite terrestrial environment. No other nation can ever repeat the distinctive features of this development.

¹ Karl von Holtei in "300 Briefe aus zwei Jahrhunderten" ("300 Letters of Two Centuries"): Hanover, 1872, vol. 2, p. XVI., once aptly said, "To me the highest degree of education of a nation lies in the fact that it enables its men to recognize adequately the value and meaning of other nations."

² Kölliker, "Goethes Faustschlag ins Gesicht der deutschen Sittlichkeit" ("Goethe's Blow in the Face of German Morality").

They are based on the unique combination of circumstances that Germany formed the center between older civilizations. It received stimuli from all sides, and was able to develop the highest degree of civilization even before it was politically a nation. Just because all the barriers, conditioned by a politically important rôle, were absent, the German was able to achieve his world-embracing universality. And no one can deny that this is, or at least was, the peculiar quality of his spirit.

§ 128.—*Originality*

Gladly and gratefully all great Germans have tried to digest and elaborate within themselves the totality of the civilization of their period. Even if no nation is thinkable without foreign influences, this is especially true of Germany. Its civilization is so deep and glorious and original just because it is not autochthonous, but embraces all the world.

Richard Wagner was one of the first to maintain this. In respect to German music, which is the German soul laid bare, he said, "German genius seems destined to search among its neighbors for that which is not inborn in its motherland, but it carries this beyond its narrow limits, and so creates something universal for all the world."

This is particularly true of Bach, the founder of German music. He lived under the pressure of a narrow middle-class life, and hardly saw anything beyond his Thuringian-Saxon home. Nevertheless, his point of departure was not in the folk melodies of his country, as it was the case with artists of other nations when they created their national music. He was a true German. Laboriously he gathered what was best from all the world, and created with it the art that is most characteristically German. With tremendous industry he studied all the material at hand, Italian vocal and violin music, as well as French instrumental music and opera (especially the orchestral suites), and also whatever was musically valuable in the Netherlands and England. He acquired all

these things to make them his own. On their basis he created works which were already distinctly German, though in externals (gigue, air, saraband, etc.) they still showed the old forms, and in many occasional pieces suggested very much the Italian manner. Out of this he created ultimately new forms, like the cantata and the German passion play, and finally the Prussian (or, as it has also been called, the "Frilzian") fugue, his most characteristic contribution to music. But even in this fugue there are distinct reminiscences of Italy and France; "he merely combined in himself the advantages of the French and Italian masters."¹

It is generally known that the same thing is true of Mozart, and no one will contradict Wagner who said of him, "He was a German who raised the Italian school to the ideal of perfection, and in this way gave it universality and ennobled it."

The same thing applies to German philosophy, which is the second distinctively German branch of endeavor. It is only necessary to point out that Windelband used almost the same words of it that Wagner used of music. "Kant," he says in his well-known "History of Philosophy,"² "has made his own the various motives of thought of [foreign] philosophical literature, and from the way in which they supplemented one another worked out from them an entirely new conception." Kant depends equally much upon German popular philosophy, the psychological analysis of the English, and the honest liberalism of the French. He mentions as the special inspirers of Kant, Wolf among the Germans, Hume, Newton, Toland, and Shaftesbury among the English, and Rousseau and Voltaire among the French.

The same thing might be shown in reference to all other arts and sciences. German Gothic architecture and German

¹ Spemann, "Goldenes Buch der Musik" ("Golden Book of Music"), chap. 328.

² W. Windelband, "Geschichte der Philosophie" ("History of Philosophy"), VL, 1, p. 418 *et seq.*

minnesong have their roots in France, but they reached their highest development on this side of the Rhine. If this ultimate completion was denied to German painting, the essential reason probably is that it failed of a harmonious working out. German painters, with certain exceptions, remained "copyists of the Italians," or they could not rise beyond the grotesque of the German fifteenth century.¹

In general Schlegel² is correct when he says of the German:

Was in Kunst und Wissenschaft
Freumder Himmel Grosses schafft,
Ward von ihm alsbald erkannt,
Wuchs so mächtiger seiner Hand.

(Roughly: Whatever of greatness foreign skies have created in art and science, he recognized at once, and in his hand it mightier grew.)

The narrow exclusiveness that to-day so eagerly and noisily loves to pose as patriotism is particularly unbecoming to the German, because in his case it has the effect of particular ingratitude.

German dependence on what is foreign has surely often been carried too far. For this reason, though Germany has been a power with which the world had to reckon for at least fifteen hundred years, it has never, as Dostoievsky once said, given the world a "new word." The German has either made the foreign a part of himself or he has protested against it. He destroyed ancient Rome, and later the new Roman-Catholic world idea, and he has put nothing in their place. Dostoievsky³ develops this thought into an overpowering vision. He writes that in the future something exceeding strange might perhaps occur. It is this, that some day when Germany has

¹ Cf. the chapter on "National German Art" in Muthor's "History of Painting," vol. II.

² Fr. v. Schlegel, "Gedichte" ("Poems"), p. 334.

³ Dostoievski, "Drei Ideen" ("Three Ideas") in the January issue of the "Grazdinin," 1877.

destroyed everything against which it has protested for nineteen centuries, it will suddenly have to die spiritually itself soon after the enemy, simply because there will then be no longer a reason for its existence. There will be nothing left against which it can protest. No one who is not wholly blind can easily escape the demonic terribleness of this idea. There surely is a grain of truth in it, and the present day shows all too clearly the greatness of the danger.

But Dostoievsky was in error when he thought any nation could or had the duty to give the world a new idea. Dostoievsky hopes that it may be Russia. The world is too large and has become too diverse for this. If any nation of the present day desires to do something essentially important for the future, it must teach the world to see its own many-colored diversity and it must put it to good account.

This is just what Germany can do. The same instinct which made the German somewhat contemptible as a protestant in the world of conflicts will make him welcome as a mediator in a united world.

This is what all good Germans have long since expected and hoped for.

§ 129.—*The Period of German Greatness*

One of the first to grasp this clearly was, as always, Goethe. He called the "fatherland talk of the Germans," which began after the Wars of Liberation, a disease that produced an atmosphere in which we "daily wasted away like a consumptive with uncertainty, and merely to live and manage to get along had to lie to ourselves in the most miserable way."¹ Goethe is so unhappy over this decay of German greatness and is so anxious to save any precious universal spirit that he makes the almost fantastical proposal "to scatter the Germans like the Jews throughout all the world, for only abroad are they bearable."²

¹ Goethe, letter to Zelter, August 24, 1823.

² Letter of W. von Humboldt to his wife, November 17, 1808.

In order to estimate this proposal at its right value, we should remember that Goethe stood above nations and conceived himself as a European, not with his reason, but also with his emotions, which is more important. For this, too, he has given us the decisive test in his demand that we "feel the good fortune or the woe of a neighboring country as though it had happened to our own."¹ Just as Christ does not mean to exclude a legitimate egoism when he says, "Love thy neighbor as thyself" (for only a madman can love another more than himself), so according to Goethe we are to love other nations like our own. If something happens to our own, it comes first. At the same place Goethe says that, of course, though he "did not hate the French, who are among the most civilized nations of the world," he nevertheless thanked God "when we had gotten rid of them."

Now, many may object that Goethe did not have any sense of patriotism. It is therefore important to point out that Schiller felt exactly the same in this respect. He surely has described in glowing enough colors the patriotic yearning for liberty of enslaved Switzerland and of occupied France. Even to-day it is still a favorite theme for school essays to show how "the Maid" prepared the ground even in Germany for the awakening of patriotism.

This latter may have been actually the case, but it is not so in Schiller's sense. Schiller recognized the distinctive quality of the German spirit just in this that, in contrast with the spirit of other nations, it was not nationally restricted.

Wo der Franke, wo der Britte
Mit dem stolzen siegerschritte

(Roughly: When the Frank, when the Briton with proud victorious step.)

Dare the German, he once asked,² now determine our destiny, still be proud of and take joy in his name? Yes,

¹ Goethe, "Conversations with Eckermann."

² Schiller, "Entwurf zu einem Gedicht" ("Draft for a Poem").

he dare do so. He may leave the battle in a wretched state, but that which gives him his true worth he has not lost. The German Empire and the German nation are two separate things. The German has created his own worth, and even if the empire should fall, German honor would remain unassailable. It is an ethical greatness, indwelling in the civilization and character of the nation, and is not dependent on its political fate. As the political realm trembles, the spiritual one has grown larger and larger.¹

In these words there is a clear recognition of the fact that German originality can be explained only by the political importance of the German Empire. And exultingly he adds that Germany will be victorious when morals and reason are victorious and when rude force yields to form.

Who can seriously deny that we might be at least as proud of such a victory or even prouder, without indicating a lack of modesty, than France is of Austerlitz or England of Trafalgar?

All German civilization-patriots hoped for such a victory. It was held to be quite impossible that Germany could possibly lose its world-embracing idealism. Jean Paul merely expressed the opinion of his time when he said, "It is not possible for us many-sided Germans (as it is for the French and English) to hold our eyes shut and to feel nothing of Europe except our own eye; it is impossible for us so to limit our view."

Nor was this alone the opinion of our classical writers of 1813; the romantic writers after 1813, when it was already clearly apparent whence the road was leading, felt this even more. It was toward such a victory that the enthusiasm of the old students' associations (*Burschenschaften*) was directed, and Herwegh's German song was meant for it. He

¹ Of the more recent Germans, Moritz Carrière, for example, says "Wechselbeziehungen deutscher und italienischer Kunst," ("Interrelations between German and Italian Art," Breslau, p. 5), "What Germany lost in external power accrued to its advantage in art,"

believes that through modern technical improvements (the "German fiery chariots") a homogeneous European civilization will become possible, and with proud patriotism he calls upon his people:

Wenn alle welt den Mut verlor,
Die Fehde zu beginnen,
Tritt du mein Volk, den Völkern vor
Lasz du dein Herzblut rinnon!
Gib uns den mann, der das Panier
Der neuen Zeit erfasse,
Und durch Europa brechen wir
Der Freiheit eine Gasse.¹

(Roughly: When all the world lose courage to begin the strife, stand forth, thou my people, at the other people's head, and let your heart's blood flow. Give us the man who will seize the standard of this new time, and let us through Europe breach a road for liberty.)

In general at that time the fatherland was conceived as a humane, ethical figure. It is characteristic that two thirds of the patriotic songs in the common German students' song-book give expression to the desire for liberty. At that time all endeavors in the direction of the realization of a unified Germany were identical with the general striving of nations for liberty and progress. In those happy days the German ideal and the ideal of mankind were bound up closely with each other.

But matters took a different turn. Forgotten was the beautiful song which Treitschke said was so often sung when he was still young:

¹ Georg Herwegh in 1841 published "Gedichte eines Lebendingen" ("Poems of a Contemporary"), which were were republican or liberal in tendency and extremely popular. In 1847 he raised a German democratic legion for the invasion of Baden and the establishment of a revolutionary government there; but failing, he fled to Switzerland. He translated several of Shakspeare's plays.—Translator.

Wenn die Deutschen Deutsche werden,
Gründen sie das Reich auf Erden,
Das der Welt den Friesden giebt.¹

(Roughly: When the Germans German will become, they will establish the realm upon earth which will give peace to the world.)

But "we no longer feel as simply as that." And yet the old saying, by force, force is overcome, is to-day no longer as absolute as it was. If there is one thing certain in this world, it is the fact that a people to-day can win victory only when it concentrates all its forces upon the peaceful competitive struggle between nations, and when it strives to become a force that will bring peace to the world. The time has come when crude force no longer will decide, but the capacity for civilization. There is no question that Germany was far in advance of all other nations in this respect. It would have been only necessary to wait; and the ripe fruit would of its own accord have fallen in its lap.

The country was then always conceived as some great human moral force, and it is characteristic that in the case of two out of every three patriotic poems in the "Universal Book of German Drinking Songs" the note is a longing for liberty. All the efforts then made to bring about a united Germany were identical with the general efforts of nations toward liberty and progress. In those happy days the German ideal and the ideal of humanity were inseparably bound up together. Then came the time when everything changed, and the fine ballad that Treitschke² tells us was often sung in his young days was forgotten:

¹ H. v. Treitschke, "Zum Gedächtnis des grossen Krieges" ("In Memory of the Great War"), § 28. This "truly German" is already found in the earliest German novel in Grimmelshausen's "Simplizissimus" (III, 4): "Of the German hero who would conquer the whole world and establish peace among the nations."

² Heinrich von Treitschke's "Zum Gedächtnis des grossen Krieges" ("In Memory of the Great War"), p. 28. This "genuinely German" idea occurs in the oldest German novel, in Grimmelshausen's "Sim-

“Wenn die Deutschen Deutsche werden,
Gründen sie das Reich auf Erden,
Das der Welt den Frieden gibt.”

(“When the Germans become Germans, then will they found that empire upon earth which will give the world peace.”)

“Such innocent thoughts are ours no longer.” Yet the old saying about force being overcome by force is no longer altogether true; and if one thing is certain in this world it is the fact that the only way in which a people can conquer to-day is by concentrating all its strength on peaceful competition between nation and nation, and endeavoring to attain a position from which it will be able to give the world peace. The time has come when brute force no longer decides, but capacity for civilization.

§ 130.—*German Adaptability*

It can easily be shown that what underlies Germany's progress is adaptability. The German virtue of being interested in other countries besides Germany, which makes Germans virtually citizens of the world, accounts for the fact that Germany is the birthplace of comparative esthetics and philology as well as of scientific geography. A century ago we in Germany already possessed the best geographical journal, and we still have the best maps and atlases and most descriptions of travels. It is owing to the German's desire to become acquainted with the literature of all nations and to his knowledge of foreign languages that Shakspeare, Ibsen, Tolstoy, and Brandes are better loved and perhaps better understood than anywhere else in the world; that we have a Shakspeare Society and a Dante Society, and ten English books are translated into German for one German book which is translated into English. Just because the German has absorbed all the world's ideas and deepened them was it pos-

plizissimus” (III, 4). “Of the German hero who overcame the whole world and will establish peace among all nations.”

sible for a Luther to succeed a Huss, a Kepler a Galilei, a Helmholtz a Faraday, and a Kant a Berkeley. How much do we not owe in Germany to the conceptions of such genuises as Darwin, Jenner, Lister, and Pasteur? Yet in all their special branches of science we in Germany have now progressed at least as far as the countries where their discoveries were made.

The special qualities which in the ideal Germany the investigator and the man of art or letters used to benefit in the Germany of ideals still benefit the technician and the commercial man in the material Germany of to-day. Our technical science is capable of picking up ideas everywhere and of developing them. Hardly had Marconi discovered wireless telegraphy than the Telefunken (Wireless) system was working admirably. France may for a time have been ahead of us in the construction of motor-cars and aëroplanes, but our technicians have long since caught up with her. We did not invent submarines, but at present ours seem to be the most serviceable.

Our commercial men proved no less adaptable. Unlike British merchants, they did not compel¹ foreign nations to learn their language, but learned the language of those with whom they wished to trade. Again, they did not try to force their goods on the foreigner, but manufactured whatever special articles each country needed. Even in quite minor matters, such as fancy goods and light fiction, we readily took the vast number of hints which we picked up all over the world

¹Not literal compulsion, which England has hardly ever applied in such a case, but the much more effectual negative and passive resistance, which, being based on incapacity for acquiring anything foreign, could naturally never be laid aside, and for this very reason irresistibly forced others to learn English. Precisely because we do not possess this innate passivity, we resort to measures of compulsion which must of necessity fail. Time was when any one was *glad* to be able to speak German in Petrograd, Brussels, Warsaw, Trieste, Budapest, Copenhagen, Prague, and Strasburg. This encouraging symptom, noticeable at the beginning of the nineteenth century, became almost automatically changed into its opposite since we attempted to force Germanism upon the world.

wherever we turned. In short, there was nowhere anything that we did not turn to good account.

Thus did the German adapt himself, and because of his having done so, Germany has progressed until in a sense she is now the most up-to-date nation in Europe. Her originality, in short, consists, as already said, in the lack of a certain kind of originality,¹ that kind which might be called provincialism. And for that future which is to unite all nations together nothing augurs better than this. The modern "*nihil me alienum puto*" is absolutely incompatible with the old idea of *originality*. It was the proud aim of our approaching victory to be able to say, knowing what it meant and that it was true, "nothing human is foreign to us."

It may not be without interest to recall the fact that such a genius as Dostoyevsky, in his political writings and in his novel "Ein Werdender," lays claims to these qualities on behalf of Russia, alleging that owing to her being still comparatively primitive, she had preserved the power of assimilating foreign civilizations. That primitive people are capable of much in this respect has certainly been proved by Japan, which in an incredibly short time has assimilated first Chinese and then European civilization. This may perhaps have been a good thing for Russia and Japan, but not for the world and for civilization in general.

The Russians have also improved and developed foreign inventions and ideas, but in so doing have as yet achieved nothing of world-wide importance. This is not meant as a reproach, but merely as the statement of a fact. It may be that Tolstoy will mean something to the world to come, but then it would be only his own actual experiences which would survive, not anything based on some one else's experience. Any Russians who have been devoted to foreign literature and

¹ Dr. Nicolai uses the word "originality" in two senses. In this case it has more the sense of the French "*un original*," an eccentric person. Nothing is more difficult to render than an English word with a German tail and an umlaut or two thrown in.—Translator.

ideas have never risen to a great height. The Germans alone have grown really great on "a foreign foundation." As Sir William Ramsay is said to have unfortunately remarked, "They do not steal from foreign nations," but adapt from them, transform what they have adapted, and then return it as something new and improved. Let us hope that this was what Sir William Ramsay meant. At any rate, once the hypnotic effects of the war are over, this is the sense he will attach to his words. In a century in which modern means of communications have literally enabled men to unite together, this German capacity for continued and wide-spread development and improvement, capacity which no one seriously denies, would have made central Europe also the center of Europe.

§ 131.—*Overstraining of Adaptability*

The future of Europe, indeed perhaps of the world, seemed within our grasp. And we threw it away because—well, simply because we also have the defects of our qualities. "Can be done," indeed, and "must be done" often mean the same thing, and any one who can adapt himself as the Germans can *must* do so. It is this with which the Germans are reproached, or, rather, it is this with which they usually reproach themselves. They have not the stubborn tenacity of the Englishman, who gets a footing everywhere and his English civilization with him. They are easily swamped in a foreign nation, and they like what is foreign. Readiness to learn and capacity for learning foreign languages lead to fondness for using foreign words; and as we did not trouble much about trifles, we did not consider it absolutely essential to have fashions of our own.

There was no harm in all this, if also no particular good; and in any case it was of no real importance. Now, however, we are going decidedly too far in our adaptability, for we would fain adopt not only foreign virtues, but even foreign vices. In short, we are so eager to be like the foreigner that we shall end by being forced to throw overboard the root

principle underlying our national habits. Other nations were political nations; we want to be so, too. They had colonies; we also want to have some. They were jingoes and nationalists, and therefore we thought we must also be jingoes and nationalists. In short, because others *are* retrograde, we think we must *become* so; and with the pious fidelity of copyists we are endeavoring out of the patriotic vanity of the French, England's obstinate isolation, Spain's national pride, and Russia's brutality to forge a coat of mail to cover up our former aspirations. It almost seems as if we had succeeded in this, and as if Theodor Vischer's lines had come true:

Was der Corse begann, das hat der Märker vollendet;
Rohe Gewalt für Recht, ist die Parole die Zeit.¹

This is bad, and however justifiably we may pose as victors, we shall not permanently succeed in making the world believe that we have done otherwise than surrender our most valuable possession and our most vital weapons, receiving nothing in exchange. No human being and no people can really suffer a sea change into something which, after all, they are not. It is with capacities as with good fortune; a man either has them or not, and whatever he strives to do against his nature and by mere force of will is never anything but unreal and ineffectual.

Good patriots are becoming anxious about Germany now, and are casting a glance at the future; but they are doing so for the same reason as the Pan-Germanists are raising an outcry. That is, they fear that Germany will not prove capable of asserting her own individuality. But, then, they do not consider that her individuality consists in brute force, but in plastic intelligence. As long ago as 1873 Dostoyevsky² al-

¹ Friedrich Theodor Vischer's "Epigramme aus Baden-Baden," published anonymously in 1867, p. 27. Vischer was a German estheticist. ("What the Corsican Napoleon began, the Man of the Marches [Bismarck] finished; brute force for right is the watchword of the day.")

² "Thoughts on Europe," in Dostoyevsky's "Political Writings." 1873.

ways far-seeing, feared some such sudden reversion. In the Russian periodical "Grazdanin" he wrote that it was clear that in Germany, after her recent triumph over France, the feeling of national self-sufficiency had such a pitch of absurdity that *even science showed traces of jingoism*. A year later, when this new tendency was actually noticeable, Emil du Bois Reymond, the well known Berlin physiologist, went still further. "Thorough as we are in everything," he said, "let us beware against falling into the other extreme (of which there are numberless signs), and instead of being a nation which used to be likened to a book-worm, become so much absorbed in politics as to be the least literary of all the great civilized nations."¹

There is still more ground for this fear to-day. It is a tragedy that, just at the fateful moment when Germanism seemed destined to conquer, indeed it might be said to save, the world, we should risk losing the inheritance bequeathed to us by our great forefathers. Such hopes for the future transcend in importance anything in the past. The German historian Meineke may believe that "the supposition that cosmopolitan and national conceptions harmonize" can be set aside because such harmony "was not always present," which no one denies. But the very notion of such a thing should spur us on to make every effort to be prepared for it, for come it must. All Germany would need to do would be to remember her old traditions, crystallized by Johann Eduard Erdmann² in the words, "To be merely German is anti-German."

¹ Address delivered before the Academy of Science by E. du bois Reymond, on March 26, 1874.

² "Das Nationalitätsprinzip" ("The Principle of Nationality") and "Ernste Spiele" ("Serious play"), in J. E. Erdmann's "Collected Lectures." Fourth ed. 1890, originally delivered in 1862, p. 221. [Erdmann was a German theologian and philosophical writer. "Ernste Spiele" are essays. His "History of Philosophy" has been translated into English.]—Translator.

4.—GERMAN HUMANITY AND GERMAN MILITARISM

§ 132.—*What Is Militarism?*

The word militarism comes from the Latin *miles*, which in turn comes from *mille* (thousand). There is no trace of contempt about the word, as there is about "soldier" (*Soldat*), which means *Söldner* (mercenary); it merely signifies that a man is one of thousands, one of a number. There is something in the word, as in the German word for army (*Heer*), which may be said to mean the same thing as people; and in the form "militia" (*Miliz*) this meaning has been preserved. Yet now militarism is often used to denote only aberrations from the real meaning of the word; for instance, the fact that armed man lords it over a man unarmed. Those who use the word in this sense are thinking of officers' prerogatives, of compulsory service and subordination, or of smart uniforms; but they are also thinking of a wide-spread organization, working without a hitch, embracing in an astounding manner the forces of an entire people, and likewise of glory and contempt of death. In short, it is possible to read into the word militarism either a fine meaning or an evil one.

All that concerns us is the sense originally attaching to the word, the belief that it is possible to achieve something in the world by means of a host numbering thousands, in other words by force. Militarism in this sense, therefore, is a particular conception of the world. It is the belief that animal struggle, with fangs or cannon, can do more than human struggle with words and convictions.

Now, there is not the slightest doubt that the overwhelming majority of Germans believe this, which is all the more singular because, as explained in Chapter I, all great Germans have hoped for the victory of reason and anathematized war. Now, this contradiction must be explained, and, if possible, traced to its one source.

The Germans say that they make excellent soldiers simply

because the German does everything best, and that this is a good thing. Other nations also say that the Germans make excellent soldiers, only they think that this is because people in Germany have been too much taken up with soldiering, and that this is not a good thing. It is clear that here again every one agrees about the main facts, and disagrees only as to the inferences to be drawn from them.

Yet even here the disagreement is not hopeless, for probably no Germans, save for a handful of Hotspurs, believe that their martial qualities are really what is best in them to-day. The modern German, they say, can certainly fight well, just as he can do a great many things well; but this does not prevent him from doing the work of peace as admirably as he would do it even were it no longer necessary to appeal to arms. Militarism, in short, they say, is only a kind of outside husk with which German all-round capability has become overgrown; it is by no means the chief characteristic of German life, as fanatical German-haters think. Moreover, uniforms are only an outer cloak, put on for the time being, but afterward to be put off. Beneath this cloak is the real kernel of German civilization. The word "civilization" is then more closely defined as meaning science, particularly chemistry, manufactures, especially iron constructions, trade, and more particularly ready-made clothing, organization, and above all obedience.

Now, it is far from easy to decide in detail what is kernel and what is husk, for we have gradually come to realize that nothing in this world is due to mere chance. If Belgium has the densest system of railways and Denmark most newspapers; if most letters and telegrams are sent in England; if America has the most schools, and Bosnia the fewest; if it is Serbia in which the largest proportion of people are married and in Sweden the smallest—all this is no less significant than the fact that Germany and France have the largest percentage of people belonging to the army or navy (ten and fourteen per thousand respectively), and America and Swit-

zerland the smallest (one and five tenths per thousand respectively).

There is nothing in the world which does not matter, and everything which a human being or a people does is significant. The attentive observer will perceive, at any rate, the essential, original cause for everything which the man in the street describes as accidental, and thus come to see beauty even in what considered by itself, seems ugly.

German militarism must be considered in this way; and then, even in this distorted form, the German ideal will be clearly perceivable; and we shall see the path which is leading Germany to a nobler future.

§ 133.—*German Love of Liberty*

It has often been wrongly thought that by their insistence on civilization and militarism being one and the same thing, the Germans were attempting to justify one by the other or correct one by the other. In general all that is meant is that both spring from the same root. There are very few persons who do not realize that an upright man may have a brother who is a criminal; and hence they think that if one side of the German is good, the other must likewise be so. Persons thus attempting to save their honor of course tend to be ridiculous, but after all such apparent opposites as militarism and civilization are really only different forms which, as a biologist would say, "*German substance*" can assume. To endeavor to trace them to a common source and really to explain Clausewitz by Kant, cannot but be fascinating.¹

All the peculiarities said to distinguish the German from other nations, whether advantageously or not, may probably

¹ See "Kants Einflüsse auf die deutsche Kultur" ("Kant's Influence on German Civilization"), by H. Cohen. Official address at Marburg, 1883. Dümler: Berlin, p. 31. But Cohen did not go deeply into the question, and in order to overcome the difficulty of making the contents of the Peace Book agree with those of the War Book he makes the far from satisfactory statement that the one dealt with principles and the other was empirical.

be traced to his strongly marked sense of individuality. In the most ancient times, as Tacitus tells us, this found expression in love of liberty, and also in an unmistakeable thirst for vengeance, about which we find a great deal in the writings of the Roman historian Velleius Paterculus. Most of all, however, it showed itself in excesses, a fact which both these writers confirm. Kleist's superlatively fine description of the Battle of Hermann shows all these un-German characteristics in chaotic savagery.¹ Purged of all impurities, they reappear in Luther's defiant saying, "*Hier stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders.*"² The impression of German strength is merely enhanced if we think of Galilei, that other great reformer, who likewise "could do naught else," yet merely murmured, "*Eppur si muove.*" Galilei's achievement may have been greater and of more permanent value for mankind, but Luther strikes us as having been humanly finer at that particular moment.

The Germans of that day were a savage and self-willed folk, and tended to become still more so owing to the conditions of their country. Whoever wished to settle in Germany, the land of forests, cleared a few acres for himself, and squatted down thereupon, not troubling about any one or anything else. It is characteristic that in a German village a house and its surrounding fields are quite complete in themselves, and that nowhere else in the world are there such straggling, and therefore such large, villages as in Germany. And as it began with the house, so it continued up the ladder of social community. True, the free peasant farmers, except in Friesland and the fen districts, were soon degraded into subjection. But every knight was free; in most cases he even exercised the lowest judicial functions, and could announce or renounce quarrels for himself and his men-at-arms. Then there were the free cities of the empire, the earldoms, and principalities, electorates and bishoprics; for since the Emperor Otto had

¹ Heinrich von Kleist, German dramatist of the Romantic school. The "*Hermannschlacht*" was written in 1810.—Translator.

² "Here I stand: I can do naught else."

played off the church against the principalities there were ecclesiastical principalities even in Germany.

All these miniature states had their own laws and their own coinage, and Germany has never succeeded in freeing herself from this absurd caricature of her quondam love of liberty. Had not the iron hand of the Corsican smashed up all this hallowed tomfoolery, who knows if we ourselves would have not laid hands on these relics of the Middle Ages? There is something in provincialism beyond doubt suited to German ways, like the countless associations which he loves forming.

Such was the people on whom the new era burst, with its social demands, first in the form of the doctrine of the brotherhood of man, and afterward in the far more effective form of profitable commercial connections.

§ 134.—*Three Reasons why German Liberty has Taken a Wrong Turn*

When solitary human beings began to consort and associate together, first in Europe and afterward throughout the world, each individual family, clan, or tribe, as the case might be, could not, even in Germany, continue to insist on keeping to itself. In Germany, however, this new tendency encountered very peculiar conditions—conditions which have had a decisive influence on the subsequent development of German mentality.

First, in Prussia, which then became the decisive factor in Germany's history, a thin surface sprinkling of Teutons, or, more correctly speaking, Germans, ruled over a backward and consequently not easily led mixture of races consisting of Obotrites, Sorbians, Varini,¹ Wends, Pruzzi, Masurians, Kaschubs, Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, and Letts, besides other Slav peoples. It was quite easy to maintain the comfortable position of overlords here, and the enslavement of the subject peoples made Prussia politically very prosperous. Hence the belief

¹ German *Warnen*, a Germanic tribe mentioned by Tacitus.—Translator.

arose that this mode of government left nothing to be desired.

Secondly, the Renaissance, which caused a revival of liberty and civilization and culture in general throughout Europe, subsequently indirectly led to a diminution of the church's power in Europe. But in Germany, owing to her strong religious bent, it all passed off in religious disputes; and the humanists properly so called never had much influence there. Hence in Germany all the liberalizing tendencies of the new era were from the very first driven into a side channel. Men were so taken up with religious liberty that they forgot there was any such thing as civil liberty; and so busy were they about spiritual affairs that they forgot all about intellectual matters. Above all, however, Germany got into the habit of considering the world on which she, after all, depended as something far away above the clouds, and anything "on this side" or "here below" as of small moment.

Thirdly, in his comparative indifference with regard to terrestrial concerns the German did not expect anything on this earth to be complete or perfect, and accordingly he frittered away whatever individuality he still possessed in all manner of absurd trivialities.

Germany thus became the country of differences in rank. The nobility in all countries used, indeed, to lay great stress on questions of etiquette; but whereas in the rest of Europe the knights had ceased to have any importance as a separate class as early as the fifteenth century, in Germany they continued a recognized class on into the nineteenth century. Moreover, ordinary citizens used to ape the nobility, guilds and corporations flourished, and every one endeavored to obtain some rank, position, title, or order, which would confer on him a distinction, albeit a trifling one, above his fellows.

The ordinary Philistine, therefore, satisfied his yearning "to be somebody" by acquiring stars and titles, while the cultivated German found satisfaction for his aspirations in philosophy, which accordingly began to develop along specific lines.

Thus, while British and French philosophy turned increasingly toward practical questions, German philosophy became more and more abstract.¹ What German genius needed was that in the free world of thought each person should be able to be a law unto himself, while in the world of hard facts he was forced to bow the knee to his superiors. A noteworthy instance of this is Kant, than whom no one followed a more independent line of thought and who yet lived in dependence on others. He who, as Karl Lehrs² says, wrote the *Marseillaise* of philosophy, gave way afterward in theological questions, and disavowed Fichte's doctrines so as not to incur the suspicion of atheism. Kant was then old, and therefore we shall not blame him, but only those who forced him to take such a step.

It was Kant's philosophy and none other which decided Germany's future. In answer to liberty he brought forward transcendental idealism, and in answer to subjection empirical realism, urging that both transcendental idealism and subjection were equally justified and equally necessary. We may think of this dual answer as we please; we may urge that the question ought not to have been put so; and we may also consider Kant or one of his followers to have succeeded in their attempt to bring about harmony by means of dialectics. The fact remains that in practice this "antinomy"³ was treated in most un-Kantian fashion. Men learned to find in transcendental philosophy satisfaction for their aspirations after lib-

¹ F. A. Lange, in his "Geschichte des Materialismus" ("History of Materialism"), published in 1875, says, "Those countries which are the home of modern philosophy are turning to practical life, while metaphysics are left to Germany." Book II, pp. 417-468 of this work are singularly interesting.

² "Die Philosophie und Kant gegenüber dem Jahre 1848" ("Kant and Philosophy about the Year 1848"), by Karl Lehrs, 1886. "Altpreussische Monatschrift," XXXII, p. 91.

³ Antinomy is a Kantian term, meaning an apparent conflict of reason with itself. Thus it may be argued, apparently equally reasonably, that the universe is infinitely vast and that it has spatial limits.—Translator.

erty, while in other respects they became politicians of the most material order.

This crass inconsistency is the illegitimate offspring of the thrice-outraged Teutonic longing for liberty. Once it was outraged by being in the bonds of slavery, once by a Christianity that had become abstract, and once by misinterpreted transcendental philosophy; and the inconsistency runs through the whole of German intellectual life.

In fact and practice the German's notion of civilian liberty, a notion which had already had to suffer from the "liberty of a true Christian," gave way for good and all to the "intelligible liberty of a philosopher." In practice he became brutal and the reverse of free; yet Germany, as far as thought was concerned, continued the freest, and, we may say with pride, the most humane country.

§ 135.—"*The Absolute*"

As this liberty, however, existed only as far as thought and ideas were concerned, and was consequently unlimited, it degenerated. Germany, to put it briefly, became the land of absolutism. It was believed that there was an absolute liberty, an absolute happiness, and an absolute knowledge. It was believed that a formula had been discovered by which men could be made free, happy, and wise even against their will; and it is no mere chance that German philosophy should have produced dogmatic Marxianism, which advocated a future state to be absolutely governed, while at the same time German social democracy should be, generally speaking, the most faithful reflection of the German people, which is compounded of doctrinaire idealism and practical militarism.

Kant believed that by setting up the categorical imperative of duty he could create a moral code which would be at once absolute and binding on all human beings alike. Later on Karl Marx hoped to endow the whole world with happiness and prosperity by first overthrowing it and then reconstructing it on right principles. Similarly the Germans really and

honestly believe that the world would be happy were it forced to do their bidding. We have carried organization to a high pitch, and we think the whole world could not but be content were it similarly organized. "Do or die" is a German proverb, and the pleasing saying, "Well, if you won't be my brother, I 'll bash your head in" has become another German proverb.

And the German thinks this is the receipt by which he can redeem the world. He may be wrong, but that does not alter the fact that this is his belief. This being the case, the German, although not really more uneducated or uncivilized than the Briton or the Frenchman, coolly comes along with his cannon and his bombs, having made serious preparations beforehand for this as if it were the most important business of his life.

A Frenchman will never understand this; he is too frivolous and materialistic. He thinks that a dead man is just a dead man, an asphyxiating bomb is just an asphyxiating bomb, and so on; and he orders his life accordingly. But the German knows that behind both there lurks something else—an idea. In his opinion cannon and bombs are something where-with he is to pursue his civilizing mission; hence he plays with such things as innocently as children with crackers. The ideas lurking behind the things themselves are the excuse for everything, and behind the bombs every German seeks and finds what he wants to find. The Christian finds his God, the philosopher his Kant, the philanthropist his love of humanity, and the Philistine universal order; and the quintessence of all these "moral ideas" is always the same—the proud words, "We 'll give them a good drubbing."

Led by force, the German has grown pious and good, rich and contented, and because he has learned to believe in the absolute, he thinks that whatever is good for his own country must also be good in itself and can in time be thrashed into people. Besides this, Germany has become great because from everywhere she has taken what is good, and therefore

she would only be paying a debt of gratitude by forcing her virtues—order and organization—upon others. The one thing she overlooks, however, is that no one can endure to accept such gifts unless of his own free will.

Here we have certainly an instance of strange things coming to pass; and even if the direct introduction of German order into Belgium meets with difficulties, yet Germany is indirectly, perhaps even against her will, forcing the whole world to organize after the fashion of the Germans. The world sees that German organization has answered well in war, and it tries to imitate it. A very great deal will certainly be organized on German lines. After the war we shall see whether this is a good thing or not, for with foreign nations likewise working their hardest, the only result can be that the German will have to work even harder than before in order to keep up with the keener competition. It may be very salutary, but it is none the less regrettable that five million people had to die in order that this result may be brought about in Europe by militarism.

Still more regrettable is it, however, that, in order to achieve it, German humane aspirations should have become so much misdirected. The fact must certainly not be ignored that worship of success and lust of power have had something to do with the rise of what we call Prussian militarism, yet this cannot be of more than secondary importance. The main and decisive cause seems to me to have been *misdirected humane aspirations* which, the Germans, anticipating events, wanted to create that world-organization the necessity for which is obvious; only, unfortunately, they wanted to do this not by the power of reason, but by that of force.

§ 136.—*Bethink Yourselves!*

There is a wonderful picture by Anselm von Feuerbach,¹ "The Battle of the Amazons," which hangs in the Nuremberg

¹ 1829–1890. Feuerbach represents modern German classical painting.—Translator.

picture gallery, but has never taken the fancy of the public, to whom it seemed too lifeless to represent a battle. Yet every fiber is brimful of the truest life. Men and women are seen interlaced in an extraordinary manner, and it is impossible to say whether this is due to love or hatred. Thus a boy is shown kneeling before a woman. Is this because of her beauty, or was he knocked down by a passing horse? Both sides are holding back their weapons and looking each other in the face, and if they lift them up now, it will be in love. Then in the center two are embracing each other as in the very ecstasy of love, and yet in their hands an ax and a lance are flashing. In the foreground lies a maiden mortally wounded, but her outstretched arm is holding back the man, even as a woman might seek to detain the husband hastening to leave her after the nuptial night. And on all sides are yearning looks, enraptured gestures; everywhere, in short, love, which seems turned to hatred, and which is in reality combat.

I could not help thinking of this picture when our merry, laughing German youths left for the front. They did not hate the enemy, as did our ill-advised intellectuals, and they loved the world throughout its length and breadth; and with this vague love of the world and of mankind in their hearts they went forth to battle.

In order to understand how cruelly hard these gentle souls have become "at the front," I was forced to think of Kleist's *Penthesilea*.¹ He, too, shows how closely akin is love to hate, and the extremes to which misguided love can go. *Penthesilea*, the love-sick Amazonian woman, is determined to possess Achilles, but dazzled by false pride, she marches upon him, surrounded by her yelping dogs, with her elephants and all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war. And yet *Achilles* was willing to surrender voluntarily to her.

¹ Heinrich von Kleist, German romantic dramatic writer. "*Penthesilea*," pub. 1808, is one of the plays by which he is still remembered.—Translator.

Even so the German Army, with its 42-centimeter Mörsers, its asphyxiating bombs, its poisonous gases, and its submarines, is marching upon the young world that is ready to accept and believe the old German legend of the humanity of man.

Penthesilea murders the youthful son of the Gods, and dies as a result of having done so. But we do not wish the young divine idea to die, nor yet that Germany should perish. There is still time; therefore, ye Germans, bethink yourselves! Bethink yourselves of your own selves!

CHAPTER XI

ALTRUISM

1.—OVERCOMING PESSIMISM

§ 137.—*Germany's Mission*

That men must and do associate with one another no one will deny. The only question is whether their association is best promoted by fighting one another or by helping one another, and whether love or hate, unselfishness or selfishness, right or might, prevail or ought to prevail in the world.

No human being is so utterly devoid of all humanity as not to fancy, at any rate in his best mood, that it is permissible to believe in such things as right and unselfishness, love and mutual aid; but afterward away he goes and acts as if he did not believe in them at all. Indeed, he does not believe in them as realities, but in his haughty infatuation imagines they are some ideal creation of his own, something which can accordingly be laid aside at will as soon as it is no longer compatible with practical politics. Now, there is nothing on earth more contemptible than practical politics when they conflict with idealism.

Germany, as I hinted at the beginning of the last chapter, is here in a peculiarly difficult position. She dreams herself into a moral world, and appeals to the idealism of a man such as Kant, and she acts in a tangible world and pursues practical politics after the manner of such a man as Bismarck. The gulf between these two, however, seems still bridgable. But Kant degenerated into Cohen,¹ and Bismarck into Bern-

¹ It is characteristic that Cohen should be almost of the school of Berkeley.

hardi; and just because the German has conceived the loftiest possible conception of morality did he depart from them utterly in practice. Perhaps, indeed, he could not do otherwise. Whoever endeavors to square the circle, very easily manages to forget even his rule of three.

Nevertheless, efforts which in themselves have no prospect of success are scarcely ever quite in vain. Thus when it became impossible to find a rational expression for numbers, the new science of irrational numbers arose. Similarly, idealism was not in vain. Thus, when it became impossible to act morally on the basis of idealism, the duty arose of seeking another basis of action. If Kantian Germany, without being false to her name, became imbued with "practical politics" to the very marrow of her bones, this merely proves that we are not meant to expend our energies in expressing pious aspirations, that the most magnificent castle in the air can never hold out against terrestrial attack, and that morality based on ideals simply has no solid basis.

The collapse of idealism, which became manifest in 1914, must be our justification for seeking some such solid basis. This collapse occurred just when all discerning persons considered it an intellectually incomprehensible anachronism; for this very reason it has proved more forcibly than any past event that the ordinary idealistic morality is wholly inadequate, since it failed to make its followers act morally. This applies to Kantian and Christian morality alike, whether, as Kant will have it, morality is to be compared only with the star-spangled heavens, or whether, as the church teaches, it is above the heavens.

No nation in the world has more cause to set off in quest of this new earthly morality than Germany, for none has set up such high moral pretensions. It may be, however, that those who ascend to great heights must first be profoundly abased. Jena may have been necessary that Leipsic might occur; and it may also have been necessary to declare that right was a scrap of paper in order that mankind might be induced to seek some

better guaranty. Were this to be so, then even this war might be something which future generations would gladly remember as the birth-throes of a new society, which, as Browning put it in "By the Fireside," "forwards the general deed of men," rightly thinking that in so saying he has said the most that can be said of any event.

Perhaps, however, no people in the world is so well adapted as the Germans to discover this new social order, because of the training they have received from two such contradictions as "Kant's idealism and Bismarck's practical politics," both of which collapsed in this war because there was no connection between them. We may now consider it Germany's future work to reunite these apparently incompatible characteristics of hers, which have already been shown to be of common origin; but to do this work she must shake herself free from the vague and indefinite aspirations forced upon her from without.

That this is possible and that firmly fixed ideal, based on solid facts, are conceivable, it is the purpose of the present chapter to prove. This natural morality, as it might be called, will one day become a reality; and it seems as if its day were, so to speak, predestined to dawn in Germany. And this notwithstanding the events of the last half-century, but because of the peculiar temperament of the Germans themselves. Then Germany, that *terra nebula* in which the sun can yet shine with such wondrous clearness, will have fulfilled her mission, *per aspera ad astra*. That mission does not consist in sending calico to Bagdad, but in giving the world peace. It may, I grant, seem foolhardy to cherish any such hope in the midst of the unparalleled horrors of this war, and many persons will rather incline to agree with Heinrich Mann,¹ when he took as a motto for his book, "This nation is hopeless."

Still, it is better to be optimistic than in too great haste to abandon our only hope. Even I fully admit the immense

¹ Contemporary German writer.—Translator.

power of those who have made the progress of a whole nation center round the sale of calico in Bagdad; and I, too, am well aware that self-knowledge cannot be attained save in a hard school. But somehow or other it will come to pass that the German again becomes German, and in another fifty years there will again be a Germany that realizes her own true sphere, and whose pride is in her own characteristics and not in her armaments.

For at all times it has been believed, even by those who have not "dip't into the future, far as human eye could see," that the war-drum must one day throb no longer and the battle-flag be furled,"

In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

There the commonsense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.

§ 138.—*The New Empire*

Some semblance of justice, indeed, is weaving and working in all this murder and horror. It all depends whether we can see this semblance. Man to-day lies bound upon the ground, with the war vultures devouring his vitals. But man to-day need be no less optimistic than his prototype, *Prometheus* bound, whom nearly two thousand five hundred years ago Æschylus made say that, as his mother *Themis* had taught him, the day must come when might would be overcome and wisdom prevail.

Prometheus, it is true, is not yet unbound, and the *Titans* and the *Forces* of all still bid him defiance; but we may console ourselves with the reflection that even the oldest tragedian possessed this optimistic belief. For the secret of *Prometheus*¹ is no cabalistic or magic formula, as the Scholastics used to believe; rather is it the triumphant faith in that future when

¹ *Prometheus* knows a secret, and *Zeus* is ready to free him if he reveals it. *Prometheus*, however, is silent, feeling assured that even without this he will be set free.

The man remains,—

Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed, but man:
Equal, unclassed, tribeless, and nationless,
Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the king
Over himself; just gentle, wise: but man.

Time was when the gods were a savage, primeval folk, and their "peace" was based only "on dark Fate's perpetual night"; that is, not upon free understanding, but on natural compulsion, which is independent of all personality. Yet personality prevailed, first, because of the selfishness of tyrannical Zeus,¹ who represented the age of selfishness and war in which Æschylus lived. But this was only a transition stage, and *Prometheus*, who endowed the world with the beginnings of all science and all art, all technical knowledge and all civilization, knows that these forces will overthrow the kingdom of selfishness and self-will, and that the conception of humanity will then prevail. To symbolize this conquest of self, *Prometheus* is to be free if another, out of pure love of mankind, descends into Hades and sacrifices himself for *Prometheus*; that is, for mankind.

We have not yet reached this point. War still goes on, but peace will come. That is the secret of *Prometheus*. Assuredly he will be free: Either *Zeus* will learn to understand the sacred mystery, and then he will voluntarily break his brother's bonds in sunder, or he will never learn to honor Mother *Themis*.² Then will "*Zeus* be hurled from his throne," and *Prometheus* will receive "his freedom, long desired and long delayed."

What is marvelous about this *Prometheus* legend of Æschylus is the instinctive faith in the progress of mankind—a faith which produces that optimism which is ever casting a glance forward toward the future.

¹ Æschylus says that *Zeus* "by the force of will has founded a new kingdom in the domain of the gods."

² *Themis* was wedded to *Zeus*, to whom she bore the *Horæ*. She personifies law and order, and was worshiped as a goddess of prophecy.
—Translator.

§ 139.—*Natural Right*

The pessimist sees nothing but a meaningless “up and down” and “hither and thither” in history, which is to him, as to Schopenhauer,¹ merely a series of events, a nightmare of the human race, without any sort of system. Yet we may proudly say, even although the actual basis in fact for such a conception has but lately been supplied by recent natural science, that almost all mankind have always been optimists hitherto, and thus unconsciously adhered to the conception of evolution. Except for Schopenhauer, after all only a single person, and the Sophists, all serious thinkers have held it true that the world might rise on stepping-stones of its dead self to higher things. Despite their imperfect knowledge, a certain definite scheme of evolution could be traced. They actually believed in the prevalence of a law which was gradually bringing us nearer to an ideal, and, however widely their opinions may otherwise have differed, all sought what they desired in right. All followed after Heraclitus, that wise man of old, who proclaimed that what nations had to do was to fight for the right.

Unhappily these efforts have taken two different directions. Those which have extended in the so-called idealistic direction have endeavored to bring about a spiritual kingdom, the kingdom of God; the others, those with a material trend, have endeavored to bring about social evolution. But instead of mutually assisting each other, these two tendencies have opposed each other; and what is now needed is to unite them.

Since Heraclitus and Æschylus proclaimed struggle and promised victory, mankind has taken a considerable step forward. True, as Deussen says, we see even now that the “principle of the right of the stronger, which has been displaced in the individual countries, is the only one still pre-

¹ “Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung” (“The World as Will and as Idea”). By Arthur Schopenhauer, 1819. Vol. I, § 35. Cf. also the same work, Vol. II, Chap. 38.

vailing between one country and another.¹ But between man and man the goddess of law and order has prevailed, and, at any rate in principle, the "right of the stronger has ceased to exist."

To this we must hold fast, for any one considering the history of nations really might think that to look for justice upon earth is looking for Utopia. Everywhere it is "*Væ victis*"—"Woe to the vanquished"; again has Brennus² cast his sword into the scales of Justice, and the Old Testament words, "the law is slacked," still hold good.³

How comes it, then, that man has nevertheless persisted in believing in eternal rights, in love of his neighbor, in altruism, human dignity, and whatever all the other ways may be of stating the fact that man respects every other man as being one of his own kind? From time immemorial it has been a disputed question whether this principle of right is naturally existent in us as an element in our souls, as it were, or has arisen in us, so to speak, artificially, having been agreed upon, owing to reflection and the dictates of reason.

For thousands of years this question has been discussed without any one ever having asked whether this "communion of men" may not perhaps be a function of their physical constitution, and therefore an actual demonstrable fact. Were this so, it would of course be absurd to describe right as man-made. On the other hand, to say that it is implanted by nature or God in men's souls is the same thing as instinctively recognizing that it is subject to laws which are, after all,

¹ "Die Elemente der Metaphysik" ("The Elements of Metaphysics") by Paul Deussen, 2nd ed., p. 233 f. by Paul Deussen. The writer adds, "From this may be inferred how immature our race still is, for it may be probably certainly foretold that the time will come when we shall look back on war as a horrible piece of barbarism belonging to long-past dark ages."

² The leader of the Gauls must be meant here, who invaded Greece in 279 B. C. He and his men were checked at Thermopylæ, then devastated Ætolia, and advanced on Delphi, but were completely defeated when Brennus killed himself.—Translator.

³ Habakkuk 1, 4.

independent of our personal desires and superior to all human wisdom.

Here again it can be seen how wisely and unconsciously justly mankind in general feels; for except for a short period when the Sophists taught that right is not anything natural, but only something agreed upon,—that is, established by man,—every one has believed in a divine or innate right,—that is, a right independent of any human will, something, as it were, impersonal and yet a fact. Socrates in particular insisted that if there were no absolute right, then there never could be any right at all; and if we reflect upon this, it seems and is so self-evident that since Socrates's time no one has questioned this principle. Only in one respect do the post-Socratic philosophers differ from their master, very unfortunately for them. They forgot that in the meantime the *φύσις* had been replaced by the *μετὰ φύσιν*, that which lies behind nature. Men ceased to perceive the primeval cause of everything absolute in Socrates's simple natural facts, and thought it needful to take refuge in the metaphysics of Aristotle or even of the latter's inferior successors. Thus what was subsequently proclaimed as "natural right" had nothing to do with nature, but was, on the contrary, metaphysical right, which had come about by human ordinance.

Once we have recognized this misconception, the question inevitably arises whether the time-honored difference between Socrates and his opponents does not vanish if we simply trace back absolute right to absolute natural laws. I believe that this is so. There is an absolute right, based upon the conception which natural science proves true, that mankind is an organism; and hence this right is no less absolute than mankind itself. (Cf. Chap. XII.) This must suffice for us, for none can penetrate beyond his own race and the natural conditions to which it is subject. But if mankind once realizes the necessity of this absolute right for the human race, then will it have understood the secret of *Prometheus*. Then will pessimism be overcome, and the vision of Christ be a reality.

§ 140.—*Right and Cosmopolitanism*

But even if we reject all metaphysical basis for right, we are nowise entitled to consider the efforts of two thousand years as having been of no avail. Natural science did not then exist, and to develop the idea of right, it was unquestionably of most importance to prove that a right was unconditionally a right. Without metaphysics this would hardly have been possible.

Now, we must note the fact that all these great moral philosophers of olden times were already thorough *cosmopolitans*. This, though much too often forgotten, after all could not have been otherwise, for absolute right cannot but apply to all human beings. Christ was by no means the first citizen of the world. Socrates before him taught that all men were brothers, and in return for this the people of Athens handed him a draft of hemlock, even as the people of Jerusalem at a later date nailed Jesus to the cross, and as even now any one who does not see eye to eye with the mass of his fellow-citizens is outlawed by them. But the death of Socrates served as an example and a warning, and his disciples, to whom alone we owe our knowledge of him, consequently kept very quiet about his dangerous new philosophy. Nevertheless, the great Athenian's cosmopolitan ideas must have been very popular even five hundred years after his death, for the comparatively ignorant Epictetus,¹ when expressing his belief in all men having one and the same country, quotes Socrates. If, he says, what philosophers say about the relationship between God and man be true, what is man to do, when asked to what country he belongs, but answer as Socrates did, not, "I am an Athenian or a Corinthian," but "I am a citizen of the world."

This idea, however, prevailed not in Greece only, where it was principally advocated by the schools of the Cynics and Stoics, but among enlightened men throughout the world. Ancient Indian and Chinese literature affords numerous proofs of this. Now, about the time of Christ this conception of

¹ Conversations, Book I, 9.

world-citizenship, which hitherto had only flashed like lightning across the minds of a few geniuses, seems suddenly to have come to life in the form of a "variation on the conception of humanity." The time was fulfilled, as the Bible says. While Seneca in Rome was preaching the doctrine of world-wide love, the Jewish scholar Hillel was committing it to writing, and Confucius proclaiming brotherly love in the far East, while at the same time Christendom was coming into being. It may seem immaterial which of these teachers we follow provided we do follow one.

Even St. Paul makes clear references to such ideas, and so do the patriarchs and all the later Scholastics. The "kingdom of God," however, was more and more interpreted as meaning life in the world to come, a fact which in time certainly prevented this conception from having the revolutionary effects which at first it undoubtedly produced. But even the worldly philosophers of every school were all at bottom cosmopolitans, and hoped in one way or another to break down the barriers separating man from his fellow-man. In the following table the only moderns I have quoted are, intentionally, Germans, because it seems, or at any rate did seem, the special vocation of the German nation to rescue these eternal conceptions of Christianity from the scholastic chaos of the church.

In the Christian era all serious thinkers were also agreed that a perpetual peace must of course be the object of all this chaos and confusion. To discuss this in detail would lead me too far away from my point, and therefore I give the following table. I would merely add that, with the possible exception of St. Augustine, those mentioned in it all believed *in peace on earth and in the community of all living beings*.

Then came the period when misinterpreted Darwinism altered awakening national sentiment and men's ideas generally. First in England and France, afterward in Germany, and now in the smallest aggregates of people speaking the same or allied languages, for instance, the Czechs and Ukrainians,

<i>Author</i>	<i>Object to be attained.</i>	<i>Method of attaining it</i>
St. Paul.	The kingdom of God on earth.	Through Christ.
St. Augustine (<i>De Civitate Dei</i> XIV, 28).	"Everlasting Rest in God."	Through Christ.
St. Thomas. (<i>De regim. princ.</i>)	"A Universal Christian Monarchy," with the Pope at its head. (Like Dante.)	Through Christ.
Lessing. ("Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts.") ¹	The Eternal New Gospel.	Through the religion of the spirit and of love.
Herder. ("Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.") ²	Humanity.	Through the rule of love and reason.
Kant. ("Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte," 1784.) ³	Perpetual Peace.	Through a league of nations united together by moral ties.
Fichte. ("Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters," 1806, VII, 18 ff.) ⁴	Perfected Society.	By mutual improvement.
Schelling. ("Vorlesungen über die Methode der akademischen Studien," p. 153, and "System des transcendentalen Ideals," p. 417.) ⁵	Universal legal constitution.	By the union of liberty and necessity.
Hegel. ("Philosophie der Geschichte," gesammelte Werke, IX, 11.) ⁶	Absolute Right.	By progress in the realization of liberty.

¹ "The Education of the Human Race," published in 1780.—Translator.

² "Thoughts on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind," English translation 1800, originally published 1784-91.—Translator.

³ "Outlines of Universal History."

⁴ "Characteristics of the Present Epoch," published 1806.

⁵ "Lectures on the Method of Academic Study," published in 1803, and "System of Transcendental Idealism," published in 1800.—Translator.

⁶ "The Philosophy of History," Collected Works.

the masses began to believe that a nation's *rights* depend upon its *might* alone. No jurist, it is true, ventured actually to admit this in so many words, though Felix Dahn,¹ who, after all, is mainly a novelist, did once make certain concessions to nationalism; but even he does not dare to go to too great lengths.

True, in quite recent times, especially after 1870, there was a change even in this respect, and now almost every one denounces his former ideals. No one, for instance, any longer ventures to call himself a citizen of the world; at most he says he is international.

2.—RIGHT AND WAR

§ 141.—*The Law of Nations*

Thus if the mere possibility of there being a right necessarily implies world citizenship, it follows of necessity that right and war cannot exist side by side.

But it is in human nature for every one to be convinced of the justice of his cause. The Castilian or Sicilian robber who plunders the rich considers himself only an essential element of impartial justice; and the savor of the truth contained in Gerhard Hauptmann's "*Biberpelz*"² consists simply in showing that there is honor even among the lowest thieves. There is probably hardly a single genuine passionate criminal who could not produce, from the depths of his subconsciousness, some moral justification for his actions; and even the cool, collected criminal, who, narrowly escaping prison, becomes a wealthy, respected citizen, can excuse himself by urging that he "keeps within the law."

And if this is true of the individual man, how much more is it true of the masses. Whenever a hundred persons do the

¹ Julius Sophus Felix Dahn, poet, novelist, and historical writer. One of his chief novels, "*A Fight for Rome*," published in 1876, was translated into English two years later.—Translator.

² Gerhard Hauptmann's "*Biberpelz*" ("*The Beaver*") is a comedy published in 1893.—Translator.

same thing, the person instinctively feels as if what so many are doing could not but be right. But nowhere do greater numbers of persons act in concert than in war, and never does this feeling of being one of a number come out more strongly than in war-time. We must therefore never expect any nation to doubt the justice of "its" war even for a moment. Now, is there any criterion by which the justice of a war might be impartially tested? "*Inter arma silent leges*"; when war breaks out, laws keep silence, as the unsentimental, but logical, Romans put it. And they were perfectly consistent, for war as war means that the notion of right is suspended; and an appeal to arms proves the refusal to recognize that right is any longer the supreme court of appeal, and the determination to place might before right.

It is clearly important to realize this. We may urge any and every reason for war. We may say it is a natural necessity, a disease which there is no warding off, a salutary medicine, a means of race expansion, or anything else we please; but let no one call it just. To do so would be to destroy the conception of right, for there is no worse injustice than one which assumes the aspect of right.¹

Ihering² says that resistance to wrong is a duty. Does it really need any further proof that war against war is resistance to wrong? That is, that resistance to war is a duty? Is it not a commonplace for Weber's laughing philosopher to say that the conception of right already includes that of peace?³ A cause may be as just as possible, but as soon as the

¹ Plato's Republic, II, 4, 361. Dr. Nicolai also quotes Livy XXXIX, 16, an indictment against hypocritical religion and using it as a cloak for crimes.

² Ihering or Jhering, Rudolf von. German jurist, who was a professor at various places, including Basel and Vienna. The work here quoted, "*Der Kampf ums Recht*," pub. 1872, has been translated into English as "*The Battle for Right*." He was celebrated as an independent and clear thinker, and propounded a fresh view of Roman law as furnishing the basis of a new and adapted system of jurisprudence.—Translator.

³ "Demokrit," by Karl Jul. Weber, Vol. X, "*Der Krieg*" ("War").

sword is drawn for it, it ceases to be so, for then it is no longer right which is championing it, but might.

In order that right may prevail between two persons, they must conclude an agreement. This, however, they can do only because, as the jurists say, they are already legally qualified to do so; or, as the natural scientist would phrase it, because they already instinctively feel that they are members of a community. But now states come on the scene as representing the collective determination of a whole community. Like individual human beings, they are living legal entities, endowed with a will of their own. The individual man, however, is not merely an individual man, but also a citizen; and similarly every state is a member of the human race. Hence it is juridically possible for individual nations to unite together to form a universal human association for right.

These premises are obvious. But it necessarily follows from them that right between human beings is impossible without the recognition in some form or other that they belong to the same state; and right between states is no less impossible without the recognition of some form of association which is above states. Thus every dispute about "mine" and "thine," and, for that matter, every criminal lawsuit, proves that both parties, even if unwillingly and perhaps only under compulsion, submit to the state, and consequently admit that they are brothers in a sense. All self-help, however, is a negation of the state.

Similarly with regard to inter-state matters. All self-help on the part of a state—every war, that is—means that the particular state ceases to recognize any superordinate organization, thereby destroying the only possible means of insuring right. In the juridical sense, a "just war," therefore, is a contradiction in terms.

From a higher point of view, however, war is justified under the same conditions as justify self-help in general. Whenever an attempt is made to inroach upon the innate and inalienable rights of an individual man or a nation, then both

resort to self-help against whomsoever it may be. This is revolution, and is permissible even in the case of a minority against a majority. War will die out so soon as the organization of the world is strengthened. Revolutions there will always be.

Now, after all and despite all, a law of nations does exist, the enactments of which remain in force even during war. True, as yet it has always been violated in every war; but even were breaches of this law of nations the rule and not the exception, this would no more overthrow the conception of it than the conception of civil law would be overthrown in a state if the majority of its citizens happened to be criminals.

The mere fact of a law of nations existing, at least in theory, is cause for satisfaction, since it proves that a supra-state community already exists, and that certain component parts of the different states have already ceased to coöperate in making war. After all, what else does a rule or enactment of international law mean but that certain things are outside war, "extrabellical" even during war, just as a legation in a foreign country is extraterritorial? Where international law is in force, there is no war.

International law may continue in force during war and side by side with it, but wherever it does exist it restricts war, and the time may one day come when it will have restricted it to the vanishing-point. But where war is, international law is not. Whether the cannons of one belligerent aim better than those of another depends upon a thousand things, but not in the least upon right.

§ 142.—*The Right of Reprisals*

That no man really takes international law seriously is obvious for many reasons. Nothing shows this so plainly, however, as the constantly repeated announcement that reprisals have been or else are to be exercised. The bread rations of French prisoners of war in Germany, for instance, are curtailed, which may seem only natural, since, owing to the action

of Germany's enemies, there is beginning to be a shortage of bread. As a matter of fact, however, it is not natural at all, for if any country undertakes the obligation to treat prisoners of war in a particular way, it is bound to do this, even should it be suffering from scarcity itself, just as an ordinary citizen must pay his debts, even if this entails his going hungry to bed. A French officer complained of there being no light of an evening, and when told that there were neither gas-works nor electricity-works in the place and that there was a great scarcity of petroleum throughout Germany, he remarked that that had nothing to do with him, and that if Germany could not give her prisoners any light, then she ought not to take any one prisoner. This was meant merely as a joke, but it is a striking instance of how little we in Germany are entitled to talk about right.

But to refer to the reduction of bread rations. As matters are now, no one can seriously reproach Germany for having taken such a step. The French, however, consider it a piece of barbarism, and would be quite within their rights in so doing; but at the same time, according to the newspapers, they are resolving to put their German prisoners of war on a diet which, in their opinion, is insufficient, despite there being not the slightest pretext for so doing, for France is said not to be in the least short of food, indeed she cannot be so.

Again, owing to the crews of our German submarines having attacked trading-vessels, the British have not treated them as prisoners of war, but have imprisoned them. The Germans consider this unjust, "because our sailors were captured by the British while faithfully doing their duty," which is undoubtedly true as far as the individual sailor is concerned, whatever may be our opinion as to the sinking of trading-vessels. Germany, however, not content with protesting, puts thirty-nine British officers under military arrest, knowing full well all the while that, even in the opinion of the Germans, they have done nothing dishonorable. Were the infringement

of the Geneva Convention really considered as a breach of law, and therefore as wrong, it would be impossible to act thus, for no one steals because some one else has done so, and no one treats a criminal except in accordance with right and law.

Reprisals, however, are never "right." Yet the only people to adopt this point of view, which it might be thought was absolutely obvious, were the Russian intellectuals, who, in their appeal, stated that although the war was certainly accompanied by a great deal of barbarity, yet it was for the Russians to protest only against such barbarities as were committed by the Russian Army; anything else was the concern of other nations.¹ All other nations, on the contrary, have protested only against "atrocities" committed by their enemies, and endeavored to put the doings of their own armies in the best possible light.

Furthermore, no one will deny that, for instance, the invasion of Belgium, the torpedoing of trading-vessels, the use of poisonous gases, and much else besides are contrary to international law; but that, as Bethmann-Hollweg openly admitted in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, supposing war to be allowable at all, international law is not unconditionally binding on a nation fighting for its existence. However much all right thinking men may deplore this, it is impossible to say straight away that there is no justification for such an opinion. But it proves that the law of nations is simply not law, as is proved by these examples; but that in the opinion of every normal man there are exceptions and special cases in it. There ought to be no exception to right, however. In any case it is not anything which can be measured out or made better or worse by something being added to or taken from it.

¹ So far as can yet be told, it is the Russian Army, contrary to the view generally prevailing, which is making more efforts than that of any other nation to act in accordance with the precepts of morality, and likewise to take advantage of this war to compel other nations to recognize Russia as a civilized power. This, of course, does not do away with the fact that Cossacks have committed gross excesses.

§ 143.—*The Right of the Stronger*

True, there is yet another kind of right—the right of the stronger, which certainly is a right only in name, and has nothing whatever to do with any right for which there is any moral basis whatsoever. But combating prejudice is only too often neither more nor less than combating the misuse of words; and the fact of the same word being used for a right based on strength and a right based on a responsibility has assuredly done a great deal of mischief.

Now, the German word *Recht* (right) contains two wholly diverse notions: moral right, and prevailing right (law). Finally there is the attempt made to combine the two senses in the word justice, man's subjective virtue.

This of course easily gives rise to misconceptions, such as the right of superior strength, or "*la raison du plus fort*," as the French say. Now, that in actual fact strength often does create right even the ancients were well aware, and Pindar speaks of "the victorious hand of law sanctifying the grossest violence."¹ Even in his time attempts were made to justify this right by natural science, Darwinistically, as it were. Callicles,² for instance, says: "In the state, as in nature, the stronger must rule over the weaker, for natural security consists therein." Even Socrates³ and Plato⁴ assure us that "the right at present prevailing is based on the accident of power," but they claim, on moral grounds, that this ought not to be the case.

Since Socrates's time the question whether man shall be a practical politician or an idealist has divided the world into two opposite camps; but although every one claiming the name of human being theoretically strives for that right which he vaguely feels to be his immutable ideal, yet most men abide by the precept of the sober Aristotle, who was content to note the fact that right, properly so called, did not exist on earth.

¹ Pindar in the laws of Plato.

² Plato's "Gorgias," 38.

³ "Memorabilia," IV, 4 ff.

⁴ Plato's "Laws," IV, 4.

Only in the brief period when primitive Christianity prevailed did large numbers of human beings venture to dream dreams of justice, but the brutal facts of this rough world soon put an end to any such extravagances. Even Spinoza¹ finally admitted that the right of each individual man extended as far as his might, adding, in order to make this seem less brutal, that the divine spark lurking in every person might be trusted to prevent too great encroachments on the part of might.

This state of pessimistic irresolution continued a long while, as the writings of Hobbes, Malebranche,² and others testify; while the sharp distinction between this "vale of tears" and "celestial bliss" made the mass of the people consider any discussion of the question in principle impossible. Not till recent times did the masses evince a desire for "enjoying celestial bliss while still on earth," and again they began to wonder what, after all, their rights really were. But the revolutionaries of to-day fell into the mistake of the feudal oppressors of yesterday, and built up right upon might.³

That there should be a transition period is understandable, but unfortunate, not merely because the bloodshed, for instance, during the French Revolution must be ascribed to this theory, but also because it prevented the innovators from really going to the root of matters, that is, from being consistent. We shall see the reason for that inconsistency which

¹ "Quia unus quisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentia valet." Spinoza's "Tractate," 1670, Caput II, § 8, "Tractatus theologico-politicus."

² Nicole Malebranche. French, philosopher, who became a Roman Catholic priest. His philosophy has a certain resemblance to that of Berkeley, but his chief connection with English philosophy is through his pupil John Norris, an acute critic of John Locke. Malebranche's "Recherche de la Vérité" appeared in 1674, and his "Entretiens sur la Métaphysique" in 1688. The former was translated into English in 1694.—Translator.

³ Auguste Comte has some very wise words about this, the fundamental mistake of all modern revolutions. In "Leçon 46," Vol. IV, p. 27 et seq. he shows the founders of a new era always set to work with the methods of the old era.

has struck every one in such men as Robespierre and Saint Just, if we reflect that they, too, wanted to base right on might.

Again, Ferdinand Lassalle is to-day popularly considered the first man to have advocated a future state based on justice. Yet it is singular that he should at the same time have once more proclaimed the ancient doctrine of the right of superior strength; and also that, despite his having strongly opposed the notion of acquired or inherited rights, he should once more have raised the question whether might or right comes first. In his speeches and writings on constitutionalism, he adopted the attitude that constitutional questions, or, to use a more comprehensive word, questions of right, are questions of might, arguing that right, in so far as it exists, always depends on actually existing conditions of power, and that therefore written law cannot be lasting or of value except it exactly expresses these actually existing conditions of power.

Now, this would seem to justify all violence, war, plunder, and what not besides, as the reactionaries of that day were astute enough to observe. Thus the "*Kreuzzeitung*"¹ wrote that the revolutionary Jew's instinct had led him to hit the right nail on the head. Roon,² then Prussian Minister of War, stated that "what history is mainly concerned about—the history not only of individual countries, but also the internal history of each country—was neither more nor less than the struggle for and increase of power." Finally Bismarck, then prime minister,³ to a certain extent admitted that his socialist opponent was right, opining that "such questions of right are usually settled not by confronting one contradictory theory with another, but only gradually, by the practice prevailing in constitutional law." That is, considering who it was who used these words, it all depends on how powerful the country or countries concerned may be at the time. Whether

¹ The "*Kreuzzeitung*" for June 8, 1862. No. 1862.

² Roon's speech in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, Sept. 12, 1862.

³ Bismarck's speech at the meeting of the Chamber on Oct. 7, 1862.

Bismarck actually used the words "Might comes before right" was long disputed.¹

§ 144.—*Evolution and Revolution*

Whether these words were actually uttered or not, the phrase "Might comes before right" has long become a fact, and the only question is whether it is to be a guiding principle.

If a man have been killed, however unjustly, no right can call him back to life; but this recognition of a fact does not mean that we think it justified, and even if what is done cannot be undone, we may still insist on its not happening again. Unless the killing of a human being does not offend any one's sense of right, as is the case with the execution of a murderer the matter does not end there. Society tries as far as it can to protest against the fact of the murder by punishing the murderer.

Hence the words "Might comes before right" merely mean that it may happen that the conceptions of right alter so radically that another right has now generally succeeded in prevailing, although of course only with the help of might. Of course it may be said that in the French Revolution might prevailed. But the only reason why might was able to prevail, and why the whole Revolution did not soon fizzle out, but revolutionized all conceptions of right, was because men were already thinking of some such radical upheaval. It was generally felt that conditions before the Revolution were wrong. A small minority were endeavoring to enforce alleged rights that really no longer existed. Hence the victory won by the might of revolutionary ideas was in reality a victory of the new conceptions of right. In a certain sense right and might are identical ideas, although only if it be realized that true right alone has the might permanently to prevail. In

¹ In 1863 they were attributed to him by Graf Schwerin, and the report spread everywhere. Bismarck protested, but it must be admitted that this was undoubtedly the sense of his speech, even although the words are not actually in the shorthand report of it.

this sense the saying "Might comes before right" is justified; but it can also be reversed into "Right comes before might," which would mean that the new right is actually more powerful than the old vested might, however powerful the outward means by which it may be supported.

Modern right will always struggle against ancient might, and this it is which justifies revolutions. But modern right will never succeed in prevailing unless the people, the mass of mankind, actually accept it; and before they can do this they must greatly modify their conceptions of right. In other words, a revolution, which is always the work of some far-seeing genius, cannot come about unless evolution has already educated the world to be prepared for it.

All revolutions, whether fought out with spiritual weapons or with weapons of iron and steel, have had forerunners. These forerunners failed simply because the new right had not yet become might. Socrates died without having had any influence worth mentioning on the world in general; and henceforth the great revolution of mankind is inseparably bound up with the name of Christ. Huss perished, but Luther prevailed, Galilei had publicly to abjure his own philosophy; but Newton followed, and with him modern science begins. Even the French Revolution could never have taken place unless Voltaire, Rousseau, and many others had prepared the way for it.

Thus these forerunners personified the right to a new order of things; the old order was corrupt even in their day: but the time had not yet come, mankind was not yet ripe, and there had not been a sufficient change in the conception of right either from the political, scientific, or ethical point of view.

That outward development of power which causes the final collapse of an already decayed structure is usually of merely secondary importance. It is not a cause, but a symptom; but because many people do not look below the surface and see only outward causes and effects, they imagine that it is this

new development of power which has really caused a new conception of right to prevail. Thus and in no other way could the saying "Might comes before right" have arisen. The decisive factor, however, is always evolution, not revolution; the new conception of right will and must prevail with or without revolts. But impatient man often wants to make events move faster, and though sometimes he may have succeeded in so doing, he has quite as often merely delayed matters.

Similarly with regard to war. *If the German people possesses the physical and psychical qualifications for ruling the world, it will succeed in doing so without any war; and if it does not possess such qualifications, the winning of any number of wars will not alter this fact.*

As far as the settlement of actual questions of power is concerned, the war is merely an insignificant temporary disaster; and in no case is the saying "Might comes before right," rightly interpreted, calculated to justify a display of force on a scale, as it seems, hitherto unprecedented.

§ 145.—*War and the Judgment of God*

Only a good Christian can be a good soldier. This may seem like contempt of the Christian doctrine of "love thy neighbor as thyself"; yet these words contain a truth which explains much that has happened and may serve as an indication of what is to come. One thing, indeed, is certain. Among moral beings none may draw the sword save he who believes in God. None save he who is firmly convinced that God awards the victory to him whose cause is just can be at once a soldier and a moral person; for if no God directs the shot, then it is might, not right, which wins.

Now, there is really no necessity to insist on moral considerations in war, which we are not accustomed seriously to take into account in any other human transactions. We might be content with saying, like Voltaire,¹ that a trifle more or

¹ "Candide ou l'Optimisme," by Voltaire, 1759.

less wrong in this most glorious of all worlds matters devilish little; and that when millions of men are being destroyed in the hideous struggle for supremacy, we can hardly grudge those who like such emotions as the pleasure of killing a few thousands in honest warfare. In any case, what's in a name? A man dies of a cancerous swelling, even if the doctor consoles him by calling it non-malignant; and the results of a war are equally inevitable, whether we call it just or unjust. Even were it proved justifiable, this would not alter the fact of its being hideous.

Yet for most men there is a great deal in a name. Other beings endowed with reason do not understand this. The lunar *Princess Domiladosol*,¹ for instance, rightly asks, "But in war why do not men appeal to arbitrators, if they believe right is on their side?" But it is just the men of to-day who seem not to perceive the irony of such a question, and they lay more stress than ever on a war being "just." Frivolous and criminal wars, they say, ought to be prevented, and in these they include religious and dynastic wars and wars of conquest. Only a "fight for the fatherland" is just, in which category people in Germany specially include the wars of 1813, 1870, and 1914.² But if even a professor of law such as Wilhelm Kahl passes over 1864 and 1866 in silence, which can hardly be wholly unintentional, yet most of his fellow-countrymen consider wars of conquest also just; and only a handful of them would allow the fact of Belgium's being annexed or not in any way to affect their opinion of the War of 1914. And though the Sultan of Turkey proclaimed the *hetwah*, or holy war,—that is a *religious war*,—this does not make him any less valuable as an ally than Austria. Yet Austria, which is held together only by the Hapsburg dynasty, could scarcely wage any save a *dynastic war*. And religious

¹ "Histoire comique, ou voyage dans la Lune." Par Cyrano de Bergerac, 1650. Chap. III.

² "Vom Recht zum Krieg und vom Siegespreis" ("On the Right to Make War and the Fruits of Victory") by Professor Dr. Kahl, 1914.

and dynastic wars are supposed to be frivolous and criminal.

No, it matters not what epithet we apply to war, but for this very reason is it worth while going into "the justice of war" in order to prove that the few who have ever seriously and impartially called war just have in reality always relied upon the "right of the stronger," that is, on a sort of supposed justice based on natural science.¹ This, as I purpose to show, has nothing whatever to do either with right or natural science, which at once answers the objection that war and peace cannot be determined by natural science alone, and that there are also profound ethical causes underlying war.

Moreover, it is a fact that man has considered war not merely as a test of power or strength, but always as a means of ascertaining who is in the right. It was the deluded mystics, who used to make the judgments of God an integral part of the institution of law, who have sanctified war, as it were. It used to be believed that in a duel God gave the victory to the combatant with right on his side, and that an innocent person did not sink in water, and was not scorched by red-hot iron nor affected by poison. Similarly it was believed that the heavenly hosts placed their shield in front of that army which was waging the war desired by God.

The world has long since ceased to believe in God's personal intervention in war. It is known that "God is ever on the side of the big battalions." But the notion that there is still some sort of justice in war seems ineradicable, despite the fact that the least reflection shows that any possibility of the just man winning must be based on the intervention of a higher principle representing justice. The educated believer will assuredly hardly believe that this omnipotent principle can be modified by force of arms; but the uneducated and superstitious, who imagine they can use their God for selfish ends, will invoke His name on behalf of their real or imaginary right.

¹ Dr. Kahl, the authority on criminal law, for instance, expressly states in one of his addresses, "War is a natural force in the history of the whole world."

3.—SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON ALTRUISM

§ 146.—*Natural Law and Purpose*

It would seem an impossibility to insist on natural duties, since nature knows neither right nor wrong. Even the phrase "natural law" is, after all, misleading. The ancient Greeks racked their brains a long time as to whether this, that, or the other was a "natural" or a "human" institution. Not till a fairly recent period was it thought possible to settle the question by deciding that it was "a natural" institution.

In modern science the phrase natural law is now one which every one understands. Nevertheless, it is still a reminder that we once believed in something which laid down laws for nature. According to a man's point of view, he considered these laws just or unjust, and then a belief in the existence of a natural law of course necessarily arose. In reality, however, there is neither law nor right in nature, but only *facts* and *necessities*, or, to put the matter in a nutshell, *conditions* under which something happens or does not happen. Were it a law that iron follows a magnet, then of course the one must always follow the other; but in reality magnetism is only *one* of the conditions by which iron can be moved, and if, for example, in any particular case gravitation preponderates over magnetism, then iron does not obey this so-called law.

Given the right conditions, anything is possible; but, as a matter of fact, possibilities are mostly so much reduced by all manner of "necessary" conditions that one particular possibility of necessity intervenes. A stone in any position in space can, so far as itself is concerned, move in any direction whatsoever if only it receives the proper impulse; but as gravitation acts everywhere on earth, the stone will always tend to move toward the center of the earth unless there is a special cause why it should not do so.

Similarly in the nature of things every human being has the power of doing everything within the limits of his physical

strength. He can, if he pleases, call this power his inborn right. Thus, to quote one instance, there is undoubtedly no natural law to prevent any human being from killing others, stealing their belongings, violating women, idling, getting infectious diseases, and dying. In this sense also each person and each nation has a "right" to wage war.

But to call the possibility of doing all this "a right" can at best create confusion, for such a possibility has nothing in common with what we call a right. Indeed, in the case of war it is opposed to every conceivable right. Broadly and generally it may be said that, in order to choose the legitimate course from the heterogeneous collection of possible courses open to us, we must have some object or purpose in view to guide us. But such a purpose transcends nature. It is probably within the province of natural science to note that some such regard for moral obligations is present in the case of a certain proportion of human beings. Similarly it can note the fact that magnetism occurs in certain substances. Natural science does not know what magnetism is or what moral obligations are, but in both cases it can inquire "under what conditions they occur."

§ 147.—*Inborn Rights*

For instance, it is a fact that most human beings (or, for the sake of prudence, let us say, some of them) shrink from committing murder. Whether the word right or fact be applied to this shrinking does not matter. Similarly it is an undeniable fact that certain persons do not feel any such horror, and that such persons are to be found not only among primitive peoples, but even among modern Europeans. Some of them have insane or criminal tendencies, but others seem absolutely normal. At times, indeed, it seems as if almost the entire population of a country absolutely cease to feel such horror. All this is a fact, and, if we please, an inborn right. In any case no one is in a position to restrict this right, and to this extent it is really inalienable. If a man's brain is so

constructed that every murder seems to him necessarily sinful, then no written law in the world, no persuasion, and no punishment would enable me to deprive him of his conviction. But probably the exercise of such a right can be prevented; and in fact the state generally does prevent its citizens from giving way to any inclination to enrich themselves by murdering another; but on the contrary, for a short period it compels men, even men who have a horror of blood, to kill others. In the first case the result is that in Germany scarcely 400 cases of murder or manslaughter occur in a year; that is, one in every 250,000 of the population. In the second case, it may probably be said, although no exact statistics are available, that during the war the number of men who refused to kill to order has hardly been more proportionately, that is, one in 25,000, in both cases a wholly insignificant percentage.

Now, individual men have of course just as much an inborn right to love killing or to hate it as to order or forbid others to kill; but even here it is seen to be more fitting to refer to such variations not as rights, but as divergent possibilities of human nature. In particular, to order and forbid anything is to place limitations on it in precisely the same sort of way as limitations are placed on every natural phenomenon. Every stone falls; that is, it must fall, or, if you will, it has a right to fall. Indeed, we have become accustomed to describe this as a natural law. But we need only put a sufficiently strong support beneath it, and the stone, although still having a right (!) to fall, ceases to do so. We may say that it has now merely a tendency to fall.

If now I place limitations on a stone on every side,—in other words, if I build it into a building,—then I deprive it of a number of possibilities of movement, though not of all. It still expands when the sun shines on it and trembles when sounds are made. Indeed, owing to its cohesion with the other stones it has actually acquired more stability and force of resistance, but it is no longer possible for it to fall down at will, or, for instance, to bash in a man's head.

Even so are human beings welded together into large organizations. Their "tendencies" or "inborn rights" still exist, but it has become impossible for them to give way to these tendencies. Thus any one belonging to a state can no longer murder at will, because by so doing he ceases to be a member of that state.¹ It is therefore merely idle to refer to these so-called inborn human rights. They are far too numerous, and being altogether peculiar to the person, cannot be made the same for every one.

Conversely we may claim that any one feeling absolutely impelled to wage war has a right to feel thus, and is also entitled to act upon his impulse, provided society in general does not prevent him from so doing. But any one feeling absolutely impelled to protest against war has also an inalienable right to do so, and is also entitled to protest openly, provided society in general do not prevent him from so doing. To put it briefly, it is open to every living thing, everything that exists at all, to gain a foothold for itself, and it tends to do this, and therefore has a right to do so. But this means struggle; and it is this innate, inalienable right to struggle which is the highest thing known to mankind. Now, not a single one of all these rights for which we may struggle is preferred before any other. Hence it does not seem possible to make any general deduction from them. The right to struggle is the one thing ever present; and it might be contended that it is the *only truly natural right which can be recognized*.

§ 148.—*The Right to War*

Here we come in contact with the unique problem of war; and it would seem as if this unrestricted struggle of all against all must mean hopeless anarchy and never-ending war; but this is only apparently so. Suppose we are determined to

¹ Even Seneca compares human society to a stone vault which would collapse if one part did not support another. (*Societas nostra lapidum fornicationi simillima est: quae casura, nisi invicem obstarent, hoc ipso sustinetur*. Seneca, "Epistolæ," 95.)

exercise this right to struggle and to survive, but not after the manner of a stone or a bomb, which flies on its way and attains its aim by senseless destruction of every obstacle, unless it meet with equally senseless destruction by encountering too severe resistance. Suppose, rather, that we mean to exercise our right as thinking persons, knowing what we want. Then we must be quite clear as to what we are really fighting for, and for love of whom—for ourselves, for the country, for civilization, for our God, or for whatsoever else. Furthermore, we must consider the means wherewith we are going to wage our struggle, for struggle does not necessarily mean war. War is only one of the many possible variations of struggle, which can be carried on in all manner of ways—by persuasion or by force, by labor or by destruction, by the work of the head or by that of the hand.

Hence there are many objects of struggle and many ways of struggling, and in each individual case the question arises whether a particular weapon will serve to attain any particular purpose. For instance, even the most narrow-minded theologians must have perceived by now that, if a man wishes to fight for his God, he had best not have recourse to cannon, as for many hundreds of years was thought to be the case. In fact, it is altogether questionable whether war is the best means of attaining any human object whatever, whether national or cosmopolitan.

Now, supposing we admit a natural right to struggle, and see the Alpha and Omega of all progress in "inspiring war." Then, I say, we are obliged to ask of what use war has been and of what use it can be. It is this practical aspect of the question of war with which I hope to deal, and I trust I shall show that war is not a suitable method of attaining any conceivable purpose. This, however, does not quite go to the root of the matter, for then we must assume that all human beings act with a definite purpose. But there may be people who refuse to admit the need for having a set purpose, saying that just as they take delight in a woman's embraces without

any consciousness of an "inspiring purpose," similarly they take delight in war, and mean to wage war, even were there no object in so doing, but merely for war's sake. Was not the Venus Hetaira always more beloved than the Venus Genetrix? Such persons must be accepted as a fact, and we have no right to criticize them even if we dislike them. The only way to get the better of them is by natural science, which sets out from no preconceived ideas whatever. Now for the first time the full advantage of this method will appear in the matter of the dissemination of truth.

Natural science asks under what conditions a stone falls, and under what conditions it does not fall, taking no account of whether in falling it does harm or not. So must we proceed in regard to war, first, purely inductively and empirically stating the conditions which, considering how many outlets there are for human energy, have yet made war a necessity. No other method of procedure would lead us to a clear issue. Frischeisen-Köhler,¹ for instance, tries to prove deductively that it is possible for the world to live at peace, and comes to the conclusion that "no natural evolution can cause the disappearance of wars," and this precisely because "they are not a natural necessity."

At first we are inclined to think that here is a misprint, and that the word "not" ought to have been omitted; for if war is really a necessity, then it can not become extinct, whereas, on the contrary, if it is *not* a necessity, then it has no real justification for its existence, and may very easily become extinct. Frischeisen-Köhler, however, really means what he writes, and hence his deductions are not so wholly illogical. If we assume that anything in the world is there by chance, then its further evolution must also be chance, and nothing definite can be predicted about it. The Berlin philosopher's conclusion, therefore, is wholly unimportant. His premises

¹ "Das Problem des ewigen Friedens" ("The Problem of Perpetual Peace"), by the still living German philosopher Frischeisen-Köhler. Müller: Berlin, 1915.

are that war is a chance event, but from this it neither follows that it will continue to exist nor that it will pass away.

Hence, in order to form a profitable conception of war, it was needful first and foremost to endeavor to conceive it as a necessity in isolated instances; for only when we see under what conditions it is necessary can we decide under what conditions it is superfluous, or, rather, impossible.¹

§ 149.—*The Law of the Organism*

We know now that war was, so to speak, a passing phase in man's strivings after higher things; we know that that day has really gone by, and that it survives only by virtue of a right sanctified by custom. And now we can inquire what is the real, and, as we think, indestructible and eternal principle of man. It may, it is true, be asked whether there is, after all, any such principle, and whether, beyond the categorical imperatives of the individual human being, there exists an autocratic, superordinate imperative that applies to all human beings alike, and by which the justifications of individual imperatives may be gaged. Now, we shall find that there is such a universal moral law, and, strange as this may at first sight appear, it is based upon man's physical nature. Hence it is categorical in quite another sense than that in which Buddha, Christ, or Kant could insist on their moral laws being categorical. Its precepts, however, are identical with those of these three teachers.

This universal moral law, moreover, could be inferred as soon as the conception of natural law was made clearer. A right based on the decision of an individual man alone must always be questionable so long as it may conflict with other rights. The basis of such a natural right or natural tendency must therefore be some independent organism which has no need to respect any rights but its own.

Now, here on earth, first, the individual man, and, secondly,

¹ Cf. the chapters on the justification for war from the point of view of the natural scientist.

the human organism as a whole alone fulfil these conditions. The individual man owes his privileged position to the fact, which no one can well deny, that his functions form together a comparatively complete and independent whole. The complete human organism, supposing it to exist at all, which is what we mean to prove, has of course the same privileged situation. Humanity as a whole, indeed, is upon earth virtually entirely cut off from ancient superordinate cosmic influences, and thus is not obliged to respect any rights of others.

All connecting terms, however, such as the family or the state are only casual and mutable products of our changing customs, and can therefore not be considered as natural, but at most as conventional agglomerations. The only organisms which are immutable, and consequently above all conventions, must be the individual man and mankind in general. They therefore form the basis of all right, and there is only the right of mankind in general and the right of the individual man who is aware that he is in the right as regards all the world. Then, but only then, is he justified in being a revolutionary.

The sensation which we experience because we feel we all belong to one vast organism we call *altruism*; but that which we experience because of the fact that we as personalities to a certain extent form distinct individual organisms we call *egoism*. Altruism and egoism are therefore not unconditional opposites, but the same sentiment directed to a different object. Egoism we need not stop to consider; it flourishes like the green bay-tree: altruism must be proved to be the necessary equivalent of something actually genuine.

4.—THE HISTORY OF ALTRUISM

§ 150.—*The Twofold Basis of Altruism*

All morality is based on the presence of altruism.

The word itself is new, having been coined scarcely a hundred years ago by Comte,¹ who rightly considered it as

¹ This is according to the German philosopher Fislér.

embracing all the conditions of civilization and morality.

The term is used by every one in much the same sense, for, after all, it is merely a verbal difference whether a desire be called altruistic if it be likely to benefit others,¹ or to satisfy them,² or in general to do them "good."³ The only point of disagreement is how far altruism serves a good purpose or is allowable. It is possible to be altruistic without limit, as certain Christians would fain have us be; but altruism can also be restricted by declaring it contrary to morality unless it promote human evolution, or, in the words of the German philosopher Cornelius,⁴ if it takes account of the emotional experiences of our individual fellow-men, but only of what is permanently beneficial to the world in general.

It is not till we come to the basis of altruism that opinions are divided. Can altruistic sentiments arise in man? And if so, how? And can an individual man, apparently apart, put himself, as it were, absolutely in the place of another? And if so, how? These questions are generally answered in two diametrically opposite ways. The simpler way of getting out of the difficulty is to say that altruism, like so much else, is innate. We can understand why the ancients said this, since they knew nothing about the history of evolution. Aristotle⁵ calls man simply a ζῷον πολιτὸν; the Stoa⁶ believed that man was a social animal for the good of the nations in general; and, finally, Hume speaks of man having an innate sense of what is generally for the best. All this we can understand, but when Spencer⁷ says that altruism is as primogenial as

¹ As does Herbert Spencer in his "Principles of Morality," § 72, 1892.

² As does the German philosopher Theodor Lipps in "Ethische Grundfragen" ("Root Questions of Ethics"), p. 11. 1889.

³ As does the German-Galician philosopher Alexius Meinong in "Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie" ("Investigations into the Theory of Values"), p. 99. 1899.

⁴ "Einleitung in die Philosophie" ("An Introduction to Philosophy") by the German philosopher H. Cornelius. 1903.

⁵ Aristotle's "Politica," I, 2.

⁶ Cf. Seneca, L. A. 5, de Ira II, 3.

⁷ "Principles of Morality," § 76. 1892.

egoism; when John Stuart Mill¹ and Wilhelm Wundt repeat almost precisely the same thing; and when Simmel² calls altruism an inherited instinct, but Ribot,³ says the altruistic instinct is inherited, then we can only say they might have known that they were really saying nothing at all.

Those who consider altruism as egoism in disguise are more logical; but even this view is old, and in reality it is held by all religions, which certainly do insist on altruism; but probably because their founders are mostly intellectual weaklings, they consider the satisfaction of a selfish sentiment of happiness as the sole motive for morality. Thus they try to encourage altruism by first appealing to egoism, by promising either earthly bliss (as in the fourth commandment of Moses), or bliss in a visionary immortality.

We have three direct testimonies⁴ to the fact that Christ said that self-sacrifice—that is, altruism—is in reality the sublimest form of egoism. “Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel’s, the same shall save it.” (Mark viii, 35.) There could not be a grosser tribute to the egoism innate in every human being; but almost all religious doctrines are alike in this respect. Christ finds eternal bliss in the “beyond,” and the Buddhist blessed oblivion, the Mohammedan finds houris, and the Indian well stocked hunting-grounds. Even the religious Seneca⁵ says, with an egoistic undertone, “Wilt thou truly live for thyself, then must thou live for others.”

Even if in religions the egoistic impulse appears only in disguise, yet it is afterward frankly and consciously expressed,

¹ Collected Works, 1869.

² “Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft” (“Introduction to Moral Science”) by the still living German philosopher Simmel, published 1892. I, 92.

³ “Psychologie des Sentiments,” 1896, by Théodule Armand Ribot, § 325. (Translated into English as “The Psychology of the Emotions.”)

⁴ Matthew X, 39; Mark VIII, 35; Luke XVII, 33; John XII, 25.

⁵ “Alteri vivere oportet, si vis tibi vivere.” Seneca’s “Epistolæ,” 48, 11. Cf. also 60 IV.

particularly by British writers. For instance, Hobbes¹ attributes right and morality to selfish impulses toward self-preservation and to the fact that we are all mutually dependent on one another. Hobbes agrees that as man soon perceived that he got along better if he took others' interests into consideration, he acts altruistically from egoistic motives.

Those who argued thus are in general the same as those who attributed right to utility. (Cf. § 151.) What they have is all very well as far as it goes. Yet all high-sounding phrases, such as Ihering's "egoism of groups" and Meinong's "selfless egoism"² are mere definitions, and explain nothing. Also it matters little whether we love or hate egoism. Kant, for instance,³ says it is the self-seeking element in man's sensual nature which is "radically wrong." Dühring⁴ even says that egoism is nowise natural, but a product of degeneracy and corruption. On the other hand, Schopenhauer⁵ describes egoism (that "impulse toward being and well-being") as the mainspring of action both in human beings and animals. Stirner⁶ declares that the Ego is autocratic; and finally Nietzsche⁷ insists that the egoistic view of the world is the ruling morality and above the altruistic morality of slave. All which views and definitions matter equally much or equally little.

§ 151.—*The Development of the "English" Doctrine of Utilitarianism*

In reality these two possible bases of morality are no longer

¹ Hobbes, "De Cive" C I, § 2.

² Alexius Meinong, l c, p. 103.

³ Kant's "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" ("Critique of practical Reason"), 1788. Part I, Vol. I, 2, and "Anthropologie," I, § 2.

⁴ "Wirklichkeitsphilosophie" ("Philosophy of Reality") by Eugen Dühring, 1878, p. 139.

⁵ "Über die Grundlagen der Moral" ("The Foundations of Morality") § 1840.

⁶ "Der einzige und sein Eigentum" ("The Individual and his Property") by Max Stirner (real name Kaspar Schmidt), 1845.

⁷ In "Zarathustra," but the idea is more definitely expressed in "Jenseits von Gut und Böse," by Friedrich Nietzsche.

of much interest to-day. But the antithesis between the two points of view to a certain extent still concerns us, because we in Germany have been accustomed proudly to insist on the fact that, instead of a utilitarian morality fit only for a nation of shopkeepers, we possess an absolute morality based on a categorical imperative; and that this morality ordains that every one shall act morally, "however much he may injure himself or others in so doing."¹ Even those who do not believe in such an absolute morality may think it desirable, at any rate, to apply some form of morality, even should it be on a false basis.

Now, we may readily admit that Kant's transcendental morality is scarcely suited to serve as a basis for conduct on the battle-field; and the German 1902 "Rules of Land Warfare" are accordingly utilitarian, whether they mean to be so or not. Above all, however, this war has proved that it is just the most cultivated persons who are likely to say to themselves that, as they cannot now follow Kant's moral precepts, although these are the only true ones, therefore they conform to no morality, but do what it is their business to do as destructive machines under the stern compulsion of iron necessity.

Now, it is out of the question to base a war morality on Kant's "dignity of man." Hence we ought, and indeed a nation at war must, try to discover some other basis for its morality. That is, unless it is to be altogether at sea. Thus the exigencies of war quite naturally lead us toward that so-called "selfish system" which we, not wholly without justification, are accustomed to consider a somewhat contemptible speciality of our relatives across the channel. But instead of endeavoring to view it impartially, our pillars of civilization are just now doing their utmost to pour contempt upon it.

The chief reason for the scorn with which utilitarianism was

¹ "Über ein vermeintliches Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen" ("On the alleged right to lie out of considerations of humanity), by Kant, 1797.

received is probably that its opponents considered that utility must necessarily presuppose a selfish motive, which is both wrong and unjust. I have already shown, and in Chapter XII purpose to show in more detail, that in the last resort egoism and altruism by no means exclude each other, but are really identical. Now, this modern view it is which is mainly based on the works of British philosophers. They successfully endeavored to combat egoism by centering all their reflections around the race, and then laying down "natural laws of benevolence."

The fact that in Germany we are still violently opposed to the British is probably mainly due to the Christian conservative philosophers, particularly Professor Immanuel Hermann Fichte,¹ the son of the great Fichte, and Friedrich Julius Stahl,² member of the High Consistory Court. Both these men, in the worst reactionary period, blackguarded the English because of their philosophy, which, as Stahl neatly puts it, tends toward revolution. Moreover, both always attribute purely egoistic views to Englishmen whenever the latter refer to the greatest good of the greatest number (that is, to altruism). In so doing, however, they utterly ignore Hume, to whom this scarcely applies at all, and also Hutchinson. But a word to the wise is sufficient, and it was the opinions of Fichte and Stahl concerning British philosophy which prevailed.

Now, the doctrine propounded by Hobbes³ in the middle of the seventeenth century, that morality was due to utility, was far from being absolutely new. The Epicurean natural philosophers had already prepared men's minds for it. Again,

¹ "Die philosophischen Lehren von Recht und Sitte in Deutschland, Frankreich und England" ("The Philosophical Doctrines of Law and Morality in Germany, France, and England), by J. H. Fichte, 1850.

² "Philosophie des Rechtes nach griechischer Ansicht" ("The Philosophy of Right according to the Views of the Greeks"), by Friedrich Julius Stahl, 1830.

³ "De cive," Paris, 1642; "De hominis natura": London, 1650, and "Leviathan," London, 1651.

at almost the same time Spinoza¹ was teaching similar doctrines at Amsterdam, which, it is true, had for some years past ceased to form a part of the German Empire, but was still very much under the influence of German ideas. Nevertheless, it is true that Hobbes was the first systematically to base morality on utility. English philosophers, such as Butler² and Paley,³ Priestley,⁴ Hartley,⁵ and particularly Jeremy Bentham,⁶ who in 1802 first used the word "Utilitarianism," certainly developed this doctrine; but at the same time they did more and more to efface the egoistic substratum of the so-called selfish system by substituting the good of the community in general for the good of the individual man. It is likewise true that such British writers as Chesterfield⁷ and Jonathan Swift⁸ popularized this system, sometimes because they agreed with it, and sometimes ironically.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the impulse given by Hobbes determined the whole trend of ideas throughout the civilized world in the ensuing period, and that none of the succeeding philosophers in any civilized country could shake off his influence. Among those who have drawn practical inferences from his works, sometimes pushing them to extremes, the Germans were well to the fore; and in particular I might mention Thomasius,⁹ Christian Wolf,¹⁰ Frederick II,¹¹

¹ The chief writings of Spinoza which here come into consideration were not published till after his death.

² "Three Sermons on Human Nature," by Bishop Joseph Butler, 1726.

³ Paley's "Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," 1785.

⁴ Joseph Priestley's "Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity," 1777.

⁵ Hartley's "Observations of Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations," 1749.

⁶ "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," by Jeremy Bentham, 1789.

⁷ Particularly in his "Letters to his Son," 1774.

⁸ Particularly in his "philosophical travel romance," "Gulliver's Travels," 1726.

⁹ Christian Thomasius, a Saxon philosopher and jurist, "Einleitung zur Sittenlehre," ("Introduction to the Doctrine of Morality") 1692.

¹⁰ "Philosophia moralis," by the Silesian philosopher, Christian Wolf.

¹¹ "Examen du prince de Machiavel," 1739, by Frederick II of Brandenburg. See also many passages from his letters to Voltaire.

and Nicolai,¹ also Holbach,² who wrote in French, down to Nietzsche. And modern German jurists, such as Beneke,³ Ihering,⁴ and Gizycki,⁵ to say nothing of such men as Kohler, adopted an out and out utilitarian standpoint.

On the other hand, Englishmen, especially Locke,⁶ but also Henry More,⁷ Cudworth,⁸ Richard Price, and most of all Shaftesbury,⁹ have protested against this utilitarian doctrine.

Most important of all, however, David Hume,¹⁰ one of the most brilliant thinkers whom not only England, but the world, has ever known, succeeded in showing, basing his arguments on Hobbes's writings, that even without metaphysics it is possible, at all events, to recognize the fact that morality may be wholly disinterested. He took sympathy as the mainspring of his ideas, unconsciously reverting to the Peripatetics, and Stoics' conception of it. These schools looked upon the world as being held together by sympathy and as simply the expression of a single great organism. Hume is therefore really

¹ Christoph Friedrich Nicolai German litterateur and bookseller. See especially many volumes of his "Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek," ("Universal German Library"), in which he voiced the opposition to Kant, Fichte, and Goethe; that is, to the then new movement of thought.

² "Eléments de la morale universelle," by Paul Heinrich Thyry d'Holbach, 1776.

³ "Grundsätze der Zivil—und Kriminalgesetzgebung" ("Principles of Civil and Criminal Legislation") by M. Beneke, 1830.

⁴ "Kampf ums Recht" ("The Fight for the Right"), in particular "Der Zweck im Recht" ("The Object of Right"), by Rudolf von Ihering, pp. 77-83.

⁵ "Philosophische Konsequenzen der Lamarck-Darwininschen Entwicklungstheorie" ("The Philosophical Consequences of Lamarck's and Darwin's theories of Evolution"), by G. von Gizycki, 1876.

⁶ "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," by John Locke, 1690.

⁷ "Enchiridion ethicum," by Henry More, 1667.

⁸ "Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality," by Ralph Cudworth, 1731.

⁹ "Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times," by Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, 1713.

¹⁰ Hume ventilated such arguments even in 1738 in his "Treatise upon Human Nature," published at the age of twenty-seven. In his later works he was constantly departing from modern utilitarianism and reverting to these contentions.

the founder of modern morality, which is no longer based on metaphysics, but applies to all human beings indiscriminately. His doctrines were afterward developed, particularly by John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith, and Charles Darwin, and to some extent also by the German natural philosophers.

I have instanced all these authors, and I might have instanced many more, to show how wrongly men's writings are frequently interpreted. The modern doctrine of utilitarianism may, in short, be summarized as "*that the aim and object of our actions is the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number of human beings.*"¹ Now let us see how Germany insures this.

§ 152.—*The Evolution of Kantian Morality*

To this practical maxim Kant² opposed his categorical imperative. He based it on doctrines extending back as far as Plato, although on practical reason as well. According to Kant's "categorical imperative," "*Man ought to act in accordance with a maxim which may at the same time prevail as a universal law.*"

Now, without expressing an opinion as to the value of and basis for these two maxims, it is certain that any one desirous of acting morally *can* do so without infringing either; but it is not so certain that any one following only one of them *must* act morally in all circumstances. At all events, no general injustice could ever result from the so-called English doctrine, although from the "German" doctrine a good deal inevitably follows which, leaving objective justice out of account, seems to us, after all, subjectively right and reasonable.

Hence the English doctrine is undoubtedly more practical than that of Kant, because an objective test can be applied to it; whereas, however much we may try to avoid it, there will

¹ "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," by Jeremy Bentham, II, chap. 17, p. 234.

² Kant's "Metaphysik der Sitten" ("Metaphysics of Morals").

always be a subjective remainder in the case of a categorical imperative. Besides this, Kant's doctrine, strictly interpreted, cannot be carried out in practice. Human beings, after all, vary greatly, and there is no universal maxim applicable alike to a weak-brained person and to a genius. For instance, a genius has a right to revolt, but if every human being claimed such a right, the result would be universal anarchy. Whether a person, however, has a right to resist this sluggish world, he alone can decide; and if he does so without regard to the interests of people in general, then he drifts about aimlessly on the ocean of limitless subjectivity.

Now, it is certain that an upright man will act uprightly quite apart from Kant, Hobbes, or Hume; while a rogue will remain a rogue, whether he call himself a Kantian or a disciple of Hobbes. It does not seem a mere chance, however, that Hobbes should have been born in England and Kant in Germany, although he was of British descent. The Germans have always considered independent, original thought as their speciality, and often as their privilege as well. In this respect they believe themselves superior to all other nations; whereas the Englishman's love of tradition and of old-established law was often ridiculed as a feeling akin to that of slaves accustomed to be driven in gangs. Your Englishman, it was said, is, after all, a slave, despite his political liberty.

Some such distinction there would really seem to be, and its causes are probably to be found deep down in the education and peculiar genius of the German and English nations. It profoundly influences all the external aspects of life, particularly those practical notions of right which have developed in both nations as time has gone on. Schopenhauer assuredly manifested extraordinary psychological perspicacity when he said ¹ that the German is all for equity, but the Briton is for justice, adding, "that equity is the enemy of justice, and often grossly conflicts with it."

¹ "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik" ("The Two Root Problems of Ethics"), by Schopenhauer, II, § 17, p. 222.

This is not the place to discuss which is the nobler quality, objective justice or subjective equity, although personally I incline to Schopenhauer's view that if human beings are to be able to live together, justice is of much the more importance. In any case, justice is more suited to everyday life.

It is interesting to trace what has happened in Germany. Setting out from Kant, we have gradually, by a circuitous route, *via* equity, come utterly to deny laws of universal application and wholly to accept a utilitarian doctrine. In England, on the contrary, men have set out from Hobbes, and have arrived, by a circuitous route, *via* Hume's "sympathy," unconditionally to admit established standards.

Kant's morality is based on the subjective categorical imperative, and it is no chance that such a pessimist as Schopenhauer, such an ultra-radical as Stirner, and such a superman as Nietzsche, all alleged that the basis of their philosophy was Kant. Even if it cannot for a moment be suggested that the ideas of any one of these three were unethical, the fact remains that it is their school which has produced such men as Moltke and Bernhardi, who proclaim the doctrine that for the strong man every means, even forcible means, of getting stronger is allowable.

§ 153.—*The Abuse of Kant's Doctrine*

Now, even in the "Handbook of the Usages of Land Warfare," published by the German General Staff, the principle is always adopted that the necessities of war override any written law introduced by international conventions. The attitude to be adopted toward restrictive legislation of this kind depends on the judgment of the persons concerned.

It is easy to see that such instructions, which take no count of anything except of possible advantage, strike at the very roots of all international agreements, and in particular they make the precepts of the Hague Convention about the laws and customs of land warfare virtually illusory. As I have frequently pointed out, war is restricted and in a sense im-

peded by such conventions. But if a nation signs them, then in so doing it binds itself thenceforward to wage war under these more difficult conditions.

No one denies that the general staff was justified in assuming that, judging by the experience of warfare, France would be most successfully attacked by a march through Belgium. The chief ground for this assumption, however, must have been that France, relying somewhat on international conventions, had fortified this part of her frontier less than any others. But whether France could be most successfully attacked via Belgium or not was no longer the question. By the neutrality law of 1839 Germany had become a guarantor of the inviolability of Belgium, and in so doing she herself erected an insurmountable wall along the Belgian frontier. She herself had put an obstacle in the way of war, just as France had done, although this is now beside the point. And now it was for Germany to fight under these more difficult conditions.

She did not do so. She set herself up above objective justice as laid down by conventions, arguing that there was so much at stake for Germany that it was allowable for her to do what best suited her own purposes without troubling about law. I am firmly convinced that both the grand general staff and Bethmann-Hollweg, who defended Germany's action, were subjectively absolutely convinced that in this particular case they did right to substitute Germany's advantage for Germany's duty and that the laws of equity justified their action. But these laws of equity can never be definitely ascertained, and Germans must not be surprised if others, both nations and individual men, do not altogether appreciate them. England, however, declared war as a guarantor of the inviolability of Belgian neutrality, as it was her duty to do in accordance with the wording of the law which guaranteed it.

Since the war began there have been more cases of objective violations of law. I omit all mention of horrible isolated acts, which may be excused on the ground of fear, confusion, lack

of discipline, or absence of supervision; but some proclamations of General von Bülow, Lieutenant-General von Nieber, and Field-Marshal von der Goltz cannot be explained except as deliberate violations of law. It is to be hoped that the authors of these proclamations knew that they flatly conflict with the regulations of the Second Hague Conference.¹ For instance, according to Article 50 of the Hague Convention, no generalized punishment in money or otherwise may be inflicted;² the torpedoing of merchant vessels conflicts with the convention concerning prize courts; the use of poisonous gases is expressly forbidden, etc. All which is bad, but not the worse.

War is not a moral action. Now, whoever says A must also say B, and he cannot be reproached even if he does so with dogged determination. There is no excuse, however, for the hypocrisy of those who have remained at home—a hypocrisy now coming to light everywhere. We can understand men losing their heads when they see the sky illuminated with the light of burning villages, but there is no excuse whatever for those who write their proclamations by the peaceful light of their study lamp. Those who assert that German militarism and German civilization are not a contradiction in terms are quite right. Even in peace-time, under the influence of militarism, there were many who used to advocate individualist or, at any rate, social “Eudæmonism” of the most outrageous description, and only too frequently they concluded by an appeal to Kant.³ Now, in war-time, this has become everywhere the fashion in Germany.

But let us leave this wretched bastard, the product of the womb of Athene, goddess of wisdom, impregnated by Mars—a

¹ “To be hoped,” because, let us hope, that German generals are acquainted with the Hague Conference regulations.

² Cf. the late Professor Emile Waxweiler’s “Hat Belgien sein Schicksal verdient?” (“Did Belgium deserve her Fate?”) *Orall Füsste: Zürich*.

³ Eudæmonism means happiness or well-being, and in modern ethics is used to denote a general type of ethical theory equally removed from the extremes of hedonism and abstract rationalism.—Translator.

union which horrified even the imagination of the ancients, none too fastidious when it came to a question of the illegitimate intercourse of the gods.

It may be, indeed, that there is neither an absolute nor even any relative morality, and that consequently we need abide by no sort of moral laws whatever. Our martial philosophers are perhaps more nearly right than they will even confess to themselves in the coming time of calm consideration and reversion to the eternal Kant. But one thing is certain: Kant's own country is already conquered.

§ 154.—*A Change of Parts and a Comedy in Consequence*

In conclusion, let me cite a curious parallel. If we set out from the delusion that Kantian ethics prevail in Germany, and utilitarianism in England, then just now both nations seem to have changed places. A dramatic instance of this is the interview¹ which the British ambassador had on the evening of August 4 with the German Imperial Chancellor, which is, so to speak, a confirmation of how seldom any human being's actions are influenced by his theoretical morality. Bethmann-Hollweg, who likes to be called a Kantian, says that, Would Great Britain for a mere word "neutrality," a word often disregarded in war-time, for a mere scrap of paper—would Great Britain wage war with a nation akin to her in blood, whose greatest wish it was to be friends with her? For purely strategical reasons it is a matter of life and death for Germany to march through Belgium and violate her neutrality.

In his despatch No. 160 to Sir Edward Grey, dated August 8, 1914, from London, Sir Edward Goschen says:

I protested strongly against that statement [that is, that Great Britain was responsible for all the terrible events that might happen], and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate

¹ Report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey. Despatch No. 160 of August 8, 1914.

the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked.

The chancellor then asked:

"But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?"

Sir Edward Goschen's despatch then proceeds: "I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements."

Every word here which the British ambassador says seems dictated by the conception of duty, and every word which the German says, by the conception of utility.

The German philosopher Vorländer¹ probably had a presentiment that this would be so, for as long ago as 1851 he wrote: "Those who pursue only the divine ideal of human nature without at the same time taking into account the reality and truth of human life, as we see it in English ethics, lose themselves only too easily in an empty, confused idealism, which leads to no good in life and does not even enrich our knowledge. But whatever be our views on morality, the important point for statesmen, more than for any other human beings, is not why they do their duty, but that they should do it, as even the 'ethical' Spinoza said,² *Nec ad imperii securitatem refert, quo animo homines inducantur ad res publicas recte administrandas, modo recte administrentur.*"

In view of the facts, I think that our professors of philosophy ought at any rate to cease prostituting themselves and Kant and their own nation, and should rather say with Beth-

¹ "Rechtsphilosophie und Moral der Engländer im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert" ("The Philosophy of Right and Morality of the English in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries"), by the nineteenth-century German philosopher Vorländer. In the "Allg. Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur," p. 356. Cf. also p. 460.

² Spinoza, "Tract. politic," cap. I, § 56.

mann-Hollweg, "Pater, peccavi." We have sinned against the conception of duties undertaken by thinking altogether too much of our own advantage, albeit, perhaps, in the circumstances there was some excuse for this; but we hope to do our best to set matters right again afterward.

§ 155.—*The Inadequacy of Both Bases of Morality*

Whether we base our love of our neighbors on religion or on egoism, we can certainly live quite morally; but then in neither case have we anything really to keep us from egoism. If altruism were only a God-given, inborn sentiment, for which there is no visible cause, then of course it can extend only so far as this inborn sentiment extends; and if any one in a particular case is inclined to be not altruistic, but too egoistic, then it is useless to reason with him, for there is no modifying any inborn sentiment. Neither philosophy nor God can change it.

But if altruism is egoism in disguise, then the original egoism may of course be entitled, indeed must, to follow altruistic sentiments only so long as it seems right to the superordinate egoism so to do; and in each individual case egoism may say that altruistic impulses are misplaced. In both cases, in short, if any one behaves decently, this is only because he happens to be well disposed. On the other hand, if the other person is to have an absolute right to proper treatment, this right must be based neither on a subjective feeling, nor must it be anything in the nature of a right voluntarily conceded, as it were, from motives of expediency. It must be a right which has nothing to do with my personal feelings or my own will.

So long as morality is not based on actual demonstrable principles, it is simply something in the air, and the modern man realizes this only too keenly. Thus Drews,¹ the well known German student of the life and teachings of Christ, says that there is no empirical morality, and that morality would be in

¹ The modern German religious philosopher Drews made this statement in 1910 in an address delivered in Berlin. Whether this has been printed or not, I do not know.

any case inconceivable without God; but that as morality is a necessity, we must, even against reason, hold fast the conception of a God, as if for most human beings this were such an easy matter! And Karl Jentsch¹ actually makes the monstrous assertion that "political economy exists for the individual human being." Even he thinks that without belief in God there would be no higher aim than the welfare of the individual human being, and as political economy must, he argues, be independent of belief in God, there is no other course left but to base it on the individual human being.

Clearly the disinclination to bring morality to the plane of this earth has very unsatisfactory results. Instead of drawing the only possible conclusion from the fact of there being such a thing as political economy, something higher than the welfare of the individual man here below, Jentsch would rather deny the fact; for, after all, it is denying political economy to assert that it exists for the individual human being.

And all this because a morality brought down to and applied to this world seems to him positively dreadful! To me it seems that the antimonist trend given to our ideas, or, rather, the regrettable popularization of antimonist philosophy, is responsible for this moral laxity, many more instances of which might be given. It is always imagined that if morality is not based on categorical imperatives, then it is not morality at all, and not worth discussing.

Let us now see whether it is not possible to find in nature the conditions of an objective morality, one which would have the incalculable advantage of being independent of our subjective feelings, be they commendable or the reverse. This is possible because of the fact that mankind can be proved to be an organism.

¹ "Zukunft" ("Future"), by the German historian Karl Jentsch.

PART TWO

HOW WAR MAY BE ABOLISHED

CHAPTER XII

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM

1.—THE HELLENIC PERIOD

§ 156.—*The First Presentiments of There Being a Soul in This World*

If a natural scientist is to be able to describe any process or occurrence, he must first be able to show how it could come about. He can understand the secretion of bile only through our anatomical knowledge of the liver. If we are to understand psychic processes, we must have some knowledge of the brain, and to account for altruism in man we should be obliged to prove some corresponding organic basis for it. The fact of the existence of a personality maintained by a homogeneous consciousness explains egoism, indeed in a sense necessitates it. Similarly the undeniable existence of altruism means that there must be some organic substratum on which it is based, and which could consist only in the fact of mankind as a whole being also a homogeneous organism and possessing a kind of collective consciousness. If this could be proved, then we should, at any rate, have some foundation to go upon.

That mankind is not a mere notion, but a solid fact, may seem absurd to many persons; but there is no denying that the noblest representatives of mankind have at all times believed in there being a soul in this world. All the higher religions may ultimately be traced back to the imperative feeling that an isolated human being is not capable of the highest, which he can attain only by means of organization. Man is instinctively felt to belong to some larger association or community. True, he cannot clearly grasp this fact, and he is therefore

irresistibly impelled to endeavor to express his vague divination by the mystical word God.

Here we have the moral—that is, the human—foundation of all religion, and not until such a God of man becomes deified is there anything contrary to morality in it. Obviously, if God no longer represents mankind, but is something extra-human, so to speak, then the individual man has a God who is “too sublime” for him, and he acquires a right to lord it over everything, with an egoism knowing no bounds. In fact, this is exactly what has come to pass everywhere.

But when attempts were made to comprehend this dimly conceived divinity by means of the intellect, or at any rate to bring it into line with the intellect; when, for instance, the Hellenes first began to indulge in philosophic speculation, even then we find references to this soul of the world, as if it were something needing no explanation.

Everything, in fact, which we continue to say, with half-melancholy resignation about the vanished harmony of the Greek conception of the world may be traced back to the fact that the divine idea of a world one and indivisible still survived in this Greek people, so simple, yet so wise. In reality, the hylozoism of Thales¹ and the other six wise men of Greece is nothing but the belief that the whole world is a single great organism. Even for Heraclitus² everything had a soul and was full of demons; even he believed that everything had a consciousness and did its share of thinking;³ he believed there to be a universal “world fire” common to everything, which

¹ Aristotle, “De Anima,” I, 2, says expressly of Thales that he taught that even stones had a soul. [Thales was the chief of the seven wise men of ancient Greece, was a native of Miletus, and flourished from about 600 to 540 B. C. In philosophy he sought for a single element out of which the whole world was formed. This he thought to be moisture.—Translator.]

² In Diogenes Laertes, L. 9. 7. [Heraclitus of Ephesus is said to have been the first philosopher to proclaim the absolute life of nature, and the conception of an unconditional rational law governing the whole course of nature.—Translator.]

³ Sextus Empiricus, ad math. VIII 286.

for him also meant universal intelligence, a conception probably similar to that of the Brahman of the Upanishads.¹ All the pre-Socratic thinkers held such views, as did also the whole Greek nation, which expressed its aspirations by creating for itself the world of Greek divinities, the lost beauty of which has been touchingly lamented by Schiller.

With Socrates, to whom we otherwise owe much, first came strife into the world. He first began to set man on a pinnacle. He believed that man, owing to his moral greatness, could be contrasted with the rest of nature. True, he also expounded ethical doctrines of a wondrous pathos which have endured to this day and seem destined to endure for all time. But perhaps precisely because of these doctrines and his conviction of their profound value, although he could not fully establish them, Socrates believed that ethics could not in any case be explained or proved, but at best only taught. All post-Socratic religion and ethics, in so far as they were dogmatic, never did more than attempt to supply this lack of basis or justification.

Now, certainly no one ought to think that in Socrates himself this great cleavage is always clearly perceivable. In his "Daimonium" there still survives something of that old Fate which his ancestors had revered, that superhuman Fate which created Greek tragedy, and which even the ancient Teutons revered under the form of that sway of the Norns to which even gods must bow.

§ 157.—*The Post-Socratics*

All these doctrines and ideas are mystical symbols of the profoundly realized fact that the destiny of us human beings, despite all our self-seeking and self-will, nevertheless works out in accordance with great laws, eternal and unbending. But men then were trying not merely to feel the world, but also to understand it, and they found it extraordinarily hard to

¹ Upanishad, or Vedanta, a system of ancient Hindu philosophy which endeavors to investigate the true nature of the human soul.—Translator.

understand what had hitherto been simply felt and taken on trust. Hence they thought they could overcome the difficulty by coining the phrase, "Man's freedom as a moral being is something outside the constraint to which nature is subjected." The glorious effects, fraught with vast consequences, of man's having thus insisted on his freedom must not blind us to the fact that in so doing he put himself so to speak "outside nature."

So long as the cause of this contrast between man and nature was not absolutely cleared up, all attempts to unite the two inevitably ended in mysticism or rationalism. Such attempts continued until Kant's time, yet even he did not quite explain the enigma. He did, however, prepare the way for its solution by contrasting the opposite conclusions reached by considering matters from the point of view of pure reason and of the actual hard fact. If Kant had not at last attempted a mystical or transcendental solution of the problem, the world would have probably perceived more clearly than it did that his point of view was nearest the truth.

Two thousand years separate Socrates from Kant, and all this time that superordinate principle survived which the wise men of old accepted and believed in as the soul of the world; but gradually it developed into a conception of divinity removed from human comprehension. Gradually, therefore, the harmony of the terrestrial world, as taught by the Pythagoreans, degenerated into a harmony of a purely suprasensual world.

Even in Plato's writings the homogeneousness of the world is generally represented only by the *demiurgos*,¹ who created the world homogeneous, and whose visible emanations are the celestial bodies. Man, on the contrary, is a miniature God unto himself, an imitation or image of the immortal gods.

Even in Aristotle we get only glimpses of the world's soul as conceived by his predecessors. For instance, he refers to a

¹ *Demiurgos* is the name applied by Plato to the creator of the universe.—Translator.

plant soul.¹ For him, as for Plato, even each separate state is a living being, a *zoon*, a substance "bearing in itself the principle of its motion and having a tendency to change." Thus did the state come within the province of natural science, and become something to be investigated by the same methods as all animate beings; that is, by experimental analysis.² Many other references to some such idea may be found. Thus Aristotle says that a slave is an organ of the family, "a part of his master, as it were, a part of his body, but with a separate existence and a soul." Of a popular assembly he says that it is a single consciousness, a single intelligence. The discussions preceding a collective decision precisely resemble the way in which an individual man takes counsel with himself, except that the collective person, having more organs at its disposal, and wider and more varied experience, is correspondingly wiser. Aristotle also expressly states that whether the different parts of an organization are in contact with one another or not is comparatively immaterial; for the real basis of the organization is rather the mutual relationships of life.

Similarly many hints occur in Aristotle that groups of human beings are to be considered as organisms, but the broad general idea of humanity was then waxing dim, and he says nothing about a collective soul of the world. This conception, indeed, survived in a far more definite form among the Stoics, whose "*pneuma*"—a something which can move of itself and think for itself—embraces the entire world, and is therefore merely the old hyolozoist soul of the world, only more vigorously conceived. The Stoics were afterward joined by Plotinus³ who insists on the homogeneity of individual souls; by

¹ Aristotle, "De Anima," II, 2, 413.

² *Idem*, I, 113.

³ Plotinus, founder of the Neo-Platonic system of philosophy. He held that the soul is the one source of knowledge, that the Deity can be grasped by intuition only; that after the Deity, the productive of all existence, comes the universal soul or spirit; and out of the spirit is developed the soul. Kingsley's "Hypatia" gives some idea of Plotinus's philosophy.—Translator.

the Manicheans,¹ the Christians, and, above all, by Origen.

2.—THE CHRISTIAN ERA

§ 158.—*The Scholastic Victory Over Primitive Christendom*

The Christians believed in the *pneuma hagion*, in a sacred, vivifying, inspiring force, uniting together every individual soul.² This *pneuma hagion* was the world soul, but a body was likewise attributed to this world. Thus St. Paul says:

“For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office:

“So we, *being* many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.”³

This last sentence is perhaps the best and assuredly the most searching definition ever given of an organism and the mutual relations of its parts or members one with another.

In amazement we might well ask ourselves how the plain men who wrote the sacred Scriptures attained to such wisdom. They probably knew nothing of the conception of an organism, nor even of human society. And yet they could define both with the utmost clarity! But how did they do so? This apparent marvel can be understood only if we take the fact which we would fain prove as being already proved, “Universal human love is the feeling which testifies to the health of the universal human organism.” Both these things are inseparably bound up with each other, and primitive Christianity was so profoundly penetrated with charity, or man’s love

¹ Manicheism, whose originator was Mani, born in Babylon about A. D. 216, and put to death by crucifixion and flaying, taught that the spirits of light send a succession of prophets to earth—Noah, Abraham, Zoroaster, Buddha, and Jesus *patibilis*, who is a pure spirit, and his body merely a phantom. Mani himself claimed to be the last such prophet, destined to carry on the work of Christ and Paul—the separation of light from darkness.—Translator.

² Cf. p. 451 et seq., concerning the conception of the Holy Ghost.

³ Romans XII, 4 and 5. This conception developed in process of time into the purely dogmatic and in reality quite incomprehensible modern conception of the “Holy Ghost.”

of his fellow-man, that this sacred love was the source whence it derived the strength intuitively to perceive the practical effect of such love. Without laying too great stress on intuitive perceptions of truth, we may yet say that every one who believes in the power of the soul to elicit the truth should inscribe in letters of gold these verses from the Epistle to the Romans.

The close and obviously inevitable connection of this Pauline precept with the conception of universal human love is also clear from the fact that even Seneca,¹ who in this respect thought absolutely as a Christian, agrees with St. Paul in considering individual human beings as members of one great superordinate living body.

Christianity, therefore, seemed destined to make widely known the ancient Hellenic idea of harmony in the world, and in the first centuries after Christ even the millenarians hoped that, at any rate at some future time, the kingdom of God would prevail on earth. Tertullian in particular did so; and even Origen, who disagreed with the millenarians in this respect, holds similar views; for he expressly states that ² "The whole world is like a great animal animated by one soul and one only." Herein he shows his affinities with St. Paul, at the same time laying down that principle which the writer would fain have seen recognized. This principle can be expressed in up-to-date language as follows: the cells in an animal, taken together, form a single large organism. Similarly all isolated individuals taken together form a superordinate organism, a statement which is to be understood quite literally, and not metaphorically.

In the interval, however, the world came under the influence of the Christian scholastics, and for centuries this conception survived merely as a symbol, overgrown and hidden by tran-

¹ "Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est: membra sumus corporis magni." Seneca, Letter 95.

² Origen, "De Princip., I, 1, 3, says: "*Universum mundum velut animal quoddam immensam atque opiniandum puto, quod quasi ab una anima virtute dei ac ratione teneatur.*"

scendental Christian, mysticism. Even Augustine¹ transformed an idea, which after all is based only on natural science, into something purely spiritual and religious. This great father of the church was unfortunately succeeded by the entirely Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages, of whom Abelard may be specially mentioned. Thomas² alone is a notable exception. These philosophers systematically ignored the clear definitions of Aristotle, whom otherwise they esteemed highly, as was always the case with those who could not apply his teachings. Human society was stated not to be a natural, but only an artificial, mechanism, possibly a creation of the devil. With it was contrasted, as being a true organism, the heavenly kingdom of God, and here again that actual kingdom of which men dreamed created a confusion in their conceptions of life.

§ 159.—*Renaissance and Reaction*

Thus matters remained until the natural philosophers of the Renaissance once more reverted to the pan-psychic ideas of Grecian mythology. Then, when the world seemed wholly given over to killing and fighting, the best mortals, who rightly called themselves humanists, once again became aware of a longing for humane ways and ideas. They remembered Greek harmony and unity, or, as they occasionally called it, equality. From the teachings of the church they selected the fraternity of the early Christians, and they even had an inkling of the liberty which knowledge was one day to confer on them.

Since then liberty, equality, and fraternity have unmistakably progressed. True, the mass of mankind have neither Greek, Christian, nor scientific leanings, and consequently are not humane either. They oppress their inferiors and bow down to their superiors; and as regards the human race, it is just the same. They imagine that a God rules over them and that the animal kingdom is subject to them.

¹ St. Augustine in his "De Civitate dei libris, XXII," XIV, 28.

² Thomas, "De regim. princ." I, 1.

Since the Renaissance, however, man has begun to feel that there exists an inward link between himself and nature; and when Leibnitz died some notion of man's resemblance both to God and beast had already filtered through even to the darkest regions of Europe. This trend of thought it was which was destined to be decisive in the future, but as yet such ideas did not generally prevail. The potentates of those days were still equally alarmed at the notion of man resembling God and at that of his resembling the beasts of the field; and although these heretical views first made their appearance decently in the garb of orthodox Christianity, yet the church was astute enough to perceive the young swan in the duck's egg almost before it was hatched.

We need not here discuss what was done with God. He became more and more fined down and exclusive, with less and less of the human about Him, until at length, in 1854, the dogma was put forth that the birth even of the mother of God was stainless. Similarly animals were represented as having no resemblance to human beings, a school of thought of which Descartes, who said they were machines, is a typical instance. St. Francis of Assisi was not exactly placed on the index, but the sense of his poems to Brother Wolf and Brother Sun was scouted. After all, that period was beginning in which the church helped to erect barriers between different categories of human beings. How, therefore, was it to recognize our brothers in trees and shrubs or in air and water?

Thus began a time when the natural man, and with him natural society, was once more combated as in the darkest period of the Middle Ages, only more systematically and more strictly in accordance with dogmatic principles. There was even opposition to those who from purely religious sentiment would fain have been brothers in Christ or in nature. Yet such men were many—a whole series of them, indeed, from St. Francis of Assisi to Angelus Silesius¹ and from Christian

¹ Johannes Angelus Silesius, whose real name was Johann Scheffler, was induced by the writings of Böhme and other mystics to join the

to Goethe. The conception of mankind as an organism seemed forgotten.

The seventeenth century had still not shaken off these influences, when men were continually endeavoring to prove that although man had natural qualities, he had also purely spiritual gifts, which put him on a plane above nature. Thus Hobbes,¹ in his "Leviathan," expressly states that natural animal societies, such as the communities in which bees, ants, beavers, and other creatures live, have nothing in common with human society, which is based on human intelligence. Spinoza,² indeed, as is well known, believed the whole world to have a soul, "*quamvis diversis gradibus animata*"; and elsewhere he says that whenever a large number of human beings act in virtue of a right that they all have in common, it seems as if they all had a soul in common. Thus he reverts to Aristotle's views; but the "soul of a state" is to him merely a creation of the human mind and its conscious reflection, not the other way about.

The reversion to Grecian harmony would have been easiest for Leibnitz, for according to his theory each individual body consists of an unlimited number of separate monads. Consequently, nothing would have been simpler than to apply to society this conception of individuals separated by space, but yet forming a unit. Leibnitz says somewhere that every plant and every animal may be considered in the light of a large garden full of flowers or a pond full of fish. But every branch of a plant and every limb of an animal, indeed every drop of its secretions, can also be considered in the light of such a garden or such a pond. Yet, so far as I am aware, Leibnitz never directly hints that he looks upon the world as an organ-

Roman Catholic Church. His mysticism has much in common with Schopenhauer's philosophy.

¹ Hobbes' "Leviathan," 1650. Published in German in 1794. p. 165 (of German edition). Similar views were held by Bossuet, for instance (*de la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même*, IV, 11), Locke, and others.

² Spinoza's "Ethics," II, prop. XIII, dealing with politics.

ism, perhaps because he saw no necessity to express in words what he undoubtedly thought quite obvious. Leibnitz was a thorough cosmopolitan not only because, owing to his principles, he could hardly be otherwise, but for other reasons also. Born in Leipsic, he wrote in French, and his "Monadology" is an attempt to combine "English and French philosophy." His correspondence shows him to have been the trusted friend of persons of all nationalities, and indeed his greatness consists partly, at all events, in his having been truly a man at home in many lands. It would certainly never have even occurred to him that a thinking being, least of all any one styling himself a philosopher, could take sides in the War of the Spanish Succession, in which his various home-lands were involved. Leibnitz, indeed, did not see danger in men being biased in favor of one particular land, and therefore did nothing to prevent being so. In short, he overestimated men's intellects, even as, a hundred years later, Bonaparte overestimated nations.

Thus matters went on for a long time, and even Rousseau based his "reversion to nature" on no considerations of natural science or even of nature. To him the word nature, in conformity with which he wanted his society to be ordered, was still altogether an idea in the Platonic sense. This idea Rousseau modified very much as it suited him to do. Whereas, in reality nature is everywhere bound by her own laws, for him nature is merely a symbol of liberty.

3.—THE MODERN PERIOD

160.—*Its Forerunners*

Yet the belief persisted that this world here below is in a certain sense an organism complete in itself and by itself; and, despite the church and its quest of heavenly bliss, the torch of knowledge was passed from one to another, and the smoldering spark thus kept alive. The history of the idea of the world as an organism, and how it arose, would be undoubtedly one

of rare fascination to write; but here it can be given only in broadest outline.

About the year 1500 Nicolas Leon Thomæus¹ was already insisting that there must be some link between individual human beings, which he used as an argument for the possibility of second sight and "natural prophecy." About 1550 Cardanus² ascribed to the world a real life of its own (*propriam et veram vitam*); in 1581 Giordano Bruno³ wrote of *natura naturans*, and Paracelsus⁴ the great regenerator's "*Consensus*" and Patritius's "*Panpsychia*"⁵ are all merely different ways of expressing their common belief in the world being an organism.

These few instances, however, can scarcely afford any idea of how prevalent throughout the sixteenth century was the idea of the world as an organism; and to cite further instances would take me too far. I shall confine myself, therefore, to quoting the words of Rixner and Siber,⁶ who have devoted a bulky volume to nothing but the opinions of these courageous "innovators" in the domain of natural science. The conclusion to which they come is that, however widely different may be the views, characteristics, knowledge, education, and mode of life of the sixteenth century scientists and thinkers, they all agreed in considering nature as a living thing. All

¹ Thomæus, quoted from Rixner.

² Cardanus's "*De subtilitate rerum*," 1550 V. opp. III, 374 and 439, and XVIII, p. 491 ed. 1663, "*utramque esse in rebus veramque earum constituere eitam*."

³ Giordano Bruno. Extract from his works by F. II. Jacob, 1789, p. 263.

⁴ Paracelsus, "*Archido*," Vol. I. According to Paracelsus, a Swiss physician and naturalist, human beings take part in the universal life by means of their sidereal or astral body.

⁵ Patritius, "*Novâ de universis Philosophia*." Ferrara, IV, 54, and V, 58.

⁶ Thaddeus A. Rixner and Siber's "*Leben und Lehrmeinungen berühmter Physiker am Ende des XVI. und am Anfang des XVII. Jahrhunderts. Heft: Paracelsus XV.*" ("*Life and Doctrines of Famous Physicists at the Close of the Sixteenth and Beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries.*")

nature was to them a universal organism, instinct with joyous life in all its component parts. The principal philosophers quoted are Theophrastus Paracelsus, Hieronymus Cardanus, Bernhardinus Telesius, Franciscus Patritius, Jordanus Brunus, Thomas Campanella, and Johann Baptist van Helmont.

In the seventeenth century these ideas were more clearly formulated. Suarez,¹ for instance, says that the individual is only a partial manifestation of the genus; Francis Bacon² asserts that there is sensibility everywhere; and Campanella³ does likewise; while Ficinus⁴ proves that civilization is ever-living and immortal, whence he concludes that the world must have an immortal soul. Even Pascal⁵ warns us against insisting too much on the difference between man and animals, alleging that this makes us overbearing; and in a famous passage he expressly compares mankind to an individual person; while Newton,⁶ who actually compiled laws of the world as an organism and who was very much disposed to favor such ideas in general, once, for purely physical reasons, refers to the earth as a "lazy animal."

¹ "Metaphysic. disputat.," by the Spanish Jesuit theologian Francisco Suarez.

² "Ubique est perceptio," in Bacon's "De dignitate," IV., 3, 1625.

³ "Omnem naturam sentire affirmandum est," in Campanella's "De sensu rerum," I, i, 13.

⁴ "Theologia Platonica," Book XVIII, by Marsilius Ficinus (or Marsilio Ficino, as he is more often known in English, the Italian physician and Platonic philosopher, born Florence, 1433, died 1499. His book referred to was published in 1482, and intended to show Platonism to be the essence of Christian belief.—Translator).

⁵ Pascal, "Pensées sur la religion."

⁶ Sir Isaac Newton's "Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica," published 1687. Even the attractive principle, in Newton's writings, and still more in those of his disciples Muschenbroek, for instance, has a strong tendency toward animism, and describes the attractive principle as "*amitia*" (friendship). Lichtenberg says quite plainly that gravitation is the longing of the heavenly bodies for one another. Cf. further the phrase "living force" or *vis viva*, which, I believe, was first used by Leibnitz.

Early in the following century Shaftesbury¹ went the length of saying that however perfect an organism (system) an individual human being may be, yet in order to see real perfection he must be placed in relation to the organism of his race. On the whole, however, the rationalistic eighteenth century was less favorable to speculations of this kind, which, in the state of learning at that time, could not but be slightly tinctured with mysticism. This somewhat sentimental point of view is found even in Fechner,² who not only believed in a humanity being an organism, but who looked on all the stars and solar systems as living beings. Dreamy speculations such as these, however, have done more harm than good. Poets, it was thought, had a right to endow everything about them with a soul, but thinkers ought to leave such matters alone.³ In modern times men came to realize the value of empirical investigations, for the time had more or less gone by for philosophical speculations, and men were beginning to look out for facts pointing to the necessity for there being some link between one human being and another, and to the existence of a great human organism.

It is well known that the "suitability and wisdom of the institutions of nature" had always been instanced as arguing the presence of a supreme being, who, however, was usually thought of as God only. Even Parker,⁴ for instance, thought it needful, because of the reason and purpose which he everywhere perceived in nature, to infer the presence of a God. Ralph Cudworth,⁵ also, while remarking that the constant maintenance of a proper equilibrium between births and deaths in the matter of numbers and differences of sex pointed

¹ "Moralists" II, 4, by the third Earl of Shaftesbury. Translated into German apparently in 1910.

² "Zendavesta," S. VI, by Gustav Theodor Fechner, pub. 1851. Cf. also "Tagesansicht," p. 29.

³ "Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart" ("Introduction to the Philosophy of the Present day"), by Alois Riehl, p. 161, published in 1903.

⁴ Parker, "Disputatio de Deo," p. 114.

⁵ "The True Intellectual System of the Universe," by Ralph Cudworth.

to the existence of a supreme wisdom, guiding the apparently fortuitous course of this world, saw nothing but God in this wisdom.

§ 161.—*Modern Empiricism*

Empirical facts, however, accumulate as time goes on, and Kant took advantage of this.¹ But he ceased to have anything to do with a *deus ex machinâ*, thereby being probably again the first to enter upon the way which leads to modern science. He took as his starting-point the contradiction between man's fetters and the freedom of which he dreams, and asserted from the outset that the organic laws of mankind clearly limit freedom. Human actions, like everything else in nature, are determined by natural laws. At first sight, for instance, it seems that marriages and consequently births and deaths could not be subject to any rule, because they are so greatly dependent on man's free will. Yet statistics in large countries prove that they, too, are under the influence of fixed natural laws. Kant compared this unvarying regularity, which is independent of man's will, with the weather, which is so uncertain that no one can arrange it beforehand, but yet in the main it is so certain that the growth of plants, the course of streams, and other natural phenomena always go on in the same way without interruption.

Climate, however, can be explained by the laws which govern the earth considered as a homogeneous heavenly body; and similarly these laws of humanity, in themselves inexplicable, can be explained by considering humanity as an organism. Kant, it is true, had no idea of any such explanation. He says that individual human beings and even whole nations persist in thinking that, by each pursuing his or its own ends each in his or its own way, and often pulling different ways, they are tending insensibly to fulfil nature's ends, despite the

¹ "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht" ("A Forecast of a History of the World from the Point of View of a Citizen of the World"), by Kant.

fact that nature's ends are unknown to them. They persistently believe that nature's ends are their guiding principle, and that they are helping to further these ends. Yet even if they did know what nature's ends are, they would trouble but little about them. Kant also recognizes that the actions of individual human beings cannot be wholly explained by their individual characteristics, but he does not say what would explain them. As is so often the case with Kant, however, two frankly admitted contrasts are clearly stated, and thus further scientific investigation is simplified. All that was now required was, if possible, not merely to represent the divergence between restrictions collectively imposed and personal liberty as a virtually insoluble problem, but to bridge the gulf between the two.¹

¹ Here I would request the reader to re-read the paragraph concerning freedom and natural compulsion, in which it is shown how this can be done by the fact of the brain having been actually freed from the body. I now purpose to prove that the freedom thus acquired is again restricted by the long-suspected fact, which natural scientists did not clearly recognize till the last century, that mankind as a whole forms an organism in the strictest sense of the word.

CHAPTER XII

THE WORLD AS AN ORGANISM

1.—THE PHYSICAL REASONS FOR MANKIND FORMING AN ORGANISM

§ 162.—*Hypotheses and Facts*

If anything in this world is not instantly traceable to facts, recourse is had to a hypothesis. For example, when it is found impossible to explain certain phenomena in connection with light, we postulate an ether, or small particles moving with extraordinary speed, or something of the kind. Such a hypothesis is all the more generally accepted, the greater the number of demonstrable facts which can be explained by it; but if a fact is found which conflicts with such a hypothesis, then the latter must of course be dropped.

Thus the theory of the emission of light was overthrown when the phenomena of polarization could no longer be reconciled with it; and at present the theory of undulation is being questioned because certain electric phenomena, undoubtedly connected with light, conflict with it. Every *theory*, therefore, remains uncertain until the phenomenon on which it is based can be directly observed. Could we succeed in proving the existence of actual light particles or of ether, this would be a much more direct proof than any theory deduced therefrom.

Similarly with regard to the theory of mankind being an organism. Even if there is much in the life of man and nations to indicate that there must be some connecting-link between individual human beings, and the number and varied nature of the relations between man and man make it probable that there is some such organism, nevertheless, the smallest

direct proof would be perhaps not actually more important, but more decisive from the point of view of science.

Modern men, indeed, although most of them would deny this, are mostly infected with the belief that all solid fact must be material. The proof of dynamic effects between human beings—effects which Aristotle thought sufficient and which in fact still are sufficient, to prove that mankind must be considered as an organism—seems to us almost immaterial, and we noisily insist on the proof of an actual physical connection. Every reader will here derisively object that mankind as a whole surely cannot be compared with a single animal. Between the tip of an animal's nose and the tip of its tail there certainly exists a vital physical connection, but what connection is there between a European and a Tierra del Fuegian, between Kant and Eucken, between Frederick II and William II, between the man in the trenches and Hindenburg, or between Hindenburg and Joffre?

Now, although it would not be absolutely necessary to prove that a bridge of some actual substance exists between all these individual persons, for the dynamically living bridge would suffice, yet in conformity with the materialistic requirements of the present day, it must first be shown that there does actually exist a uniform continuously living connection which has always subsisted, between *all* human beings in all ages and all lands, and that, moreover, it is actually in operation.

Not till this has been done can the connections between the various forces be investigated, which, resting on this substantial basis, make mankind into an organism which can be taken into practical consideration. Unlike the substantial basis, which remains almost unchanged, these connections between forces develop as time goes on, and every day make the human organism more of a unity and of more importance.

§ 163.—*The Continuity of Germ-Plasm*

The continuity of germ-plasm points to some such physical link between one human being and another. As long ago as

1878 Jäger¹ advocated this idea, and two years later Nussbaum² did likewise. It did not become generally known, however, until Weissmann³ made his comprehensive investigations of *Hydromedusæ*. This doctrine of Weissmann's is now so thoroughly admitted everywhere that Delage and Goldsmith⁴ speak of the "difference between soma and germ-plasm" as a fact of common knowledge. They explain that soma dies with the individual, whereas germ-plasm lives on in posterity, and is thus "immortal and continuous." Hypothesis does not come in, they say, except in the particular deductions made by Weissmann from this fact—deductions which do not concern us. What does concern us is the "fact of common knowledge," which can be easily understood by means of the accompanying diagram.

Every egg-cell (thus Cell A in Fig. 9), out of which an animal or human being is afterward developed, first splits up once into two parts, of which one, the dark half, grows rapidly, forms the entire body, dies with that body, and disappears with it. This is indicated by the arrow turned toward space. The other light-colored half of the cell, however, does not grow, but remains living germ-plasm, merely arranging itself differently, and converting itself into seed-cells or egg-cells. In Cells B1 and B2 in the diagram this process is indicated by the uninterruptedly light coloring of the germ-plasm. The seed-cells or egg-cells which subsist in the testicles or ovaries of a human being are therefore not merely symbolically, but


¹ Jäger's "Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Zoölogie" ("Handbook of Universal Zoölogy"), 1878: Leipsic.

² "Die Differenzierung des Geschlechts im Tierreich" ("The Differentiation of Sex in the Animal Kingdom"), by M. Nussbaum (1880). In the "Archives for Microscopical Anatomy," XVIII.

³ "Die Entstehung der Sexualzellen bei den Hydromedusen" ("The Origin of sexual cells in the Hydromedusæ"), by A. Weissmann, 1883. Cf. a later work by this German zoölogist, which is very comprehensive, "Das Keimplasma, eine Theorie der Vererbung" ("Germ Plasm, a Theory of its Inheritance"). 1898: Jena.

⁴ "Die Entwicklungstheorien" ("Theories of Evolution"), by Delage and M. Goldsmith. (An authorised translation exists in German.)

quite genuinely, living pieces of his or her parents. And as they are transmitted unchanged and alive to our children (C1 to C4), and then to our children's children (D1 to D8, etc.), it is a fact that a portion of grandfather, grandchild, great-grandchild, etc., does consist of the same living substance. And as we can and must continue in this way indefinitely (as indicated by the side branches of cells A and D left open), it is clear that the tree shaded light, which is all one and is constantly putting forth fresh branches, represents a single organism all parts of which are connected together.



From this the individual human beings (tinted dark and designated as individual beings by letters) grow, just as apples do on a tree. They are like particles of this organism; in time they fall away, and in so doing become individual units, and die.

But the tree of germ-plasm which confers form and existence on the different individual units, and is consequently the principal important part of humanity, lives on forever as a homogeneous organism. A portion of this homogeneous organism, however, lives also in each individual unit, physically connecting us permanently with mankind in general. True,

it can be eliminated from the human body without utterly destroying life, but what there is left of the man is proved by such deplorable beings as eunuchs and castrated persons. All recent experiments, indeed, clearly show that all those instincts of life which make a human being into a human being are inseparably connected with this remnant of mankind in general which we have in us. It lives in us and manifests itself in us. Egoism represents, so to speak, physical self-consciousness, and altruism represents self-consciousness of the germ-plasm. Others have, therefore, as we see, a right represented in me, for a portion of their living substance also lives in me.

Whoever first spoke of the slaying of egoism as a slaying of the flesh had a foreboding of more than he expressed. For the flesh is the perishable body, which falls from the universal tree of humanity. That which remains, however, that which makes men capable of love (that is, of morality in the broadest sense of the word) is germ-plasm, or what the Holy Scripture calls the sacred pneuma "capable of procreation." Luther translated this by "*der Geist, der lebendig macht*" ("The spirit that quickeneth"), thus attributing a purely symbolical meaning to it. The conception of pneuma, however, goes beyond this, and cannot be understood save by those acquainted with its origin in Greek philosophy. Into this I am unable to enter in detail, but Diogenes Laertes expressly states, "That which causes the procreation of us all is the pneuma,"¹ thus meaning precisely what we may now call germ-plasm. Moreover, just as we must now make up our minds that an almost imponderable quantity of germ-plasm² influences the whole body, even so the men of old imagined the mysterious workings of the "Holy Spirit."

In the sixth chapter of the Gospel of St. John, verse 63, we read, "It is the spirit [pneuma] that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing." Thus the Bible also must really be refer-

¹ Diogenes Laertes VII, 156.

² The body of a human being is about one thousand billion times greater than the germ-plasm from which it has arisen.

ring to germ plasma. Now, there is no need to state that this pneuma is never clearly expressed either in Greek writings or in the Bible what we now mean by germ plasm. Nevertheless, it is important to recollect that those who wrote the Bible felt, as it were, intuitively, that it existed. The conception of the crucifying of the flesh, indeed, has been grossly misinterpreted. Flesh was identified with sensuality and with love,—indeed, after a time, almost altogether with love,—and the pneuma with the “higher” attributes of the soul. That this is wrong is clear from I Corinthians, xv. 44¹ where the soul is mentioned in contradistinction to the pneuma. It is a pneumatic body to which reference is here made; and this body, if we hold fast to what is known to have been the meaning of the pneumatic in ancient times, actually materially passes through the body of all human beings. Thus we have here again the exact notion of germ plasm.

The pneuma, in short, is something above mankind, which unites mankind together. It creates the relations between man and man, and also love between man and wife and between man and his neighbor. It creates eternal life and it creates morality. The victory of the pneuma is the victory of germ plasm over somato plasm, the victory of the conception of humanity over individual consciousness, and of altruism over egoism. In this sense we all can and all ought to believe in the Holy Ghost, the *pneuma hagion*.

The habit of combating and pouring contempt on “earthly love,” as it is called, is all the worse because it helps, and helps very materially, to bring about heavenly love.

§ 164.—*Earthly Love Makes Heavenly Love Possible*

There has been a vast deal of speculation as to why procreation must take place by means of a man and a woman, and why the children of human beings cannot simply be cut away from an unsexual procreator, as is, at any rate for the

¹ Luther here translates spiritual (psychic) by natural, which is certainly not the sense.

time being, the case with the lowest animals. The question of the causes for this may be put aside here, but not that of the consequences.

Whenever a creature produces six new creatures by parthenogenesis, experience proves that each one of them is slightly different from the rest; and if we imagine these six offspring producing six species, again by parthenogenesis, then these will become more and more dissimilar, for each species will always be inheriting more and more new qualities¹ in which the others can necessarily have no part. On the other hand, they in turn are exposed to other influences. Each individual one, in short, invariably becomes the ancestor of a new species.

Thus the organisms become increasingly split up, and even if at a particular time one branch had succeeded in dominating the world, as man is now doing, yet from that very day they would begin to divide up again. In that case we should still actually have the sinful sons of Cain with us, and the good children of Abel. But if the sons of Cain had murdered all the descendants of Abel, then the race of Cain would again be split up into several divisions, which in course of time would have become quite dissimilar. Between these two types of men a fight would again have become necessary. In short, the inevitable result of this type of procreation would be an everlasting war waged by every one against every one else, for, as time went on, the transmitted qualities would decrease almost to the vanishing-point, and would be quite unable to keep the other qualities under control.

But we are sexually begotten, and although when parents have six children, each one is certainly different from the rest, yet these differences always counterbalance one another because the children's children intermarry, and thus the

¹ How this occurs is of no moment. It is a fact that animal species alter in process of evolution, and this is the only fact here alleged in support of any statements.

varying accumulated inheritance of qualities has never time to become very different. Sexual love and sexual intercourse, therefore, are both the means of insuring the preservation of the uniformity of germ substance in any animal species in so far as the animal has an opportunity of sexual union with others of its species. They constantly bring the entire organism of a whole race into contact and keep it together. Indeed, to the extent to which such an entire organism necessitates altruism, earthly love is the mother of heavenly love.

The basis for the opinions just set forth has already been known for a considerable time. In 1853 the German zoölogist Rudolf Leuckart discussed the tendency of sexual procreation to prevent the degeneration—that is, the dispersion—of a race. In 1859, Charles Darwin¹ stated plainly that crossing, as opposed to unsexual reproduction, is of great importance in nature, inasmuch as by this means the individual units belonging to a species or variety are kept pure and uniform in character. His ideas were adopted in the main by Spencer (1864), Nägeli (1866), Hantsch (1887), Hertwig (1893), Strassburger (1900), and Weismann (1902). Weismann, with his theory of ideas and determinants, created useless confusion, while others think, for instance, that the formation of different varieties is the very reason for bisexual procreation.

But it is the Russian biologist Janicki² who most strongly insisted on the importance of sexual reproduction. He writes:

The world, if I may say so, has not been broken up into a mass of independent fragments, which then, forever isolated from one another and mere parts of the whole, must strike out for themselves on straight courses, with only side branches. On the contrary,

¹ "Origin of Species." Chapter IV.

² "Über Ursprung und Bedeutung der Amphimixis. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre der geschlechtlichen Zeugung" ("On the Origin and Significance of Amphimixis. A Contribution to the Doctrine of Sexual Procreation"), by C. von Janicki, 1906. "Biolog. Zentralblatt," XXVI, No. 22.

owing to bisexual procreation [amphimixis], the image of the macrocosm is periodically, but incessantly, set up as a microcosm in each part, and the macrocosm resolves itself into a thousand microcosms. It is as if nature, by introducing bisexual procreation, had made a compromise between individualization and the hypothetical condition of panmixis [procreation by many]. The individual units are meant to be as independent as possible, to be able to move about freely and independently, etc., but, on the other hand, to be materially and continuously connected with one another, and remain in constant contact, like strawberry-plants, the runners of which are joined together. There is no way out of this save the periodical admixture of germ substances, whereby the necessary material continuity is transferred into each single individual unit, paradoxical as this may sound, for the continuity is present only on a miniature scale. But it is there. Each separate individual develops, as it were, on an invisible system of rhizomes [root substances], which unite together the germ substances of countless personalities. This means the negation of that individualization which for vegetative purposes is indispensable; and if we look at a paramaecium under the microscope, we do not at first suspect how something endlessly complex and multifarious, a *whole*, is to be found in this particle of living plasm. This whole is most intimately connected by invisible threads with the sum total of individuals who compose the particular species in question, and who live or have lived a separate existence under the most diverse conditions.

And on page 789 he says:

But let us return to amphimixis. As in the case of unicellular creatures, so also in that of polycellular ones, periodically occurring bisexual procreation is a physiological necessity. In both cases bisexual procreation affords each individual a constantly renewed connection with that form of life as a whole in which the species consists. In this close connection with the whole the simplest monoplastid becomes modified periodically as time proceeds, and however often it is divided up, it never meets with a natural death and consequent complete new formation apart from its growth; its body is simply remodeled, as in the case of a plastic substance. In the same connection with the whole, in a condensed primeval plasm, as

it were, the life of polyplastids is rooted. The continuity of life, however, is assured by germ substances [plasms] alone. Somata appear in the light of a series of disconnected curves, which arise one after another from a continuous curve, that of the germ substances taken together. The bodies have lost their plasticity, and each time bisexual procreation takes place they are formed anew in ontogenesis.

To this there is scarcely anything to add. Janicki has exhausted the problem, and all that now remains is to draw the necessary inferences and apply them to man's moral actions.

2.—THE APPROACHING MUTATION OF WAR

§ 165.—*The Meaning of Mutation*

First and foremost it must be proved that the practical importance of this purely physical connection in the life of nations does not end with its being the solid basis of altruism. If, owing to any influence, this living substance should at any time have acquired the capacity of changing after a certain lapse of time, for instance a thousand years, then we must not be surprised if after this time all who have some of this living substance in them suddenly undergo a corresponding change.

The enormous importance of this phenomenon need not be insisted upon. It means neither more nor less than that the future history of mankind is already present as a functional occurrence in the bodies of contemporary humanity. That this is true of the brain on a smaller scale was explained in § 26; but it now becomes clear that this may be an absolutely universal principle prevailing throughout the organic world.

Now, such changes and sudden variations do actually occur, and in the case of plants, where investigation is easier, owing to generations succeeding one another more rapidly, it has been carefully studied. The Dutch botanist Hugo de

Vries¹ has shown that in a field of mullein, in which for centuries past the flowers had never varied, noteworthy differences suddenly began to appear. As a matter of fact, this is what happened. In a field of mullein each year a few plants show certain abnormalities, such as longer or shorter, thicker or thinner leaves, than the rest. Generally speaking, such abnormalities are of no importance, but suddenly in one particular year one of these abnormalities—long leaves, for instance—occurs in a great many cases of plants (Professor de Vries's fifth law). These long leaves are quite constant at once; that is, they are fully transmitted, independently of external conditions. The following year, therefore, this new kind of mullein occurs generally, and thus, as Professor de Vries says, a new kind of mullein has arisen by sudden variations, or so-called mutation.

How this change comes about, whether really by what Professor de Vries calls mutation, or whether, as others state, it is only a case of latent qualities becoming again manifest, is of no moment here. What does matter is the actual fact, which simply proves that some connection must exist between the individual mullein-plants, and that this connection is still strong enough to affect them. Thus between the individual mullein-plants there is an actual coöperation of forces. That is the mulleins as a whole, despite their individual peculiarities, form an organism as a whole. And the fact of the continuity and immortality of the germ plasm proves that such an organism is conceivable.

Now, beyond doubt a similar connection exists between human beings, and as we human beings, like all other animals, vary mainly with whatever organ has of late undergone the greatest changes (that is, with the human brain), most instances of variation will be found in the psychic domain.

¹ "Arten und Varietäten und ihre Entstehung durch Mutation." ("Species and Varieties and their origin owing to Mutation"), by H. de Vries, 1906.

Here it is, however, that the striking similarity between the mullein and man occurs. In each year human beings are present with brain variations. These variations are the expression of abnormal ideas, and may be described as signs of madness or of genius, according to whether they are capricious or reasonable. Whether they really portend genius or madness does not depend on the human beings themselves, but on the future, or rather on the mutations already latent in millions of their fellow-men, at present apparently entirely normal.

Now, if the elongation of the leaves is already present in the germ plasm of the mullein, it matters not that there should be abnormal mulleins, with too short, too thick, or too thin leaves: they are bound soon to die out. It is the long-leaves species of this particular year which are the geniuses heralding the coming change. And so it is with men. If the time is not yet fulfilled, if brain variations are not yet latent in us, it is of no use for men of genius to arise and prophesy changes. But when the time is fulfilled, then there is no longer need for prophecy. The least trifle is sufficient to give the needed impetus. Huss could achieve nothing where Luther carried all before him. Socrates took poison, but the crucified Christ left behind Him a religion which has influenced the whole world.

Suddenly, at much about the same time, in Germany, France, and England men took to flying, just as formerly the conception of charity arose almost simultaneously in the most diverse parts of the world.

§ 166.—*The Mother of War Instincts*

These series of evolutions are concluded, and we can survey them. Others are still awaiting completion by evolutions to come. Thus, for instance, Moltke discovered the ethical value of war, while Tolstoy insisted, as no one else had ever done, on the absolute necessity for its abolition. For the present it cannot be said which of these two variations

represents madness variation and which genius. That depends on the direction in which the majority of our descendants mutate in the future. I should merely like to observe that the enthusiasm with which the War of 1914 is being carried on is absolutely no proof of Moltke's having been possessed of genius; for in any organ which is shortly to undergo a mutation great and frequent variations occur some time beforehand. The fact on which I insisted in my first chapter, that nowadays our opinions about war are more widely divergent than ever before, seems to me a proof that before long our opinion of it will radically change. And the only one of the different mutations which will be able to endure will of course be the one best suited to actual present conditions. Consequently all that has been said in preceding chapters about the injuriousness of war at the present period justifies us in coming to the conclusion that man will one day be transmuted once for all into a peaceful creature. The opinions of Moltke and his satellites down to Bernhardt, after all, wholly differ from those of the average mortal, and may be considered merely as a good omen for this mutation being no longer far off.

Indeed, everything points to the fact that the dusk of the war god's day has already set in.

3.—THE UNITY OF MANKIND AS REGARDS BOTH TIME AND SPACE

§ 167.—*Man's Connections from the Point of View of Time*

It is impossible to conceive of man as an insulated being, and this not merely because of his being the product of a succession of ancestors who extend back perhaps for millions of years, and whose gradual perfecting he represents. On this fact, however, I do not purpose to touch further here, as it can be looked up in any history of evolution. Note, however, the unusual complication of the mechanism resulting from this fact. Man lives on directly by his germ plasm in

his children and children's children. Hence, supposing there are three children on an average in a family, by the twenty-first generation (that is, in about five hundred years) his vitality will be represented in a number of live human beings which will about correspond to that of the whole of mankind.

Or, conversely, each individual human being has in him a drop of blood of each human being who lived five hundred years ago. The result is such an infinite number of connections that at present there seems not the slightest chance of completely following up any single case. Houston Stewart Chamberlain says every important achievement we owe to men of Teutonic blood. Possibly, but it is just as possible that, as the modern French anthropologist Paul Souday says, we owe everything of importance to Celtic blood. And if any one arose and said everything good is due to Slavonic blood, it would be scarcely possible to disprove his assertion.

No one can state in which of the ancestors of a man of genius the germ plasm was so much modified that the said man of genius was the result. Only one assertion can be made with absolute assurance, and that is that he did not become a genius of himself, but is the product of unknown ancestors, who must be considered as a whole for the simple reason that they are not individually known.

Perhaps even more important than these direct physical links with the past is very often the intellectual influence of a human being—an influence, of course indirectly, also physical. It is a commonplace to say that man survives in his works, but what is remarkable is how even anonymous human beings have survived in this way. Thus some insignificant diluvial human being, whose body and whose very skeleton are probably long since dust and ashes, covered the walls of the caves in the beautiful Valley of the Vézère with primitive markings intended to represent mammoths and bisons. Perhaps he did so only because he was bored, but on his scratchings we to-day are basing theories as to the

origin of art. Thousands of years ago an unknown, perhaps idiotic, female slave at play imprinted her five fingers for the first on a clay vessel, and in so doing kept the brains of thousands of inquirers busy in the nineteenth century. The half-monkey or half-man the roof of whose skull chanced to have escaped decomposition at Trinil in Java certainly never ventured to dream that after a fabulous lapse of time he would become a personage of importance for all our scientists and would even influence our whole attitude to life.

No one knows or can foretell how much an individual man is influencing or may influence mankind, and in historic times there has been no change in this respect. Have we any idea what occurrence, what saying, or even what gesture of some unknown human being may possibly have enabled human beings such as Jesus or Socrates first to utter thoughts which have decisively influenced the fate of mankind for thousands of years, have influenced it, indeed, for all time? Yet it may be that at the outset of these thoughts is some vanished human being whose very name is forgotten, but whose works live after him.

It would be idle to speculate as to what may have been, but not idle clearly to realize that such things are possible. We see an endless series of effects and causes, which in detail we do not know, and which for that very reason we are obliged to consider as a whole. Mankind would be incomprehensible if we did not look upon it as a homogeneous organism.

Now that thoughts, once expressed, lead among mankind a life so to speak apart from their author, penetrate into others, as it were, and are a living influence on them, just as is physical germ plasm, there can be not the slightest doubt. These thoughts, like germ plasm, are endowed with eternal life, and proclaim aloud the primeval Orphic wisdom of the harmony of all life and the fact of mankind being an organism.

As a wise man of old, Empedocles, sings, in this sense there is neither birth nor death: "Yet another truth will I

tell unto thee. Not a single mortal thing is truly born, and Death the destroyer is not the end. There is naught but intermixture and exchange of what is intermixed. Only among men is it customary to call this birth."

Thus material and dynamically intellectual connections are transmitted through boundless periods of time, binding mankind together; nor can any one say which are of the more moment, the physical or the intellectual connections.

§ 168.—*Man's Connections in Regard to Space*

Easier to prove is the existence of an intellectual bond between man and man—easier, at any rate, up to a certain point. Still more obvious is this intellectual bond if we consider the spatial relations of contemporary human beings. Even in this respect no living man can be considered as other than part of an organism.

Now, a man talks and learns only because he sees others doing so; that is, because he has some connection with these others. He can work only because he relies on the work of other men. For instance, I can write only because somewhere men have felled trees, other men have cut them up, others again converted them into paper, and finally a whole series of men have conveyed the finished product to me. Another endless series of men furnish me with a pen, another with a pen-holder, and yet another with ink. But in order that these words may be printed, that is, exert any effect, more endless hosts of men throughout the world have been busy. Some mined the lead for the type, others the iron for the machines, others, again, produced the oil and dye-stuffs for the printers' ink; and each of these workers requires tools and food, the production of which again has employed more enormous groups of people.

Thus, if we go back to ultimate causes, perhaps the whole world may have had to help in order that even the smallest thought of an author may be transmitted to his reader; while as for the thought itself, it proceeds from millions of brains,

and in the end can produce effect only because it is somehow predestined to do so in the brain of the recipient. In short, neither intellectually nor physically would man be conceivable except regarded as part of a great organism.

We call the principles on which mankind works division of labor; but division is possible only if there is some whole which can be divided; that is, the labor of all mankind. This sum total of labor, however, is and must proceed from an entire body. That this division of labor is demonstrably present in many human actions unknown to us is all the more proof that there actually is something present which is superior to the will of the individual man.

Kant already pointed out that there are many purely physical qualities which obey great laws, the result being, so to speak, an "average human being" who in reality has no existence at all. This average human being in Germany is 50.6 per cent. man and 49.4 per cent. woman; he or she enters into .8 marriages, has $2\frac{1}{2}$ children, consumes 2500 calories, commits .0002 suicides, .00001 murders, lives 40.5 years, and so on.

We believe that it is of our own free will that we marry, beget a child, get drunk, etc., whereas in so doing we are unconsciously merely fulfilling a law in order to fulfil a particular case of the universal law. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that correlative growth, or, rather, correlative variability, can be proved to occur in the individual organism as also in mankind. Darwin¹ has defined this phenomenon as follows: different parts of an organism are so connected in some unknown way with one another that, if one part modifies, the other does likewise, and if modifications occur very frequently in one part, owing to selection, then other parts become modified.

Now, it is quite easy to show that, if a new power-press is invented in America, a change occurs in European newspapers; that, when the number of people in Europe increases

¹ "Descent of Man." Introduction to Vol. I.

too much and there is consequently more emigration, this has its effects on conditions generally in America and Australia; and that whenever Armenians are murdered by the Turks this has its effect on the decisions taken in Washington. Many more similar instances of cause and effect might also be cited. All which proves that just as not a cell can change in the human body without the whole body suffering therefrom or being affected thereby, similarly no one on earth can do or suffer anything without all mankind, and therefore every single person, being affected in some way, though often unperceivable, it is true.

Furthermore, just as a single cell forcibly removed from its surroundings cannot long survive alone, even so man, alone and isolated, perishes.

As far as children are concerned, this is obvious, but even adults, who have already benefited by the influence of mankind in general, cannot survive unless perhaps under altogether exceptionally favorable conditions; for instance on a solitary island where there are neither savage beasts nor any other special hazards.

4.—THE AGE “WHEN MANY SHALL GO TO AND FRO”

§ 169.—*Humanity and Intercommunication*

All mankind, therefore, is one organism physically and materially united together by the fact of germ plasm, and intellectually and dynamically by the fact of action and reaction. But whereas the connections due to germ plasm are immutable, the reciprocal relations are perpetually changing. Indeed, it is beyond doubt that their numbers increase with time; that is, with their help mankind is developing into a more and more perfect organism. Hence it is these dynamic relations, this interchange of intellectual forces, on which the pitch of organization attained by the human organism depends in the last resort. Were these relations, therefore, absolutely clearly set forth, then we should know what point

in its development the human race has already attained, and what degree of universal brotherhood could be demanded of it.

Hence nothing perhaps would be so well worth doing as to describe these relations; but this is impossible within the limits of this volume, owing to their being absolutely limitless in number. Everything which we call civilization or culture, language, morals, law, or rights, technical achievement, art, or science, and much else besides, are merely ways of expressing such relations and the means of continuing them. There are two ways, however, and only two, of hindering everything of the kind. One of these ways is crime, and war is the other.

All these relations taken together may broadly and generally be described as humanity, for the possibility of such relations is precisely that which confers on the human race its unique, dominant position in nature. This humanity, however, thus considered, ceases to be a vague conception of any remote ideal of our dreams, but an absolutely real embodiment of an existing link. The ideal and the future are to be found only in the perfecting and further development of what already exists, and in opposing everything tending to obstruct such further development; that is, in opposition to crime and war.

To some, however, the fine word humanity still does not convey a sufficiently definite idea, which is partly due to its being so frequently misused. To others again the phrase "human relationships" seems too colorless. They should therefore select the tangible relationship,—intercommunication,—which does not include merely trade, post, and railways, but, after all, everything forming a tie between man and man; and a survey of the history of evolution would soon prove that all this springs from the same origin—love. Humanity, love, and intercommunication accordingly all mean the same thing.

What, therefore, really ought to be done is to write a history of intercommunication from the point of view of humanity, and likewise to promote it. Suffice it here to say, however, that in this respect we are undoubtedly passing through a critical

period. During the last century all technical means of travel and communication were perfected by leaps and bounds, and it is inconceivable that this should not produce any moral after effects.

This striving after perfection of means of communication finds unconscious expression in the socialist movement of the nineteenth century, the so-called revival of the Christian spirit, and in pacifism.

But just because man was not aware of these aspirations of his, the masses, with their instinctive conservatism, rebelled against the inevitable new order of things and the regrettable, but probably inevitable, reaction was the War of 1914.

The war, however, is only an episode, and intercommunication—going to and fro—is an epoch. When, on January 7, 1891, the Emperor William II wrote to Dr. von Stephan, Secretary of State for the German Imperial Post-Office, that "The world at the close of the nineteenth century is under the sign of intercommunication," he merely expressed a commonplace. It is satisfactory to note the assurance with which he proceeds to say, "This intercommunication breaks down the boundaries separating nations, and forms new connections between them." It would not have been difficult to perceive, arguing from these premises, that all military preparations, all excitation of jingo passions, and all suppression of methods by which nations can express their desires could do nothing but hinder this process of international union of which the emperor clearly had at least a premonition.

§ 170.—*Speech as a Means of Intercommunication*

Now, the movement tending to develop the dynamic relations between man and man has certainly never come to a standstill. Language was the first means of communication and mutual understanding, and even now it is the most delicate intellectual sediment and a touchstone of culture and civilization. True, there are still peoples who manage with a few

hundred words, but the vocabulary of a Shakspeare runs into tens of thousands of words. Beyond doubt this increased facility of expression has an extraordinarily refining influence on relations between man and man; or, rather, these additions to our vocabulary prove that such relations have become more intimate.

Now, it may certainly be objected with reason that this applies only to the individual persons of one nation, that is, to people all speaking the same language. But it is nevertheless a fact that as civilization advances, the divergencies of language over a large extent of territory decrease. In America the number of languages is greatest,¹ for none of the small, itinerant Indian tribes can be understood by a neighbor tribe. After America comes Africa and Asia, while Europe, which, like China, that vast aggregate of races, has long been inhabited by civilized peoples, early attained comparative unity of language. Thus in Europe only about fifty (that is five per cent.) of the thousand odd languages in the world are spoken. This is partly due to the fact that wherever civilization is high, and consequently there is a great deal of intercommunication, languages mix, becoming enriched in the process, and thus all the more easily supplant the poorer and more backward languages. England, in fact, owes the richness of her language, and perhaps also her civilization, to the fact of almost all Teutonic and Romance families of languages being here included in one speech. The assimilation of foreign words, in fact, is not only a linguistic gain, but likewise signifies an advance in civilization. For instance, in the Middle Ages, when the German language borrowed from Latin and Greek the words *Brief* (letter, *breve*), *Tinte* (ink—*tingere*), *schreiben* (write—*scribere*), *Kirche* (church—*kyriakon*), *Pfarrer* (pastor—*parochius*), and *Mönch* (monk—

¹ In Australia the same conditions probably prevailed, but here many languages have partly died out, together with the natives speaking them.

monachus), it not merely enriched itself in so doing, but likewise proved that the Germans had learned to write and become Christians.

Similarly to-day. The craven fears of the language purists not only impoverish the German language, and make it less resisting, but also show that the purists are nowise disposed to accept the consequences of technical achievement as tending to make all men brothers. The fact of the word "telegraphy" being international merely means that when it became acclimatized in the different countries it was everywhere instinctively felt that telegraphy was a means of bringing nations together not merely outwardly in their bodies, but inwardly, in their souls. And to-day, when we Germans are endeavoring to supplant the word "*auto*" by "*Kraftwagen*," in itself a felicitous choice, this proves that we to-day have ceased to realize how much such modern inventions tend to unite nations together. The question of foreign words, indeed, is not merely a question of taste, but a moral question. It betokens ingratitude in us to accept the foreign invention and then try to find a German name for it.

At the outset of the Middle Ages, when German mercenaries used to go about the world serving foreign nations, they took their words with them, and even now in France numberless expressions used in war are of German origin without anybody taking this amiss. The *lansquenet* is the German *Landsknecht* (mercenary), and the *Maréchal de France* owes his name to the German word *Mährenschalk*,¹ meaning a man who holds some one's horse. The French word *arquebuse*² is the German *Hakenbüchse*; *canon* is the German *Kanone*, and *flam-berge*³ (sword) is the German *Flamberg*; and even the most

¹ The German word *Mähre* now about corresponds to the English word "jade"—a contemptuous, old-fashioned word for a horse.—Translator.

² The word *arquebuse* is more properly *harquebus*, and meant an early form of firearm.—Translator.

³ *Flamberge* is a word which now survives only in certain expressions, such as "*mettre flamberge au vent*" to draw one's sword, and "*Flamberge au vent*," with drawn sword. In German it means the

modern French weapon, *flèches* (arrows, airmen's arrows) is derived from the German word *Flitz-(bogen)*.¹ It is not without interest that the word for war in all modern languages (*guerra, guerre, war*) is not derived from the Latin *bellum*, but from the German word *Wehr* (defense).

In the case of an unsophisticated people this process of assimilation goes on almost automatically. The new product or new invention, as the case may be, comes together with the foreign name, and at the same time civilization is enriched. Soon every one is quite used to the innovation, and it is not till patriotism has been artificially inflated, that, aware of its own innate weakness, it seeks for external indications of an internal strength of the absence of which it is aware.

Considering what powerful arguments may be urged against any dread of foreign words, other arguments for them simply do not count; such an argument, for instance, as that the use of international expressions make every kind of travel very much easier. In any case the outcry against foreign terms that arose in the nineteenth century is merely the expression of the artificial barriers put in the way of all efforts to promote whatever tended to humanize the world. But besides the effect of mixture of languages in civilized countries, however, we must not forget that people soon learned to write their language here, which also tends to lessen diversity of languages in advanced continents.

Once language is, so to speak, fixed by being committed to writing, it can penetrate further than the human voice, for writing is also one of the technical achievements by which we have overcome the cramping effects of natural compulsion. Not only does the written word, which is also the fixed word, wander all around the globe, whereas the spoken word scarcely penetrates beyond the confines of the speaker's native valley; but man, having once learned to write, achieves the broadsword of a knight, and is still used poetically to mean sword.—Translator.

¹ The word *Flitzbogen* now means a boy's crossbow.—Translator.

apparent impossibility of making the fleeting moment lasting. Writing united mankind beyond the bounds to which the individual human tribes wandered, and writing likewise joined race to race for all time.

§ 171.—*The Results of Intercommunication*

It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the power of the written word to cement nations together did not become a reality until the introduction of modern postal arrangements in the nineteenth century. When the Greek hemerodromes, the *tabellarii* of the Roman Republic, or the *Withingen* of the Order of German Knights had to carry letters, perhaps, at a rough estimate, about 100,000 crossed the frontier of the various countries in the year throughout the world. But even had it been a million, this would still not work out at nearly as much as one letter for every thousand human beings, whereas at present in Germany alone nearly a billion (1,000,000,000) letters, post-cards, etc., go through the post annually; that is, about fifteen for each person on an average.¹

The number of letters, etc., has increased especially during the last few years. About forty years ago, when the World Postal Union was founded in those countries now belonging to this association, about 3,000,000,000 letters, etc., were posted annually, whereas even in 1906 this number had risen to 35,000,000,000, and before war broke out it cannot have been less than 50,000,000,000. This means that each person on an average probably receives something through the post every ten days (in England every three days).

Moreover, letters reach their destination now far more quickly than formerly. At the beginning of the medieval period a letter took nearly a month to go from Germany to Italy. Now it takes forty hours;² and the invention of the

¹ The number of letters going through the post in the United Kingdom in 1911 was 3,047,500,000. Taking the population of Great Britain and Ireland in that year (45,216,665), this gives an average per year of rather over 67.—Translator.

² This is true despite the fact that in certain places, even compara-

telegraph means that for the written word distance no longer counts, and in a certain sense the entire world (at any rate, the entire civilized world) is already reduced to a single large room, in which it is possible to communicate almost as we please with any one we please, or very soon will be so reduced.

It is a fact of importance that words travel faster than those who carry them. So long as letters had to be sent, a courier was necessary, and sometimes a great deal depended on him. Thus when a sea-captain used to sail with a ship to some far distant part of the world, the owner of his ship could not get at him. This of course made him very independent. No one at home could know how circumstances were when the captain reached his destination; consequently the latter had generally to be not only a navigator, but also a merchant. He accepted new cargoes, and sometimes even selected his route when there did not happen to be any agency of his ship-owner on the spot. In such circumstances there must of course have been a great deal left to the agents.

Now, however, a sea-captain, on reaching his destination, finds telegraphic instructions awaiting him. He has become merely an employee; but any one who has seen with what a very bad grace an old East Indian captain, for instance, who was proud of his independence, conforms to the new order of things, can realize that here is a case of the telegraph destroying a part of a man's own personality in order that universal organization may be promoted.

Similarly with regard to a country's foreign diplomatic representatives, commercial travelers, commercial agents permanently stationed abroad, and also superior and inferior officers of the army and navy. Whereas formerly they could not be reached, and therefore had to act on their own responsibly civilized places, such as Siberia or Morocco, the post still crawls with snail-like slowness. Even in some parts of Germany this is still the case. Thus the post in East Prussia between *Johannisburg* and *Lötzen* (thirty-five miles) even now takes almost a whole day, or seven hours.

ity, now they are in telegraphic communication with headquarters, and have thus gradually degenerated into a kind of marionette. No disrespect is intended to them, but it is merely desired to prove how much man's self-will is diminished by technical science in order that the world's total output may be increased. The possibility of asking for more detailed instructions of course relieves the person of responsibility, and consequently lessens his sense of responsibility.

But there is another respect in which modern means of communication detracts from a man's individual attributes, and that is this. They cause somewhat the same sort of conditions to prevail everywhere. The Virginian planter and the Mecklenburg farmer used to live after their own peculiar fashion, and hardly knew anything of the outside world. But now the daily paper, letters, and travelers connect both with the world in general, and make even the backwoodsman somewhat of a cosmopolitan. This may be regrettable, but certainly cannot be helped.

§ 172.—*The Connection Between Intercommunication and the Greatness of Countries*

The increased speed with which men can cover space, however, cannot fail to affect a country's greatness in a much more direct way. Up to a certain point this has assuredly something to do with the rapidity of its means of communication. Experience proves that the only countries which were really at all vigorous organisms have been those in which the different component parts could be reached in at most a few days from a single center. Hence, it is possible to trace some connection between the greatness of countries and the development of our means of intercommunication. Let us consider the following figures:

	Miles
In one day a traveler in the backwoods covers about	12½
“ “ “ the ordinary post	62
“ “ “ a mail-coach	125

			Miles
In one day a railway (about 1850)	covers about	375	
" " " a modern railway	" "	1250	
" " " an express train within the limits of technical possibilities	" "	6250	

Here we have a scale showing how man has slowly advanced from being only able to get across a town in one day to a speed which enabled him to fly across the quadrant of this planet in the same time.

Modern Empire




Fig. 10.

Had countries increased in the same proportion, then their diameter would have had to increase in the proportion of 1 to 500; that is, their size must have increased 25,000 times.

Fig. 10 shows this. The small black square in the middle represents the empire which men would be able to found without any assistance from technical science. The square striped with black indicates the size of a country which can be gov-

erned with the help of horses, good roads, and correspondingly good postal communications. This refers to the whole period up to the Napoleonic Wars. Now, however, with the beginning of modern technical science, empires might have expanded accordingly, and we might have expected some large enough to fill up the big white square.

Translating these reflections into actual facts, we find that a mountain valley may be the natural limit set to the range of power of a barbarian, technically speaking, that is, a man with no means of locomotion save his feet. To the men able to travel by mail-coach were apportioned countries about the size of those which arose at the outset of the Middle Ages and still exist. But these antiquated miniature countries are already far too small for the present time, for which some such countries are appropriate, as have already been formed in America, Australia, South Africa, Russia, etc., and which will probably before long be compulsorily formed in Europe. In the future, when we can get from one part of the globe to any other in only one or two days, the world can and will be one homogeneous state.

It is useless for man to invoke the memory of his beautiful old traditions, and resist with all his might such inevitable evolution. The spirits he has once raised will never depart from him. All these vast means of intercommunication created by the human mind during the last hundred years are now working together of their own accord, in conformity with laws of their own, and forcing reluctant mankind to come together. This homogeneity of organization will and must come, and it is probably needless to attempt to hasten it, for we must all complete the circle of our existence in accordance with laws rigid and eternal. But man can actually achieve the impossible. He can understand and love this necessary evolution, and then complete, as it were of his own free will and creation, what must needs come, and what all other creatures do only in obedience to iron necessity.

No profounder interpretation can probably be given to

Socrates's saying that virtue can be taught. In this sense virtue means understanding our evolution sufficiently to be able to anticipate the future, and from this anticipation to forge the unbreakable weapon with which it is possible to make a stand alike against opinions which may chance to prevail for a time and against such trivial obstructions and hindrances as war and pestilence.

Thus virtue is likewise happiness, and it is only the European to-day who can possess such happy virtue.

§ 173.—*Premature Attempts to Attain a Universal Monarchy*

If we adopt these ideas as our own, and realize that the fusion of all Europe into one must necessarily result from our slowly moving evolution, then we shall also perceive that it was idle to broach the problem of universal peace and a universal world monarchy at a time when conditions were not yet ripe for such conceptions. This is nowise derogatory to those dreams of the future which the best men have always dreamed. Such men were geniuses, precursors of a future which they understood by intuition. But we must not be surprised if such projects were never realized, the time being not yet ripe. After all, men were always dreaming of and anticipating the day when they would be able to fly, but this dream was destined to remain unfulfilled until there were machines weighing only a few pounds per horse-power.

The Roman Empire, which, after being reorganized by Diocletian and Constantine, was in reality merely a federation of comparatively independent provinces, was doomed to perish on this account. It has been urged that its fall was due to its having had no representative constitution, which may be true. But such a constitution was impossible in view of the state of technical achievement at that time, and hence the Roman Empire was bound to perish, because it was an impossibility.

The conception of a United States of Europe, however, has never quite disappeared. Apart from the fact that popes and

emperors were always insisting on something of the sort on principle, there was no lack of direct and exceedingly diverse attempts made to bring about something of the sort. The most important of these attempts are set forth below:

1095. Pope Urban II, at the Ecclesiastical Council of Clermont, proclaimed the *Arenga dei* for all Christendom.
1253. Thomas Aquinas published his "Summa Theologiae."
1300. Dante Alighieri published his "Tractatus de Monarchia," first printed in Basel in 1559. Republished in Vienna, by Witte, in 1874.
1306. Peter Dubois' "De recuperatione terre Sancte," E. H. Meyer's "Die Staats—und völkerrechtlichen Ideen von Peter Dubois" ("Peter Dubois's Ideas on National and International Law"), Marburg dissertation, 1908.
1466. Georg von Podjebrad proposed an Alliance of Christian princes, the first proposal for a federation. Sewitzki's "Der Europäische Fürstenbund" ("The Union of European Princes"), Georg von Podjebrad: Marburg, 1907.
1495. The Emperor Maximilian I, at the Diet of Worms, proclaimed perpetual public peace.
1600. Sully (1638) in his "Economies royales" refers to a project of Henry IV and Elisabeth of England for establishing a Christian European monarchy. M. Kükelhaus, "Der Ursprung des Planes von Sully" ("The origin of Sully's Project"): Berlin, 1893.
1677. Leibnitz, in a work entitled "De jure suprematus ac legationis principum Germanie," proposed a European confederation.
1713. The Abbé Bernardin de Saint-Pierre published his "Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe." Drouet, "L'Abbé de St. Pierre. L'Homme et l'œuvre": Paris, 1912.
1789. Jeremy Bentham published his "Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace on Principles of International Law."
1795. Kant published his "Zum ewigen Frieden, ein Philosophischer Entwurf" ("Perpetual Peace").

In long past times it was hoped to govern the world from one single center. Thomas Aquinas wanted it to be ruled by

the pope. Dante by the emperor, and Dubois by the King of France; but since the fifteenth century it was recognized that this could not be. From that time forth all proposals have mentioned only a confederation of states, all on an equal footing. Not till we come to Napoleon the Great, dazzled and led astray by the ease with which he won his military laurels, do we find any one hoping once more to become the sole ruler of Europe and thus to unite it. More recently still—that is, after 1870—Germany cherished similar aspirations, although she was more cautious in expressing them, alleging that she merely wanted to organize Europe. But the shade of the mighty Corsican should be a warning to us all. Europe can only be freely welded together.

CHAPTER XIV

THE TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN JUDGMENT

1.—THE PERIODICITY OF OPINIONS

§ 174.—*Contradictory Views*

Owing to mistaken impartiality, our age is peculiarly inclined to refrain from delivering itself of clear and unambiguous judgments; but it is significant that war should never have been discussed from one point of view and one only. In olden times it is true men simply accepted facts as they came, and invented a formula to suit the occasion. Thus they compromised with war because it was discovered to have beneficial effects on the health of the population. It seemed a bad thing, but it also seemed a thoroughly effective remedy against something still worse.¹ It was looked on as a sort of blood-letting, so as to get rid of superfluous strength, as a tonic preserving us from effeminacy, or a stimulant to arouse nations from brooding moodily over matters. Every one held such opinions, but as it was known that all good medicines, such as quicksilver, arsenic, and quinine, are also poisons; the utmost divergency of opinion consisted in the fact that one man looked on war mainly as a tonic medicine and another mainly as a poison. Not till our own times did these differences of opinion become really extreme, and some people begin to extol war for war's sake, while others were peace-at-any-price men.

¹ Even a modern war advocate such as Karl Braun, the Liberal German deputy, who has nothing but ridicule for the pacific aspirations of others, nevertheless says, in "*Während des Krieges*" ("During the War," Dunker: Leipsic, 1871, p. 17); that "war is a disease," and hopes with the singular and incomprehensible illogicalness which characterises all war advocates that "war may soon lead the way to a *lasting peace*."

How confused are the notions on which both sides base their opinions is obvious from the fact that the most convinced advocates of one set of views are just those who most frequently go over to the other side. Thus Albert Thomas, Jaurès's old friend, entered the French Ministry of War, and Gustave Hervé, the most popular of all anti-militarists, supports war on the battle-field zealously and sometimes too zealously in his "*Guerre sociale*," afterward rechristened "*La Victoire*." The British pacifist Frederic Harrison wrote a letter to the "*Times*" advocating new dreadnoughts being constructed with the utmost possible speed, and Ostwald, once the apostle of Esperanto as a means of bringing all the world together, is now crying out for war between the nations. On the other hand, generals, when getting old, have very often cursed their "damned job."

If the only result of this modern cleavage should prove to be that extremists on both sides were further apart now than ever, then there would be a good basis for future discussions; but, unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of mankind praise and exalt war and peace in the same breath. Peace, they say, is delightful, but all honor to war. And certain aspects of war are praised, such as the awakening desire of men to sacrifice themselves for a great cause, which is described as the most magnificent aspect of man's character; while other aspects, such as the inevitable neglect of the sciences, are deplored, and certain wars—for instance, the so-called defensive wars—are considered necessary and good, whereas others say that offensive warfare is the greatest disgrace of the nineteenth century.

Thus it could happen that the socialists in all countries, though in theory in favor of peace, were as much in favor of the war as any one else when it actually broke out. But in the case of the socialists, as in that of the pro-war intellectuals, it might be urged that the influence of others' enthusiasm for the war and of suggestion counted for something; and for this reason we must never forget that there always have been ex-

tremists who have endeavored to see the good and bad side of war simultaneously.

Thus Napoleon said, "I love this business of war and I hate it," and a hundred years afterward the German poet Johannes Schlaf¹ said the same thing in a book which is, after all, nothing but a lengthy paraphrase of Napoleon's brief utterance, which to me personally is unknown. Schlaf, an author of much delicacy, who, despite his frequent and regrettable lack of clearness, has often shown a real power of interpreting the feelings of his day, writes literally that "to condemn war is to blaspheme, indeed positively to outrage every truly religious thought and feeling, and likewise every human entity and destiny." Here, therefore, is one who loves war and holds it sacred, but who also hates it, for, as he says in so many words, he would like "to prove that this wicked pacifist blasphemy is based on reason and necessity."

This dual view of war was expressed by a man of such iron nature as Napoleon in order to give vent to his subjective sentiments. But it seems very closely akin to madness in the apparently objective dress in which Schlaf tries to clothe it. Yet not one of us is wholly free from this inward contradictoriness, and the chief reason for my quoting Schlaf is to show in what a tight corner the world has gradually landed. Like Schlaf, we instinctively feel that war is something fine and glorious, but no less instinctively that it is something horrible. A man of action such as Bonaparte or a man of feeling such as Schlaf set these two sentiments over against each other as an antithesis, but a man of science studying war must endeavor to arrive at some sort of explanation as to why these two diametrically opposite points of view about war should exist.

§ 175.—*The Idea of Evolution as the Solution of the Difficulty*

It is easy enough to see how this divergence might be ex-

¹ "Der Krieg" ("War") by Johannes Schlaf, 1907. Marquardt & Co.: Berlin.

plained. There is hardly any occurrence or phenomenon about which we need always be of the same mind if we trace it back through the ages. That is, no evil was originally an evil, but only became so. Even Börne,¹ despite his having opposed gilds and nobility all his life long, believed that originally both rendered great service. Gilds were necessary organizations to oppose the once too powerful landed proprietors, while the nobility as the original champions of intellect and virtue waged war upon folly and low ideals. The fault, he urged, lay in the fact that gilds and the privileges of the nobility persist even now, although no one now interferes with the occupations of citizens, and intellect and virtue are not the monopoly of any one class.

Many more such instances of things originally good, but which have survived their purpose, could be quoted, and among them perhaps we might include war. Like everything which has life, war never remains at rest, but is always developing. Animals did not wage war, but human beings did, and our descendants, the "supermen," as Goethe and Nietzsche call them, will cease to do so. This, at any rate, is what we believe. But let us leave the future to take care of itself, for, after all, the war with which history has acquainted us was once born. It was young and now is old. But just as the love of a maid seems lovely to us and that of an old woman repulsive, even so is it with war. We cannot and must not judge alike two things which from their very nature and meaning are wholly different. There is nothing whatever in common between Achilles's eternal "Song of Hate" and Lisauer's "Hymn of Hate" to England, and similarly there is the profoundest difference between the battles in the Scamander Valley and the fighting between the Meuse and the Moselle.

Again, universal experience shows that what once used to be necessary and a matter of course seems as beautiful to man

¹ "Nouvelles lettres provinciales," by Ludwig Börne (Loeb Baruch), 1825, In his *Collected Works*, 2nd ed., VII, p. 45.

owing to tradition. Only to the few is it given to perceive the beauty of what is to come. The ideal of beauty of most of us is the retrospective ideal of the past. Thus we can explain the origin of the Biblical paradise and the Golden Age of the ancients, as well as the fondness of Tacitus and Rousseau for primitive peoples. Even our ideal of human beauty is that of the Middle Ages, when physical strength and skill were of use, whereas now they are merely "beautiful."

As regards all art, indeed, we think that there must necessarily always be a conflict going on between new tendencies and that "classical art" on which every one, even trained critics, rightly set great store. In fact, we never learned to esteem the different artistic periods aright until we began to consider them historically; that is, from the point of view of their place in the scale of evolution.

If therefore we wish rightly to appreciate the many and wholly contradictory judgments passed on war, we must take into consideration the fact that war has changed, and that, owing to tradition, most of us still judge it particularly from the esthetic point of view as it deserved to be judged in the preceding epoch.

§ 176.—*Love of War, Ancient and Modern*

In dealing with the evolution of war I gave the reasons why our peaceful primitive forefathers turned into warriors, showing also how division of labor gave a set-back to the soldiers' profession until in the nineteenth century it acquired a new lease of life. As we do not know what primitive man thought about war, the ensuing period naturally divides up into three:

- 1.—The archaic period, when men simply accepted war as a fact, and when all had to fight as a matter of course. This began in the earliest ages, and had probably come to an end everywhere before a single nation entered upon the stage of history.

- 2.—The period of civilization and cultivation of the ground, which was comparatively inclined toward peace, when only a

limited number of professional soldiers used to bear arms, but otherwise mankind tried to engage in labor tending to civilize and cultivate.

3.—The period of sentimental glorification of war, the archaistic period, when, owing to the newly created “people’s armies,” *all* men again became warriors. This begins with the great revolutionary struggles at the end of the eighteenth century.

However peacefully inclined our still half-animal primitive forefathers may have been, and they certainly seem to have been pacific, nevertheless, when once fratricide had occurred, a latent, but universal, state of war must have prevailed. At any rate, at first all human beings, although after a very short time men only were forced to be ever ready to take up arms. Just as to-day there is still no protection for the rights of individual states, so at that time there was none for the rights of the individual human being. As is the case with the state to-day, so it was the case with the individual man then: possession was nine points of the law, and he might at any moment be forced to defend his rights against those of others, even others who were brutal, overbearing, or crazy. Indeed, there being no sort of guaranty for any one’s rights, these could not be defended save in war.

Thus it was almost inevitable that the opinion should have arisen that war is the natural state, and as primitive people in general think that what they are accustomed to do is right and proper, it may be assumed that our slightly more highly developed forefathers really did consider a state of war lawful and good. No such opinion has come down to us in written documents; we know it only in the watered down, familiar version that war is something natural, and that we have always had war with us.

This view is a wrong one, but we can understand it. Even old Heraclitus believed that war had always existed. He called it the father of all things, and looked on it as the motive force that kept the world going. But just as primitive

man certainly did not take up arms save under compulsion, even so for Heraclitus war was only a means to an end, and the end of the world seemed to him to be peace. Moreover, he did not identify his "struggle" with war and its bloodshed any more than Nietzsche did; for he expressly states that "Man can cleanse himself neither with filth from filth nor with blood from bloodguiltiness."¹

Not only law and right, however, but also phrases, are inherited and transmitted like an ineradicable disease, and Heraclitus's axiom, taken far too literally, has been perpetually repeated. Although he was the one solitary instance of a philosopher delighting in war,—if even he really did do so,—he was taken as a paradigm. Plato,² it is true, in his "Laws," makes Kleinias say that all states are in fact perpetually at war with all others; but he adds that this ought not to be so. Similar statements occur also in the subsequent period. Not till man had grown weary of endless wars, with their ever increasing horrors, did Hobbes,³ in his tractate "De Cive" wrench this sentence from its meaning so as to make it mean that not only did war actually subsist between all human beings, but that this was even the natural state of things. But even Vorländer⁴ pointed out that this very phrase is only an abstract scientific hypothesis, and is not to be considered as historically exact. Moreover, he of course insisted on the necessity for abolishing this so-called natural state.

If the literature of the world is searched for passages glorifying war, astonishingly little will be found up to the nineteenth century; but we must not forget that love of war was probably universal only in the period when man could still not write. Thus we find everywhere the memory of legends tell-

¹ Heraclitus, "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker von Diels," 1903, page 67, No. 5.

² Plato's "Laws," I, 2, p. 625.

³ Hobbes, "De Cive," I, 11f., and "Leviathan," II, 17.

⁴ Vorländer, in the "Allgemeine Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Litteratur," chiefly quotes the passage in Hobbes's "Leviathan," chapter 13.

ing how gods and men fought, but nowhere is it stated that such combats were right or praiseworthy. Perhaps even in later times there were occasional cases of some one really fond of war, but it would seem as if this primitive fondness went hand in hand with a primitive dislike of writing. Soldiers who were also literary men—for instance, Xenophon and Caesar—have never loved or praised war. In fact, if we wish to realize how these hypothetical primitive human beings, our ancestors, thought, we must go back a very little way indeed, not beyond quite modern times.

2.—THE VOICE OF NATIONS

(a) SCIENCE AND ART

§ 177.—*The Antique*

When once division of labor had created various occupations, the world began to perceive that the farmer could dress his fields better if he were merely a farmer, and was protected in his peaceful employment by the "soldier." Both were thus equal, but they gradually became unequal, because the armed man of necessity got the power into his own hands, and became the master. Of course this power was often misused, the defenders of the country and its food producers were set over against each other, and thus the warrior became not exactly beloved, and war partook of his unpopularity.

This period, which includes almost the whole historical time known to us, must on principle be divided into the time before and that after Christ. Although war was not popular even before Christ, nevertheless it was accepted as a necessity of nature; and not till the doctrine of loving thy neighbor as thyself was announced did men begin consciously to make war upon war. In practice, however, no such division of time can be insisted upon, because this Christian concept had already taken root in many persons before it was preached, whereas afterward it seemed to produce absolutely no effect on most

Christian people. Religions, in short, the position of which in regard to war is in any case quite exceptional, must be considered by themselves.

The oldest epic poem, the *Iliad*, is certainly a war epic, full of innocent delight in the heroic deeds of the heroes. But there is not a single passage in which Homer says the least good of war as war. Indeed, in the introductory part, he says by way of a confession of faith:

Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, heavenly goddess, sing!
That wrath which hurls to Pluto's gloomy reign
The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain;
Whose limbs unburied on the naked shore,
Devouring dogs and hungry vultures tore.¹

And in Book II, when Agamemnon advised the soldiers to return home, the warlike Achaians ran so that

their trampling feet
Beat the loose sands, and thicken to the fleet.²

And even Ulysses, who calls them back, is not angry with the Greeks for so desiring to return to their homes, but says:

As many birds as by the snake were slain,
So many years the toils of Greece remain;
But wait the tenth, for Ilion's fall decreed.³

Elsewhere, too, the only epithets which Homer applies to war show him to have had the profoundest horror of it. He calls it a blood-stained human vampire, and speaks of a war debauchee who did not even care for whom he fought, and in the Fifth Book of the "*Iliad*" *Zeus* says that he would have long since have hurled war far deeper down than the *Titans*

¹ Homer's "*Iliad*," opening lines of Pope's translation of Book I.

² "*Iliad*," Book II, Pope's translation.

³ *Ibid.*, Pope's translation.

had not *Mars* chanced to be his own son.¹ Even as at the present day the kings of men love war for dynastic reasons.

Sprung since thou art from Jove, and heavenly born.
Else singed with lightning hadst thou hence been thrown
Where chain'd on burning rocks the Titans groan.²

Yet even considered as a whole, this war epic is not warlike in the modern sense. True, it sings of war being brought to a close, but also hints at its being overcome. It may, indeed, be said to contain the program of humanity. Even the object of the Trojan War points to the future, for it was waged to avenge a violation of the time-honored human right of hospitality, which is equivalent to citizenship of the world. (Compare Kant's "Perpetual Peace.") And who is making war? All Hellas, which in reality was so torn asunder. Any such idea could have been only a dream of the future for Homer. From Taygetos and from Pindos the Hellenes came on a thousand ships to Troy. The tiny states of Lacedæmon and Argos, Messina and Athens, were at one. From all the isles did they come, from Rhodes and Crete and all the Greek colonies. For Homer this was the world, and thus it is that the war which he describes for us is one which the world has as yet never witnessed—a war for which we, too, long, as the war of the future, the only possible war, one waged by the federation of man against the rebel who has violated the law of nations.

Homer may begin with the mænads of Achilles, but from his wrath he comes to *Irene*, to peace; and the Homeric chants end in the words of *Zeus*, in the last lines of the "Odyssey":

None now the kindred of the unjust shall own;
Forgot the slaughter'd brother and the son:
Each future day increase of wealth shall bring,
And o'er the past oblivion stretch her wing.

¹ "Iliad," Book 5, at the very end.

² Pope's translation.

Long shall Ulysses in his empire rest,
His people blessing, by his people bless'd,
Let there be peace.¹

But "old Homer" has done yet more. Not merely did he sing of a far-off, misty future, which he only faintly anticipated, but he clearly says how such a future is to be brought about. In the lines selected as the motto for this book he says that fratricidal warfare on earth must be impossible.

Between Homer's time and now we have climbed every rung of the ladder. First, kinsfolk realized that they were brethren, then towns, and finally states. To-day one alliance of states is already opposed to another, and to-morrow mankind, united into a single alliance, will look on every war as a "war between men of kindred race," and will do what Homer wanted—refuse law and help and protection to its engenderer. Herein lies the true meaning of this most ancient of war epics.

Herodotus, the father of history, also writes of nothing but wars and rumors of wars, but war is abhorrent to him, "for there can hardly be any one so devoid of all reason as to prefer war to peace; for in peace the children bury the fathers, but in war the fathers bury their children." And being wholly unable to account for such things, he adds, "But probably some demons or other like wars to occur."

And in Herodotus's days nations in general thought as he did. No one would ever have dreamed of seeing anything good in war. It is significant that all commentators erroneously derive the Latin word for war (*bellum*) from *bellus* (beautiful), explaining that this was meant sarcastically, and that war was called *bellum* because it was *not* beautiful.²

War seemed to every one a scourge of humanity. In the

¹ Homer's "Odyssey," Book XXIV, Pope's translation.

² Cf. Rabelais, Prologue to Book III of "Pantagruel:" "Je crois, en effet, que la guerre est dite *belle*, en latin, non par antiphrase, ainsi que le croient certains rapetasseurs de vieilles ferrailles latines, mais parce qu'en guerre apparaît toute espèce de bien et de beau et que toute laideur et tout mal y sont cachés."

Revelation of St. John the Divine the four riders have "power given unto them over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword and with hunger and with death and with the beasts of the earth," thus representing war,¹ and even now we pray, "Give peace in our time, O Lord," and "from plague, pestilence, and famine, Good Lord, deliver us." It seemed such a matter of course that war could not be otherwise than bad that as a rule it is not thought worth while mentioning the fact. Not even the bellicose Romans wrote a single pæan in praise of war; and Horace,² in his ode to Mæcenas, when enumerating pleasures which to him do not seem worthy the name, but in which others take delight, particularly mentions war. But this is the only time when he adds any epithet, and in this case the epithet is "*detestata*"—"hateful"—war. And matters continued thus throughout the centuries, for as to medieval delight in war very many people have an altogether wrong notion about that.

For instance, Walter von der Vogelweide,³ who is constantly singing the praises of the knights and princes of Germany, extols their valor and good breeding, their clemency and readiness to make peace, their constancy and diligence. He hopes that it may be granted the Emperor Otto⁴ to be just, and to Ludwig of Bavaria, to have plenty of good hunting;⁵ he

¹ Revelation 6, v. 1-8.—Translator.

² Horace, "Carmen ad Cilnium Mæcenatem," v. 25. Some will retort by quoting Horace's well-known "*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*," but they must not forget to quote the following line also: "*Mors et fugacem persequitur virum*," for without it Horace's real meaning escapes us, which is that "as death strikes even a fugitive, it is always better, when a man is once on the battle-field, to die a fine and glorious death for the country than to die as a coward."

³ Walter von der Vogelweide, Simrock's translation, quoted from Bard's edition. Berlin, 1906.

⁴ Cf. in particular "*Gefährdetes Geleit*," ("Escort Imperiled"), p. 125; "*An die Fürsten*" ("To Princes"), p. 147; "*Mass und Übermass*" ("Moderation and Excess"), p. 179; "*Vier Tugenden*" ("Four Virtues"), p. 184; and "*Die drei Stühle*" ("The Three Chairs"), p. 189.

⁵ "*Das Feschenk Ludwigs von Bayern*" ("The Gift of Ludwig of Bavaria"), p. 140

praises Philip's wisdom and clemency,¹ and accounts it a virtue in the Landgrave Herrman² that he never indulged in caprice. But not once does he praise a prince for having won a war. Moreover, it is characteristic that, when he appeals to men to join the crusades, he never invokes any human being, but always the three archangels, Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael; and when Leopold returned from the crusades in 1219, though he certainly extols him, it is for having kept order and returned "unsullied."³ Only once, and then in his last poem, "*Heimkehr*" ("Home-coming"), does he say that a wave of boundless sorrow has come upon the world, and now he, too, would fain seize his lance and with it win a heavenly crown. But this is resignation, and nowise delight in war; for he knows full well that it is after all the church's duty to be at peace, and that the conception of the crusades is un-Christian. Thus in his poem "*Der Klausner*"⁴ ("The Anchorite"), he says that the reason for so much ruin and desolation is that the church itself has become warlike.

§ 178.—*More Recent Times*

That no one should have had a good word to say of war while the religious wars were devastating Europe is not surprising. In Friedrich von Logau's "Epigrams,"⁵ for instance, war comes off so badly that even his editor, Lessing, assuredly no lover of war, says that Logau "may perhaps have

¹ "Leitstern" ("Guiding Star"), p. 137, and "Die Milde" ("Mercy"), p. 140.

² "An Landgraf Herrmann," p. 156.

³ Walter von der Vogelweide's "Leopolds Rückkehr vom Kreuzzuge" ("Leopold's Return from the Crusades,") p. 167.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵ "Epigrams" ("Sinngedichte") by Friedrich von Logau, 1654. (Cf. Lessing's reviews of Logau, which contain five of his characteristic war poems, "Der verfochtene Krieg," "Des Krieges Raubsucht," "Krieg und Hunger," "Eine Heldentat," "Jupiter und Mars," ("War and its Champions," "Ravenous War," "War and Starvation," an "Act of Heroism," and "Jupiter and Mars.")

exaggerated the evil aspects of war." The German novelist Grimmelshausen,¹ who himself took part in the Thirty Years' War, also has hardly a page in which he does not express his horror of war, the irresistible power of which nevertheless seems to him so great that his hero can see nothing for it but, like his father, to become a hermit. On the other hand, it is characteristic that, as already mentioned, the only person who asserts that war is something natural, though not precisely good or desirable, should be an Englishman—Hobbes.² But Hobbes, living on his sea-girt isle, resembled Englishmen of today in the fact that he saw comparatively little of the horrors of war, particularly those of the Thirty Years' War. Hobbes, it is true, lived through the English civil wars of Cromwell's time, although the devastation wrought by them must have been far behind that wrought by contemporaneous Continental wars, if only because they were civil wars, and no foreign armies were involved in them.

Moreover, intercommunication and travel were increasing, and confirming men in the belief that war between modern constitutional states was not merely horrible, but foolish and useless. Even Erasmus³ calls war "senseless," and though his contemporary Luther began by calling cannon "damnable machines and works of the devil," he afterward, as in so many cases, made great concessions to the war lust of the age.⁴ Suarez⁵ explains that a community of interests and civilization subsists between the different nations, and that this ought

¹ Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen was captured by the Hessians in 1635, and probably was a soldier in the ranks in 1638, 1646, and 1648. His "*Simplicissimus*," pub. in 1669, is considered the first German novel of permanent value, and is an appalling description of the misery resulting from the Thirty Years' War.—Translator.

² Hobbes, "*De Cive*," 1642, I, 11.

³ "*Encomium moriae*," by Erasmus. Cf. in particular "*Militis Christiani Enchiridion*" and "*Charon*."

⁴ Cf. § 188 and 189.

⁵ Francisco Suarez, Spanish Jesuit. James I ordered his "*Defensio Catholicæ Fidei contra Anglicanæ Sectæ Erores*" to be burned by the common executioner.—Translator.

to be furthered by community of legislation; and Hugo Grotius,¹ in his famous work on the laws of war, which long remained the code of international law, made the first attempt to restrict war. Montesquieu remarks that wars in his day had become quite different from those of the ancients as regards their effect on trade, intercommunication, and civilization generally. Holbach, the French philosopher, wrote that war did not even spare the victor, and that even the most successfully waged war was a calamity.²

We must not be surprised, therefore, that all the great men of this period, if they referred to war at all, should have done so with the greatest contempt, sparing no pains to flagellate its useless immorality, cruelty, and barbarity. Suffice it to quote only a few instances. In any case, it does not seem even to have entered into the heads of most writers of the period that there was any need to allege serious reasons for opposing war. They agreed with Leibnitz,³ who during the war of the Spanish Succession, in which his country was involved, wrote to Foucher, saying that "Philosophers have no concern with war," and in general their one desire was to keep as far from the battle-field as possible. True, they did not all express this desire with the Diogenes-like simplicity of Gellert,⁴ who, when he ought once upon a time to have sued for some favor from Frederick II, exclaimed, "Fall down at his feet and recommend him in my name to keep the peace," and then hastily retreated into his lecture-room.

People of those days believed that, as civilization progressed, war must disappear of its own accord, and therefore for the most part contented themselves with abusing it. Thus Hume⁵

¹ "De jure belli et pacis," by Hugo Grotius, 1625.

² Quoted according to N. van Suchtelen, "Das einige Europa" ("Europe United"), 1915. Published by the Committee for the United States of Europe (*der europäische Staatenbund*).

³ Leibnitz, "Philosophische Schriften," Gerhardt, Vol. I, p. 420.

⁴ Gellert's "Letter to a Noble Damsel," 1758. Cf. H. Pröhle, "Friedrich der Grosse und die deutsche Literatur": Berlin, 1878.

⁵ "Treatise upon Human Nature," 1738.

compares two nations at war with two drunken fellows belaboring each other with clubs in a china shop. Quite apart from the bruises, which would keep them doctoring themselves for a long while to come, they would also have to pay for all the damage done.

Pascal¹ gives it as his opinion that "theft, incest, infanticide, and patricide all once were included in virtuous actions, but war never; for can there really be anything more ridiculous than that a man should have a right to kill me because he lives across the water and his ruler has a complaint against mine, although I have nothing whatever against him?" On which Voltaire remarked sarcastically that "ridiculous" was not the right word, and "infamous madness" was much nearer the mark.² Moreover, this friend of Frederick the Great considers all wars began only that men might be enabled to steal,³ which on another occasion he condensed into the epigram that the first king was a successful thief (*un heureux voleur*). Schopenhauer went one better,⁴ and asserted that "lust of thieving" was the origin of all war. And even the "laughing philosopher"⁵ becomes wholly serious when the word war is mentioned.

"War," he says, "is a word as heavy as lead. It is the scourge of humanity and of nations, the antithesis of all reason, although not seldom a harvest for the great, for ministers, generals, contractors, and Jews. War is mankind's obscene picture, and war first begot despotism. War begot the feudal system. War made of free men the first slaves." And Klopstock says in one of his poems that "war is the most hideous

¹ Pascal, about 1650.

² Voltaire's "De la paix perpétuelle," about 1750.

³ "Dans toutes les guerres il ne s'agit que de voler," to which Schopenhauer adds the comment, "And let the Germans take warning by that."

⁴ Schopenhauer's "Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit," ("Aphorisms on the Philosophy of Life," 1850. Chap. V, C, 29. Cf. also "Parerga und Paralipomena," II, 9, "Zur Rechtslehre und Politik," ("On Jurisprudence and Politics"), § 125.

⁵ Weber's "Democritus," Vol. X, p. 216.

laughing stock of the human race.”¹ Elsewhere he says that Cerberus had three jaws, but war has a thousand.

I could fill thousands of pages with such quotations. But it would be unfair to pass over in silence the three shining lights of German humane philosophy—Herder, Kant, and Goethe. I shall have to refer so frequently to Goethe afterward that I will here merely remind the reader of the fine passage in “Egmont.” As for Herder, he says: “Mere endeavors for the betterment of mankind can scarcely succeed in any country so long as the spirit of conquest has the upper hand there, dominating everything. In such a case we are and remain what we were even in Tacitus’s time—*barbarians, armed for war even in peace.*”² All noble-minded human beings, he urges, should do their utmost to disseminate such views, if only because they are human beings. Parents should do their best to instil them into their children, so that the dread word “war,” so lightly uttered, may not only come to be detested of men, but that in time we may scarce dare to pronounce or write it, save with the horror with which we speak of St. Vitus’ dance, pestilence, starvation, earthquakes, or the Black Death.

Finally, Kant³ writes: “We are civilized till we have become a burden to ourselves, with every kind of social refinement and decency. But we are a very long way from being entitled to look upon ourselves as moralized. For . . . so long as governments concentrate all their strength on frivolous designs for forcibly extending their power, thus continually putting obstacles in the way of the slow efforts their people are making to think for themselves, so long need nothing of the kind be expected.”

¹ Klopstock, about 1770.

² “Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität (“Letters in Advocacy of Humanitarian Ideas”).

³ Kant’s “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (“Outlines of Universal History from the Cosmopolitan Standpoint”), Part 7, pub. in 1784. Cf. also and particularly his “Perpetual Peace,” 1795.

§ 179.—*The Transition to Modern Times*

In the preceding pages I have cited only writers fairly generally known, and whose importance is beyond dispute. In so doing, however, I have left the extensive pacifist literature properly so called wholly out of account. It is from no lack of deference that I have not mentioned, for instance, Alfred H. Fried, and Professor Wilhelm Foerster in Germany, the Baroness Bertha von Suttner in Austria; Baron d'Estournelles de Constant and M. Jaurès in France; Alfred Nobel in Sweden; Andrew Carnegie in America; M. Jean de Bloch; above all, that great apostle of peace, Tolstoy, in Russia; and very many more besides. We all honor their faith and idealism, but what they said might be considered preconceived opinions, and what I wanted to show was that these pacifist utterances were not by any means isolated, but that in general everything that hath breath and understanding is in agreement with them.

The "Aktion" is shortly to publish a large number of quotations in proof of this, although these will by no means exhaust the list, which would fill many volumes. I will merely refer to the anthologies of pacifist quotations made by Leopold Katscher¹ and Alfred Fried,² which contain many quotations from authors not named here, unfortunately almost always without an exact indication of the source.

A great many quotations, some of them very valuable, have already been collected and published in the "Aktion."³ They are from a great diversity of writers, including William Lloyd Garrison, Herder, Swift, Adin Balu, Charles Letourneau, Channing, Flammarion, Alphonse Karr, and

¹ "Friedensstimmen, eine Anthologie," ("Voices of Peace. An Anthology"), collected by Leopold Katscher, the Hungarian pacifist, with an introduction by K. F. Meyer and Bertha von Suttner. Leipzig, 1894. 399 pp.

² "Handbuch der Friedensbewegung," ("Handbook of the Peace Movement") by Alfred Fried, 1911. Leipzig and Berlin.

³ "Die Aktion," August 7, 1911. No. 25.

Emile Rod. Many more quotations may be found in Tolstoy's "Do penance."¹

I should also refer the reader to the quotations given by Dr. Herman Wetzel, the German philosopher, whose book can, unfortunately, no longer be bought.² Then there are of course a large number of thinkers and authors who scarcely deal directly with war, but whose brief, pithy sayings, torn from their context are made use of by war advocates. Here I shall confine myself to mentioning two instances only. The German writer on art, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, after 1870 enlarged his work on esthetics by a chapter on "War and Art," lauding war to the skies; and Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher, is everywhere instanced as having incited the world to the present war.

True, Vischer said after 1870 that "all the idealism of a Teutonic existence is bound up with war." (Literally he said "lay" in war, but those of like mind with him are right in saying that the context shows that he believes his assertion to be true of the present.) His words, therefore, bring grist to the mills of the Germanophobes. In my next chapter, however, which will also be my last, he will not be quoted, for it deals with war-lovers proper, and it can be proved that this love of war is merely an overflow from the feeling everywhere engendered by the Franco-Prussian War. When Vischer was in the prime of life, and aged thirty-seven, he thought differently. Not only did he consider the "enormous sums swallowed up by standing armies" to be the chief evil in the state;³ not only did he think it "not lawful to speak" of the "triumphant success of Becker's 'Rhine Chant' *without blush-*

¹ "Besinnt Euch" ("Bethink Yourselves"), by Leo Tolstoy. (Dealing with the Russo-Japanese War.

² "Die Verweigerung des Heeresdienstes und die Verurteilung des Krieges in der Geschichte der Menschheit" ("The Refusal to Serve in the Army" and the "Condemnation of War in Human History"), by Dr. H. Wetzel; Potsdam, 1905.

³ Vischer's "Kritische Gänge" ("Essays in Criticism"), 1844, Vol. II, p. 293.

ing for the Germans'';¹ not only does he scoff at Herwegh and his hopes of making everything better by war,² but in 1844 in his "Proposals for an Opera" he directly states that his reason for proposing the Nibelungen legends as the words of an heroic opera³ was because in opera it is not necessary to prove that the characters ever actually existed. Nibelungen operas, however, he says, are no longer possible now, because the present age is "incomparably greater than the remote past." In our century, when Germany's narrow interests have extended so as to embrace the whole world, the Nibelungen characters would remind us too much of the "artificial efforts of Teutomania," which Vischer hated from the bottom of his heart. In short, he still believed then that in the two thousand years which have elapsed since the origin of this ancient legend, the German people "had wrested a new form of culture from Northern asperity."

In 1870, however, when Vischer recanted, he thought it necessary expressly to state that we were still in the midst of this "Northern asperity" and that the warlike ideal still continued to be the German ideal. But although Vischer will not hear of historical evolution, yet we, in criticizing his writings, must not forget that there is such a thing. Considered from this point of view, the words which he wrote after 1870, in war-time and when he was growing old, acquire a wholly different meaning.

And now to come to Nietzsche. He, the war philosopher *par excellence*, was never warlike at all. Victories on the battlefield never obscured the clearness of his vision, and he was perhaps the first to perceive the effect which such unparalleled military successes must have upon German feeling, the more so as they were almost uninterrupted, quite unaccustomed, and

¹ Ibid, p. 302. (*Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein*)—"The free Rhine, the German Rhine, never shall they have it").

² Vischer's "Gedichte eines Lebendigen" ("Poems of a Living Man"), "Jahrbücher der Gegenwart," 1843, No. 1.

³ Vischer's "Vorschlag zu einer Opera," ("Proposals for an Opera") in his "Essays in Criticism," II, p. 397 et seq.

quite unexpected. His prophetic soul saw in anticipation how these military successes would change the heroic sense into a military sense, a change which even during the war he deeply lamented. Apart, however, from its special aspects, he invariably opposed war with the utmost vigor; and in his "*Ecce Homo*" he specially denies that by necessary struggle he had ever meant war. He does indeed advocate war, he says, but war without powder and smoke, without the striking of martial attitudes, without pathos, and without sprained limbs.¹ His war is the war which Voltaire waged, the war of free minds against false idealism, in which he, like the German philosopher Stirner, included first and foremost ordinary patriotism.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, and when hypnotized by it, Frau Foerster,² it is true, in a so-called apology for her brother, did accuse him of having been out of his mind when he wrote "*Ecce Homo*." Yet this same Frau Foerster once on a time declared that all men were criminals who opposed her brother's philosophy on the ground of his having lost his reason in his later years.³ Fortunately, however, in the days when there was as yet nothing the matter with him, in 1886, Nietzsche expressed his views of war in absolutely unmistakable terms; and any one wishing to know what this supposed martial philosopher really thought about war need only read "*War as a Medicine*" and "*How to Insure True Peace*."⁴ Here Nietzsche says that war is of no use except for sick peoples: a healthy nation does not need war, and, secondly, that a nation in arms (universal service) is unhuman, and worse than war, and that he hoped one day a nation would

¹ "*Ecce Homo Menschliches, allzumenschliches*," Nietzsche's "*Collected Works*." (Vol. XV, 2nd set of German edition.)

² "*Der 'echt preussische' Friedrich Nietzsche*," by Elisabeth Förster Nietzsche, in the "*Berliner Tageblatt*" for Sept. 16, 1914. (Frau Förster-Nietzsche wrote a life of her brother, translated into English in 1912).—Translator.

³ Nietzsche lost his reason in 1889, at the age of 35.—Translator.

⁴ "*Der Wanderer und sein Schatten*," 1886. Nietzsche's Works, Vol. III of Series I, German edition.

arise "which would voluntarily exclaim, "We will break our sword in pieces" and which would raze its whole military system to the ground, and "rather perish twice over than make itself hated and feared." And he solemnly adds that "this must one day be the ruling maxim of every single state."

And people even dare to drag Nietzsche into their polemics!

The lying spirit has grown powerful in Germany, and appears to have got a hold of every one; otherwise such a thing could never have happened.

§ 180.—*Soldiers and Diplomats*

It is by no means only peace-loving scholars and authors who have hated war, however. Soldiers have done so, and among them often even the greatest generals, strange as this may seem to us to-day.

Of "educated soldiers" of comparatively modern times we may take as an example Cyrano de Bergerac, probably the most bellicose of all authors. He actually killed more than a dozen men in duels, and served with distinction between 1638 and 1640, first in the Nobel Guards and afterward in the gendarmerie corps of Prince Conti. If ever there were a man who delighted in battle, it was this Gascon, made so real to us by Rostand. Yet he hated war, saying that "all beings are born to associate together, but man will not have it so."¹ He is forever poking fun at war. "Does not each side say it is in the right?" he exclaims. "And if they believe this, then why do they not go before an arbitrator?"² And in another passage he says that "it is no more discreditable to lose in war than at dice," and he sets far more store by a victory of knowledge than by the winning of any battle whatsoever.³ Cyrano, indeed, had already comprehended the great and wise modern

¹ "Histoire comique du soleil," by Cyrano de Bergerac, 1661. Chap. IV, p. 259. "Œuvres Complètes": Paris, Mercure de France, 1908.

² Ibid., p. 176.

³ Ibid., p. 178.

conception that war is now no longer a suitable form of human struggle, and he condemns war "because it testifies to human cowardice."

From Cyrano de Bergerac to Colonel Hugo von Gizeky and to the Saxon Lieutenant-Colonel Moritz von Egidy,¹ who had the courage to say in 1890 that "war is incompatible with true Christianity," there is a long succession of men whose anti-war views were due to their actual experience of the battle-field. Above all we must never forget that Tolstoy, the greatest genius of them all and likewise the most ardent hater of war, began his career as an officer in the guards, as did Prince Peter Kropotkin, that other great Russian pacifist. In the same category must be placed Garibaldi, who, although ever ready to fight, nevertheless said that the first thing Europe ought to do was to make war impossible. Even Frederick II of Prussia² was of this way of thinking, for he refers to war as "this brazen-headed monster, the War Demon, athirst for blood and for destruction," while elsewhere he calls Bellona "that woeful, wild woman, beloved of ancient Chaos."

That these and similar utterances are not merely the exaggerated phrases of an eccentric form of poetry tending to hyperbole, and that the philosopher of *Sans Souci* really did often feel a horror of the mode of life he was forced to live is proved by his insistence, even in 1749, that a distinction must be drawn between a man's situation and the man himself, "particularly where war is concerned." True, he was not quite logical, perhaps could not have been so because of his position. He does, indeed, insist that "we must not satirize war, but get rid of it, as a doctor gets rid of fever"; but very often, as for instance in his famous letter to Voltaire,³ he merely makes gruesome fun of himself. "Do not imagine," he writes, "that it is a pleasure to go on leading this absurd

¹ "Zum Ausbau der ernsten Gedanken," ("Serious Reflections Made still More Serious") by Moritz von Egidy, 1891, VIII, p. 17.

² "L'ode de la guerre" and other passages by Frederick II of Prussia.

³ Frederick II's "Letter to Voltaire," Nov. 27, 1773.

life. Seeing men one does not know dying all round one, and even handing them over to Death."

He then goes on:

Can any prince who clothes his men in blue cloth, gives them hats with white strings, and orders them to right about and then to left about, make them go through a campaign for honor's sake without deserving the honorary title of an instigator of good-for-nothings who only become hired executioners from dire necessity, so as to fulfil the honorable calling of highway-robbers? The philosophers must send out missionaries to convert people, and to rid the countries of their great armies, without this being noticed. These armies are hurling the countries downward into the abyss; they must be reduced until gradually not a single fighting man is left. No lord of the soil and no people will any longer have any such luckless passion as that for making war, the consequences of which are so disastrous. Every one will utter only reason, things as demonstrable as a proposition in Euclid. I deeply regret that I am too old to hope to witness so fine a sight; indeed, I shall scarcely live to see the first blush of the dawn of that day. I and my contemporaries will be pitied for having lived in an age of darkness, at the end of which, but not before, the first streaks of light were seen breaking unto the perfect day of wisdom.¹

Is it possible to be theoretically a more convinced pacifist than this great military sovereign, even although he declined to believe in the peace organization proposed by the Abbé de Saint Pierre?²

That other crushing remark of the great king, "If my soldiers began to think, not one would stay in the ranks," is certainly famous; but no one has ever tried to put it into practice. Or have the nations never yet begun to think in the sense meant by Frederick the Great?

Not even Napoleon, who is called the Soldier Emperor, who was a soldier by profession, and who unquestionably owed

¹ Frederick II, "Einige Gedanken Friedrich II aus Herders Briefen zur Beförderung der Humanität." ("Some Reflections of Frederick II from Herder's Letters in 'Advocacy of Humanitarian Ideas.'")

² Frederick II, "Totengespräche" ("Conversations with the Dead").

everything to war, saw anything necessarily great about war. Even when still a young officer he complained that he had missed his vocation, an idea which never quite left him. I have already quoted his saying that "he hated this business and he loved it"; and although he waged more wars and won more victories on the battle-field than any other mortal, he over and over again showed that for him war—this barbarous business, as he calls it—was at best a means to an end, never an end in itself. He considered it his mission "to establish civil order on a firm footing, side by side with the military and ecclesiastical power which, until his time, alone prevailed"; and when he founded the Legion of Honor, the first order for all classes of the people, he said that "time was getting on, *and soon the greatest general would feel honored by being permitted to wear the same order as a scholar and an author.*" Indeed, he even thought seriously of abolishing the professional soldier and introducing a militia. "In peace-time," he said, "I will manage to induce the sovereigns not to have any soldiers except their own guard."

Even his enemy, the Austrian Field-Marshal the Archduke Charles,¹ the only man who in those topsy-turvy times conquered the revolutionary armies and once even Napoleon himself, at Aspern and Essling, this only general of the Germans of that day, expressly states that "unduly large armies are a curse to humanity, and cause the ruin of countries."

It is narrated of James Wolfe,² the stubborn and apparently cruel conqueror of Quebec, that on his death-bed he was reading a poem by Gray ("The Elegy in a Country Churchyard"), and said, "I had rather have written such lines than have conquered Quebec"; and even Bismarck, a contemporary of Moltke and in one sense his colleague, said, before beginning his third war,³ that "he considered even a victorious war al-

¹ "Aphorisms," by the Archduke Charles, 1816.

² Wolfe. Cf. R. Wright's "Life and Correspondence of Major General James Wolfe," 1864.

³ Bismarck's "Rundschreiben an die diplomatischen Vertreter des

ways an evil in itself, and one which statesmanship ought to endeavor to spare the nations." And when he had brought his wars to a victorious conclusion, he, so to speak, apologizes for them, saying that "the last two wars were an unavoidable historical event come down to us from past centuries."¹

It is perhaps also worth while mentioning that the Crown Prince Frederick William, even during the Franco-Prussian War, in which he gave an excellent account of himself both as soldier and strategist, expressed his "horror of war," and once actually said, "We really must feel ashamed ever to look at barbarians, because they do neither more nor less than what we do." He was truly of the same mind as his great ancestor Frederick II, to whom he is well known to have been greatly attached.

What I have done here is to collect the pacifist sayings of the very men from whom such utterances might not have been expected to proceed. It would be superfluous to add to the list. Every one knows that all the great British ministers condemned war. Whigs and Tories agreed in this. A Liberal such as Gladstone described militarism as the greatest tyrant of our age, and a Conservative such as Lord Salisbury believed that the triumph of civilization lay in the overcoming of war. Even Crispi said that none but fools or ambitious men desire war.

It may be objected that the history of nations proves this to have been mere hypocrisy, for, after all, they have almost all waged wars, from Frederick the Great's to Lord Salisbury's wars. But it must not be forgotten that modern militarism is based not on the fact of wars being waged, but on the conviction of there being something great about war, something which is cause for rejoicing, and for which preparation must be made. It is this conviction which must be opposed, and

norddeutschen Bundes" (Circular to the Diplomatic Representatives of the North German Association), July 9, 1870.

¹ Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag of Jan. 11, 1887.

when men's views have changed, then a new set of facts will arise of their own accord.

But I have given instances enough. Every one who studies literature even superficially will admit that there has never yet been any man of eminence who has loved war for war's sake. Subsequently (§ 187) I hope to mention the modern men who do so, among whom, however, is only one, Moltke, whose achievements entitle him to claim to be numbered among the great; and even Moltke was induced, from practical considerations, one day to declare that the cessation of war was something worth striving for.

3.—WAR POETRY

§ 181.—*Dramatic War Poetry*

It might be thought that the quotations hitherto given were specially and not fairly selected. Anything so horrible as war, it might be argued, must have opponents, but certainly supporters also. Let those who think so test things for themselves, however, and they will find it is quite true that until the French Revolution, and indeed even until the middle of the nineteenth century, there were never any genuine friends of war. True, the oldest epic poems are war poems, but despite there being such an immense deal about battles in the *Iliad* and the *Nibelungenlied*, in *Firdusi* and the Bible, and in Greek and Roman mythology, not a single one of all these contains the slightest trace of enthusiasm for war. As regards the *Iliad* I have already gone into this in detail; but the tendency of even the German national epic, the *Nibelungenlied*, is in reality against war, and when at last the Germans have torn one another to pieces (Burgundians against Bernese) to the last man, and Theodoric alone remains, there can hardly be any one who does not feel the wearisome folly of war.

No doubt many poets afterward succeeded in giving fine descriptions of battles, such as the account of the battle of Waterloo in Victor Hugo's "*Les Misérables*" or Tolstoy's de-

scription of battle in "War and Peace." But it is just in books with a peaceful tendency written by men of peace that we find these vivid descriptions. What a gulf really separates poets and soldiers can best be realized from the fact that a poet or dramatist has never yet succeeded in a drama the central figure of which was a soldier or the plot of which was a battle. The Napoleonic tragedy has never been made the subject of a successful play or poem, and only quite lately has an attempt been made to use Napoleon in private life (*Napoléon intime*) as material for comedies. Nor is there any drama of Frederick the Great; in Lessing's "Minna von Barnhelm" he merely forms a background. Similarly Schiller preceded his Wallenstein trilogy by "Wallenstein's Camp," which is destined to throw into relief Wallenstein's human side, and, as Schiller quite properly adds, explain his inhumanity. Even in olden times it was just the same, and the "Seven Men before Thebes" is not a war drama.

This neglect of wholesale slaughter might seem surprising, because, after all, murder and assassination have been frequent themes in all tragedies since Grecian times. The reason for it, however, is simply the endless uniformity of all battles ever fought as yet. If a private person strikes another dead, he has some sort of reason for so doing which may possibly interest a poet; but if a soldier strikes any one dead in battle, he has no reason whatever for so doing, and it would really be hard to say what a poet or dramatist would make of such an incident. Battles, indeed, are not merely superfluous, but also deadly dull, and deadly dull they remain even when dramatized, and, be it remarked in parenthesis, when they are painted on canvas.

But beyond all doubt there are fine war-songs, by which we rightly set much store, and many poetical lines glorifying war. But the circumstances in this case are peculiar. The poet believes, or did once believe, it to be his duty to put himself in the shoes of as many different people in as many different circumstances as possible. For instance, Schiller is particularly

praised for having been able to pen his masterly description of the Alps in "William Tell" without ever having been in Switzerland; and similarly he did his best to feel as his characters would have felt and speak as they would have spoken without himself really sharing their feelings.

Schiller wrote "Nadowessiers Totenlied" and die "Kindmörderin" (the "Child-Murderess"), and yet he was neither an Indian nor a child-murderer. In like manner he thoroughly appreciated the soldier's free and easy life, and he it was who wrote what is perhaps the most splendid cavalry song in the world. The lines

Und setzet Ihr nicht das Leben ein
Nie wird Euch das Leben gewonnen sein,¹

and

Der dem Tod ins Angesicht schauen kann;
Der Soldat allein ist der freie Mann,²

contain the highest moral tribute which it is possible to pay to war. Yet it would be a mistake to insist that Schiller had any trace of enthusiasm for war in him. He knew only too well that, as he says in "Max Piccolomini," "war is a cruel, brutal business," and he also knew that "war carries off the best," as he says in "Siegesfest."

War is so far from appealing to Schiller's finely sensitive personality that, perhaps unintentionally, he often does not even refer to it when he might have been expected to do so. In his "Song of the Bell," in which the whole of life, and even the Revolution, is made to pass before us, there is no description of war; there is merely a negative reference to it: ("*Möge nie der Tag erscheinen*," etc.—"May the day never dawn"). In the "Eleusian Festival" the savages come and

¹ That he who does not stake his life shall never have it won from him.—Translator.

² That the soldier alone looks death in the face; the soldier alone is a free man.—Translator.

"cast their blood-stained weapons from them"; and even though he says that all the heavenly beings descend, Mars, the god of war, is not among them. Similarly the war gods are not in the "Gods of Greece," although thirty deities are named, and although, as is well known, Mars was one of the twelve chief gods. (In the second edition he even omitted Zeus, the "Thunderer," because this epithet seemed to him to sully the "hellenic harmony.") Finally, in the "division of the earth," in which, according to prevailing opinion, the soldier would have the chief share, only the peasant and merchant, junker, abbot, and king, but not the man of war, are mentioned; and in the poem "Johanniter" Schiller expressly says the watchman's garb adorns a knight better than a coat of mail. But in principle the passage already cited is most important. Here Schiller expressly extols the German for not prancing about like a Frank or a Briton, after the manner of a proud conqueror. Only once, in the poem¹ "Wilhelm Tell" does he admit justification for a just war; but this war of the Swiss was not a war at all in our sense of the word, but a revolution against a legitimate ruler, and, as we shall see, revolutions are not at all the same thing as wars. In any case, at that time they were put on quite a different footing, and a typical instance of which is the fact that Kant, although in

¹ In his dramas "Wilhelm Tell," "The Maid of Orleans," etc., Schiller of course allows certain characters to praise war. Thus in the "Bride of Messina," in accordance with the impersonal nature of the antique chorus, he makes his chorus sing that "Beautiful is Peace, that lovely boy," and afterward that "war hath her victories," war "which decides the fate of man." Similarly in "Henry V" (Act II, Scene 4) Shakspeare makes the *Dauphin of France* say that peace "dulls" a kingdom, while in the last act we have the *Duke of Burgundy's* marvelous speech about the blessings of peace, "dear nurse of arts, plenties and joyful births," and the injury done to "our fertile France" by war, with all her husbandry "lying on heaps," her vines unpruned, her meadows unmown, and her vineyards grown to wildness. But it is worthy of note that even this play, this "dramatized triumph song of the British nation," as Gildemeister calls it, ends with the words (V. 2) spoken by *Queen Isabel of France*, "That English may as French, French Englishmen, receive each other. God speak this Amen!" [ALL] "Amen!"

principle an opponent of war, genuinely admired the French Revolution.

My reason for devoting so much space to Schiller is to prove that it is by no means always the man who writes good war lyrics who can be claimed as a friend of war. But the same thing applies more or less to all dramatic poets, for example, to Shakspeare, although he has written enough and too much about wars and rumors of war, and although there are characters in his plays who praise and love war. Although Shakspeare has many a vigorous passage about war, yet he himself was nowise a war-lover, but a peace-lover, as is clear from the characteristic passage in "Henry V" in which the Duke of Burgundy extols peace. But above all his sonnets prove this, for, as Bodenstedt says, in them we see the man in the poet before us. Read sonnets 19, 25, 66, 94 and particularly 107, which is one of the finest of odes to perpetual peace. It is impossible not to admire the assurance which enabled Shakspeare even then to say:

Uncertainties now crown themselves assured,
And peace proclaims olives of endless age.¹

§ 182.—*Lyric Poetry*

Even the war lyrists, however, must not be judged indiscriminately by their verses, for they did not always take Goethe's warning to heart and put nothing in their poetry save what they themselves had inwardly experienced. Referring to war lyrists in particular, Goethe² once said:

¹ In sonnets 19 and 94 I really cannot find much indication of Shakspeare's preference for peace. In Sonnets 25 and 66 and particularly in Sonnet 107 it is clear. Dr. Nicolai admits that he is quoting Bodenstedt's translation, which appeared in Berlin in 1862, with the numbers of the sonnets all changed. Consequently he may be wrong in his numbers as regards Shakspeare. But No. 107 is evidently the sonnet he means, as he quotes the above two lines in a free German translation. I have consulted Dowden's edition.—Translator.

² Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe," March 5, 1830. Cotta's edition, III, p. 217 *et seq.* (Theodor Körner, was a writer of the fieriest patriotic songs.—Translator.

Writing war-poems and sitting in a room—that would not have done for me! To sally forth from a camp where at night you could hear the horses of the enemy's advance posts—that I could imagine myself enjoying. But my life and work were cast in different lines, and I left such things to Theodor Körner. His war-songs absolutely suit him, but in my case, I being in no sense a warlike disposition, war-songs would have been like a mask which did not fit.

I have never touched upon or expressed anything in my poetry save what I had personally gone through and what clamored for expression in me and occupied my thoughts. I have only written love-poems when I was in love. How could I have written hate-poems, then, without hate?

Here we have the real truth. Most writers concoct their hymns of hate without hating. They write to order, and describe a battle when they had rather be doing something else, or, as Theodor Körner once said, "with the enthusiasm of a coward they shout out their delight to their conquering brethren."¹ Their place is with those who sit at home in the chimney-corner, and who were an abomination to this young hero.

Even the verses of the old war lyricist, Tyrtaeus, limped. We will not concern ourselves, however, with the martial poetry of other nations, but only with that of Germany. Here again, we find the same old story—war lyrics only too obviously written not by the light of a camp-fire, but by that of a study lamp. Take the poet Gleim, for instance, whose celebrity is mainly due to his "Songs of a Prussian Grenadier," published in 1756 and 1757. His poem going over all the wars of Frederick the Great and entitled "To the Eighteenth Century" is sufficient proof of his not having been of martial disposition.

Old Father Gleim excluded war from the category of the virtues, but above all he says that men make war of their own free will (Cf. § 6), and this must always be counted unto him for righteousness.

¹ Körner having volunteered to fight for Prussia against Napoleon in 1813 was entitled to such a sneer. He fell in battle the same year.—Translator.

Friedrich Rückert, who afterward became a distinguished Orientalist, merely held the mirror up to the nature of his age in his famous "Sonnets in Armor," in writing which he certainly did not draw on his own personal experience. In treating of the wisdom of the Brahmans he was not so martial. Even the people felt the want of sincerity of his sonnets, and even Major Beitzke¹ says that "sonnets are not a vehicle for the blaring of trumpets and the roar of cannon." In so saying he is thinking of Schenkendorf and Fouqué,² although they did go through the campaign as lieutenants of volunteer marksmen (*Jäger*).

Platen, it is true, also served as a lieutenant in the last campaign against Napoleon, although he did not reach the firing-line; and his at first obviously trumped-up hatred of Napoleon, which found vent in feeble rhymes, was under the influence of this campaign, speedily converted into a feeling exactly the opposite.

As for the Wars of Liberation, indeed, in which, nevertheless, the nation was said to have arisen as one man, hardly a single person who fought in them afterward achieved any importance in science or art. Yet at the time those who ought to have constituted Germany's subsequent greatness were young.

There was one who of course did not draw the sword at this time, although he had formerly served in the Prussian Army, and that was the Franco-German, Chamisso. Yet we must not forget his prophetic utterance just then. "I have as yet no country," he said, thinking of the time when all Europe would form one great civilized community. But of all the other poets, many of whom both before and after wrote many a battle-poem, hardly a single one served in the army; and as for those representing the other arts and the sciences, if possible fewer still of them were in the fighting-line. Fouqué came

¹ Gleim's "Lieder für das Volk" ("Songs for the People"), Halberstadt, 1772. No. 66.

² Fouqué, author of "Undine."

from an old general's family; and he, Chamisso, Platen, and Zedlitz were all officers. They therefore really ought to have been obliged to go to the war; yet Chamisso and Zedlitz did not go; Immermann was ill in 1813; Eichendorff led a somewhat inactive life guarding fortifications at Torgau; and Schenkendorf, who could not use his right hand, was employed at headquarters. This exhausts the list of those who delighted in the war. Nevertheless, Wilhelm Müller, Justinus Kerner, the brothers Grimm, Ludwig Uhland, Gustav Schwab, Ludwig Tieck, Rückert, Varnhagen von Ense, Ludwig Börne, Graf von Pückler-Muskau, and Grillparzer were then between twenty and thirty years of age: and Achim von Arnim, Clemens Brentano, and Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, not to mention any others, were not much over thirty. It would seem, therefore, as if, when it is really left open to a man whether he will join the army or no, those who feel themselves capable of really achieving anything in any direction are not willing to go to war.

§ 183.—*The Three German Poets of War*

There remain therefore these three: Ewald and Heinrich von Kleist, and Theodor Körner. But was Theodor Körner really a poet? I believe that even his most enthusiastic admirers now no longer think so. Early arrived at maturity, he wrote some comedies which created a certain stir in good society in Vienna, where light literature is much appreciated. Then he wrote a few mediocre tragedies, and then he was suddenly involved in the war, although he had never before given it or military enthusiasm a thought. Romantic notions of the greatness of Roman heroes, particularly Decius's¹ divine sacrifice of himself, stirred his feelings. He went to war an innocent child, and out of his enthusiasm for it he wrote a handful of poems which are rightly remembered, whereas the rest of his writings are mere literary ballast. But, after all,

¹ Körner's letter to his father of December 19, 1812.

it is not really the poet Körner who is remembered, but the youth who, full of fine enthusiasm, fell for his country.

He went to war an innocent child, and the views of this twenty-year-old youth hardly count in trying to arrive at an estimate of what the nations really thought. We do not know what life might have made of him, though we may guess at this. When Körner, as he said, "had to spend rather a long time at headquarters against his wish and contrary to expectation," he wrote to Frau von Pereira in Vienna, on July 28, 1813, referring to this period, "If you have had a glance at the kitchen, you can hardly help having a horror of what is cooked there." A few weeks later he fell on the field near Gadebusch, and was thus prevented from giving further expression to this horror.

There remain, therefore, only the two Kleists. It is scarcely necessary to argue that Ewald von Kleist was no poet, but a patriot. His patriotism, moreover, was merely devotion to the great king, and not at all to his mother-country, Germany. How could it, indeed, have been otherwise with a man who used to travel about Switzerland pressing recruits into the service of his king, a sovereign enthusiastically devoted to French culture? Nor did his enthusiasm for the war go very deep, for the German historian Maximilian Lenz, when addressing the annual meeting of the Goethe Society in 1915, and endeavoring to discover traces of "German national sentiment in the period of our classical writers," actually says of Ewald von Kleist that "Even for this poet poetry and serving in the army were really two different worlds." There remains, therefore, only Heinrich von Kleist, who was a poet and who wrote war-songs of an outrageous savagery equalling that of any modern writer.

Impartially considered, however, this so-called martial enthusiasm appears in a singular light. It is somewhat staggering to find, for instance, that among the twenty-odd poems of his which have come down to us is one of the finest "peace-songs" in all literature. This poem, "Der höhere Frieden" ("The Higher Peace") may be quoted in full:

Wenn sich auf des Krieges Donnerwagen
 Menschen waffnen auf der Zwietracht Ruf,
 Menschen, die im Busen Herzen tragen,
 Herzen, die der Gott der Liebe schuf.

Denk ich, können sie doch mir nichts rauben,
 Nicht den Frieden, der sich selbst bewährt,
 Nicht die Unschuld, nicht an Gott den Glauben,
 Der dem Hasse wie dem Schrecken wehrt.

Nicht des Ahorns Schatten wehren,
 Dass er mich im Weizenfeld erquickt,
 Und das Lied der Nachtigall nicht stören,
 Die den stillen Busen mir entzückt.

This song was written in 1792 or 1793, during the Rhine campaign, when Heinrich von Kleist, still a young man, was a lieutenant in the Prussian Guards, but, as it clearly shows, war and soldiering did not suit him, and he soon bade farewell to both. The next thing he did was to write his "Schroffenstein Family," which is an outspoken description of the folly of war. Indeed, did we not know that it appeared in 1803, it might easily be taken for a parody on the present war. Two nations, who really have a great affection for each other, fall out and go to war because they have prepared for this war so long, and each side thinks it must break out some day or other. Added to the war are all kinds of misunderstandings, particularly telegrams which have been wrongly interpreted, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unintentionally. The first country which must needs believe in these telegrams is a neutral state (Hieronimus), which would like to intervene between the respective parties. Then the insane war begins, and when it is over both sides perceive that all they have been doing was to murder their own children.

No, Heinrich von Kleist was never, never a warrior. He *loved the right and hated force*. Every line he has written can be explained in this way and in this way only. We need

only recall all his famous writings: "Der Zerbrochene Krug" ("The Broken Pitcher"), "Prinz von Homburg," "Michael Köhlhaas," "Marquise von O," etc. But Heinrich von Kleist saw that the right does not prevail in this world, and this put him beside himself. There is something in his old *Michael Köhlhaas* about him: "The sentiment of right" made a "robber and a murderer" of him, too, and his war lyrics and his play "Die Hermannschlacht" are protests against that unjust war of which for him Napoleon was the incarnation. They are not hymns in praise of any just war.

Life made him cruel, and he makes his *Herrmann* kill "good and bad" indiscriminately and murder prisoners and envoys; while he makes *Thusnelda* cause her former lover to be torn in pieces by a bear. Then there are scenes such as that in which *Herrmann* and *Fust* thrash each other in order to decide who shall have the honor of killing *Varus*, who is standing by, looking on; or the scene in "Penthesilea," where *Achilles* is torn to pieces by the dogs of his lady-love. Such scenes are a sign that the writer's imagination, although that of a genius, was, nevertheless, over-excited. Moreover, his crazy war-lyrics were not written till 1809, and consequently at a time when the poet's mind was already unquestionably unhinged. One effect produced another, and the poet, having lost that "higher peace" to which he has such fine lines, came to love murder and horror, and thus in darkness and night took his own life. Verily, when we look back calmly upon this German's life, we cannot but conclude that he had to pay a heavy price for his estrangement from peace. Heinrich von Kleist, indeed, is no argument for war, but rather one against it.

§ 184.—*The Poet and Liberty*

One more point I wish to bring forward, but it is my main point. In all war-poems composed by any genuine poet it is never war as such which is brought in, but always "wars unknown to any crowned heads"—revolts of oppressed man-

kind against some usurper or other.¹ Any one instancing war-lyrics as proving poets' enthusiasm for war, therefore, must be logical: he must first become enthusiastic for liberty; and then, and not till then, for war.

This is never more clearly manifest than when comparing German war-lyrics of former times with those of this war, from whose beneficial influence on art very much was hoped. The result can already be seen in a number of anthologies, but it is just the true patriots who are likely to be somewhat distressed about this. Most of them would probably agree with Friedrich Lienhard² in "deploring the precocious and extravagant doggerel of the present day"; and even the much praised "Hymn of Hate" against England, millions of copies of which were sown broadcast, is now rejected as smacking too "much of the Old Testament," and rejected by the very persons who did their best to procure it its short-lived celebrity.

In an astute article in the "Kunstwart," moreover, the German art critic Wilhelm Stapel pointed out, quite rightly, that to compare the patriotic poems of 1813 and those of 1870 is like first tapping the body of a violin and then a box of cigarettes; the difference is not merely striking, but alarming. The cause of the inferiority of the 1870 war poetry was that the old expressions were used again and an attempt made to outdo them. Moreover, in 1813 the protagonists of liberty expressed their innocent quest in the future; and in 1870 every one was basking in the sunshine of German's greatness and of self-satisfaction. The true note of patriotism was already wanting, and there was instead an ebullition in honor of Bismarck, the emperor, and the empire.

Freiheit, die ich meine, die mein Herz erfüllt,
Komm mit Deinem Scheine, süßes Engelsbild,

wrote Schenkendorff in 1813.

¹ Cf. § 130.

² "Deutschlands Europäische Sendung" ("Germany's European Mission") by Friedrich Lienhard, 1914: Stuttgart.

Hurra, Du stolzes schönes-Weib, hurra Germania,
Wie kühn mit vorgebeugtem Leib am Rheine stehst Du da,

wrote Freiligrath in 1870.

And what about the German poets of 1914? Stapel, whose article just referred to was published shortly after the outbreak of war, hoped that, "unless appearances are altogether deceitful, we may now be on the eve of another great experience which will prove the inspiration of a finer patriotic poetry, as was the case a hundred years ago." Doubtless the first year of war robbed him of his illusions, for all competent judges agreed that never before were the verses of Fulda, Halbe, Hauptmann, Dehmel, Arno Holz, and Ludwig Thoma so meaningfully lacking in sincerity as now. Even the humorous verse written since August, 1914, by Leo Leipziger and Georg Freund, Gottlieb and Caliban, shows only too plainly a striving after effect, and is only too obviously written to order. Finally we come to the new poets produced by the war, Fritz von Unruh, Dr. Klemm, and others. They may, indeed, be martial, but as poets they are worth little. In short, all the characteristics which distinguished the lyric poetry of 1870 from that of 1813 (not to the advantage of the former) are still more manifest in the war poetry of to-day.

This continuous deterioration may be accounted for in two ways. Either Germany's capacity for producing poetry has decreased, or wars, the impetus for such poetry, are fought less for an idea or ideal and more for the hope of material advantage. We will deal with the second of these suppositions only.

In the Wars of Liberation¹ the people were fighting for liberty—liberty in all respects, civil, political, military, and social, and likewise for freedom of association. We need only

¹ It is significant that we have recently begun to call the "Wars of Freedom" (*Freiheitskriege*) "Wars of Liberation," (*Befreiungskriege*), as if the main object had been liberation from the yoke of Napoleon. Lamprecht recently called attention (in "Krieg und Kultur" ("War and Civilization"): Leipsic, Hirzel, 1914, p. 13, to this "remarkable twisting" of a word; for the winning of freedom of thought and opinion, which occurred at the same time, was, he says, fully as important.

think of Schiller's "Räuber" or "Kabale und Liebe," which were essentially "topical" plays. What a complete transformation has come about is proved by the impossibility of imagining the events on which these dramas are based as having happened *after* 1813. In the Franco-Prussian War the people were fighting for national unity. This was no longer unconditional progress, and the very men who had formerly championed the conception of unity, such as Georg Herwegh, stood resentfully aside, as also did Bebel and Liebknecht, the champions of the new order of things.

But what happened in the War of 1914? For what are the people fighting now? Our Government tells us that it is a defensive war. But mankind has never waxed enthusiastic about anything negative. Others talk about the acquisition of land, and not always for purely commercial reasons. In this, too, there is nothing to inspire poets. And what about the "place in the sun"? Great heavens, the poet's sun,—at any rate, the sun of a poet who writes good poems—is a wholly different thing from the sun which is meant here.

As Goethe rightly observed, war-poems are poems on particular occasions, and if they are to be good, the occasions must be good; and our present day war-poems are bad for the same reason as Goethe's poems on special occasions were bad, when, for instance, he wrote a poem on the birth of some uninteresting princess of Weimar.

The failure of German war-poetry must be accounted for by some other cause than that the occasion was not favorable. Hundreds of thousands of poets put a bridle on Pegasus, and there was assuredly no lack of choice of writers. The noisy enthusiasm of the first months of the war ought to have been able to supply the necessary inspiration; and, in fact, even the German General Staff reports were transfused with a poetic strain.¹ And then what direct possibilities of inspira-

¹ It is sufficient to recall the dramatic intensity with which, for instance, the conquest of Liège was described in the German General Staff reports. First an attempt was announced, which very nearly

tion! It is with somewhat scant courtesy that *Brutus* rid himself of a poet who went to the front. "What should the wars do with these jiggling fools? Companion, hence!"¹ But to-day we think differently of jiggling fools.

Richard Dehmel was in the trenches, as a thousand odd "new poets" also were, and Ludwig Ganghofer was at headquarters; but most of the others, including R. H. Bartsch, H. Eulenberg, B. Kellermann, Aage Madelung, and C. Vollmöller, oscillated between these two extremes, some of them as officers, others as war correspondents.

No, the outward circumstances were favorable to poetry, and if, nevertheless, none was produced; if, as every one is agreed, Fulda, Halbe, Hauptmann, Sudermann, Arno Holz, and Ludwig Thoma, never before wrote such insipid verses, we may at any rate console ourselves with the reflection that the German people's unconscious sense of fitness and right is still sufficient to prevent it being really profoundly stirred by events not likely to promote any ideals.

4.—MODERN DELIGHT IN WAR

§ 185.—*The Renaissance of Delight in War*

In times past premature war advocates were only very occasionally to be found. Machiavelli was an instance of one succeeded; then, on the seventh, the actual conquest: "The fortress of Liège is taken." And then, on the tenth, came the "Truth about Liège," according to which the town was now so firmly in our grip that heaven and earth could not wrest it from us again. This way of putting it caused even simple-minded people to think that there must be something still not quite as it should be; and, sure enough, on the eighteenth came the official announcement that now the "mystery of Liège could be unveiled." But probably not quite unveiled, for there were still droll episodes to come when the commandment was captured and a Zeppelin dropped bombs on the fort of Liège, two announcements which were omitted from the Wolff telegrams, as subsequently issued. Then think of the really epic description of Belgian atrocities, particularly gouged-out eyes, which the German Chancellor gave the representatives of the "American United and Associated Press." And think of such poetic neologisms as "colored Englishmen," "Black Frenchmen," and so forth.

¹ "Julius Cæsar," IV, 3.

such. In his "Prince" he praises or excuses murder and bad faith, treachery and brutality, everything, in short, which may lead a man to power. Thus he praises and excuses war, and even if he does not go to such lengths as men to-day, and insist upon the advantages of war, still, he glosses over its evils with the infamous grace of a pupil of the Borgia.¹

But although Machiavelli extolled war, he was, after all, alone in doing so, and even those who acted upon his principles had sufficient sense of shame to oppose him in theory. Even during his life this was the case. The Medici disavowed him, so that he was forced to join in the conspiracy of Cosimo Rucellai in 1523; and in 1527, when the people had really fought for and won their freedom, they, too, would have nothing to do with him, and he was not even elected a city councilor. Thus matters continued a long while, and not till the nineteenth century, and even then not until the second half of it, did any one venture openly to side with Machiavelli; and then, sad to say, mainly in that very Prussia whose king once wrote against the famous Florentine.

To use the terms customary in the history of art, this essentially sentimental reversion to the simple-minded point of view of the oldest and most primitive human beings, might be spoken of as archaistic. But it will be more easily understood when it is seen to have been due to a threefold misunderstanding. First, it is a fact that in the nineteenth century the condition of "a nation in arms," which had long been a thing of the past, was resurrected. Formerly only a limited number of professional men of arms were involved in war; but now the entire people were so. It is humanly comprehensible, therefore, that the civilian fathers learned to love the soldiers, their sons, who were actually in the fighting-line; and hence it was that first the army became popular, and, finally, war itself.

¹ Cf. in particular his sixth chapter (of new dominions which have been acquired by one's own aims and power), in which he lays it down that conquest with arms, in itself useless, is really the beginning of conquest properly so called.

Yet national armies, which owed their origin to the Revolution, were originally inclined to be altogether anti-war-like; for they were armies against war, nations as a whole protesting against the irresponsible system of government based upon the existence of the old professional soldiers.

In the American War of Independence undrilled militia commanded by Washington had won a victory over British regulars. Then came the French Revolution, in 1793, with its *levée en masse* and its national armies, with their irresistible onslaught. These armies, originally justified by the fight for freedom, were afterward increasingly used by Napoleon for wars undeniably more or less dynastic in character, or, at any rate, wars waged for purely personal considerations. Then they failed, but, on the other hand, when France's enemies in their fight for freedom introduced that same universal conscription for which they had so often blamed France, this decided the issue, first in Austria, under the Archduke Charles, and later on in Prussia under Scharnhorst. But here again, precisely as happened in France, a temporary institution, originally intended only for the war and for freedom, was converted into a permanent one, in order to conform to Metternich's ideas.¹

The enormous armies of modern times, therefore, originally used for fighting out revolutions, gradually came to be used to serve the purposes of reaction. Their origin was speedily forgotten, but the fact of their existence could not fail to incline the peoples to delight in war, for everything which exists clamors to be used. There is something tragic in this fate which has befallen the one and only democratic idea which took possession of almost the whole world. Charles Fourier, however, the socialist and Utopian, extraordinarily able despite all his eccentricities, perceived that the arming of whole nations would tend to reaction, and accordingly looked upon it as

¹ Cf. § 75 on the rise of standing armies, for details of the conversion of territorial defense forces into an army of aggression.

an alarming reversion to the habits of Tatars and Indians.¹

Secondly, Darwin's² biological theory that in struggle for life are comprised the conditions of racial progress, was frequently used to explain the awakening of delight in war. True, this theory has often been disputed, but in its broad general lines it can scarcely be contested. Since then many persons, mostly professional soldiers, it is true, have imagined that they could perceive not only beauty, but also a useful purpose, indeed even morality, in war and struggle.

Thirdly, it was almost universally assumed that German unity was a direct result of Germany's three wars, in particular of the Franco-Prussian War. Thus for the first time in the history of the world an undoubted benefit seemed really to have been wrought by blood and iron; and this of course also tended to raise people's estimate of the value of wars.

§ 186.—*Moltke and his School*

This could not fail to be particularly the case in Germany. Hence it is not surprising that the first voice ever heard from time immemorial praising war *for war's sake* should have been that of a German. It was Hellmuth von Moltke, the conqueror in the three wars to which I have just referred, who wrote, in his famous letter to Bluntschli: "Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, and war is a link in God's universal ordinance. In war man's noblest qualities are developed—courage and resignation, fidelity to duty and readiness to make sacrifices, even when it comes to laying down life. *Without war the world would become swamped in materialism.*"³

We can scarcely believe our eyes when we see war recommended as a remedy for materialism in the very same lan-

¹ Cf. § 84 on the very doubtful claims of modern armies to be considered democratic institutions.

² "On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection," 1859.

³ Cf. Bluntschli's "Collected Minor Writings," Vol. II, p. 271. Nördlingen, 1881.

guage as that in which Herder, Goethe, and Kant wrote advocating German idealism. But such is the fact; there is no doubt about the genuineness of this letter, and it has borne fruit, although the plain and unadorned simplicity of Moltke's language has never since been attained.

Unhappily, it is by these words that Moltke will probably live in history; but we must in justice point out that they are perhaps not wholly consistent with the character of a man of such profound feeling, and ought perhaps to be considered merely as an after effect of the war. Before war had conferred on Moltke the utmost which it can confer on any one in Germany, that is, when he was yet a mere captain, he wrote that "increased prosperity by means of peace is better than military conquests," and he hoped "it would be possible to reduce standing armies in Europe," and save "the thousands of millions swallowed up in war expenditure and the millions of men in the prime of life torn from their occupations, in order to be trained for use in war, should war occur," and "to make an increasingly productive use of these incalculable sources of strength." Once he even said: "We frankly admit that we are in favor of the much-ridiculed idea of peace between all the European nations. Is not the trend of the history of the world to approach such a peace?" In any case, however, he had a sufficiently prosaic notion of the causes of this approximation to the "ideal," for he thought the only reason why wars were becoming less frequent was that they were becoming more costly.¹

The immense influence of the Franco-Prussian War on European ideas can be traced in the writings of the theologian and philosopher Ernest Renan even better than in the case of a general such as Moltke.

When we see what a transformation has occurred, after only a few months of war, in a peace-loving man such as Renan, who has given us books about Christ full of the most

¹ Cf. Rhanon's "Völkerrecht und Völkerfriede," ("International Law and International Peace"), 1881, p. 43.

genuine excellence, we need no longer wonder at a pastor who turned martial during the Crimean War, nor at the change in men's minds in 1914. In general no one need trouble about any books written during war or shortly after it by a citizen of a belligerent country.

This is to some extent true even of Dostoyevsky's famous article on the war, written in 1876, when war was threatening again to break out between Russia and Turkey. This is the *only* time that a really eminent man has written anything which could be interpreted as coinciding with Moltke's views. It is clear that Dostoyevsky's is the mind of a genius, although, as we now know, a genius on the point of collapse, playing with the notion that, alter all, there might be something good in the threatening war. But Dostoyevsky, who set murderers and prostitutes on a pedestal, had at least so far preserved his reason as to put his poem in praise of war into the mouth of a man who, as he writes, "was known to hold very paradoxical opinions, and who probably defended war merely for the sake of paradox." I repeat, therefore, that Dostoyevsky by no means defends war. On the contrary, he introduces himself as a speaker and is perpetually contradicting paradoxes.

Many others, not so great as he, have, it is true, followed in Moltke's footsteps. This is mainly attributable to the three causes I have already enumerated: the existence of national armies, misinterpreted Darwinism, and the fact that the after-effects of the Franco-Prussian War were represented as morally a step forward.

§ 187.—*Instances from the Writings of War Advocates*

Presumably certain natures have at all times experienced direct, so to speak, physical, pleasure in war;¹ and they were

¹ If I may be allowed to cite an example of a contemporary, I would mention Count Reventlow as an instance of this type of man; but he seems wholly devoid of any such bashfulness as used to prevail at one time.

assuredly not the least noble persons who did so, especially as for a time a certain sense of moral reticence seems to have withheld them from expressing their feelings. Otherwise there is no explaining the fact that in early times this martial point of view should absolutely never have been represented in literature. The war advocates of those days, in fact, were on the defensive, and ventured to come forward only whenever some new piece of Utopianism made belief that the conception of perpetual peace was on the point of being realized. These humanists, as they might be called, were indeed far too sanguine, and the war advocates made a vast deal of cheap fun of them. Not one of the latter, however, has succeeded in making his name known, not even to specialists. Who knows anything about the opponents of the Abbé de Saint Pierre? Who knows anything of such a person as Alexander Lamotte, Valentin Emser, Frédéric Ancillon, Rühle von Lilienstein, Luden, or Tzchiener? Anselm von Feuerbach and Hegel ought alone to be mentioned in this category; for though they opposed Kant, they were men of some note. Yet despite their having considered war necessary, they never asserted that it was useful or even good.

It was left to modern times to do this. True, not nearly all those whom I have in mind are out and out martially disposed; but the endeavor to represent war as morally justifiable may be seen running through them like a red thread. Thus the German military writer S. R. Steinmetz¹ calls war "an institution of God, Who is weighing the nations on His scales." War, he says, is "the main form which a state assumes, and the only means which nations have of putting forth all their strength at one time and for the same purpose." Victory is not won because of any one good quality, but because of a number together; and there was never a defeat which could not be traced to some kind of crime or weakness. Fidelity, sense of solidarity, endurance, conscience,

¹ "Die Philosophie des Krieges" ("The Philosophy of War") by S. R. Steinmetz; Barth: Leipsic, 1907.

education, inventiveness, thrift, wealth, physical health, and strength—all these and every other kind of moral or intellectual superiority count before “God’s great judgment seat” and when “He hurls the peoples one against another.”

But the more recent writings of Lasson¹ and Kattenbusch,² of Homer Lea and J. P. B. Storey, of Ratzenhofer³ and Stengel,⁴ of Professor Wilkinson⁵ and Admiral Mahan,⁶ will be read in after times only with a certain feeling of amazement. All in good time I purpose to refer to their writings in detail.

But the book in which this modern conception of war was undoubtedly most uncompromisingly and boldly expressed was “Germany and the Next War,” by the German General Bernhardi, which appeared in 1912. The fact of its author being a recognized authority on strategical questions lent the book additional importance. Bernhardi argues that Germany must fight for predominance, without any regard for the rights and interests of other nations. He speaks of the “duty of waging war,” and describes the German peace movement as “poison,” being firmly convinced that the business before the German people could not be carried out save by resort to the use of the sword. The duty of self-assertion, according to him, is by no means confined merely to repelling the enemy’s attacks, but includes insuring the existence of the en-

¹ “Das Kulturideal und der Krieg” (“War and the Ideal of Civilization”) and “War,” by Adolf Lasson; Berlin, 1868.

² “Das sittliche Recht des Krieges” (“The Moral Right to Make War”), by F. Kattenbusch: Giessen, 1906.

³ “Die soziologische Erkenntnis und die ‘positive Ethik’” (“Recognition of Sociology and ‘Positive Ethics’”), by General Ratzenhofer: Leipsic, 1901.

⁴ “Weltstaat und Friedensproblem” (“A Universal State and the Problem of Peace”), by Karl von Stengel: Berlin, 1900. [This Stengel was a delegate to the first Hague Conference, on which occasion he gave such proofs of his bellicosity as highly to delight the caricaturists of the day, who represented him as a particularly obstreperous goat standing on its legs, butting the gardener, who is trying to cultivate the peace flowers.—Translator.]

⁵ “War and Policy,” by Professor Spencer Wilkinson, 1900.

⁶ “The Influence of Sea-Power upon History,” 1890.

ture community included within the confines of the state, and making it possible for them to develop and expand. Furthermore, he asserts the desirability of conquests being achieved by war and not by peaceful means. Silesia, he adds, would not have been worth so much to Prussia if Frederick the Great had acquired it by the decree of an arbitral tribunal. Attempts to abolish war are not merely "immoral and unworthy of mankind," but also attempts to rob man of his chief good—the right to risk his life for ideal objects. The German people, he concludes, must learn to realize that the maintenance of peace cannot and never ought to be the aim of politics.

Perhaps the only other man who has expressed himself so clearly is Ex-President Roosevelt in America. He says that he despises nations and human beings who calmly pocket insults, and does not admire the love of peace of timorous persons. America, he continues, if she is to play a part in this world (*sic!*) must perform those sanguinary deeds of heroism which have brought glory to a nation in the past; for only in war can a nation acquire the energy which is necessary in the struggle for existence. If, on the contrary, it were to live in peace and comfort, it must give way before other nations which have not yet lost the valor and love of adventure of a true man.

All which is nowadays familiar enough. Roosevelt does not seem to have let any trace of his real spirit transpire, and this is particularly the case with his warlike enthusiasm. Indeed, it all reads rather like an electoral speech. The sole source of satisfaction seems to us to be that the Americans obviously think differently on such matters, and they did not reëlect Mister Roosevelt.¹

It is plain, however, that even lately, at any rate before the outbreak of hostilities, delight in war has not very fre-

¹ I translate Dr. Nicolai in full. The time when he wrote this must always be remembered. The notes of exclamation in the citation of Mr. Roosevelt are, of course, the author's.—Translator.

quently found expression in literature; but that it was latent in the people was proved only too clearly by their general state of mind after August 4, 1914. After all, such people as Bernhardt merely had the courage to say what thousands of others were thinking, sentiments which were even being vaunted over a glass of beer, only in an undertone. I hope and believe that Bernhardt's book does not express the opinions of the best Germans, but assuredly it expresses those of the majority and of the most influential. His views are the views held by the Pan-Germanists and by members of the navy and of the defense leagues. Large portions of the population, indeed, do now really place military virtues before all others, a point of view which I do not need to discuss, since this whole book was written to oppose it.

CHAPTER XV

WAR AND RELIGION

1.—RELIGION AND LOVE OF PEACE

§ 188.—*The Older Religions*

The discrepancy between the fact of war and dreams of peace never appears so acute as when we consider religions and their connection with war. True, the oldest religions did not much feel the inconsistency of war and religion, for they created a special divinity for each category of emotions. Hence, with so many gods, they could easily set a god of peace side by side with a god of war, or do as the practical Romans did, and arrange to have a two-headed god, who was simply turned round one way when war was declared and turned round the other way when peace was concluded.¹

When men became converted to the worship of one God only, however, Who was to unite all attributes in Himself, a certain difficulty arose; but it has seldom happened that a religion has laid down its military aspirations as a matter of principle, as was the case with Mohammedanism, for instance. Islam, indeed, was actually invented by Mohammed and his warlike men of Medina for the express purpose of waging war, and they invented their new rules in order to be able to attack and plunder Mecca even in the holy month. This religion never shook off the effects of its origin in robbery, and just as

¹ What is here said about the two-headed Janus, whose temple was closed on the conclusion of peace, is only symbolically meant. In reality we do not even yet clearly understand the significance of Janus. It is noteworthy, moreover, that in so highly civilized a country as Greece, Ares, the god of war, had virtually no temple, and there are very few statues of him extant.

Mohammed could always ferret out some verse of the Koran to prove that he might have as many strange women as he pleased,¹ so he invariably contrived to find texts to reconcile slavery and warfare with the will of God.² It is significant that in the Koran the chapter on "The Right to Own Slaves" should be followed by the chapter on the "Right to Make War"; and again it is only too plain what an intimate connection there is between these institutions. It was the resultant close union of brute force and priestly fanaticism, culminating in the harem, the *régime* of hosts of janissaries, and the slave-market of Aleppo, on which the strength of the Osman Empire depended.

There was a time when it was believed that this Turkish trinity was inferior to the Christian trinity. That was when Osman armies heavily oppressed Europe. To-day the Turk is outwardly driven back almost into Asia, but *morally* he has conquered Europe, and the green standard of the prophet is flying invisible over every house in which there is talk about that "holy war" which used to be known to Islam only. Formerly other religions were peaceful, at any rate in theory, and waged war only in practice. Buddhism and Christianity in particular, however, are essentially pledged to the conception of the prevalence of a world-wide harmony; and consequently for them war must be an anomaly, as it were, an infringement of their principles. Nevertheless, all have come round in some circuitous fashion to approve war, as we shall prove more in detail as far as Christianity is concerned.

§ 189.—*The Old Testament a Jewish National Book.*

The Old Testament says in so many words, "*Thou shalt not kill.*" This commandment is older and more sacred than the nine others, for after the Flood, when God made a new

¹ Cf. Weil's "Geschichte der islamitischen Völker" ("History of Moslem Peoples"): Stuttgart, 1866, p. 11.

² Just as Henry VIII of England introduced the Reformation into England in order to marry the beautiful Anne Boleyn.

covenant with Noah, He said, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed" (Genesis ix, 6), a command which is repeated many times, for instance, Exodus xx, 13; xxi, 12; xxi, 14; and in Numbers xxxv God says that whoever kills any one with an instrument of iron or by throwing a stone or "with an hand weapon of wood," "he is a murderer; the murderer shall surely be put to death."¹ No mercy is to be shown, for "ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are: for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it."²

Thus taking man's life is very often forbidden in the Bible, but according to the sacred writings God makes from the very outset a clear distinction between theory and practice, for when God theoretically by his new covenant with Noah forbade man to slay his neighbor, he had in practice long since sanctioned fratricide. Cain, who had slain his brother Abel, becomes afraid, thinking he will be forced to take to flight, for he will be killed wherever he is found. The Lord sets his fears at rest, however. "Whoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold." (Genesis iv, 15.) This announcement that in practice murder is to go unpunished is remarkable, and Cain would seem to have been the first "murderer pleasing to God," a description which now applies in the main to soldiers only. In this connection the fact may be mentioned that modern militarists—that is, agrarians and iron magnates—are reputed to be descendants of Cain; for in the Bible it is said that the descendants of Cain are "such as have cattle," while Tubal Cain was "an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron." (Genesis, iv, 20-22.)³ It is not wholly without significance that, as

¹ Numbers, xxxv, 16-18.

² Numbers, xxxv, 33.

³ As recently as 1856 Pastor Euen (in "Der wissenschaftliche Materialismus") ("Materialism Based on Natural Science"): Berlin, p. 31) wrote that the descendants of Lamech, Jubal, and Tubal-Cain (Cain's sons) all went the same way, and with them sin increased. Thus even

is well known, the breeding of cattle makes men boorish, and that armorers should always have had a special interest in the perpetuation of war.

Apart from this strange story of Cain, however, murder is forbidden in the Bible, and very sternly forbidden. But—it is only the murder of Jews. As is natural, considering the period from which it dates, the Bible is absolutely national in character. Only the Jew is really considered as a human being; cattle and strangers might be slain without the slayer himself being slain. In this case there was a ransom. Accordingly, war was of course allowed also, and the Jews were no more illogical than the Moslem who kills the outlander. Of late years the Jews and the Old Testament have often been reproached for their contempt for those who were not Jews; and in practice even Christ acted in precisely the same way.

§ 190.—*The Brotherhood of Men*

There is this difference, however, that in the meantime, through *Christ Jesus*, the Jewish national church has become the religion of mankind. Since Lessing explained the progressive character of religion so finely in his "*Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*" ("*Education of the Human Race*"), thousands of apologists for Christianity have repeated, without turning a hair, that "the reason why the Christian faith is the highest is that, like heaven, it can include the whole world," and it is implied that such a faith lays certain obligations on those who hold it.

In Christ's time the old principle was still in force, that "he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword."¹ Christ himself even goes further, and says "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword."² St. John says that "whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." after such a long period as this Cain's sin is considered a sin by the church.

¹ Revelation, xiii, 10.

² Matthew, xxvi, 52.

derer"¹; and St. Matthew, that "whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment."² But in the main Christ puts the duty of love in place of the right of vengeance. We are most familiar with this new doctrine, which Christ was not the first or the only one to proclaim, from the Sermon on the Mount; and if there is anything in the world of which Christianity may be proud, it is that in the very early Christian times this brotherhood of all men, which hitherto had been advocated by only a few philosophers, should have been realized by the mass of mankind.

Since the days of the Sermon on the Mount there ought to have been no more wars, for "war is a satire on the New Testament."³ But here we must remember that even if today the Sermon on the Mount is no longer considered as the sole source of all morality, nevertheless for two thousand years it was so, and European Christianity must answer for what it has done during this long period with the pound of brotherly love entrusted to it.

No one can seriously doubt that the Christianity of the Gospels was not only peace-loving both in its ideas and its principles, but in practice wholly opposed to war. When Christ says He came not to send peace on earth, but a sword,⁴ it is clear from the context that all He means is that conscientious scruples would and were meant to destroy much peace and happiness.

If this passage, therefore, is not an incitement to actual warfare, but at best to struggle, all other new Testament passages, but most of all those which Martin Luther⁵ quoted to justify the wars of his day, cannot be used to advocate wars

¹ I, St. John, iii, 15.

² Matthew, v, 22.

³ Diary of the Emperor Frederick III, 1870.

⁴ Matthew, x, 34.

⁵ "Ob Kriegsleute auch in einem seeligen Stande sein können." ("Whether soldiers can also be in the realms of the blest"), by Martin Luther. The passages Luther quotes in justification of war are Romans, xiii; I Peter, ii, 14; Luke, iii, 14; and John xviii, 36.

except by wholly distorting their meaning. They all mean, indeed, just the contrary, and the thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans says that love is the fulfilling of the law (verse 10); in the first Epistle of Peter we find it said (verse 19, chap. ii), "for this is thankworthy if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully"; in Luke (chap. iii, verse 14) it is stated outright that a soldier must "do violence to no man"; and in John's Gospel Christ says, "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." (John xviii, 36.) Thus these undoubtedly hypocritical quotations of Luther¹ go directly to show that Gospels and the early Christians were eminently opposed to war.

The earliest Christians were in earnest about their religion. They courageously refused to serve in the army, and the Romans consequently persecuted them. As peaceful combatants, intentionally unarmed, they went forth to meet the lions in the Roman arena. Even in Christian writings there is a great deal against the state, and in the early days this was the case with official writings also, whereas now it is so only in the case of those of an excommunicated person such as Tolstoy. Thus Tertullian² condemns any participation in the services of the state, stigmatizing military service in particular as "the service of the devil"; while Origen³ says that no servant of Almighty God may take up arms, and that no Christian may even legally carry out sentence of death on any one.

¹ I, at any rate, think that, despite our being prejudiced in favor of so valiant a champion of God as Luther, we cannot implicitly admit his good faith when we find such sentences, for instance, as this: "For supposing the sword to have been a wrong thing in fighting, so would it likewise have been wrong supposing it to keep the peace."

² Tertullian's "De idolatria." Cf. also "de Corona militis."

³ Origen's "Contra Celsum," Libri VIII, III, 451.

2.—THE DILUTION OF CHRISTIANITY

§ 191.—*The Practical Compromise Between Christian Doctrine and War*

But this was not for long, and in practice men soon went over into the camp of the militarists. Christ could not quite abolish the sword even during His own lifetime, for according to the Biblical legend, Simon Peter cut off the ear of Malchus, the high priest's servant, and had Christ not intervened, he would probably have used his sword still more. (John, xviii, 10, 11.) But it was Peter whom the church chose as its symbol, and it was from the chair of St. Peter that that same Christianity at whose birth the angels sang "Peace on earth" was converted more and more into a church militant, until Pope Julius II finally exchanged his pallium for armor. It is too well known to require any proof that, with the possible exception of the atrocities of such a man as Jenghiz Khan, there has never been so much desolation wrought in the world with poison, fire, and sword as during the Christian era, partly by the Christian church itself, through the Inquisition and Courts of Inquisition, and partly in the church's name, through the crusades against the Turks, Albigenses, Hussites, and others, and through the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹

But apart from this, the main reason why enthusiasm for war attained greater dimensions among the proud white civilized peoples than among any others is probably that at a period when the people still needed a religion Christianity proved unable to make a strong enough stand against the murderous propensities unchristian in the truest sense of the word, of the mighty men of this world. From this reproach Chris-

¹ The contemporary German philosopher Max Scheler, it is true, says in his war-book, p. 268: "In reality the Christian world knows nothing of any such institution as that of a Holy War for the forcible dissemination of the Faith."

tianity will never be able to clear itself. *Tua culpa, tua maxima culpa.*

So cowardly a compromise between principles and practice cannot be approved, but it is understandable. The energy inspired by a new conception almost always dies away after the death of those who watched its birth and were transported by enthusiasm for it. The Christians, owing to long-continued persecution, became weary and cowardly, and ceased to refuse to kill, if ordered to do so by the state; and thus the legions of Rome actually fostered the new sect. At first Christ's famous precept, "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's," was probably obeyed, in the belief that in this conflict of duty a "middle course" could be found. But it was impossible to continue in this way; and Constantine by A. D. 312 had already learned to pray to the god of peace for victory in battle. Twelve years afterward, under Sylvester I (A. D. 324), when the Christian Church debased itself to become a state church,¹ it was all over with the peace of Christianity. About the year 400, Mars, the ancient war god, was received among the saints and called Martinus, and it was not long before the peaceful missionaries of the first centuries of the Christian era were followed by others who made conversions at the point of the sword.

These conversions began in the Saxon wars of Charlemagne, and then, probably owing to the Moslem advance, reached their climax in the crusades and the Inquisition, and at length gradually dwindled down into colonizing missions to convert the heathen, and into powerful home missions, which in turn gradually degenerated from funeral pyres into dragooning people into religion, and then into the refined irritation of attempting to convert them by exercising a purely economic pressure on them. Of Russia and Germany it is best to say nothing, but even in England the test acts, preventing Roman Catholics from holding public office or sitting in Parliament,

¹ Luke xx, 25. Also Matthew, xxii, 21, and Mark xii, 17.

were not abolished until 1829. A Christianity with so much *must* about it, forcing atheistical university professors on to their knees (and in Russia making them absolutely prostrate themselves), plays the very devil with all true religious feeling.

Among heretics, it is true, some remnant of the old spirit of Christianity still survived; and the modern Manicheans and Catharists,¹ the Waldensians² and Albigenses,³ the Moravians⁴ and Quakers all, in their best days, refused military service.

Thus even those sects the essence of whose doctrines was the refusal of military service gradually degenerated. To-day the Mennonites in Germany, the Doukhobors in Russia, the Paulicians, the Nazarenes, and whatever all their names may be, are lying in trenches side by side with socialistic free-thinkers, shooting at one another. In their views of the world in general they were enemies, in their belief in pacifism they were friends. But all this is now forgotten, and they are all alike in their inconsistency in joining in the present wholesale slaughter.

Menno Simons, the founder of the Mennonites, who died in 1561, condemned war and vengeance, basing his condemnation on the passages in St. Matthew: "All they that take

¹ Cf. Hahn's "*Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter*" ("History of the Medieval Heretics"), 1845. [The Catharists, or Cathari, held views virtually identical with those of the Albigenses, with whom they were often confounded, and in whose sufferings they shared. They held that matter is intrinsically evil, and that men's bodies are evil; therefore they aimed, by an ascetic life, at freeing themselves from the control of the body.—Translator.]

² Cf. Dieckhoff's "*Die Waldenser im Mittelalter*" ("The Waldenses in the Middle Ages"), 1853.

³ According to Schmidt's "*Histoire et doctrine de la secte des Cathares*," even "legitimate self-defense" was forbidden to the Albigenses.

⁴ The best-known writers of the Bohemian Brethren (or Moravians) are Peter Chelcicky, who wrote in the sixteenth century, and Johann Amos Comenius, whose chief work was published in 1639.

the sword shall perish with the sword" (xxvi, 52), and "resist not evil" (v, 39); and for centuries his disciples faithfully abided by his teachings. Even in 1813 the strength of their moral convictions was still so great that, despite the patriotic excitement of that year, even so ruthless a soldier as York absolved them, by rescript dated February 18, from joining the territorials. But in 1915, G. Mannhardt,¹ the preacher of the Dansie community of Mennonites, actually delivered an address glorifying feats of arms and martial heroes.

Any one who impartially compares the principles of church doctrine with church practice will feel no surprise that the church councils should have forbidden the reading of the Bible, and we can only rejoice that it was a revealed book in the most orthodox sense of the term. Otherwise the church would not merely have prohibited, but also burned it.²

§ 192.—*The Theoretical Compromise of the Middle Ages*

Thus in practice did the religion of love gradually become overlaid. But whereas formerly men at any rate felt scruples about allowing this to happen, and finally yielded only to pressure from without, even this has now ceased to be the case, and it proves how little influence Christianity really exerts on the masses that it is to-day considered wholly immaterial whether Christianity is peaceful and humane or not. What has Christian love to do with us? it is argued. We are good soldiers and good patriots!

This indifference to the claims of morality is worse even than religious wars. To what straits the few persons are driven who still think of their religion at all appears from the following poem, published in the "Generalanzeiger" of Bonn, when trench warfare had long been going on, with varying fortune, but with no result:

¹ "Taten und Helden, eine Rede zur Kriegszeit" ("Deeds and Heroes; a War-Time Address") by H. G. Mannhardt, 1915.

² Karl Lehrs' "Kleine Schriften" ("Minor Works"), 1902. P. 508. Lehrs is a contemporary German philosopher.

Warum der Kampf jetzt steht?
 Zum heil für unsre Sache!
 Dass Dein verlöschet Gebet
 Zu neuer Glut erwache.

Dein Gott die Welt durchheilt
 Und aucht und späht und siehtet
 Ein Volk, das ungeteilt
 Die Herzen auf ihn richtet.

The writer therefore quite seriously believes that Gott is prolonging the present slaughter merely in order to see which European people is the most pious. ("Why do we still fight?" He asks, and answers: "For the sake of our good cause!") A conception of God which is assuredly fit only for a pickle-herring farce or perhaps for a worshiper of Moloch.

Originally, at any rate, Christian philosophy was peaceful in principle, and the doctrine that war is consistent with man's natural state was directly opposed by some, who then inclined to accept the Biblical conception of paradise. I do not purpose to discuss in detail the extensive number of works by scholars on this subject, but I should like to quote the words of Alberic Gentilis,¹ who expressly asserts that "no war ever came about naturally" (*a naturâ bellum esse nullum*). Whenever war was going on, it was looked upon as a work of the devil or a "Divine chastisement," and accepted as calmly as was the devil.

Thus with the help of a little sacerdotal duplicity the difficulty was solved, and all went well until it was desired to reconcile monistically that contrast between war and Christianity which the plain man could not but feel. So long as peace was sought in a remote past or only hoped for in a far distant future, perhaps only in heaven, the inconsistency could be ignored; but when it was asserted that peace ought also to prevail in the present, then the time-honored longing

¹ Albericus Gentilis, "De jure belli libri tres," I, 15, 1558.

for peace could not fail to degenerate into the grotesque conception formed by the masses of Leibnitz's "harmony in the best of worlds." On the other hand, those who, like Voltaire's *Candide*, declined to continue crying peace, peace, when there was no peace, simply denied that such a thing as peace was possible; and asserted that everything centered round the struggle for existence.

Finally every ideal was abandoned, and men fell back upon a vague, shadowy eclecticism. They ceased to see, as old Heraclitus saw, that the object to strive for was successive evolution from war, as the father of all, to peace. They went almost blindly from war to peace, and from peace to war, and it is felt to be almost illogical that those who insist on the value of life and likewise all friends of peace, and even religious people, should long since have become reconciled to war as to something natural and inevitable.

§ 193.—*The Theoretical Compromise of Modern Times*

Not till the Reformation, probably under the influence of Luther, did men begin to justify war theoretically also, from the Christian point of view. To most people, however, war still did not seem exactly a Christian institution, despite its being systematically decked out with Christian symbols. Thus army chaplains* (or their equivalent) were appointed, flags and cannon were consecrated by priests, and battle-ships were baptized. Hume, indeed, still maintains¹ that between a soldier and a priest there is an eternal and unvarying contradiction. For the time being, indeed, the conception of Christianity had merely been "enlarged," somewhat after the manner of the great and unprejudiced King of Prussia² who remarked that he considered whoever helped him as a Christian, and whoever meant to injure him as merely a heathen.

¹ Hume's "Essay on National Characters." Philosophical Works, Edinburgh, 1826. Vol. III, p. 225.

² "Über die Bösheit der Menschen" ("On Human Wickedness"). By Frederick II, written November 11, 1761.

But this "enlargement" of the conception of Christianity had not yet led to its abolition. For instance, Charles Kingsley in his defense of the Crimean War as a "just war against tyrants and oppressors," wrote that Our Lord Jesus Christ is not only the prince of peace, but also the prince of war and the lord of armies. Whoever fights in a just war against tyranny and oppression, he added, is fighting for Christ, and Christ, as captain and colonel, is fighting for him; for so it is written in the Bible. But though he found many to agree with him, Tom Hughes, for instance, yet on the whole people disagreed profoundly with him. In excuse for Kingsley it may be argued that these words were written during war, that is, while the hypnotic effects of war were being felt.

But the wheel of time revolved rapidly, and scarcely half a century after the Crimean War the main conception of Christianity, after vainly endeavoring for two thousand years to get possession of the world, had so utterly disappeared, and the illogical absurdity of "Christian warfare" had so thoroughly taken possession of mankind body and soul, that now nothing any longer surprises us. Here and there a Christian theologian still attempts to combat this new Christianity, as was notably the case with Herr Rade of Marburg, whose proud saying about Belgium, "I openly defy any one to approve of what we have done there," will never be forgotten any more than will be his phrase, "the bankruptcy of Christianity." But it is the Gottfried Traubs and Immanuel Heyns who preponderate, in proof of which I will adduce only two facts. Professor Baumgarten,¹ the theologian of Kiel, does, it is true, note the contradiction between the martial ethics of the German nation and the Sermon on the Mount, but tells us that "at the present time we ought to pay more attention again to Old Testament texts," and smilingly and consciously throws Christianity overboard. Secondly, the

¹ Baumgarten's "Twenty-ninth German Address for Serious Times." See the "Berliner Tageblatt" of May 13, 1915.

German pastor and theologian Artur Brausewetter¹ writes that "we never knew what the Holy Ghost was till this year of war, 1914."

But in Prussia probably they could not do otherwise than write thus. Did not the President of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies² a short time before call the House to order and upbraid those who described war as an outrage on Christianity? And long before this did not a mighty man of to-day venture to say, without any one protesting, that *only a good Christian could be a good soldier*, even as a great German philosopher recently stated in a lecture on the war that *only a good Kantian could be a good soldier*? And yet when Christ was born choirs of angels sang "peace on earth." And yet Kant wrote his wondrous plea for "perpetual peace."³

3.—THE WATERING DOWN OF KANT AND BUDDHA

§ 194.—*The Misuse of Kant*

The way Kant has been misused is even more repellent to-day than the way religion has been misused. It is, however, typical of the whole miserable business of the compromise between religion and war, and therefore I cannot but refer briefly to it. Some of those who thus misinterpret Kant must be presumed to have read his writings. They know, therefore, that in his preliminary articles Kant would forbid the following:

1.—Peace treaties which contain the seeds of future wars.

¹ "Pfingstbetrachtung" ("Whitsuntide Reflections") by Pastor Artur Brausewetter. Published in the "Weserzeitung" No. 24, 649, of May 23, 1915.

² Herr von Erffa in the seventh year of grace, 1912.

³ This same German philosopher, Herrmann Cohen, in a volume written in collaboration with Houston Stewart Chamberlain, wrote what was obviously intended to be a work in support of the ideas of his great master. But while Kant hoped and longed for "perpetual peace," his disciple has already had enough and more than enough of it, and turns his back on it accordingly.

2.—Annexations (even in the form of voluntary cession of territory).

3.—Standing armies.

4.—Loans for purposes of armaments.

5.—Interventions (interference in the concerns of foreign states).

What Kant would like to see established are the following:

1.—The republican form of government in all countries.¹

2.—A federation of free states only.

3.—Citizenship of the world (in the form of universal hospitality).

They know, therefore, that in the war which the Kingdom of Prussia fought against the Republic of France, Kant had the courage openly and unreservedly to champion the enemy's institutions. Further, they know that we in Germany to-day have not yet attained one of Kant's eight objects; and yet they appeal to Kant more than to any one else.

It might be possible to connect the moral regeneration of Prussia, which culminated in the Wars of Liberation, with Kant. Indeed, even he, old man as he was, might have shouldered a rifle to fight for what the people then achieved and above all for what the best men of that day hoped to achieve, unless he had been wiser than the 1813 idealists and had known from the first that an ideal can never be attained by force of arms. But apart from this, does any one really believe that the ideas of a man who formulated the above eight demands can be consistently quoted by the Germans as their main justification for the War of 1914?

But they say that Kant knew nothing about war. As if any one needed to understand anything about the methods of a Rinaldo Rinaldini in order to condemn robbery as immoral!

¹ The contemporary German philosopher Max Scheler, on page 23 of his book on the war, says that in the nineteenth century "Republics waged far more wars than monarchies"; but it is hard to know exactly what he means by this, for the great military powers of Europe to-day are, with the sole exception of France, monarchies, and France did not become a republic again till 1870.

In order to understand this kind of controversy, we must reflect that modern critics of Kant are people over whom a complete change came the moment the cannon's roar was heard, and who obviously think everybody else can veer round about with the same facility. Thus they think that the Kantian *Hamlet* is mad only about peace when the wind is north-northwest, but whenever it shifts to the south, he can distinguish a legitimate war from an illegitimate. These Rosencrantz-and-Guildenstern-like military philosophers think that they can entice any tune they happen to need out of the Königsberg flute, and quite seriously imagine that they can exploit the conception of duty of the "half-cracked apostle of peace" in order to inveigle him into the service of the army. The Prussian army, they say, in short, is Kantian because it is the living incarnation of Kant's sense of duty.

Now, however high a value we may set on an army's sense of duty in the literal meaning of the term, this merely means that we respect the individual soldiers as human beings. But for us all that can matter, for us Kantians all that ought to matter, is whether the army as a whole is doing its duty in Kant's sense, not in letter, but in spirit. That is whether, in the sense of Kant's philosophy, fitting up human beings for the purpose of war is an object worth striving for. Kant himself has supplied a sufficiently clear answer to his question not merely in his peace manifesto, which was not the outcome of any mere passing fancy, but in the logical inference from his whole moral teaching. Is it not at once obvious that of all conceivable moral maxims none could be so unsuited to war as the injunction, "act so that thy action might become a universal maxim"? For if I shoot an enemy, I cannot do so, according to Kant, unless I also desire him to shoot me.

Kant's philosophy is absolutely irreconcilable with war. True, Kant himself once¹ called war sublime, in a passage which is quoted by Scheler and which, especially in a popu-

¹ "Kritik der Urteilskraft" ("Critique of Pure Reason") § 28.

lar book, might easily mislead people into thinking that Kant approved of war, unless it be added that what Kant calls sublime is the subject of *negative* pleasure, a fact of which probably only a very few who read Scheler have any notion. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that his particular sentence is given as an instance in a discussion of the sublime in nature. Not till five years later, when the French Revolution had taught him that nations could be free, and are therefore responsible as nations for their actions, did Kant write his "Perpetual Peace" manifesto, in which he dealt with war as a moral problem. But then, in 1790, war still appeared to him in the light of a fate from which there is no escape—a fate caused by princes with their subjects, and with which the people were bound to put up as with some natural event. War thus seemed to him a part of nature.

Now, according to Kant, nature can absolutely never be sublime. If we *call* it sublime, this merely means, according to Kant, that we human beings are aroused to sublime thoughts by the very contrast between us and nature, what he calls negative pleasure. If we perceive the unconsciously terrible aspects of nature and yet feel that as moral beings we are superior to any such compulsion, then we apply the word sublime to what is evoked in us by this feeling. "Something otherwise without form or purpose," which "merely strikes terror into the ordinary human being," is sublime to the philosopher, if he is, which Kant insists on as important, himself in safety and therefore does not "look upon such an occurrence as anything before which man need quail."

Now we can understand why Kant calls war sublime. For that matter, indeed, all he actually says is that "even war has something sublime about it"; and he really looks upon it as an unconsciously terrible event, which he did not then think it possible to avert, but which he even then admits had no power over him. There is nothing here incon-

sistent with perpetual peace; it is merely the preliminary groping after it. It is already liberation from war, though not yet its conquest.

But it is *Kant or war*. There is no possibility of reconciling both, although in itself this need not abate any one's enthusiasm for war, for, after all, Kant is not the Alpha and Omega of all wisdom. But the Kantians ought to have more fidelity to Kant, and above all to be truer to their own selves. Any one, indeed, who, faced by such facts, does not lose faith in the supremacy of human reason must needs be very sanguine.

§ 195.—*The Compromise of Buddhism*

I have already referred to the virtual identity of Buddhism as regards its main doctrine of human brotherhood with Christianity. Buddha also speaks in simple language of the brotherhood of men, of the sacredness of life, and of love and pity. His doctrine is neither harder nor easier to understand than that of Christ, but it seems to have met with a somewhat better fate. When Christ was about to die, Peter seized his sword; and when Buddha died and was cremated, there immediately appeared, according to the *Acvagoshas*,¹ the princes of seven countries, with mighty armies, in front of Kucinagara, to take possession of his ashes. But when the Brahman Drona tells them that "every believer committing a hostile act is sinning against the principle of his faith," they come to an understanding; and in general the Buddhists really have lived much more at peace than their brethren in Christ.

After Schopenhauer's glorification of Buddhism, quite excusable in view of the state of knowledge of his day, Buddha's tolerance and love of peace were certainly for a considerable time greatly exaggerated. As long ago as the seventeenth century the Buddhist priests of Japan had entered into a close alliance with the major-domo's office under

¹ *Acvagoshas*; "Buddha's Life and Deeds."

the Tokugawa to destroy non-Buddhists; and to-day, when the Mongols are aroused from their supposed slumber, even the East has begun not merely to tolerate murder, but, what is even worse, hypocritically to justify it.

When Japan had fought out her great war with Russia, a few faithful Buddhists may perhaps have protested, but Soyen Shaku,¹ one of the highest Buddhist dignitaries in Japan, wrote as follows in justification of the war: "Buddha once said 'the world in its triple form belongs to me; all things in it are my children, and all are the image of my Ego, for all come from one origin, and are thus parts of my body. Hence I cannot rest so long as the smallest particle of everything existing has not fulfilled its destination.'"

And on this last sentence, imbued through and through with anxious, pitying and world-embracing love, this modern disciple of Buddha has contrived to base his martial enthusiasm. He argues as follows: Buddha himself says that everything which exists has not yet fulfilled its destiny. Therefore the world is not as it ought to be. Many a human being, even now, is ruined and cheated, and becomes wicked through *ignorance*. Against this ignorance we Buddhists must wage war. All which is comprehensible, and certainly what Buddha meant; but, according to Soyen Shaku, Buddha's disciples ought to rid the world of ignorance not by instructing it, but by cannons, and ought in fact to wage a merciless war to the knife. "They shall exterminate the roots whence all misfortune arises."

Not that Soyen Shaku is to be reproached for defending war, but what is repellent is the hypocrisy with which he twists the meaning of the teachings of his god.

Heine said only that the priest and the rabbi both stink alike. To-day we may confidently include the bonze as well, for all have bowed the knee to Baal, that great Moloch who swallows up hecatombs of human bodies.

¹ "Buddhist Views of War," by Soyen Shaku in the "Open Court" for May, 1904.

It would not matter about the words of such men as Christ, Buddha, and Kant having been wrenched from their true meaning, for there have always been weak characters; but what does matter is that no one blushes scarlet or is even wrathful about it. It almost seems as if mankind had long been content not to be able to make theories agree with practice. Quite apart from whether war is good or bad, it is accepted as a necessary fact, which may indeed be discussed, but which no one feels morally strong enough to get rid of or even to alter. It is as if war was not the work of man, which could be influenced by educating men, but a product of nature, against which there is no rising up.

There are still men who feel in what a painful dilemma their illogical train of thought has landed them, but even they are now hardly waiting for some Alexander to cut this Gordian knot of contradictions for them. They and their reason have both long surrendered to supposed facts.

3.—THE NEW RELIGION

§ 196.—*The Meaning of Every Religion*

It cannot be that any religion aims at causing men to believe in the unreality of an abstract or even concrete conception of God or at supporting the power of some church or other. If there is any justification at all for religion, this can be only to procure for man what is ethically valuable; that is, in plain language, to increase man's respect for the dignity of his fellow-man and tend to promote brotherliness.

Now, this is just where all religions have failed, and their failure is attested by, among other things, the fact that, as I have shown, they have all come to deny brotherliness; in other words, to sanction war.

For this failure of religions there is a natural cause. The word religion is derived from *religere* to bind, and all religion is rooted in tradition, and binds man to something old

and sacred which has been handed down to him; that is, to the past. Religion, therefore, is of necessity unable to adapt itself to new conditions, and despite all that may be hoped from the future, it is in its very nature retrospective. We may found new religions and protest against existing religions, but to the very name of religion there clings a trace of the curse of constraint. The utmost any one has ever succeeded in doing is to pour new wine into old wineskins, to adapt new doctrine to an old form. But it is often said, and not without reason, that this in itself would not matter so much, for new wine improves in flavor and quality by being put into old wineskins, if mankind in general only did not continue to cling to outside matters, and always attach too much importance to them in comparison with what is within. Every religion therefore must dwindle down into dogmatism, and in course of time obstruct further progress. Without being in some way or other bound, however, no one can act morally. True, a man can freely impose restrictions on himself, but he must believe in some sort of law or being which is higher than himself, and which guides him.

Yet no one should endeavor to believe in anything if he knows that it has no real existence. Thus any one who does not know that the good God has no real existence may derive his morality from Him, nay, can and ought to do so. But any one who does know that God does not exist, and yet forges for himself some fanciful notion of force which he defines as God is acting foolishly; and in this sense the most innocent idolator is far more reasonable than many deeply learned philosophers.

Let there be no confusion about this. That undefinable aspiration which tells all good human beings that there is something higher than their own petty selves, that there is a starry firmament and a moral law, is the highest sentiment which man can feel; and if only he does feel it, this is quite enough. But it is folly—may I be pardoned for so apparently harsh a word?—to attempt to consolidate this unde-

finable aspiration into something of which we know has no existence.

Now, let us inquire what such a basis of morality must be like, absolute and yet mutable, above humanity and yet human, ideal and yet real. This is antinomistic philosophy, and yet some such thing there is which fulfils all these requirements:

That thing is humanity.

§ 197.—*The Religion of Humanity*

If it were desired to found a religion which is, so to speak, unchangeable in its eternal youth and yet capable of modification, so as to meet the needs of mankind, then it must be based on something unchangeable and yet capable of change. We know, and we need not here repeat, that there is perhaps nothing really absolute in itself, but it is a commonplace to say that for us men man himself is something absolute. Our organization, with all its different ways of comprehending the outer world,—man, that is, together with his surroundings,¹ is for us an actual tangible fact, a fact which, it is true, progresses, which in the course of centuries has altered, and in the course of countless thousands of years will alter again, but which at any particular moment represents for us something absolute.

Humanity, therefore, is sufficiently absolute and mutable for our purposes. Moreover, it also rises above man and is yet human.

Humanity has evolved and is evolving still further, in a course and direction which may be chance, but which has been fixed once for all. We were animals, and we became human beings, and the human being of to-morrow is something different from the human being of to-day, albeit the one may be potentially contained in the other.

Thus the superman is nothing new, but merely something

¹ Cf. "Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere" ("The Surrounding and Ideas of Animals"), by J. von Uexküll: Berlin, 1909.

different. It is idle to speculate whether this evolution is good. It is a *fact*, and therefore to oppose it is folly and, it might even be said, criminal. Animals and man, and in the future the superman, are all one, only united together by time. Consequently even the superman is and remains something purely human, even if he is above man.

Similarly man and superman are one, if the superman is considered as uniting in himself all actually living human beings, as the totality of mankind, in short. Thus we have unity in space. Hence the conception of the superman in time and space transcends the individual human being, and yet remains a human being. Finally, however, the conception of humanity is both real and ideal at the same time.

An attempt has been made to prove that humanity is objectively a reality; but for us it is an idea, for as we are only a part of it both as regards time and space, we do not possess the necessary organs to enable us fully to comprehend it. For us it remains the idea of a perfecting process which, taken as a whole, effects on a large scale "what the best human being does or would fain do on a small scale." "We are uplifted by the wave, sucked under by it, and sink"; but without the conception of the "eternal stream"—the onward-flowing stream of humanity—it is inconceivable that this should be so.

Thus humanity fulfils all the conditions for the basis of a lasting religion. This, after all, need hardly be said, and every great thinker of the past who has yearned for a religion has found it within himself. Modern science has also shown that even the most primitive peoples did likewise, for in the likeness of man did men make their gods. But men gave a more or less absolute life to these creations in the image of God, or, in the case of higher human beings, divine conceptions. This life thus became independent of what takes place in ourselves and thus the danger inevitably arose and constantly recurred of these divine images becoming

stark corpses no longer capable of taking part in the life of men.

§ 198.—*Uniformity of Moral Law*

Whoever would fain have a real religion must base it in the reality of man and not on visionary ideals. The natural result of this ever-changing human reality, which in course of time becomes ever more and more perfect, is that the future will seem to us an ever higher reality, in which we can believe, on which we may legitimately set our affections, and to which we must pin our hopes. The three cardinal virtues of Christianity are in truth the main supports of every true religion; but we must not believe in anything unreal, nor set our affections on anything past, or our hopes on any mere visions.

It may be asked, Do such views deserve to be called a religion?

They do and they do not. In actual truth they do, for they mean nothing more or less than that we feel ourselves inseparably bound up with that with which we are, after all, inseparably bound up; that is, with our bodies and their sensations. But, after all, this is so obvious, or at any rate ought to be so obvious, as to need no special name.

In Chapter XIII an attempt was made to inquire how it is that, from the fact of our being quite certainly organized human beings, certain necessities have arisen which we can define as moral requirements. But these moral requirements are merely based on the fact that we are, after all, human beings, and all the deductions which we can make from this fact we are accustomed to sum up under the name of humanity.

To be humane, however, simply means that we have comprehended the history of the evolution of mankind; that we know whence we come; that we have an inkling of whither we are going; and that we are accordingly trying to conform to the general scheme of nature, which for us means the

progress of human evolution. We believe in this progress of evolution; we love mankind, and we hope for further progress; in other words, for that superman who is daily and hourly slowly coming into being. This recognition of self-evident facts embraces every moral law. Were we to express the ten commandments in accordance therewith, they would read somewhat as follows:—

1.—There is no morality without *belief in the superhuman*.

2.—Thou shalt not try to believe in anything of which thou knowest that it has no real existence. As nothing superhuman really exists except the community of mankind, let thy morality be based on this.

3.—Inwardly to realize that mankind as a whole is a reality means feeling thyself bound up with this world, means having religion, and means loving thy neighbor.

LOVE AND HONOR

4.—The forms and symbols of the community of mankind—thy family and thy country.

5.—Human life and the life of mankind.

6.—Good traditions, instincts which still serve a purpose.

7.—Labor.

8.—Truth.

9 and 10.—Oppose evil traditions, instincts which no longer serve a purpose.

How we formulate our morality, however, is no matter; all that matters is that we should bethink ourselves of ourselves and understand that man is an individual unit and at the same time a part of a superordinate organism. Whosoever knows this, and realizes it not merely as a truth which can be acquired, but as a living law in him and a feeling, is a human being indeed and in truth. But whosoever does not realize this is no true human being, no matter how much he may outwardly resemble one, or, as Kant puts it, how civilized he may be; for he lacks that essential thing which dif-

ferentiates man from all other living beings—the feeling of belonging to the *genus humanum*.

Scio et sento genus humanum esse simplex et unum,
Scio et volo me esse hominem,
Scio et spero nunquam oblivisci.

Whoever is a human being at all is also a moral human being. In face of this truth no isolated occurrences have any importance save as phenomena, and so it is with war. If humanity wins, the death-knell of war will have sounded, but only then; for man cannot and will not break his sword in sunder so long as he does not know that a sword has neither part nor lot in the conception of mankind, but is merely a tool to be laid aside like any other.

THE END

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